Abstract
Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) is an attractive post-quantum cryptosystem for low-resource devices due to its simplicity. Communicating parties only require the use of AND and XOR gates to generate or verify LPN cryptogram samples exchanged between the parties. However, the LPN setup is complicated by different parameter choices including key length, noise rate, sample size, and verification window which can determine the usability and security of the implementation. To address advances in LPN cryptanalysis, recommendations for ever increasing key lengths have made LPN no longer feasible for low-resource devices. In this paper, we use a series of experiments to simulate and cryptanalyze LPN authentication under different parameter values to arrive at recommended values suitable for low-resource devices. We also examine the impact of limiting the key lifespan of the LPN secret vector as a means to balance security while keeping key lengths relatively short.
Keywords
- Learning Parity with Noise (LPN)
- Cryptanalysis
- Machine learning
- Post quantum cryptography
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- 1.
In the case of LPN, the key is also referred to as the secret vector. For this paper, we will use key and secret vector interchangeably for readability purposes.
- 2.
Including 3M, EM Microelectronic, Fujitsu, NXP and Rockwell Automation.
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Acknowledgement
This project is supported by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, under its MOE AcRF Tier 2 grant (MOE2018-T2-1-111). The computational work for this article was partially performed on resources of the National Supercomputing Centre, Singapore (https://www.nscc.sg).
The work is also supported by A*STAR under its RIE2020 Advanced Manufacturing and Engineering (AME) Industry Alignment Fund - Pre Positioning (IAF-PP) Award A19D6a0053. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of A*STAR.
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A Algorithm Pseudocode
A Algorithm Pseudocode
We assume the existence of a function Random(n, p) that returns a binary matrix/vector of size n where each element has a probability p to be 1. The secret key s is randomly generated.
We performed a sub-experiment to measure the efficacy of the fitness function by varying the number of erroneous bits in \(s^{\prime }\) and noise rate to find any advantage that adversaries may be able to uncover.
Return values for simulated fitness function for \(k=64,\delta =0.5\)
Figure 8 shows the graph which plots the return values of the fitness function for error bits in \(s^{\prime }\) from 0 to \(\frac{k}{2}\) in increments of 1 and for noise rate \(\tau \) = {0.05, 0.125, 0.25, 0.4}. For clarity purposes, we have fixed \(k=64,\delta =0.5,n=500\). It clearly shows that the fitness function is unable to tell the difference in the number of error bits for partial solutions since the fitness values become close to zero once there is at least one error bit in \(s^{\prime }\).
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Tan, T.G., Soh, D.W., Zhou, J. (2022). Calibrating Learning Parity with Noise Authentication for Low-Resource Devices. In: Alcaraz, C., Chen, L., Li, S., Samarati, P. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13407. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_2
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