Coastal Forest Re-Grabbing: A Case from Langkat, North Sumatra, Indonesia

Abstract

Grabbing in its various forms, such as land and maritime grabbing, has been a global concern. This is not only because it happened in many places but also the negative impacts on local people and the environment were often severe. Studies found that millions of local people were excluded from their access to resources they depended upon for decades or even generations. In some places, environmental impact occurred beyond the ability of the ecosystem to recover. This paper will also deal with the above issues. Nonetheless, while most studies focus on grabbing and their socio-environmental impacts, this paper will demonstrate the process of “re-grabbing.” This is how local community supported by NGOs and other agencies took back the control over the coastal mangrove forest taken and converted by a private company for palm oil plantation. This paper will explain the process and strategies employed by coastal communities in Langkat, North Sumatra, in resisting the palm oil plantation’s presence that has impacted their fishing and coastal livelihoods seriously. Interestingly, one of the strategies was “destroy and rehabilitate.” This is the destruction of coastal dikes and palm oil trees and the reestablishment of the mangrove forest. This strategy bears two results. The first is the recovery of the ecosystem, which supports the redevelopment of coastal livelihoods, the old and new. Second is the acknowledgment from the government on the fact that communities have rehabilitated the coastal mangrove well. This, in turn, has stimulated government to grand the communities the Hak Perhutanan Sosial (Social Forestry Right) to manage the designated forest. In conclusion, this paper will argue despite the fact that in most cases grabbing left the community and environment as the lost parties, with certain strategies the reality can be turned back for the favor of the communities and the environment.

1 Introduction

Land grabbing in various regions of the world targets forest areas and agricultural lands. Furthermore, it is considered a solution to the global food and financial crisis (GRAIN, 2008; Dell’Angelo et al., 2018). Multinational corporations, countries, and international financial institutions collaborate to increase efforts aimed to capitalize and privatize land management for both food and energy needs, as well as global financial strengthening.

GRAIN recorded 416 lands grabbing cases by foreign investors in 66 countries, which were carried out to enable the production of food. Furthermore, the land obtained amounted to 35 million hectares. Ecoruralis, an NGO based in Romania, provides a critical note that is not only limited to this problem but also talks about the grabbing of forest areas by extractive wood processing industries, mining companies, privatization of water sources, and expansion of palm oil plantations (Baker-Smith & Attila, 2016). This then minimizes the opportunities and access of the community to natural resources by changing the communal management of these resources (public goods) into commercial commodities (private goods).

Capitalization causes conflictual relations between state and corporations, which lead to the emergence of an elite minority group that manages the natural resources in the community (Baker-Smith & Attila, 2016, p. 5). In Indonesia, land grabbing is part of an agrarian conflict and has been going on for many years. The collaboration of state, corporations, and traditional elites since the colonial era has resulted in encroachment on agricultural land and introduction of commercial agriculture (Breman, 1986; Zanden & Marks, 2012) due to the expansion of palm oil plantations in the New Order authoritarian era (AGRA, 2010; KPA, 2018). Furthermore, it is believed that this is the right way to increase the economic value of the society, as well as absorb labor (Colchestester et al., 2006; Tadjoeddin, 2007).

Until 2008, the estimated land occupied by palm oil plantations was 14.33 million hectares, most of which (7.8 million hectares) were controlled by corporate groups (Directorate General of Plantations, 2018, p. 4). Furthermore, these groups were considered destructive because they accelerated the deforestation rate, marginalized communities, eliminated livelihood sources (Tadjoeddin, 2007; Aditjondro, 2011; Syafi’i, 2016), and caused many agrarian conflicts (KPA, 2018). The 2018 Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) report stated that 83 cases or about 60% of conflicts occur due to the expansion of palm oil plantation land permits that violate community rights to their land (KPA, 2018).

Land grabbing cases due to this expansion also occurred in Lubuk Kertang Village. It was carried out by encroaching on mangrove forests and has been going on for many years, even since the colonial era. In the early days, it was caused by the existence of oil and gas exploration activities, charcoal industry, and intensive shrimp farming, as well as the presence of palm oil plantation industries. This caused the elimination of livelihood sources, as well as led to conflicts involving subsistence small fishing communities and large corporations.

Due to the fact that the fishing community suffered from the conversion activities, they fought back in other to grab back the source of their livelihood. In the early days, the resistance movement was carried out sporadically, was disorganized, and only led to the replanting of mangrove trees in areas that had not been cultivated by the company. Furthermore, it was initiated by village community leaders and began to get the attention of younger groups, even though it was not sufficiently able to stop the rate of forest destruction and restore lost sources of livelihoods. In the last 10 years or so, this movement gets stronger, as the youth groups are now connected with several NGO networks, and are able to mobilize the strength of the fishing community; therefore, they can regain “grab-back” access to the forest area. In this context, this chapter will explain how the “grab-back” process is carried out. In-depth interviews, observations, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with actors were carried out to understand the processes and roles in consolidating resistance, which ultimately succeeded in not only regaining access to mangrove forests but also being recognized by the state through social forestry schemes. Furthermore, this research also determines the extent to which this access gives them the opportunity to rehabilitate, conserve, and restore the livelihoods of fishing communities.

2 General Social–Political Context

In Indonesia, land grabbing has been going on since the colonial era, especially after the Agrarische Wet (AW) publication in 1870. Agrarische Wet then became the basis for economic liberalization policies that opened opportunities for corporations to increase the productivity of export crops (commercial agriculture). Furthermore, it has resulted in the rapid conversion of land for plantations, especially in Java and Sumatra.

The land grabbing process continued until post-independence, especially in the New Order era (1967–1998). During this period, land change, which was later indicated as land grabbing, was carried out through methods such as Green Revolution scheme, Business Use Rights (HGU), Forest Planning Rights (HPH), Industrial Plantation Forests (HTI), national park area determination, land tenure mining through the contract of work mining concessions, as well as concentration of land control for infrastructure development, including that of the military, and settlements (property) (Alliance for Agrarian Reform Movement, 2010). This land grabbing activity began around the 1970s and greatly increased later on due to that massive land changes could not be separated from the transmigration program, which became the world’s attention in the 1980s (Pagiola, 2000). Furthermore, transmigration involves the relocation of residents, especially from the Java and Bali islands to other areas such as Sumatra and Kalimantan, and it has an impact on forest clearing for agriculture and plantation businesses. The success of this program then prompted many other spontaneous transmigrants to move along.

Pagiola (2000) explained that in the 1980s, the government began to implement a diversification policy for commodities other than oil and gas by increasing expansion in plantation crops. This is made possible by the existence of a centralized state policy that regulates forest area management through the Industrial Tree Crop Estate (HTI). HTI initially used degraded land, but in practice many companies holding concessions carried out encroachment on forest areas. For the government, forest conversion for palm oil plantations is considered an alternative way to increase the economic value of the community because of its ability to absorb a lot of labor (Colchestester et al., 2006; Tadjoeddin, 2007).

In line with the changes in centralized government characteristics, Law No. 22 of 1999 as amended by Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning regional governance allows forest areas to be managed region by region. This aims to provide wider opportunities for regions to organize themselves based on the principles of equality, justice, and diversity in order to realize regional welfare. However, the decentralization practice as a manifestation of democratization and globalization has actually created contestation between elites at the national and local levels in fighting over access to natural resource management (Hadiz, 2010).

Land concession permits are increasingly issued by local governments and tend to be uncontrolled, therefore resulting in an increasing rate of deforestation. The Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) report stated that investment licensing in the natural resources sector is most often issued before the local electoral event. Furthermore, it stated that the gratification practice by regional heads to fulfill high political costs ahead of local elections is directly proportional to the number of regional heads that have been caught in a sting operation (OTT) by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) (Kompas, 2017).

Decentralized practices in Indonesia ultimately tend to be directly proportional to the increase in deforestation rate. This is due to the fact that many regional heads opt for fast ways to benefit from forest utilization, including through mining, plantation, energy, and infrastructure permits. The aspect of sustainability, which is part of the aims of decentralization, has been ignored; therefore, it not only causes ecological disasters but also increases social conflicts. This extreme situation then forced the government to restructure decentralization practices through a law on new local governments (Law No. 23 of 2014).

In Law No. 23/2014, the governor as a representative of the central government becomes a central point of forestry affairs where the district/city government no longer has authority except for the management of the Grand Forest Park (Tahura). Considering that forestry management in this law has moved to the province, several authorities related to proposals and technical considerations also fall under the province authority. After the implementation of this law, all forest management functions at the site level came under FMU management, starting from planning and implementing activities for utilization, rehabilitation, forest protection, and conservation. FMUs also carry out a service function to the community for utilization of forest resources (Putro & Nawir, 2018), including being responsible for resolving problems, such as conflicts and third-party rights claims (Steni, 2016). In this context, the absence of authority possessed by the district/city government makes them tend to be apathetic and unwilling to be responsible for issues on natural resource management in their area (Putro & Nawir, 2018).

During the decentralization period, collaboration between the State, corporations, and international financial institutions allowed for the massive expansion of palm oil plantation concessions. This situation places Indonesia as one of the countries with the largest palm oil plantation area, reaching 14.33 million hectares (Indonesian Plantation Statistics, 2018). However, this expansion not only increases deforestation rates but also marginalizes community groups, eliminates livelihoods, and creates potential conflicts (Tadjoeddin, 2007). The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) report stated that in 2018, there were 410 cases of agrarian conflicts in various provinces in Indonesia, with the most (35%) occurring in the plantation industry. Furthermore, of all the plantation-related conflict cases, as many as 60% occurred as a result of the expansion of this plantation’s land permits, which violated the community’s rights to their land (The Consortium for Agrarian Reform, 2018).

In North Sumatra, the expansion of the palm oil plantation industry has resulted in forest destruction and scarcity of local foodstuffs and threatens the existence of protected animals (Aditjondro, 2011). The coastal forest areas of the Lubuk Kertang Village, West Brandan District, which is located in the Langkat Regency, North Sumatra, is one of the areas where mangrove forests have been converted into palm oil plantations. This conversion, including the utilization of forest lands for the development of shrimp ponds in the 1980s, has been going on for many years, according to various historical records. The results of the research conducted by Basyuni et al. (2018) show that during the 1990–2006 period, 51.5 ha of mangrove forest lands were converted into shrimp ponds. However, over time, the ponds managed by communities did not yield much profits; therefore, they went bankrupt. Also, those owned by individuals were sold off illegally to palm oil plantation companies because the business lands were state forest areas.

The expansion of the mangrove charcoal company by PT Sari Bumi Bakau, which began in 1999, has further increased the rate of destruction of mangrove area. Although in 2006 the company was closed by the Ministry of Forestry, Indonesia, it sold off its mangrove forest concession to an palm oil plantation company. This company then expanded into the register 8/L area, which is a protected area that has been established since the Dutch colonial era. Therefore, its activities greatly disrupt the villagers and their surroundings, whose source of livelihood is fishery.

Lubuk Kertang is not a homogeneous village because it has a lot of potential that has not been utilized optimally, including rainfed rice fields and mangrove areas besides palm oil plantations that have recently emerged (Lubuk Kertang Village Profile, 2018). This mangrove has great potential as fishermen in this village depend on it for their economic resources directly or indirectly (Sari, 2012). Its direct benefits are that it serves as a nursery, feeding, and spawning ground for various types of fish, shrimp, and other marine biotas, as well as being a supplier of fish larvae, shrimp, and a site for tourism. At the same time, its indirect benefits are that it serves as a storm and wave breaker, offers protection against abrasion, and is a mud retardant, a natural filter for organic waste, and a sediment trap (Arief, 2003). The presence of palm oil plantations in areas that were initially part of this forest has marginalized community livelihoods, as villagers use the tributaries (paluh) that flow in it as a source of wealth. Paluh is a breeding ground for marine life, such as various types of fish, shrimp, and mangrove crabs, which have high economic value, and fishing in it is an activity that has been carried out by the coastal community of this village for many generations.

Land grabbing involved logging of mangrove forests to be replaced by palm oil plantation. In order to maintain the survival and extent of palm oil plantations, companies seal creeks (paluh) by making embankments to block seawater flow to the plantation area. These embankments are usually of heights ranging from 2 to 4 m, with widths of about 4–6 m. The problem is that this closure causes the creation of seawater puddles when the tide rises. Previously, the occurrence of rising tides only entered the paluh and inundated the mangrove swamp, while bringing various marine biota, which then reproduced. The overflowing water that was held back by the embankment flowed to a lower landscape, hence inundating residential areas and the rice fields. In 2009, the impact of this event was felt greatly by communities, especially the Lubuk Kertang village, as there was serious flooding due to the massive expansion of palm oil plantations (Ompusunggu, 2018). This land grabbing phenomenon changes the community’s economic structure, as most of the villagers depend on fishing businesses. Logging of mangrove forests and closing of paluh by creating embankments have changed the coastal ecosystem, as well as caused loss of livelihood for fishermen. Furthermore, agricultural areas around Paluh often experience crop failures when high tides occur.

Mangrove forests that previously protected agricultural areas have disappeared, causing intrusion and standing of seawater that has damaged rice plants. This has led to the scarcity of economic resources and, consequently, the emergence of social problems such as the development of client–patron relationships. Due to poor economic conditions, small fishermen are often indebted to the business owners, and this has led to the creation of asymmetrical relationships. According to Kusnadi (2000), this relationship can easily turn into a means of dominance and exploitation. Another option is that when fishing or farming does not provide the necessary funds for day-to-day activities, some villagers choose to become workers in palm oil plantations, which is relatively new to them, while some others choose to migrate to cities, where they carry out odd jobs, as unskilled labor, since they lack crucial skills.

3 The Development of Palm Oil Plantation and the Socio-ecological Impacts: The Grabbing

The mangrove forest conversion in Lubuk Kertang Village has been going on for a long time, even since the pre-independence era. Furthermore, the exploration of oil and natural gas carried out by the colonial government is an early marker of this conversion activity. Until today, the state oil and gas company, Pertamina, controls the area. In more recent times, land conversion in this area, which led to land grabbing activities, began in 1986 with the creation of shrimp ponds (Saragih, 2018). However, these ponds did not yield much profit; therefore, their production went on a steep decline, and this caused many farmers to sell off their ponds to palm oil plantation companies.

Almost simultaneously with the shrimp pond expansion, mangrove areas were also converted for charcoal-making industrial activities. The company that has obtained the concession permit is Sari Bumi Bakau Ltd. (PT. SBB), and through the decree from the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, which is now the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, with Number 934/kpts-II/1999, this company obtained a Business License for the Utilization of Timber Forest Products in Plantation Forests (IUPHHK-HT), formerly known as forest concessions (HPH). Furthermore, on October 14, 1999, it obtained a mangrove forest concession covering an area of 20,100 ha, out of which 155.2 ha were in Lubuk Kertang Village (Saragih, 2018). The expansion of this company then caused mangrove forests deforestation in Langkat Regency to become more widespread, and it has even occupied an area that was initially an animal reserve (Sonjaya, 2007). This was carried out because the raw material for making charcoal from mangrove logs in their concession area had run out; therefore, the area needed to be expanded.

In Lubuk Kertang Village, the company that “bought” the concession was KUD Harapan Sawita, occupying a land area of approximately 850 ha. Furthermore, another company, by the name, Pelita Nusantara Sejahtera Ltd. (PNS), also received a concession area of 42 ha. Both companies obtained land from a sale made by KUD Mina Murni (Saragih, 2018). In the past, the land was not obtained through this means. It was got when citizen identities (KTP) were obtained and used to claim the 2 ha of land due to each of them. In addition, any citizen who was able to claim back the land was compensated with 2–3 million rupiah. This is supported by Onirizal (2015) who states that the company’s main mode is to take advantage of community claims toward inherited land, which is then sold to them regardless of the area being considered a protected forest. Meanwhile, the practice of collecting KTP is carried out by KUD Mina Murni in order to give the impression that the village head and residents are legalizing the sale of the land, which in fact belongs to the state.

The success of this practice then perpetuates the palm oil company from completely converting mangroves into plantation areas. This was followed by a dam-building activity by the company to prevent seawater from entering the acquired forests, which are now occupied by palm trees. Consequently, this practice has certainly disrupted the ecological system on the coast of the village and has caused fish and crustacean resources therein to decrease significantly. This is felt by the fishing community not only in this village but also in the surrounding villages that depend on proceeds from fishing in the mangrove area. Preceding this conversion, fishermen were able to earn up to 2–5 million rupiah monthly, but as it stands, they only earn about 500 thousand rupiah. Some of them were even forced to migrate to Aceh Province and work in the informal sectors.

Fishermen were not the only ones to suffer from this conversion, and forest honey seekers also had their fair share. According to Azhar, a community leader, before the expansion of palm oil plantations, forest honey seekers could produce about 200–300 l of honey yearly. As an additional note, the destruction of mangrove forests in Lubuk Kertang Village not only eliminated their livelihood source but also caused the flood disaster in 2009 (Ompusunggu, 2018). This flood made the community more aware that their environment had been damaged due to the mangrove forest conversion to palm oil plantations.

4 Community Resistance to Palm Oil Plantations: Coastal Re-Grabbing

The mangrove conversion has an impact to the fishermen livelihoods not only in Lubuk Kertang Village but also in other villages such as Perlis, Klantan, Lubuk Kasih, Sungai Bilah, Brandan Barat, and Pangkalan Batu. These communities live across three sub-districts, namely Brandan Barat, Sei Lepan and Babalan Subdistrict. After large-scale land conversion, fishermen’s income decreased dramatically, as well as some other livelihood sources such as forest honey seeking and farming due to seawater intrusion and tidal flooding. This triggered the migration of some of these individuals to other areas, especially in big cities in Sumatra, to become unskilled laborers or rickshaw drivers.

The coastal ecosystem damage and the loss of livelihood sources have made the communities that depend on mangrove forests to fight back. This resistance involved not only the individuals that chose to remain in the communities but also those that had migrated to the big cities. They all teamed up to be involved in the “grab-back” movement of the mangrove areas controlled by the company. In this context, the resistance carried out by fishing communities is part of postcolonial environmentalism. Cao (2015) stated that postcolonial environmentalism is a citizen’s struggle to get out of poverty that occurs in the southern region due to the transnational economy expansion from the north.

Initially, the resistance movement did not directly challenge the company. It was carried out clandestinely and individually by the cutting down of grown palm oil trees, or the entering of mangrove areas controlled by companies, in order to find old commodities, such as crab, shrimp, and fish (interview with Azhar Kasim, 2018). Scott (1976) mentioned that it was the daily resistance of a person or farmer groups, or in this case fishermen, against corporate and state hegemony that threatens their subsistence economic structure. Another form of resistance was the mangrove rehabilitation in concession areas, which had not been cultivated by the company. Abdul Jalil and Amat Ali are two community leaders that started voluntarily rehabilitating mangroves in damaged areas. This was carried out to overcome the direct impacts of conversion such as seawater intrusion, tidal flooding, sedimentation, and the loss of livelihood sources (interviews with Amat Ali and Hadian, 2018). However, these rehabilitation efforts have not been able to stop the mangrove destruction rate.

Inspired by these two figures, the community then began to gain strength by establishing groups to increase the rate of rehabilitation. The Mekar and Keluarga Bahari Mangrove Farmer Groups were established in 2005 and 2007 respectively, became the forerunners of groups that gained access to forest management through social forestry schemes. These two groups then continued to control the rehabilitation movements by involving many other stakeholders. In the end, the rehabilitation efforts carried out by the community were not optimal for restoring the mangrove forest function, at least until 2012. This is because the expansion of palm oil plantations was still ongoing; hence, its ecological impact continued to be felt by the community. This incident prompted two groups, Mekar and Lestari Mangrove, to openly fight against the company. Young figures such as Hadian (Mekar Group), Azhar Kasim, Tajjrudin, and Rohman (Lestari Mangrove Group) then began to amass mass power and networking, not only with the local government but also with several NGOs involved in advocating for this movement. This context is relevant to Ostrom (1990), as it suggests that in 8 rules managing the common, resource management will work best if it is associated with a larger network. Indeed, for several things, Ostrom stated that resources could be managed locally, but in order to achieve goals in managing common pool resources, including mangrove areas, it is important to create a network in a regional context. Eventually, what these young leaders do is a guarantee to strengthen and ensure that they are involved in managing these mangrove resources.

In the context of the resistance movement, Azhar Kasim and Tajrudin Hasibuan (Indonesian Traditional Fishermen Union/KNTI) as well as M Iqbal and Sahrul Pasaribu (North Sumatra Walhi/Indonesian Forum for the Environment) were young leaders that were driving for the reorientation of the resistance movement strategy. They already had networks with various stakeholders and succeeded in gathering the masses to carry out direct and open resistance movements against the company. Some forms of resistance that they used include logging of palm oil trees and exploiting mangrove areas controlled by companies that have been quietly abandoned. They then consolidated the fishermen’s strength, both nets, torch, ambai, and trawl fishermen that were increasingly pressed due to the mangrove land destruction to seize and restore the socio-ecological functions of the mangrove area.

The resistance leaders did not only succeed in carrying out mass mobilization, but also they succeeded in consolidating networks with several NGOs working on environmental (Walhi), coastal community (Kiara and KNTI), and related legal issues (Medan Legal Aid Institute (LBH)) later on. Through this network, from 2009 to 2010, the breakdown of clay dams made by palm oil companies, which had been used to prevent seawater from entering the plantation area, was a manifestation of the resistance to the company. This caused seawater to rise again and kill existing palm trees. These dams were located on the Register 8/L area, which was illegally created by the company. In this case, the networks that were built during the resistance against the company and after are mapped in Fig. 6.1.

Fig. 6.1

Mapping of actors is an effort to strengthen community groups in re-grabbing. (Source: Processed based on the results of a focus group discussion with the actors involved and field observations, 2018)

The company did not just sit back and watch the resistance groups destroy them. They made efforts to criminalize and intimidate the leaders of the groups. Azhar Kasim, Tajruddin, and Rajali are the figures reported by the company to the police for damages. However, this did not discourage resistance because the network that had been formed made them strong in dealing with the company. Their resistance was not only limited to mass movements in the field but also succeeded in raising other issues such as legal issues, community welfare, and the environment. The criminalization of the company against the three figures was not entirely successful. In 2012, this movement succeeded in re-grabbing a 325-ha mangrove area that was previously an palm oil plantation.

The Mekar group continues to consistently carry out environmental rehabilitation, so also do the other group. A year after being founded, they received assistance from the Forestry and Plantation Service at Langkat Regency through the National Movement for Forest and Land Rehabilitation (Gerhan/GN-RHL) program. This program succeeded in replanting in an area of 25 ha. Two years later, the same program was carried out again in the same area as in 2006. In 2010, this group independently planted on 55 ha of mangrove land. Then in 2012, together with the success of the “grab back,” they and the Sumatran Elephant Foundation (Yagasu), a local CSO, returned to planting in the same area, in the previous location. Furthermore, Yagasu helped formulate regulations on village-based mangrove forest management, construction of information huts, and the boundaries of the Mangrove Protected Area Forest (DPM). This activity was the beginning of ecotourism development in the mangrove area in this village.

The Keluarga Bahari Mangrove Farmer Group later changed to the Lestari Mangrove Group (2011), and since then, it has been building stronger networks with state institutions. This effort was actually an adaptation to suit the country’s structure. The goal was to make obtaining mangrove seeds easy, therefore increasing the ease of rehabilitating the land area (“Azhar Kasim’s Testimony,” 2017). In its development, especially after the success of the movement, this change was carried out to initiate efforts that grant access to forest management and are legalized by the state through social forestry schemes.

Initially, from a total of 325 ha, which resulted from the “grab-back” movement, in 2012, Lestari Mangrove planted in 25 ha of mangrove, with seeds obtained from BPHM (Mangrove Forest Management Office) Region II Medan. Rehabilitation then continued in another area of 15 ha with seedlings provided by the Ministry of Environment. The rehabilitation movement continues, and the areas that have been successfully planted have expanded. This is inseparable from many stakeholders that were involved during 2012–2014. Pertamina, for example, the state oil company, helped in planting in an area of 60 ha. Furthermore, another stakeholder, by the name, BPDAS Wampu Sei Ular, helped plant in an area of 183 ha. Also, Kompas-BRI and Pertamina EP did the same in 8 ha. Figure 6.2 shows changes in land conditions from planting seedlings (2012) and conditions in 2018.

Fig. 6.2

Rehabilitation of Mangrove Forest in Lubuk Kertang. (a) Land conditions before rehabilitation, (b) rehabilitation by planting mangroves in 2012, (c) planting yields in 2012 reviewed in 2014, and (d) current condition of mangrove forests (2018). (Source: http://mangrovelangkat.blogspot.com/p/perkembangan.html (Mangrove sustainable group archives, figures, a, b, and c) & author (figure d))

The success of the Mekar and Lestari Mangrove Group through young leaders in rehabilitating and reclaiming management of mangrove forest areas has an impact not only on the return of their livelihoods but also on conservation efforts to restore the ecological function of mangrove areas. The group’s consistency in rehabilitating, fighting, and utilizing mangrove forests in a sustainable manner then received recognition from the state through granting concessions for mangrove forest management in social forestry schemes. In 2014, the rehabilitation efforts carried out by the community reached 700 ha (interview with Tadjrudin, 2018). Although in records, converted areas between 1999 and 2012 amounted to 7000 ha. Based on the existing condition, there are still many palm oil plantations side by side in contrast to the mangrove forests that have begun to be successfully rehabilitated.

5 Social Forestry Program: Future Forest Management to Enhance Community Welfare

Based on the experience in Lubuk Kertang, the community needs a long and tiring struggle in order to gain access to the mangrove forest management in their area. Their resistance to taking back the forest area that has been converted is to restore not only the forest ecological function but also their lost livelihoods. The resistance movement and actions carried out by fishermen’s communities in Lubuk Kertang Village provide an understanding that the role of the community in natural resource management can be a solution not only to overcome poverty due to marginalization but also to impact environmental conservation. In line with this, the World Bank (2008) emphasizes the importance of understanding, articulating, and subsequently accommodating local wisdom and traditional institutions in forest governance. To realize this, in 2016, the government through the Ministry of Environment and Forestry launched the social forestry program. This program aims to provide space for community-based forest management to not only improve welfare but also resolve uncertainty and injustice in land tenure, which often creates conflicts.

Basically, the social forestry concept is implemented in the form of granting forest management permits to local or customary law communities in the form of five schemes such as Village Forest (HD), Community Forest (HKM), Community Plantation Forest (HTR), Community-Privately Owned Forest (HR), and Forestry Partnership. Until 2018, this program has granted management and utilization rights on an area of 1,558,453.58 and 969,215.18 ha for HKM, 99,709.87 ha for HTR, 102,000.08 ha for partnership forest, and 22,435.59 ha for a Social Forestry Utilization Permit (IPHPS), as well as an area of 27,950.34 ha for Customary Forest (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2018) (Fig. 6.3).

Fig. 6.3

The access division in social forestry schemes. (Source: Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2018)

In fact, the social forestry scheme not only places the community as the main actor in its management but also has a positive impact on the area development, from an economic, social, and environmental perspective. This can be seen in the Beringin Community Forest (HKM) in Lampung, where they were able to reduce the rate of land cover loss, improve welfare, and reduce inequality between communities. Furthermore, there is also Kalibiru Independent Farm Community Forest at Yogyakarta, which focuses on managing ecotourism. This establishment can generate more than 300 million rupiah monthly and absorb workers from three surrounding areas; therefore, income distribution can be felt in the buffer areas.

In Lubuk Kertang Village, the existing social forestry scheme includes forestry partnerships and community forestry. The inauguration of the two social forestry schemes for the two groups that have been consistently fighting for sustainable mangrove forest management, such as the Lestari Mangrove and the Mekar Groups, has real implications for the community’s socio-economy. The Sustainable Mangrove group obtained a community forestry permit based on SK.987/MenLHK-PSKL/PKPS/PSL.0/2017 in March 2017, with a land area of 410 ha. Community forest management is carried out through core activities in the form of cultivation development with a silvofishery system. Meanwhile, the Mekar Group is engaged in developing ecotourism activities through a forestry partnership scheme based on the Decree of Recognition and Protection No: SK.1671/MenLHK-PSKL/PKPS/PSL.0/4/2018.

In the social context, the granting of this permit provides space for the community to manage forest areas that dominate their village, based on their potentials. It is not only the development of ecotourism and silvofishery-based cultivation that creates sources of livelihoods, but the return of mangrove function and broad access to the community also allows for the development of livelihood sources that were lost during the conversion, such as fishermen and honey seekers. This shows that there is a change in the social structure because there are now opportunities that ultimately provide a more decent livelihood, economic improvement and other multiplier effects in the form of job creation, environmental preservation, enhancement of human resource capacity, and strengthening of group institutions. Figure 6.4 shows a map of mangrove management using a social forestry scheme.

Fig. 6.4

Map of social forestry in Lubuk Kertang Village. (Source: Stabat forest management unit (KPH) archives)

It is undeniable that there are things to be anticipated in the management of the social forestry scheme in the future. The experience in Lubuk Kertang Village, where various groups that previously carried out re-grabs and gained access to management through social forestry schemes, actually raised other problems, further supporting this claim. In this village, the existence of several social forestry schemes in one area, which is administratively located, created a new conflict between them. One of the reasons is that there is no specific institution at the village level regulating joint management between existing social forestry schemes. Although this is not regulated by a ministry, the existence of a joint regulation at the village level is important to reduce conflict between groups and at the same time strengthen communication between them in developing potential management of the area.

The re-grabbing background in Lubuk Kertang, which involved many groups, not only created the Lestari and the Mekar Groups, which currently have access through the PS, but also groups in the process of applying for social forestry schemes. Therefore, the communication forum between groups at the village level is very crucial. This condition makes relations between group actors lead to new potential conflicts. Moreover, the output produced by each group of forest managers is almost the same; hence, it tends to be ineffective and prone to disputes. This problem arises due to social jealousy, limited knowledge, and understanding of the social forestry types, as well as the weak role of village stakeholders. Therefore, various strategies are needed to overcome the problems. The strategy that can be carried out is the formation of institutions at the village level that are able to cooperate in managing and utilizing mangrove forests to improve community welfare. In the future, it is hoped that a village forest can be formed to accommodate people that have not joined the forest management group managed by a Village-Owned Enterprise (Bumdes).

Based on input from local community leaders and related stakeholders, LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) promotes the Lubuk Kertang Village Government as the regional power holder to formulate a Village Regulation that is able to “cover” mangrove management activities. Furthermore, with the involvement of this government without overstepping existing social forestry regulations, it is hoped to be able to synergize the utilization while maintaining the mangrove ecosystem preservation and promoting active participation of all community groups. In realizing an institution based on village regulations, synergy with government agencies such as the Stabat Forest Management Unit (KPH) Region I, the Langkat Regency Marine and Fisheries Service, and NGOs such as KNTI and Walhi is needed. The presence of LIPI also helps in implementing this strategy.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the process of re-grabbing or grab back of coastal mangrove forests by the local community in Lubuk Kertang, North Sumatra. In so doing, it starts with the discussion of the grabbing and its socio-environmental impacts, followed by the process of re-grabbing or grab back. In this conclusion, we would like to highlight several factors that led to the success of the re-grabbing. We believe that these factors are very important as a lesson learnt for comparative future studies as well as for understanding the barrier and enabling factors for such a movement.

First, we believe that severe socio-ecological impacts were one of the drivers that have united the majority of the communities. The serious level of hardship people experiences because of the conversion of the ecosystem from mangrove forest to palm oil plantation produced a common sentiment of being as a victim. Thus, despite the politics “divide and control” run by the company, the majority of community members were united and formed a strong resistant movement.

Second, the community resisting strategy of “destroy and rehabilitate” was another key to success. This strategy produced several benefits. The destruction of the palm oil trees, the dike, and the replanting of mangroves have rehabilitated the ecosystem, supporting the rebuilding of community livelihoods. Community’s concern for the ecosystem has attracted NGOs that share the same concerns to join the resistant movement. This has stimulated the growth of the movement beyond the community. In fact, with the help of media, it has become national news, attracting the attention of a much wider public. The last benefit is that the success of the mangrove rehabilitation has attracted government attention, which at the end granted the community the right to manage the mangrove forest.

Third, the alliance of the community with NGOs and media is also an important enabling factor for the success of the community grab-back. It was the alliance of community, NGOs, and Media that increased the leverage of the resistance movement from community-based and local to a collaborative national movement. We believe without such an alliance, the political power of the company was still beyond the community’s capacity to get rid of. We believe it was because of the alliance that the company was being able to be brought to justice.

The final point is government support. The granting of forest management rights to the community has provided certainty on tenure over the area and the resources therein. This is the seal for the community to really be able to grab back the mangrove forest.