Keywords

2.1 Introduction

In the early 1990s South Africa had 13 capital cities. Three of these were the result of the unusual arrangement to split the country’s capital into three: Cape Town (legislative), Pretoria (executive) and Bloemfontein (judicial). The other ten were capitals of the ‘homelands’ created under Grand Apartheid (the creation of ethnic nation states). When the ten homelands were integrated into South Africa after April 1994, their capitals lost their capital status, apart from Bisho and Mahikeng, which became provincial capitals of the Eastern Cape and North West Provinces, respectively.

Capital cities not only host the bureaucracies involved in making and executing laws, they are also symbols of power. They are places where the nation-state “projects its power through the urban landscape and spatial layout of the capital city”, a power “manifested in the capital’s architecture, in its public monuments, and in the names of its streets and public spaces” (Bekker and Therborn 2012, p. 1). Like European capitals, most African capitals display power in this way, and many of their power symbols are reminders of a colonial past. Notable studies in the literature on capital cities are Christopher (1985), Therborn (2002), Cochrane (2006) and Bekker and Therborn (2012). Less common in the literature are case studies of cities that have lost their capital status (Marais and Twala 2021). Phuthaditjhaba’s capital status is further complicated by the location of the city in the mountains and in the economic periphery of South Africa.

The aim of VerwoerdianFootnote 1 apartheid in creating the ten homelands or ethnic states was to minimise the number of black people in ‘white South Africa’ and give them a place where they could have political rights. To achieve these two aims, the government brought in influx control, forced removals and channelled urbanisation. These mechanisms slowed urbanisation but did not prevent it. By 1994, the ten homelands consisted of four ‘independent national states’ (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) and six ‘self-governing national states’ (Lebowa, Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, KwaZulu and QwaQwa). The African National Congress (ANC), one of the main black opposition organisations in South Africa, rejected the idea of these homelands as the place for black people’s political aspirations. For the ANC, South Africa was one political entity and these homelands had to become part of the post-apartheid regional dispensation.

Grand Apartheid required QwaQwa to provide a political home for the Sesotho-speaking population of the Free State, although the government recognised the limitations of making QwaQwa an independent state, and its Chief Minister, TK Mopeli, was not in favour of independence, as he considered QwaQwa critical in a future regional dispensation of South Africa. Phuthaditjhaba (seSotho, meaning ‘meeting place of the tribes’, formerly Witsieshoek) was made the capital. The government used channelled urbanisation to redirect the Sesotho-speaking black population to QwaQwa, and it became a dumping ground for ‘forced removals’.

Three decades later, some implications of these changes are evident. This chapter focuses on Phuthaditjhaba, its rise and demise as a capital city, its planning challenges, and its future sustainability. Pickles and Woods (1992) argue that academic literature tends to undervalue the urban areas in homelands because of the focus on forced removals, resettlement camps, rural areas and the dearth of economic activity in these places. This trend was established before the political changes since 1994. This chapter attempts to restore some balance by focusing on Phuthaditjhaba, its rise and demise as a capital city, its planning challenges, and its future sustainability. Today, Phuthaditjhaba forms part of the Maluti-a-Phofung Local Municipality (which includes the towns of Harrismith and Kestel, traditional land areas and commercial farms) and hosts the headquarters of the local municipality and the Thabo Mafutsanyane District Municipality. It is thus in a position of considerable regional importance.

2.2 Phuthaditjhaba as Capital

The South African government declared QwaQwa a self-governing homeland on 1 November 1974. Its population increased rapidly, from just over 14,000 in 1970 to 340,000 by 1991, 25,000 of them living in Phuthaditjhaba itself (Krige 1995). This led to various land expansions in QwaQwa. In 1987, the government attempted to incorporate a second urban area, Botshabelo in the central Free State, into QwaQwa (Twala and Barnard 2006). This incorporation failed after the Appeal Court ruled against it in 1988. Self-government required a capital where the government could take legislative and executive decisions and implement them. As the only proclaimed urban settlement in the area, Phuthaditjhaba became the capital city. Four factors drove the initial development of Phuthaditjhaba as capital: the new ‘country’ of QwaQwa had to acquire a bureaucracy, the built environment had to be constructed, national symbols had to be created, and an appropriate economy had to be developed by focusing on the capital. Obviously, sustainable development did not exist when the city started to develop (Rogerson 1999).

Self-government required a bureaucracy. To set this up entailed electing an assembly, appointing a cabinet and making laws. The legislature had 60 members, of whom 40 were designated to the two traditional chiefs in the area and 20 were elected members (Twala 1998).Footnote 2 Establishing the legislative and bureaucratic environment required office space, a parliament building and bureaucrats. The parliament building was erected on the small hill overlooking Phuthaditjhaba. At the same time, the QwaQwa government built various ministerial homes (with extensive security) and a ‘white suburb’ where delegated officials from the South African government resided. The parliament building overlooking the city is the ultimate symbol of power. The building’s modernist 1980s architecture was intended to emphasise the importance of self-governance. A statue of Chief Minister TK Mopeli was erected at the entrance.

Two other prominent symbols of power and nationalism were the national stadium, named after Charles Mopeli (the father of the Chief Minister, TK Mopeli) and the Mofumahadi Manapo Mopeli Hospital (named after TK Mopeli’s mother). Another was the Elizabeth Ross hospital, named after a missionary in the area and reflecting the colonial history. Another symbol of power came with the creation of a football club, QwaQwa Stars, worthy of playing in the Premier Soccer League in South Africa. The club, founded by local businessman Mike Mokoena, was launched in 1977 and received premiership promotion in 1986. To add to its national importance, the capital city attracted high-level services in the form of a teacher training college and a university, a satellite campus of the University of the North, established by the QwaQwa government in Phuthaditjhaba in 1982. The cultural links with the broader Sotho languages (including Tswana) were the basis of this arrangement with the University of the North.

Establishing an economy for the people of QwaQwa was a priority. The apartheid government’s Regional Industrial Development Programme (1981) provided the foundation. The programme provided a wage subsidy to help industries relocate to QwaQwa. QwaQwa benefited extensively from the subsidy and the QwaQwa Development Corporation was instrumental in realising large-scale industries. By 1982, it had established 35 factories employing 2,100 people. By 1988, two more industrial parks had become operational and Phuthaditjhaba now boasted 200 factories. Between 1988 and 1991, the QwaQwa government directed new factories to Industriqwa, an industrial area closer to Harrismith. By 1991, 293 factories were operating, employing nearly 30,000 people. However, local value chains were minimal, wages were low, employees were primarily women, worker conditions were mostly inadequate and the QwaQwa government did not allow unions. In some cases, the industrialists made profits from the wage subsidy by not paying it entirely to the workers (Bank 1994). Slater (2002) says that people living in Phuthaditjhaba had a better chance than those in the traditional areas of getting jobs in these manufacturing plants. In addition to the industrial development, Phuthaditjhaba developed an important regional services function serving the rural hinterland. Shopping centres, hospitals, colleges and the university contributed to the regional function. Phuthaditjhaba gave entrepreneurs opportunities, as they relied on “the secure incomes of the emerging class of urban workers” (Slater 2002, p. 600). These entrepreneurs could use this certainty to expand their services to cater to the regional needs. For air transport a landing strip was available, but plans to develop it into a fully fledged airport did not materialise.

A further attempt at promoting modernity was the creation of a modern urban settlement by modernising housing delivery in Phuthaditjhaba. Various planning documents provided the framework for urban settlement and infrastructure. By the early 1990s, urban class differentiations had become apparent. As evidence, Pickles and Woods (1992) note the Chief Minister’s compound with its security fence and some newer suburbs to serve the emerging middle class. The white suburb, set apart for the seconded South African government officials, was evidence of differentiation by both class and race. The QwaQwa Development Corporation played a crucial role in developing middle-class housing (albeit with the help of a large subsidy). Strict urban land-use control was applied and harsh treatment of people invading land illegally was common (Terreblanche 1991). The early planning documents provided low urban densities with an average of 500m2 per stand (Du Toit 1980). By the mid-1980s, Phuthaditjhaba had a town council consisting of nine councillors (one for each of the wards) and although residents had to pay a fixed amount for services, the council did not levy a land tax. The complex land arrangements made it impossible to provide full title. However, residents received a letter confirming their land rights and the QwaQwa Development Corporation and commercial banks financed houses within this arrangement. The council had limited power and used seconded staff from other government departments (including seconded staff from the South African government) and the QwaQwa government was far more dominant than the town council. Providing water and service to the city was a high priority. The completion of the Fika Patso dam in 1987 was a milestone in this regard (Die Volksblad 1987).

By 1990, Phuthaditjhaba was well established as the capital of QwaQwa. The homeland government was in control and the local symbols and architecture proclaimed it a ‘modern’ state. Although primarily based on the South African government’s industrial subsidies, a robust urban economy developed. The reintegration of QwaQwa into South Africa would change the urban landscape and cancel Phuthaditjhaba’s symbolic role as a capital city.

2.3 Loss of Capital Status

The reintegration of former homeland areas into South Africa was a bumpy process. Particularly notable was the Bisho massacre on 7 September 1992, when the Ciskei army defended its ‘independence’ by killing 28 people in a march of 80,000 protesters who wanted Ciskei to be reintegrated into South Africa (Bond and Mottiar 2013). The reintegration of QwaQwa into South Africa and the dismantling of Phuthaditjhaba’s capital status did not go smoothly. The ANC planned a protest similar to Bisho’s, to be held at the QwaQwa agricultural show on 10 September 1992. However, fewer than 400 protestors arrived and there were no violent clashes (Smith and Coetzee 1992). The animosity between the QwaQwa government and the ANC was manifest during the 1990–1994 transition period. The Chief Minister clung to his belief in a confederal arrangement in which QwaQwa would be a critical region; the ANC was adamant that QwaQwa should be reincorporated into South Africa. Strikes were prevalent during this period. Early in 1990, for example, 21,000 factory workers and 10,000 public officials went on strike demanding better work conditions and the right to belong to unions (Bank 1994), and in July 1992 government officials came out on strike demanding that the Phuthaditjhaba Council suspend the town clerk (Die Transvaler 1992).

The integrations after the democratic transition in 1994 remained bumpy. The relationship between the newly elected provincial government, with the ANC in the majority, and Mopeli’s Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA) was not good. Mopeli, unlike many other homeland leaders, did not join the ANC but contested the 1994 elections under the banner of the DPSA. The DPSA could not get a seat in the provincial or national legislature but won various local seats. For example, during the 2016 local government election, it won four seats on the local council. The Free State Provincial Government was responsible for the reincorporation of QwaQwa into South Africa. Its first step was to appoint an administrator to manage the process (The Citizen 1994) and ensure political oversight (Nieman 1994). These high-level appointments showed how seriously the provincial government took the reincorporation. Next, the Free State’s first premier, Mr Lekota, wanted to remove symbols of power associated with Mr Mopeli and his family (just as in 1994 the statue of Prime Minister HF Verwoerd was removed from the Free State Provincial Government Offices in Bloemfontein and the name of the building was changed to Lebohang). He targeted the Charles Mopeli Stadium and the Mofumahadi Manapo Mopeli hospital (Smith 1994) for possible name changes. Ultimately he did not succeed and these symbols from the homeland era remain. The statue of TK Mopeli at the parliament building was removed, but it is not clear whether the Free State Provincial Government was responsible for this.

The next question was how to deal with the bureaucracy of the former homeland. The Free State Provincial Government incorporated the staff of Mr Mopeli into the office of the premier—a sign of trying to ensure central control. There was an initial idea that the provincial government would spread some provincial government functions across the Free State, with some functions allocated to Phuthaditjhaba. Ultimately, however, many officials relocated, as most government functions were centralised in Bloemfontein, the provincial capital. This relocation meant that the city lost some of its middle-class residents to Bloemfontein. Later, realising the importance of the votes from QwaQwa, the ANC took a more reconciliatory approach by favouring traditional leadership. The Free State’s first premier’s initial uncompromising approach in 1994 made way for a reconciliatory approach from later premiers. For example, in 2014 the Free State’s premier opened a traditional leadership sitting (Moloi 2014). Finally, with the demarcation of new municipal boundaries in 2001, Phuthaditjhaba became the headquarters of Maluti-a-Phofung and the Thabo Mafutsanyane District Council, which occupied the administrative building of the former QwaQwa homeland.

The above changes had negative economic implications. Losing the capital status meant losing the economic value that came with it. The ANC government found the Regional Industrial Development Programme unsustainable and with the loss of this subsidy many of the industrial parks across South Africa collapsed. The industrial parks in Phuthaditjhaba, however, survived. In 2018 the Department of Trade and Industry allocated about R50m for the upgrade of Phuthaditjhaba’s industrial area (Die Volksblad 2019) and the current occupancy levels are at about 65%. There are several reasons why industry survived in Phuthaditjhaba (Marais et al. 2005). The location, halfway between Gauteng and Durban and on the main route between the two, is advantageous; the labour costs are lower than those of Gauteng and Durban, despite the minimum wage being the same across South Africa; and the price of industrial floor space remains substantially lower than elsewhere in South Africa. The lower tariffs for floor space have been achieved by not asking cost recovery rates. This is one of the main reasons why the Department of Trade and Industry had to provide capital in 2018.

Despite the problems of homeland development under Grand Apartheid, the ANC government prioritised rural development (Harmse 2010). In November 2000 it introduced the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP). QwaQwa was one of 13 nodes in the ISRDP, which included other former homeland areas. Although the programme focused mainly on rural concerns, Phuthaditjhaba also benefited from the improved rural roads and rural economic activity. The national government conceptualised the programme in close relationship with the Maluti-a-Phofung Local Government, including prioritising the area in provincial planning. For example, the Free State Provincial Government declared the Mofumahadi Manapo Mopeli Hospital a regional hospital, which boosted Phuthaditjhaba’s regional functional role. Changes in the educational landscape saw the University of the North campus being transferred to the University of the Free State (which has its main campus in Bloemfontein). The sports scene saw changes too. In 2002, the Premier Soccer League bought the QwaQwa Stars club in a bid to reduce pressure on fixtures by reducing the number of teams in the League. The owner reignited the club under the name ‘Free State Stars’, but with Bethlehem as its headquarters.

As a result of all these disruptions, Phuthaditjhaba has suffered from large-scale political infighting, corruption and poor administration in the Maluti-a-Phofung local municipality (De Klerk 2000; Van Wyk 2000; Van Rooyen 2018). At the time of writing, the municipality is under administration, which means that an administrator appointed by the Free State Provincial Government takes decisions and not the council. Maluti-a-Phofung has been unable to produce municipal financial statements since the 2015/16 financial year (Gericke 2018).

2.4 The Future

As part of Maluti-a-Phofung, today Phuthaditjhaba is one of 39 intermediate city municipalities (ICMs) that could potentially access support from the ICM support programme (Marais and Nel 2019). The programme provides support for the development of strategic infrastructure in these cities. In practice it ringfences infrastructure funds but on the condition that the local government apply strategic planning and adhere to good governance. This potential depends mostly on the city’s ability to contribute to the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, follow the principles in the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), provide adequate regional services, and overcome the current political turmoil in the local government.

Although most of the sustainable development goals have implications for urban areas, Goal 11 refers explicitly to sustainable cities and communities. The notion of ‘sustainable communities’ is one of nine policy levers in the IUDF (Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs 2016). The other eight levers are integrated urban planning and management, integrated transport and mobility, integrated sustainable settlements, integrated urban infrastructure, efficient land management and governance, inclusive economic development, effective urban governance and sustainable finances. The IUDF specifically focuses on the transformation of urban spaces and what to ensure urban access, the management of growth, good governance and spatial transformation. Considering the internal political strife, poor financial management and very little adherence to some of the critical spatial planning requirement in the IUDF, the sustainable development of Phuthaditjhaba as an urban area seems to be an uphill battle. Although complying with the principles in the IUDF and achieving the sustainable development goals is complex, four aspects would enable Maluti-a-Phofung and Phuthadithaba to make progress: institutional stability, sustainable municipal financial management, building on its regional services role, and ensuring an appropriate economy. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 with its focus on inclusivity, managing growth and emphasising urban governance should further help Phuthaditjhaba to achieve these outcomes.

Institutional stability is central to the SDGs and the IUDF. The IUDF refers to efficient urban governance, and one of the aims of Goal 11 is the creation of sustainable development strategies. Poor municipal management, large-scale political infighting and corruption remain a challenge for Maluti-a-Phofung. The fierce infighting and the rapid turnover of mayors, municipal managers and administrators are not conducive to good governance in the local municipality. Many political fights are related to resource distribution and accessing state money (often referred to as ‘state capture’ in South Africa). Although the Integrated Development Plans could be aligned with sustainable development strategies, linking them with the SDGs, there is little evidence that this is happening in Maluti-a-Phofung. An ineffective council unable to implement and monitor its plans makes it hard to achieve the city’s overarching goal of sustainability.

Development plans require sustainable municipal financial management. The municipality’s inability to produce financial statements since the 2015/16 financial year points to large-scale corruption and bargaining for power positions. Media reports reflect concerns about accountability, the administrator needing extra security, and council being unable to meet.Footnote 3 Leadership positions are being exploited to distribute resources to family and friends. Such nepotism and abuses of power excludes Maluti-a-Phofung from benefiting from the support programme for ICMs.

One of the critical contributions of Phuthaditjhaba to the development of QwaQwa has been the provision of higher-order economic and social services as part of its regional services role. High school and even post-school education is available in Phuthaditjhaba. An excellent regional hospital further strengthens this vital role. Decision-makers need to realise the value of Phuthaditjhaba for rural development. This aspect was undervalued in the ISRDP and the IUDF pays it only scant attention.

The homeland government prioritised Phuthaditjhaba for QwaQwa’s economic development. More recently the focus has shifted to nearby Harrismith. The allocation of a Special Economic Zone (although mostly defunct) to Harrismith is one example. Although at 65% the occupancy level of Phuthaditjhaba’s existing industrial area is still substantially higher than that of many similar industrial areas in South Africa (many have closed down completely), it does point to the difficulty of maintaining such spaces in the economic periphery of South Africa. In addition to being physically located at the margins of South Africa and economically at its periphery, even within the municipality there is evidence of increased spatial marginality.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the rise and demise of Phuthaditjhaba as the capital city of QwaQwa. Under Grand Apartheid, the homeland policy provided the opportunity to develop ten homeland capitals, of which Phuthaditjhaba was one. The development and characteristics of these homeland towns and cities seldom received adequate attention from scholars, as most research emphasised their rural nature and the forced removals associated with homeland populations. Like most capitals, Phuthaditjhaba retains homeland power symbols: a parliament building overlooking the city, a Chief Minister’s compound, and public buildings named after the Chief Minister and his family. The industrial subsidies under apartheid provided an economic base and contributed the presence of bureaucrats in the city to develop an urban middle class in the 1980s.

The incorporation of QwaQwa into South Africa and the Free State provincial government in 1994 was difficult. There were early attempts to change the homeland symbols. But, other than the statue of TK Mopeli, now removed, many of the homeland symbols remain. The Free State provincial government quickly incorporated the QwaQwa government staff into its structures and relocated many to Bloemfontein. The location of the headquarters of Maluti-a-Phofung and the district municipality in Phuthaditjhaba has kept some bureaucrats in the city. Although the occupancy of the industrial estates has declined, the post-apartheid government has invested a large sum of money in upgrading them. It is doubtful whether this will counter the declining occupancy in the long term, but it does prove national commitment to a peripheral place. The implementation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) in QwaQwa did not directly benefit Phuthaditjhaba. There were, however, some indirect benefits: better access to the city for the rural population, better services, and rural economic development that has benefited the urban economy.

Maluti-a-Phofung has been included as one of 39 intermediate city municipalities (ICMs) in South Africa. Its inclusion in this list could give it access to new financial sources. However, the poor state of governance and financial management means that Phuthaditjhaba is unlikely to access these funds. The economic focus in the municipality is shifting to Harrismith. In my view, Phuthaditjhaba’s potential lies in its regional services function. Serving the rural hinterland and playing an essential role in rural development is central to this function. The existing hospitals, education centres and shopping centres all play a role in this. However, the notion of a regional services function remains underdeveloped. Local strategies and plans could aim to build on Phuthaditjhaba’s existing regional services and expand their regional role and function. In Phuthaditjhaba, achieving the sustainable development of the IUDF, and therefore the SDGs and in particular SDG11, will be difficult. The current political climate, poor financial performance and continued corruption are likely to affect strategic planning and complying to these goals negatively. At the same time, the cities peripheral and mountainous location will place increased pressure to comply to these goals.

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

Andrea Membretti Susan Jean Taylor Jess L. Delves

In 2015, all United Nations Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda is a plan to first and foremost eradicate poverty by 2030 and to “take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path” (UNGA 2015: 1). The 2030 Agenda builds significantly upon the Millennium Development Goals by encompassing a far broader sustainability agenda which requires coordinated global action. To guide this action, the 2030 Agenda created the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets for sustainable development (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1
figure 1

The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/

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The SDGs are “integrated and indivisible” and reflect the interdependent nature of the many aspects of economic, social and environmental sustainability (UNGA 2015: 1). In 2017, specific targets and associated indicators were designed which are used to measure global, national and subnational progress towards each target and their SDGs (UNGA 2017). The universal nature of the goals facilitates comparison on multiple scales of progress in achieving the goals for developed and developing countries and regions. They provide a boundary object that can unite efforts for driving sustainable development between diverse stakeholders acting at multiple levels throughout society, the economy and politics. It is as such a boundary object that the SDGs are applied in this book.