Abstract
We study obnoxious facility location games with facility candidate locations. For obnoxious single facility location games under social utility objective, we present a group strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio of 3. Then we prove the ratio is tight by giving a corresponding lower bound instance. This is also proved to be the best possible mechanism. For obnoxious two-facility location games with facility candidate locations, we study the heterogeneous facility case in this paper. We design a group strategy-proof mechanism and prove that the approximation ratio is 2. We also prove that the problem lower bound is \(\frac{3}{2}\).
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Gai, L., Liang, M., Wang, C. (2022). Obnoxious Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations. In: Ni, Q., Wu, W. (eds) Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management. AAIM 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13513. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16081-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16081-3_9
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