Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses various current official statements, 2021 election programmes and party manifestos, media reports—especially from public and state broadcasters such as Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, academic discussions in the newly founded German-language magazine China.Table,Footnote 1 publications from the field of policy advice of the DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations), of MERICS as well as public hearings with regard to the fast changing view of China, in the German public discourse.

The public broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) very much highlights the opportunities offered by the Chinese market, which is still considered a growth market: “In the next ten years, the country is estimated to account for 30% of global economic growth” (DW 2021b). In a first phone call with President Xi Jinping, Scholz stressed that he wants to “deepen” economic ties with China and the readouts of the phone call show that human rights were never mentioned (DW 2021f; von der Burchard 2022). Thus, it is obvious that Olaf Scholz is very much in line with his two predecessors, Angela Merkel, and Gerhard Schröder, who both emphasized economic pragmatism in dealing with a rising China. Xi Jinping also called Merkel an “old friend” (lao pengyou), an honorary title also given to Nixon and Merkel’s predecessor Schröder, previously reserved for socialist politicians such as Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, and Robert Mugabe (Wurzel 2021). However, after the Ukraine war started, Scholz is said to have clearly stated in a virtual summit with Xi Jinping that Germany expects China to condemn the invasion of Ukraine and not to undermine economic sanctions against Russia (Reuters 2022).

According to the data compiled by the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Re:shape Global Europe Initiative earlier in 2021, 47% of Germans see China as a rival or even an adversary in conflict with Europe (Oertel 2021). This is consistent with public perceptions in other EU member states: Across the Union, Europeans who see China as a true partner that shares common interests and values with Europe are becoming a minority. Those who see a partnership with China as necessary in certain areas are still in the majority in many member states, but no longer so in Germany (and France) (Oertel 2021). While German policy towards China is often alleged to be more focused on economic relations, German voters are quite principled about the type of approach Europe should take. Fifty-two percent of Germans believe that the European Union should strongly criticize China’s violations of human rights, democratic values, or the rule of law; this percentage is above the EU average on this issue (Oertel 2021; see also Rühlig 2020) (Graph 1).

Graph 7.1
A chart includes 4 parameters, the E U should strongly criticize China, neither, don't know, and the E U should avoid conflict. In 2 charts labeled, Germany and 12 other countries, the highest shares are for those in favour of criticizing China, at 52% and 45%, respectively.

Germans are more principled on the Eu’s policy towards China than the continent’s average (Source Kirchner and Wurzel 2021)

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Intermingling of Interests Between China and Germany

To get a better understanding of the role of the German Chancellor and the foreign minister with regard to German’s foreign policy, two principles are of importance: the Richtlinienkompetenz (guideline competence) and the Ressortprinzip (departmental principle) (Die Bundesregierung 2022). The government policy towards China is formally determined by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who, on 8 December 2021, officially took over the post from Angela Merkel. In addition, other ministries are directly involved: the foreign minister (the current one is Annalena Baerbock of the Greens, who took over the post from Heiko Maas—SPD); the minister for economic affairs and climate protection, Robert Habeck (Greens), previously Peter Altmaier (CDU); and the minister for economic cooperation and development, now Svenja Schulze (SPD), previously Gerhard Müller (CSU). According to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the chancellor determines the guidelines for all government policy and bears total responsibility. This guideline competence covers the specification of a framework for various government actions. The individual ministries then have to fill it with a specific content, including of course the two ministries involved in foreign policy as previously mentioned. Paradoxically, however, within these guidelines set by the chancellor, each minister runs his or her ministry independently (departmental principle). Whether Germany’s former Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz will be as directly involved in international relations as his predecessors is yet to be seen. During the election campaign, he presented himself as Merkel’s heir apparent, as someone suited to maintain the stability with which Merkel had governed quite successfully (Barkin 2021; Falk 2021).Footnote 2 However, the new foreign minister Annalena Baerbock has already signalled a new tone in foreign relations.

The history of Germany’s relationship with China is one of balancing values against other interests. Economic and military cooperation between China and Germany can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) ruled over the Chinese empire and reached a peak in the 1930s. However, due to Japan’s invasion of China and Hitler’s pro-Japanese orientation (visible for example, in the diplomatic recognition of the Japanese puppet regime of Manchukuo in February 1938; in the withdrawal of German military advisers from China in June 1938, etc.), a shadow fell over bilateral cooperation and relations between the two sides. In 1949, the division of Germany was sealed with the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany and then the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and this also shaped relations with China. Because of the international situation during the Cold War, the West German government pursued a policy of not recognizing either the government of the Republic of China in Taipei or the People’s Republic in Beijing, so as not to be drawn into the sovereignty dispute over the Taiwan Strait and not to jeopardize its own interests. On the other hand, the GDR fully recognized the government in Beijing starting in 1949. The Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic relations in 1972, in line with most Western countries.

Germany does not feel militarily threatened by China and even in the case of Huawei, Germany’s IT Security Law 2.0 approved in April 2021 by the German Bundestag, it seeks to balance the push to ban certain 5G providers from many of its Western allies with the advantages of keeping its options open (DW 2021e; O’Mahony 2021). After seven years of negotiations, the EU signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China in December 2020 under Germany’s EU Council Presidency (European Commission 2021; Lau 2021). However, as of March 2021, the European Parliament opposed ratification of the agreement due to China’s “unacceptable” behaviour towards members of Parliament, the European Council’s Political and Security Committee, and European think tanks (Emmett 2021) and as of December 2022, the deal has yet to be signed. In 2020 China was Germany’s most important trading partner for goods, with a trade volume of almost 212 billion euros (Statistisches Bundesamt [Destatis] 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic has further boosted trade between the two countries. German mechanical engineers, automotive groups, and chemical companies, among others, have initially benefited from the situation. Conversely, Chinese electronics and technology companies have benefited from the enormous demand from Germany, in the first year of the pandemic. According to preliminary figures, goods worth around ninety-six billion euros were exported from Germany to China in 2020 (Statistisches Bundesamt [Destatis] 2021). For years, the Asia–Pacific Committee of German Business (APA) very successfully lobbied the German government for a China policy that paved the way for China to become Germany’s largest trading partner (Kirchner and Wurzel 2021; von Hein 2021). Siemens and Volkswagen, in particular, have been heavily involved in China. The increasing international confrontation between China and the West, as well as China’s internal shift towards greater decoupling—at least in parts of its industry—and China’s ambition to become a global leader in many areas, such as its goal to be the world leader in technology by the People’s Republic of China’s 100th anniversary in 2049, has prompted some German business leaders to rethink their position. Following Bloomfield’s theoretical mode (2016: 264), Germany thus stayed in the “economic pragmatism” subzone while at times moving towards “binding engagement” with China, e.g. the “German-Sino Rule of Law Dialogue” (Deutsch-Chinesischer Rechtsstaatsdialog), which goes back to a proposal made by the Federal Government in 1999. It is based on the “Agreement on Exchange and Cooperation in the Field of Law”, which was signed by both governments on 30 June 2000 (Justice), 2021. The Chinese leadership has defined its own decoupling and autonomy agenda, embodied in President Xi Jinping’s speeches and the party’s recent five-year plan. China is focused on improving its own technological and productive capabilities and strengthening its global market dominance in key sectors (Oertel 2021). The United States view on Germany’s China policy is summarized in a lengthy Politico article: “It is beginning to dawn on many German industrialists that China, which has relied on their technical acumen to modernize its economy, may no longer need them. Over time, China has become quite good at designing and building specialized machinery, tools, and other equipment that it used to need Germany for” (Kartnitschnig and Gehrke 2021). The article further quotes a Siemens spokesman saying that the company “categorically rejects any form of repression and involvement in human rights abuses”, adding that it “places trust in the U.S., China and Europe to find political solutions based on… reliable and transparent rules of cooperation and open dialog” (Kartnitschnig and Gehrke 2021). Volkswagen, the world’s largest automaker, however, has set up factories in Xinjiang and Herbert Diess, VW’s CEO, defended his company’s involvement in the region, arguing that it upholds its “values in Xinjiang, including employee’s representation, respect for minorities and social and labour standards” (Kartnitschnig and Gehrke 2021). Volkswagen and other large German companies are now torn between expectations of China, the German business community and an increasing pressure put on them by NGOs, and by various actors from the different political spectrums (Thoma-Schade 2021; Xu et al. 2020). That the new German government is formed by three coalition partners, who all wish to strengthen their own profile, in view of future elections, does not help to achieve a more subtle diplomacy.

In addition to some key data on diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Foreign Office, on its website, mentions economic relations, but also the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and climate change. With a trade volume of 245 billion euros, China was once again Germany’s largest goods trading partner in 2021; “In view of international crises and growing global challenges (including climate change, Covid-19), German-Chinese cooperation and coordination are of great importance. China sees Germany as a key partner in Europe, not only economically but also politically. Regular high-level political coordination in a variety of dialogue mechanisms as well as trade relations, investment, environmental cooperation, cultural and science policy cooperation characterise the relationship. Since the outbreak of the Covid 19 pandemic, German-Chinese exchange has been severely impaired in almost all areas due to restrictive Chinese entry regulations. Germany advocates for substantial and reciprocal relations between the EU and China and for strengthening EU unity vis-à-vis China” (see Auswärtiges Amt 2022a). Later, more contentious issues are mentioned. A focus is laid on human rights, individual liberties, and a different understanding of the rule of law: “…there are fundamental differences of opinion. This applies in particular to human rights, especially personal freedom rights and questions of the validity of international law, the international order, and the interpretation of multilateralism. It remains an important interest of Germany that China increases the openness of its markets for European companies and their products, develops rules-based-law structures and social systems, allows more political and economic participation, resolves minority issues peacefully and with respect for human rights, and also shapes its engagement in international institutions and for a rules-based international order in this sense” (Auswärtiges Amt 2022a).

During her 16 years as German chancellor, Angela Merkel emphasized the importance of a multipolar world. While her policies have come under increasing criticism from some sectors of German politics, especially during the election campaign, others describe her policies more positively: perhaps one of her main strengths has been that she has managed to remain faithful to Germany’s alliance partner, the United States, while keeping precarious relations with Russia reasonably intact, and even building a substantial partnership with China while engaging it in global and regional responsibilities (Falk 2021). Merkel viewed China as an economic partner rather than a political adversary, and thought of the Chinese industry and of the Chinese market as indispensable to the prosperity of Germany and Europe. Thus, Germany stayed within the economic pragmatism zone even though the famous slogan “change through trade” (Wandel durch Handel) showed that Merkel as well her predecessor Schröder believed in a more binding engagement, in the hope that through tighter economic ties with the West, China would ultimately follow other former authoritarian states, such as South Korea and Taiwan, in a transition towards democracy and closer to Western values.

Merkel’s approach was much embedded in the German tradition of Realpolitik—with a tradition from Helmut Kohl through Gerhard Schröder, i.e. pragmatic rather than ideological (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz 2022). Thus, “economic pragmatism” within the hedging zone prevailed. Of course, this was much easier for Germany as, unlike Japan and Southeast Asian states, it has no border conflicts with China, and in contrast to Russia, China also does not present a direct threat to any other NATO members.

The responsibility for foreign trade promotion lies with the Ministry of Economy and Climate Protection. Unlike the new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, the new minister for Economy and energy, Robert Habeck (also of the Green Party), has not attracted attention with extremely China-critical statements, and it is to be expected that he will initially continue the policy of his predecessor, Peter Altmaier (CDU). The ministry’s policy on China was officially presented in June 2021 (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2021). The opening statements reads: “The importance of the People’s Republic of China as a global political actor has increased sharply in recent years. Whatever challenges of global significance there may be, whether environmental and climate protection, the stability of the international economic and financial system, or the future development of countries in Africa—none of them can be met today without China’s involvement” (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2021). It was first emphasized that German-Chinese economic relations continue to develop positively despite the recent moderate growth of the Chinese economy and increasingly difficult framework conditions, and that China was Germany’s largest trading partner in 2020 for the fifth-time in a row. The bilateral trade volume in 2020 amounted to 212.1 billion euros (2019: 205.6 billion euros). This means that Germany accounts for more than one-third of the EU’s total trade volume with China (around 586 billion euros). Critically, the official position also mentions that China would benefit from open markets in the EU and Germany. Therefore, the ministry has demanded that, “It is important that China now follows on its recent announcements with regards to market opening with concrete actions. Measures are needed to open markets and create stable, reliable framework conditions, leading to equal treatment of foreign companies with domestic companies in China. The aforementioned investment agreement between the EU and China is a first step in this direction. It will be important that this is complemented by further appropriate EU external economic policy measures to achieve the goal of a level playing field in relations with China” (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2021). Another point mentioned by the EU is the area of digitization/automation (Arcesati 2020; Committee on Foreign Affairs and Vautmans 2021; Ghiretti 2021). The main issue here is to ensure data protection, data security and the protection of intellectual property. At the same time, this requires free access to a fast Internet, while also ensuring the protection of trade secrets and the protection of intellectual property. For many German companies, the compulsion to transfer technology involuntarily is mentioned as a central problem. Legal regulations and special practices that require technologies to be disclosed or passed on to Chinese economic actors free of charge, for example, as part of certification processes, meet with particular criticism (Ghiretti 2021).

Elections and Election Programmes

Ahead of the 2021 federal elections, several media outlets discussed the political platforms of the major parties, which for the first-time focused on China at great length. The China-critical research institute MERICS summarized that “almost all parties take a critical view of China, with issues such as geostrategic challenges, market access conditions and the human rights situation in the foreground” (Reimers 2021). The CDU/CSU, while emphasizing the foreign and security challenges China poses, continued to call for economic cooperation. The Greens focused on the human rights situation and the need for a dialogue on climate issues, while the FDP was most critical of China, with particular emphasis on human rights abuses, legal security, and the development of relations with Taiwan.Footnote 3 The Left—briefly also considered as a potential coalition partner—held back on its criticism of China and sought an equidistant position between China and the United States, both regarded as imperialist powers. The AFD’s programme was the most contradictory: it supported Germany’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but strictly criticized China’s alleged interference abroad via Confucius Institutes (Damm 2020). The new tendency observed is that China is no longer perceived “only” as an economic competitor or partner, but the four centrist parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Alliance 90/The Greens) all refer directly or indirectly to the EU’s 2019 formulation that China is simultaneously “partner, competitor and rival”; “For the EU, China is simultaneously—in various policy areas—a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival” (Parliament 2020) (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 MERICS’ summary regarding the positions of the different parties
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To summarize, all parties in some way hold a critical view of China, but with a very different focus, i.e. either on geostrategic challenges or the problem of market access conditions and human rights issues. Primarily the SPD emphasizes more strongly its willingness to engage in dialogue despite raising fears of Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy and the situation in Xinjiang. The FDP in its programme condemned strongly human rights violations, legal security and even called for an expansion of relations with Taiwan. With the exception of the Left, China’s growing global influence and more belligerent and illiberal posture at home and abroad, is considered as a threat, to the Western liberal order. All parties—with the exception of the AFD—also point to the need of European, transatlantic/transnational cooperation when dealing with China. The Greens, once critical of NATO and US hegemony, are positive about the Biden administration’s proposals to confront China together with other democracies worldwide. The CDU/CSU and FDP are quite close to the Greens in their reflections of global systemic conflicts while the SPD attempts to balance moral and realpolitik considerationse.

Trade and Economic Considerations in Political Parties’ Orientation

Another crucial factor, especially since China is one of Germany’s most important trading partners, and the German industry is strongly intertwined with China’s, is trade policy and development of the economy. The business magazine Produktion specifically asked the representatives of the parties represented in the Bundestag: “What are your goals in trade policy towards China after the new election?” (Ringel 2021). Andreas Lämmel, deputy economic and energy policy spokesperson for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, kept his position strictly close to the EU, explaining: “We want to meet China at eye level. China is a cooperation partner and competitor, but also a system competitor”. Furthermore, he called for unity with the “transatlantic partners and other like-minded democracies. This applies in particular to the protection of intellectual property, our advanced technology, and our data, so that we do not fall into dangerous dependencies…On the other hand, we want to deepen cooperation with China wherever possible. A true partnership is only possible within the framework of fair competition on an equal footing and in compliance with the principle of reciprocity” (Ibid.). Bernd Westphal, economic and energy policy spokesperson for the SPD parliamentary group, commented on China with friendlier tones and emphasized the importance of maintaining trade and cooperation: “We see China as an important trading partner. In this context, the rules of fairness and positive reciprocity play an especially significant role for us Social Democrats. … Chinese companies—like European ones—should be obliged to comply with internationally agreed labour, social and environmental standards in their transnational value chains. A future European supply chain law must—like the German pioneer law—also be enforced at international level and include Chinese companies” (Ibid.). Tino Chrupalla, Chairman of the right-wing populist AfD commented: “China’s growing influence in the world is a challenge. Cooperation with China must only take place under conditions of equality and fairness. … A further sell-out of German or European technology must be prevented. If these conditions are guaranteed, the People’s Republic of China will become even more important for Germany, especially as a trading partner. With the ‘New Silk Road’ project, China has launched the project of the century. … The Chinese Silk Road strategy from East to West should be complemented by Germany with an initiative from West to East” (Ibid.). Michael Theurer, member of the Federal Executive Committee and deputy chair of the FDP parliamentary group, commented more on human rights and on civil society relations. Jörg Schindler, Federal Executive Director of the Left Party focused mainly on the necessity for environmental, economic, and social cooperation, as well as crisis prevention.” Finally, Dieter Janecek, spokesperson for industrial policy and the digital economy for the Greens parliamentary group, said, “China’s promise to simplify market access for foreign investment has not been kept. The hurdles for the EU-China investment agreement could not be higher: lack of rule of law, forced technology transfer as well as joint venture coercion. Instead of unfair competition, reciprocity must be the central principle of mutual economic relations in future. Fundamentally, we must pay more attention to differentiating sales markets—and in particular strengthen relations with other Asian trading partners”. All parties potentially involved in the future federal government, CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and FDP, agreed that China policy must be a European common policy. In particular, the CDU/CSU and the Greens both used the EU-coined term “competitor, partner, system rival”, and both explicitly talked about using transatlantic cooperation to counter China. With regard to choosing between the United States or China, it is of great interest that the CDU and the Greens position are very close, both emphasizing the necessity of a transatlantic cooperation in dealing with China, thus approaching a “dominance denial” position (Bloomfield 2016: 264) position, while the Left and the AfD both emphasize a neutrality of Germany within the power struggle of China and the United States.

German Political Parties’ Views on the Taiwan Issues

Even more interesting is the view of the Taiwan issue in the party platforms. Unlike the United States and even Japan, the status of cross-Strait relations does not directly involve Germany. Germany has no military interest. One main problem for Germany is the fact that the European Union is rather divided—ranging from Lithuania and its decision to allow Taipei to formally open a representative office in Lithuania using the name of ‘Taiwan’ rathern than the usual ‘Taipei’, which resulted in huge criticism from China and a de facto trade embargo on Lithuania, to Hungary—once known for closing the Central European University supported by George Soros—now preparing to set a campus of the Fudan University in Budapest (DW 2021c). The larger players, France and Germany both try to reduce tensions and while never questioning the one China principle, they also warn against any military threat towards Taiwan (Auswärtiges Amt 2021; Narang 2021). In addition, the European parliament, including its members from the Greens and the FDP, sent a delegation to Taiwan and ignored China’s strong criticism (DW 2021a).Footnote 4

Both the AFD and the Left as well as the CDU do not explicitly mention Taiwan in their party manifesto. The SPD, on the other hand, mentions Taiwan once: “For Hong Kong, the internationally vested principle of ‘one country, two systems’ must be upheld. We view the growing pressure on Taiwan with great concern”. The Greens mention Taiwan five times, including Taiwan’s role in the WHO, the need for increased exchanges with Taiwan, the warning against a military solution against the will of the Taiwanese people. The FDP mentions Taiwan eight times and explicitly states: “We Free Democrats support the development of democracy and the rule of law in Taiwan as a successful alternative to the authoritarian system of rule in the People’s Republic of China. We support Taiwan’s efforts to integrate into international organizations—as far as this can be done below the threshold of state recognition. […] A unification of China and Taiwan can only take place by peaceful consensus. We strongly condemn military threatening gestures of the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. Together with our European partners and other democracies, first and foremost Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, we want to develop a strategy to dissuade China from threatening to take Taiwan by force and to urge China to stay on the path of diplomacy. Our long-term goal is for the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan to agree through peaceful dialogue to allow Taiwan’s citizens to freely decide their political future” (Asienpolitik 2021; Deutsch-Taiwanische Gesellschaft e.V. 2021).

Federal Parliamentary Hearings and Spill Over into Academic Discussions

The questions of how Germany shall deal with China in future; how to interpret the developments in Xinjiang; how to react to China’s increasing belligerent posture on the world stage were also among the topics of various hearings held in the German Bundestag and led to spirited discussions within academic circles, especially in the realm of policy advice. This clearly demonstrates that Germans political parties, academics, and civil society are very much involved in the question how Germany shall position itself in the strategic competition between the United States and China. Thus, between 2020 and 2021, the German Bundestag held several expert hearings that also highlighted the political and academic divide on how to deal with China in future. In a June 2020 hearing on COVID-19 and economic relations (Deutscher Bundestag 2020), Mikko Huotari, then director of the Mercator Institute on China Studies (MERICS)—which is said to be very critical of the CCP and in general proposes much stricter measures to reduce Chinese influence on German economy, politics, and education system—said China’s leadership was concerned with “narrative dominance” in dealing with the Corona crisis. In the Communist Party’s self-representation, the country had responded successfully and efficiently to the pandemic, demonstrating its superiority in systems competition with the Western model. Mechthild Leutner, emeritus sinologist at Freie Universität Berlin, emphasized that the management of the COVID-19 crisis in China had been perceived as a confirmation of the superiority of the Chinese system and boosted self-confidence. She also pointed to the main threat posed by the US (Trump administration) narrative of an “America First”, which emphasizes decoupling and a reversal of globalization. Thus, she proposed the continuation of multilateralism and the idea of a multipolar world and stated that China had, meanwhile, become a promoter of the “Western concept of globalization” and continues to focus on multilateral solutions including a binding engagement with various international players. Bastian Giegerich (International Institute for Strategic Studies) was critical of China, pointing at the country’s enormous industrial, security, and military ambitions. He claimed that China wants to play a leading role in areas such as robotics, aerospace, cyber and information technology, and artificial intelligence. For him, countries like Germany are considered by the Chinese as a “source of technology”, and he thus sees no advantages in the cooperation. For him, even the economic relations should critically be revised. Stefan Mair of the Federation of German Industries, on the other hand, called for a balance in relations with China both as a system competitor and as an economic cooperation partner. He called for more European unity, more investment in its own competitiveness to protect the EU market from distortions.

On the Chinese side, Shiwei Shi (University of International Business and Economics, Beijing), spoke out strongly against economic decoupling from China: “No country will benefit”. He said that the ever-closer cooperation and division of tasks in the course of globalization has led to an enormous increase in efficiency in the world economy and, for example, has also lowered prices for buyers of computers and smartphones in this country. It is clear that international leading experts are divided on such issue.

Mikko Huotari’s prediction that the pandemic had also led to a crisis of legitimacy in China appears correct if applied to the Western world and wrong, if applied to the domestic audience in China. In Chinese social media, the deteriorating health situation in Western countries was perceived as an expression of the failure of these countries to cope with the pandemic.Footnote 5 After an initial period of social media criticism of the handling of the pandemic in Wuhan, the initial successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic strengthened the legitimacy of the CCP. The more recent draconian lockdowns and measures tied to the Zero-Tolerance policy of the CPP however, are creating a lot of discontent among the Chinese populations, which is difficult to assess fully, at the time of writing (October 2022) as the lockdowns is still ongoing and will last for sure until at least after the Party Congress in the fall.

A report from 2020, on “Covid-19 and European-China Relations” claimed that German media in general were rather good in distinguishing between the different roles China played during the pandemic, ranging from a source of the problem to a sources of crisis response as well as a partner for developing joint-resolutions (see also [ETNC] 2020: 27; Pongratz 2020). It remains thus unclear to what degree COVID-19 pandemic has impacted German-Chinese relations.

In November 2020, a hearing dealing with human rights issues in China (Bundestag 2020) showed a more critical attitude towards the CCP, already in its incipit with summary stating: “The experts are genuinely concerned about the human rights situation in China. The majority of the experts accused the Chinese government of disregarding and violating basic human rights. The German government must also take more decisive countermeasures here”. Wenzel Michalski (Human Rights Watch Germany) is quoted as saying, “Arbitrary mass arrests, torture and mistreatment of members of the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region are ‘the order of the day’”. Representatives of various NGOs were even more critical: Kai Müller (International Campaign for Tibet Association) talked of: “Active assimilation, indoctrination and control policy” and “Sinicization policy”. Lea Zhou (freelance journalist) mentioned: “Extrajudicial brainwashing institutions”, while Sayragul Sauytbay (whistle-blower) talked of: “Genocide, torture, brainwashing, slave labour and killings”. Finally, Adrian Zenz (European School of Culture and Theology), the German anthropologist known for his studies of the Xinjiang internment camps and Uyghur genocide, spoke of an “increasingly totalitarian” China. In this very same report, Mechthild Leutner, on the other hand, described the widespread criticism of human rights violations in China as “mainly motivated by foreign policy” and referred to the security and terrorism problems in Xinjiang. It thus becomes clear how the German China debate has become very much polarized and crystallized around pro-China or anti-China groups. While reports by the Chinese government and by Chinese academics are often quickly labelled as propaganda, voices critical of the CCP are immediately labelled as part of a “New Cold War” anti-China grouping. International media outlets paint a predominantly negative picture of China, while reports by NGOs and whistle-blowers are often mistaken as objective reports. There also seems to be a lack of critical evaluation (or lack of knowledge) of CCP opponents and critical outlets, such as the Falungong magazine Epoch Time, and the increasing influence of US-led evangelical groups in the anti-China camp.

A similar polarization of “pro” or “against” can likewise be found in the field of social sciences research on China, which was reflected in the German press and various social media, and took the form of various disagreements and back and forth between Eberhard Sandschneider and Andreas Fulda and later on, between the latter (and a few more colleagues) on one side and Björn Alpermann and Gunter Schubert on the other; the latter arguing against a moral crusade and an increasingly polarized German China debate.Footnote 6 The first widely recited article “China bashing is booming” in July 2021 was written by Eberhard Sandschneider, who held a professorship in Chinese politics and international relations at Freie Universität Berlin from 1998 to 2020 (Sandschneider 2021). From 2003 to 2016, he was also Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Sandschneider complains of a double standard in dealing with China: “The U.S. talks about values, but they mean geopolitical influence. The Europeans also talk about values, but they mean economic interests”. He strictly rejects sanctions: “Sanctions don’t help anyone, certainly not the people in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Instead of verbal armament and the military show of force of times past, the West should seek dialogue with Beijing. After all, everyone knows that the world’s problems can only be solved with China and not against it”. Sandschneider, in an answer to some of the questions in this volume, also makes clear: “First, we should not indulge in delusions of grandeur that we can ‘manage’ China’s rise. China cannot be managed from the outside, just as it cannot be contained, for that matter”. In particular, he criticizes US administrations, both Trump and Biden, for still believing they can stop China’s rise instead of facing the reality that China’s rise is unstoppable. He is sharply critical of the willingness to use ever harsher language on China policy, which can be found nowadays in almost all political parties’ platforms. He also warns against focusing on the usual irritant issues: Criticism of China’s policies in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the Indo-Pacific region, which he describes as the standard repertoire of moralizing foreign policy with a clear reference to values but otherwise quiet little factual competence. Finally, he concludes: What might a less moralizing China policy look like? Ideally, it should consist of at least three steps.

  1. (1)

    Military restraint; Europe is not a Pacific power and would be well advised to urge both the United States and China to reduce the potential for military conflict. Here, he specifically mentions the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific.

  2. (2)

    Sanctions prevent dialogue: In the art of diplomacy, it is important to leave things unsaid, especially when they are obvious. With regard to Xinjiang, using events in Xinjiang as a reason for sanctions, as the European Union has just done, ensures domestic political approval and media applause, but does not help the people in the affected regions. Instead, it only tempts China into acts of defiance and ensures that even the last channel of dialogue is blocked.

  3. (3)

    Talking to China: The tone makes the music: Instead of relying on aggressive accusations and military threatening gestures, a less popular strategy seems to have the potential to be the silver bullet in the long run after all: namely, dialogue with China on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet?

His conclusion is that the rise of China does not mean the demise of the West, but it does indicate the necessity to abandon the fatal “either-or” binary understandings of the China-West relationship.

A similar argumentation can be found in Berthold Kuhn’s article in the same journal, namely China.Table (Kuhn 2021). He criticizes EU policy towards China in general: “Basically, the question arises as to the sense and effect of politically motivated sanctions, such as those imposed on China. … And with regard to China, it is not to be expected that the sanctions will trigger a process that will improve Europe’s relations with China and thus open up opportunities for influence.” Kuhn specifically mentions the EU’s 22 March 2021, sanctions against Chinese officials and institutions in Xinjiang. China has responded to the sanctions imposed by the EU. For example, in addition to some politicians, academic institutions in Europe are also affected, including the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). The sanctions have hit many young scholars hard, those who joined MERICS after successfully graduating, often producing high-quality analysis, and have been subjected to the sanctions, due to the institute’s China stance.

On the other side of the spectrum, Andreas Fulda, represents a critical voice in regards to the CCP and firmly believes that German policy towards China, since Schröder’s chancellorship, has been largely determined by the commercial interests of the German private sector (Fulda 2020). While such a corporatist approach has ensured huge commercial gains for the country, it is problematic when business lobbyists dictate the parameters of Germany’s China policy. He recommends that, “A new German China policy must critically address the systemic totalitarian tendencies of the Xi regime. To this end, the German government should establish an interdepartmental staff unit for dealing with authoritarian states, which would make recommendations for action to both” (Fulda 2020). Thus, Sandschneider and Kuhn very much propose to maintain a dialogue, which we can fit into the above mentioned “hedging” subzone of “binding engagement” with China, positioning the EU and Germany firmly in the middle between the United States and China, while Fulda supports a “soft balancing” position with the aim to form an alliance between Europe, the United States, and other states such as Australia and Southeast Asian nations to join forces to rein in China’s expansionistic mire. In this same context, Chinese FDIs in Europe and in Germany are seen as one of the biggest threat (see also Bloomfield 2016: 264).

A further point of discussion worth noting in the German panorama is a study published by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation at the end of 2021 entitled “China Reporting in German Media in the Context of the Corona Crisis” (Jia et al. 2021). The study attests to the dissemination of colonial stereotypes and the creation of the image of an enemy in the China reporting of the German leading media and thus goes beyond Sandschneider’s criticism of moralizing foreign policy and reporting stagnation. The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation states: “Negatively connoted statements … can be found on almost all topics, but especially on the characterization of Chinese domestic and foreign policy”. At the same time, “the historical and current complexity of the conflicts” that preoccupy Chinese politics is hardly addressed. The study underscores the one-sidedness of the coverage by pointing out that 88% of all posts on Chinese domestic politics are rated “critical” or “very critical”; the “neutral posts” only 9.4%—referred “predominantly to concrete events,” such as the postponement of the National People’s Congress, while there were only four contributions “in which the common practice of ‘measuring’ China’s political and social system against the West is not adhered to”, but in which the country “is accorded an intrinsic value, taking into account its cultural background and social reality” Above all, “the influence of the newly fomented thesis …” in the United States that China is a threat “not only to the U.S. claim to leadership, but to the entire world” is evident. This clearly “revives threat scenarios that originated in colonial and anti-communist contexts”.

Andreas Fulda responded to this study, stating that the study on China reporting misses the political reality (Fulda 2020). Overall, he accused the study of being “distant from practice and uncritical of rule”. His first accusation is that the study pretends that there has been no practical engagement of the West with China in the last forty years. In doing so, the study creates the impression, Fulda says, that the media are exclusively responsible for creation of a negative image of China in Germany. Fulda also mentions that the description of Xi Jinping makes clear how uncritically the three authors of the report analyse China. In the study, they speak of a “narrative of the communist dictator”. To this Fulda retorts that the political reality is that Xi has created a personality cult, ended collective leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee, and clearly rejected liberalization and democratization of the country.

Andreas Fulda, also published a longer article “The Chinese Communist Party’s Hybrid Interference and Germany’ s Increasingly Contentious China Debate (2018–21)” (Fulda 2022). This article basically consists of two parts, the first part describing what he calls the “United Front Strategy of China, and the second part titled “Germany’s increasingly contentious China debate (2018–21)” in which he further calls for a more confrontational stance. In his report, Fulda mainly criticizes German sinologists and their “cultural relativism” what he terms as six discourses. In brief these are: (1) Playing down valid empirical evidence of victimization/oppression in order to appease Chinese authorities. (2) Trivializing the significance of anti-democratic CCP edicts and/or antiliberal CCP policies. (3) Recommending “silent diplomacy” while keeping tight-lipped about obstacles to dialogue. (4) Prescribing academic cooperation with China without addressing the issue of access. (5) Extolling the virtues of neutrality in Asian Studies and discouraging positionality. (6) Acknowledging political censorship without offering practical and applicable solutions.

The varied and deeply polarized along “ideological” fault lines discussions among Germany’s sinologists and policy analysts are having a deep influence on the new China policy of the German government under Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock.

The New Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock

The change from Heiko Maas (SPD) to Annalena Baerbock (The Greens) as foreign minister of Germany will likely change the previous German attitude towards China more radically. With the exception of Kiesinger, most German chancellors were actively involved in setting the parameters for German foreign policy after World War II. With respect to China (as well as Russia), Olaf Scholz seems to be more in line with the previous chancellor, Angela Merkel (von Hein 2021). This underscores Germany’s special role between the United States and China/Russia, both in terms of policy and economic relations. Annalena Baerbock, however, as well as the third coalition partner, the FDP, have expressed significantly more reservations about China, and while the Greens once advocated strict pacifism and the dissolution of NATO, they now emphasize the West’s shared values and openly promote a common strategy against what they perceive as China’s human rights abuses.Footnote 7 Annalena Baerbock’s decision to replace Miguel Berger, a “senior official in the Foreign Office”, with Andreas Michaelis could also be a sign of a new perspective on German foreign policy”—one should keep in mind that Michaelis is a member of the Green Party, but not necessarily a proponent of the concept of a “values-based foreign policy (Spiegel 2021)”. An article in the Diplomat described Baerbock’s policy and her commitment to a “values-based foreign policy” as a “paradigm shift” (Falk 2021). Baerbock herself had given an interview to the left-green Tageszeitung on December 1 in which she explained her vision (taz 2021). “Eloquent silence is not diplomacy in the long run, even if some have seen it that way in recent years”, and further “A values-based foreign policy must always be an interplay of dialogue and consistency”, Baerbock stressed. Moreover, she also proposed an import ban on products from Xinjiang. Nevertheless, Baerbock merely summarized the coalition agreement, in which China’s internal affairs will play a greater role for the new government in the future. The coalition agreement echoes the EU’s slogan that policy towards China should be shaped “in partnership, in competition and in systemic rivalry”. It can be concluded that the agreement also commits to the elaboration of a “comprehensive China strategy” as part of the common EU-China policy, although this will not be easy to achieve; in fact, countries such as Hungary, Lithuania and Czechia have very different ideas about how to deal with China (and relations between the two sides of the Strait).

The question remains, if the EU will be able to establish a common China policy. Recently, It was proposed that Brussels would impose collective sanctions if an EU country were punished from outside (von Marschall 2022), an action Merkel would have strictly opposed. Acting this way, the EU is edging further towards the “dominance denial” subzone (Bloomfield 2016: 264), which in turn could provoke further economic woes with China, in the near future.

In addition, Annalena Baerbock emphasized the importance of transatlantic relations during her inaugural visit to Washington as Foreign Minister, stating that “as Europeans, we have no stronger partner than the USA” (Leithäuser 2022). Also the official website of the foreign ministry was updated and mentioned that Baerbock is also counting on good transatlantic coordination in China policy (Auswärtiges Amt 2022b). The foreign policy expert Omid Nouripour, who is running for the Green Party presidency, told the newspapers of the Funke Mediengruppe before Baerbock’s visit to the United States: “The Europeans must strive for their own sovereignty”. He said there were voices in the United States calling for a complete decoupling from China. “That is neither desirable nor realistic”. European interests are not congruent with American ones, he said. “Nevertheless, it is of great importance to cultivate and deepen a partnership based on common values—regardless of who is sitting in the Oval Office and the Chancellor’s Office at the moment” (Auswärtiges Amt 2022b). Germany, not being located close to China and having no border conflicts, remained, under the Merkel’s administration, firmly within the boundaries of the “economic pragmatism” subzone, implying enthusiastic trading and relative openness to Chinese FDI (Bloomfield 2016). The “binding engagement” subzone meant engaging China and encouraging it to participate in regional institutions. This posture is also partly observable in Germany as the role of a multilateral engagement was and is often stressed as of crucial importance.

The new government, on the other hand, emphasizes both the need for a transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States, when dealing with China as well as its opposition to a stronger decoupling. The latter solution has followers and supporters in the United States and is also favoured in some academic circles in China, where the official policy emphasizes Chinese economic independence, but no total decoupling. Since after Annalena Baerbock has assumed the post of Foreign Minister, the big incognita remains how pragmatic Baerbock and Scholz will be towards China, especially after the war in the Ukraine. The new German government, and especially the two smaller coalition partners, the Greens, and the FDP, have clearly shifted from “economic pragmatism” towards “dominated denial”, closer to the balancing zone but it remains to be seen how this will play out especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. To this extent, increasingly more media articles report that the German industrial sector is trying to divert its investments to other parts of East and Southeast Asia (Zapf 2022). Baerbock also sharply criticized Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who at the Munich Security Conference spoke out in favour of some kind of neutral status for Ukraine. “Ukraine should be a bridge connecting West and East, not a front line” she said. And Baerbock was quoted as calling the unity between Moscow and Beijing as “Dangerous” (Zapf 2022).

Furthermore, Germany is officially going through the so-called Zeitenwende, a term which was coined with regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine after Chancellor Scholz himself called the invasion a “Zeitenwende” in the history of the European continent. The government’s official translation for that term is “watershed”, but, as with many German compound nouns, the original has a richer meaning: it is the change of an era. What Scholz announced constitutes a dramatic shift in defence posture and spending. And this has a dramatic impact also on China as the idea of “change through trade” is dead (Tausendfreund 2022). Baerbock Commenting on economic relations Baerbock recently stated: “one-sided economic alignments in fact make us vulnerable. Not just with regard to Russia”. And the German Chamber of Commerce in China conducted a flash survey in which almost half (46%) of the respondents believed that China’s attractiveness had decreased, due to the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, this will not immediately remove economic interdependence with China built over decades. That there is a tendency, however, to decouple economically and to distance oneself politically, as shown in the introductory chapter to present volume, is also visible in politicians’ speeches and official acts. For example, in his first visit in an official capacity to Asia, Olaf Scholz went to Japan, unlike his two predecessor Merkel and Schröder, who went to China.

Conclusions

In its March 2019 Strategic Outlook, the European Commission describes China as a systemic competitor, but also as a crucial global player and leading technological power. For a long time, in the West, the predominant assumption was that only democracies and market economies can create prosperity for their populations. China disproves the argument that only with a democratic system, can a country attain a certain level of wealth, as hundreds of millions of people have risen from absolute poverty to the middle class.Footnote 8

As shown in the chapter, Europe’s broader response to China’s rise and the cooperation with partners across the Atlantic or in the Indo-Pacific region has also become the focus of political discourse in Berlin. During the election campaign, it was addressed in particular by the Greens’ candidate for chancellor, Annalena Baerbock, but it is also attracting increasing attention in conservative and social democratic circles in Germany. It is early to tell, however, whether Germany will follow the United States and Australia, both of which emphasize the West’s systemic conflict with China, or whether it will carve out a niche for itself and maintain a more autonomous posture. In fact, While Annalena Baerbock seems to have placed her focus on transatlantic relations and willingness to side with the United States, it is still very unclear how and to what extent a values-based foreign policy will be pursued in future. The pressure from German businesses on the new government is likely to increase, especially since Chancellor Scholz himself is known for his pro-business position and the SPD itself is far less critical of China, than its coalition partners. That Olaf Scholz would therefore engage in a direct confrontation with China blindly following the Green Party’s vision, seems rather implausible at the time of writing in November 2022. Scholz will likely continue to emphasize the need for a “strategic autonomy” posture on part of the EU; “limited bandwagoning” remains more desirable for the new government than “hard-soft balancing”. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Scholz will discontinue the tradition of previous chancellors being heavily involved in foreign policy decisions and generally “setting the course”. Baerbock will thus have to try and reconcile the demands of her party’s values-based foreign policy, demanding a tougher line on China on human rights issues, with a more pragmatic course set by “Realpolitiker” Scholz. Despite the goals of the coalition agreement, the lofty idea of a values-based foreign policy in post-Merkel Germany could be hollowed out before it even begins. At the time of the Merkel Era, the imperative of focusing on expanding and deepening trade relations with China while hoping that the country would slowly integrate into the rules-based international order made sense. In fact, significant opportunities for Europeans, and especially German, companies were available through the Chinese market; especially among Chinese business elites, there was a palpable willingness to reform; and the time was ripe for building closer ties.

Presently, due to the high volatility of the geopolitical environment in both Europe and Asia, where market concerns have given way to security concerns, policy adjustments will be necessary; not only to achieve key economic policy goals for improving business opportunities for the German industrial sector, but also for maintaining the country’s innovative edge and creating jobs at home and abroad. Germany, like many other countries in Europe and Asia, is now confronted by a much more polarized political and academic debate regarding China and engagement versus decoupling. There is, however, no question that Germany’s China policy will encounter new challenges especially after the Ukraine war. The policy “Change through trade” seems to have vanished into oblivion and it is likely that China will be regarded more as a “systemic rival” in the future; this will further impact economic relations between Germany and China. Germany will likely attempt to maintain good economic relations with China, while at the same time investments will be diversified and politically a stronger alliance with Western nations will be strived for. Thus, Germany will continue to move further towards the “balancing zone”, shifting at times between “economic pragmatism” “dominance denial” and “soft balancing” according to the issue at stake, but remaining within the hedging zone. Specific developments will directly depend on the evolution of the United States domestic and international political situation and of course on developments in China. As discussed, the Chinese government is still committed to a multipolar world order and hopes for an increasing role of the EU as a stronger geopolitical actor. The term “Systemic Rivalry”, however—an integral part of the EU’s official vocabulary when referring to China since March 2019—seems to have become a defining prism for the relationship, with both Germany as well as France eager to promote a common EU policy towards China (Parello-Plesner and China 2022). It is thus likely that we shall continue to see the upholding of this newfound unity in the European and Transatlantic position against China, which has been further reinforced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and common concerns against autocracies.