The Individual and Society

Abstract

In this chapter, the authors’ own theoretical foundations are outlined. Their theory of the individual comes from Klaus Holzkamp’s Critical Psychology. For Critical Psychology, humans stand out from animals because they produce their own living conditions such as houses, infrastructure, language or state, racism and market, and therefore can change them. According to Critical Psychology, humans have both sensual-vital needs such as the pursuit of food or shelter, and productive needs to participate in the disposition of the societal conditions in order to secure the sources of need satisfaction. They understand society as a material, symbolic and social framework for action that has a certain degree of independence. Society is determined by forms of mediation via market, state planning, self-organisation and so on. This mediation can provide a logic of inclusion that promotes solidary and just action, or a logic of exclusion that prompts living at the expense of others to satisfy one’s own needs.

We will now concentrate on the theoretical foundation of our own approach. In Chaps. 3 and 4 we lay the basis for a transvolution and utopia theory. We have created a theoretical space, and now we would like to fill it with some of our own furniture. In line with our reasoning, we must first concentrate on the substantive content of the utopia theory, because we have to begin by understanding what we aim at before we can look at how to get there. So, we will start with the theoretical basis of our utopia. Provided it rests firmly on this basis, those who agree with our basis can also agree with our utopia. However, by all means, one could also agree with our utopia from a different theoretical perspective. The discourse on utopia has a scientific basis: we can argue about our (and other) theoretical foundations. The frustrating and non-scientific “take it or leave it” thus becomes a scientific dispute about utopia. Our theoretical basis rests on two pillars: a theory of the individual and a theory of society. These two theories are interconnected, for they deal with the same object: the relation of individual and society. Nevertheless, they must be distinguished. They require different methods. They view the same context from two different perspectives: the individual and society. Our theory of the individual is based on Kritische Psychologie (Berlin School of Critical Psychology), although we try to overcome its traditional-Marxist elements. Our theory of society rests on neo-Marxist studies, which we also claim to extend.

1 Theory of the Individual

Klaus Holzkamp and his fellow theorists laid the foundation of Critical Psychology at the Free University of Berlin in the 1970s. They did not intend to examine and describe human behaviour on an experimental-statistical basis; aiming big, they wanted to understand the inner dynamics of the psyche. Like Marx’s Political Economy, Critical Psychology is not content with phenomena on the surface but wants to get to the bottom of the psyche. This programme requires an understanding of what is typically human. What makes the human, human? That is the question of a scientific concept of the human being. Importantly, a concept of the human being fundamentally differs from a “view of the human being”. A concept of the human being is the result of a certified scientific process, a view of the human being rests on ascribing ontological properties. The scientific concept of the human being was developed by Critical Psychology in a historical categorical analysis (cf. Meretz 2012, 2017c). See below for more.

A concept of the human being is supposed to represent what is generally human; not historically specific, not how we only experience humans in present-day capitalism, but what makes the human being human. Looking at concrete people who live within a specific society involves the risk of mistaking actions that are encouraged by society for generally human. An example of this is to consider the satisfaction of egoistic interests at the expense of others as a general human behaviour and declare it a natural feature (also called “ontologisation” or “naturalisation”), instead of treating it as a realisation of possible actions under certain conditions.

But how can we possibly examine the “subject matter” of the theory of the individual? How can a categorical analysis referring to the subject be achieved at all? The human being did not fall from the sky. The human species is a product of natural history, of an evolutionary process. In his groundbreaking book Grundlegung der Psychologie (1983; working title: Foundation of Psychology, available in German only, cf. Tolman 1994)—which established the foundations of Critical Psychology—Klaus Holzkamp tries to reconstruct the forming of human nature in the course of the evolutionary process. Historical grounding protects Critical Psychology from the temptation of declaring societal-specific actions to be general human behaviour. And it opens up the possibility to understand the particular quality of human life in contrast to other forms of life.

Altruistic Trap

Egoism is to do something following only one’s own interests, regardless of others. Altruism, on the other hand, is about doing things merely for others, regardless of oneself. It is true that people can postpone their needs for the sake of others. But can altruism be expected to be a general principle? This would create a society in which the individual restricts itself for the sake of “others” or “society”. The general rule would be “community or society before the individual”. This element can be found in fascism but also in socialism, and many interpersonal ideas of community, which tell the positive story of admirable people, put the well-being of the community before their own.

Oscillating between egoism and altruism does not meet human agency. Even mainstream psychological theory has discovered that people act for others to feel better. But things become more complicated when considering the whole of society. At the societal level, we can only be free and happy if all other people are also free and happy. Because it is only then that other people have no reason to restrict our agency. Freedom and happiness cannot be gained individually, in isolation, separately and limitedly. We will expand on that below.

1.1 The Concept of Human Being

This might set off alarm bells: some researchers have the audacity to state what “human being” and “human nature” is about. As much as they might have reflected on their views and might have a friendly disposition, they only want to legitimise their own assumptions and hopes by fixing their view of manhood onto the human being. This impulse is in many cases legitimised but, as a result, numerous emancipatory, critical theories totally exclude an entire field of knowledge. The point is not if we must talk about the human being—there is no question about that. We must, in the name of knowledge and to decide whether we people are actually capable of fulfilling the emancipatory hope of a society free from domination. The point, however, is how can we speak about us?

Human Essence

The concept of the human being differs not only from a view of the human being but also from assumptions about the essence of the human being. According to the latter, the essence represents the “actual human being as such”, from whom people have become alienated at present. The real “being human” presumably still remains unattained. A “should” is derived from this: the human being should free itself from this alienation and uncover its true humanity. This idea is present in the writings of the early Marx, for example, but also in all those statements trying to distinguish between “true” and “wrong” needs, “real” and “fabricated”. But all needs are “true”. They develop under certain societal conditions. That includes striving for →power (p. 4) over other people. Each society is human insofar as it realises human possibilities. However, we can try to investigate whether a more satisfying form of realising human potential has been known and experienced so far. This is exactly what most concepts of “real” aim at. However, we cannot delegitimise needs as “unreal” from the outside; we can only question them and look into societal possibilities that allow us to lead a more satisfying life. In order to be able to specify these possibilities, we need a concept of the human being.

Affirmative as well as emancipatory approaches are characterised by a particular form of reflecting on the human: images of humans. Such images are present in our entire world. One, in particular, is used decisively to legitimise the capitalist system: the human being is supposedly egoistic by nature. If limits were not imposed on human beings, they would satisfy their →needs (p. 113) again and again at the expense of the needs of others.

How do the representatives of emancipatory approaches react to this claim? They normally give examples (e.g., families and friends) where people take into account the needs of others. They remind you that reality contradicts that egoistic idea of humans. However, their critics justifiably ask: is it possible to form a whole society on a non-egoistic basis? Trying to prove this, we land on the →altruistic trap (p. 111). The problem here is that one abstract idea of what is human is criticised from the position of another abstract idea of what is human: “The human is bad. – No, the human is good!” Many serious thinkers at this point will say: “Humans are neither good nor bad, they are capable of both”. But in what situations do humans act “right” or “wrong”? The answer depends on which actions are suggested by the current conditions and, therefore, are functional from a personal point of view. Conditions are not static and do not fall from the sky: people produce the societal conditions under which they act. This dual relation—to produce conditions and to experience them as the preconditional frame of one’s own actions—is vital for a concept of the human being.

People are neither clever nor stupid, neither white nor black, neither necessarily good nor always bad. We people develop under the societal conditions we have produced. These recommend a specific course of action, such as an excluding or inclusive behaviour. Both lie within the space of possibilities, they are part of the human potential. The concept of the human being allows us to recognise this human space of possibilities. This concept must make conceivable all that is evil and all that is good in human actions. Our concept of the human being does not enshrine people; it determines their possibilities. We do not say what they are but what they can be. And consequently, we also say what people cannot do, what possibilities are out of their reach. So now, on the basis of what—in our view—is the most suitable theory, Critical Psychology, we would like to develop the concept of the human being and ask ourselves what lies within the human space of possibilities, what is available to the people.

Needs

An individual’s needs determine his/her interior status and the resulting readiness to act—discernible as wish, ambition, motivation or desire. Needs are not isolated, interiorised, and static characteristics of an individual; they undergo changes depending on the degree and possibility of their satisfaction. Therefore, needs are constantly emotionally rated and related to the societal environment and the incorporated possibilities of action. As needs and the means for meeting these needs are interconnected, both change in the course of societal development. New means for the satisfaction of needs produce new needs—and vice versa. Thus, the smartphone satisfied new communication needs and, at the same time, produced them. The general aspect lies in the fact that all specific needs involve a productive dimension of disposal over means of satisfaction and a sensual-vital dimension of enjoyment (cf. p. 117).

1.2 The Societal Nature of the Human Being

Humans are a social species. We live together with other people, and only in this relationship can we survive and unfold our humanity. Only in relationships can we learn, be protected, evolve and subsist. Early humanity—the hominines—lived almost exclusively within stable interpersonal social groupings. They were directly connected with each other through cooperative relationships. These cooperative connections were based on direct personal interactions in social proximity. For all parties involved it was clear who is doing what for whom, and in which way their own contributions were necessary elements for the livelihood of the social community. If somebody did not contribute, the community was in trouble. It depended on the individual. Direct social cohesion was all the hominines had. They lived socially but not societally. Not until the homo sapiens evolved was the mere interpersonal level of the social community overcome.

During the homo sapiens era, people are connected to people they do not know, to people they will never get to know. Nevertheless, they work for each other. How do they do it? The hominines already went beyond simply adapting to the natural conditions they came upon. At first it was just some tools, clothing, and dwellings; however, the production* of conditions of living (cf. p. 10) gets more and more complex and diverse. It possesses the characteristics of proactively making provisions: the social community secures its future existence by producing its own living conditions. The separate communities of hominines are in contact with each other. Occasionally, an individual switches its social community (e.g., to avoid incest), and there is also a sporadic exchange of products. But as long as the connectedness with other communities—mediated on a material-social basis—is too weak to contribute to the existence of the separate groups to a considerable or even indispensable extent, the whole burden of livelihood rests within the respective social community. However, its cooperative reach and complexity is limited, and this can be life-threatening in emergency situations.

This is a barrier that homo sapiens left behind. Connectedness, mediated on a material basis, is vital here. Means are no more produced only to be used in the group but, moreover, for the sharing and exchange of products and knowledge and the establishment of continuous social connections, crossing the boundaries between groups. These means, in turn, can be used for common activities, for example, as means for hunting, involving the whole group, or means for building dwellings. Little by little, the proactive production* of living conditions overcomes the limit of the group and increasingly includes other groups. By creating stable networks that exceed the group, larger cooperative connections can arise (“tribes” etc.) which become increasingly important for the provisions of the individual groups and their members. Rare and irregular connections between groups are replaced by substantially mediated networking as this provides a survival benefit. With homo sapiens as actor, the proactive production* of living conditions exceeded the mere interpersonal-direct group frame and opened the door to a transpersonally mediated space of society. The level of direct cooperation is broadened by the new level of mediated societal cooperation. More and more, the individual’s life does not solely depend on the survival of the social community anymore but on that of the society. What is central here is that the new, steadily growing societal space of possibilities is created by more and more people who have no direct relationship. That is what transpersonal mediation is about, and it enormously extends the survival probability of the human species. Societality is the decisive new feature of evolution, that which makes humanity really human. Societality—and, thus, the ability for individual socialisation, for participation in the societal context—is a natural-genetic feature of the human being. Its societal nature is its human capacity to build a society according to its needs.

1.2.1 Relation of Possibility and Freedom

In the evolutionary process leading to homo sapiens, the comprehensive societal network develops such a stability and self-sustaining ability that the direct need for concrete individuals to take part in the cooperative reproduction is reduced. Although it goes without saying that the contributions needed for the preservation of the society must be met, for the individual, societal necessities increasingly become mere possibilities for action. In the social community of hominines it was still vital that individuals carry out the functions they were in charge of. These necessities were quite obvious, since the existence of the group and their own existence were connected in an apparent and tangible manner. That is not so with the societally mediated form of life: here the necessities of society are possibilities for the individual. Thus, the individual can keep a distance from its circumstances. It can decide for or against acting. For the individual, the world represents a realm of possibilities, and it gains freedom from the immediate conditions. That enables a conscious behaviour towards the world. Freedom and consciousness are two sides of the same coin.

Due to this relation of possibility, there are now two ways to match societal necessities and individual possibilities: either the people are forced to do it or they do it voluntarily. This opposition is not quite true, for coercion always includes some degree of acceptance. Thus, the work principle (cf. p. 22) in capitalism forces people to fulfil the necessities, but the coercion is never absolute; there are also elements of →voluntariness (p. 144). In addition, there is a wide range of interpretative patterns which make the coercion appear as a voluntary choice.¹ Throughout history, most forms of society were characterised by the primacy of coercion. However, a society with its societal necessities being actually met by voluntary action could allow for the human capacity to unfold in a socially unrestricted manner. Coercion would lose its function, and society could develop much stronger, because individual motivation (cf. p. 119) would constantly drive the societal possibilities to satisfy needs. This society of voluntariness remains the utopian horizon.

1.2.2 Distance of Recognition and Societal Awareness

With homo sapiens, the material, symbolic and social conditions are no longer the epitome of necessities but form a space of possibilities. Being able to step out of the immediate necessities of existence allows us to distance ourselves from the circumstances. And distance allows for a pause, weighing, reflexion—consciousness. The individuals are no longer inhibited by their immediate subsistence; they can adopt a conscious, reflecting distance from the world and themselves. Consciousness develops as a relation of understanding the world and ourselves.

Consciousness and social awareness are not the same. Individual consciousness is the capacity to recognise the world and oneself. Social awareness is the degree of knowledge about the organisation of one’s own conditions of life. Therefore, social awareness is consciousness of the societal mediation of one’s own existence. If the individual considers its immediate living environment to be the whole world, it can consciously roam in this vicinity, but it will not develop a reasonable degree of awareness of society. To be sure, the relevant societal living conditions dominate one’s own living environment, but remain unrecognised and, thus, out of dispositional reach. The individual does not utilise its societal capacity. Consciousness is an individual characteristic, whereas social awareness exceeds individuality and can only be gained collectively. I cannot recognise the whole of society on my own. I can only achieve social awareness together with others. Social awareness is collective consciousness.

The Concept of Inclusion

In recent discourse, the concept of inclusion is closely linked to the inclusion of people with disabilities. In this case, inclusion refers not only to certain groups but, in a general sense, to the inclusion of all people in their particularity—that is, at least, the claim. While integration means placing the “other” into a predefined common feature, inclusion does not imply an opposition of commonness and particularity, which it can integrate or not, but thrives on the diversity of the particularity and constantly changes in the face of the new particularity. Inclusion aims at “togetherness in diversity”; this dimension of the inclusion concept we want to stress. However, we notice that inclusion is dependant not only on our culture and our attitudes, but also on how the dominant →logic of exclusion (p. 17) is suggested by societal conditions. The attempt to achieve general inclusion must necessarily involve the creation of conditions that support the logic of inclusion, in which my needs are best served by including others.

1.2.3 Productive and Sensual-Vital Dimensions of Needs

But can we not do without awareness and the conscious collective disposition over our living conditions? That is basically possible. However, a renunciation is always connected with the fear that “external” conditions might change and infringe on one’s own existence and quality of life. The urge to secure one’s own existence in the long term has evolutionarily developed as the productive need to dispose over the proactive production* of living conditions. Strictly speaking, this is not about “one need”; each and every need possesses a productive dimension, apart from its sensual-vital dimension of enjoyment. To enjoy the food that is currently available is one thing, to have the power of disposal over food in the long run is another. In this context, “power of disposal overfood” does not necessarily mean to produce it oneself. Hunger only seems to be a sensual-vital need; but it develops a particularly destructive power if I do not have the choice of partaking in the social disposition over my life conditions in such a form that I will not be hungry in future. This is the productive dimension. And it is the poor, in particular, who are most clearly excluded from participating in the disposal of their living conditions in this world.

1.2.4 Agency

Generally speaking, in societies with a division of activities we mutually produce the means for the satisfaction of our sensual-vital needs. Therefore, the productive dimension of needs presents itself as the desire to participate in the disposal of the proactive production* of life conditions. I am oriented towards seeing my needs integrated in the way the production* of life conditions is organised. This vital importance of proactive disposal is why Critical Psychology calls agency the “prime need of life”. Agency means disposal of one’s own life conditions through participation in the disposal of the societal process. Depending on the form of society and the particular societal conditions, this participation can manifest itself in excluding or including relationships with others (cf. Chap. 5, 2.2). If the societal conditions urge people to satisfy their needs at my expense, I am induced to try to control my relevant life conditions and the people involved. The need to participate then becomes a need to control. I aim at organising the conditions according to my needs. I feel the need for →power (p. 4) over others—this is where Nietzsche’s “The Will to Power” (2017) finds its societal base. Society then materialises as the battle of all the opposing individual needs for control. Control is always precarious and fragile, even if I were to control the whole world. Because other people have sound reasons to resist and escape control in order to prevent their needs from coming second. This triggers my fear of others taking away my control. However, this anxiety, in turn, contaminates my satisfaction of disposal through control: I cannot be sure of my proactive satisfaction of needs, but I must worry about it. Anxiety is the general feeling that runs through exclusion societies. This hints at an explanation of the “authoritarian tendencies” of exclusion conditions: people wish for a strong authority—a state or a Leviathan, as in Hobbes’² novel, a leader—which will cushion the free-for-all battle, moderate, manage and decide according to their needs. At the same time, there is absolutely no reason why there should not be a second option; we can organise our participation in the disposal of the production* of our life conditions not only in excluding but also in inclusive relationships. Not in opposition but together. For that purpose, we need societal conditions that encourage inclusion, the integration of the needs of others. Such an inclusive common disposal would be free from angst, for I would not have to be afraid of others trying to deny my needs by exclusion. I cannot reach this individually; I can only participate in a collective disposal.³ In its most satisfying form, people exercise their participation through inclusive relations with others. As it were, they care for me as I do for them. As societal people, we always depend on others. However, in inclusive conditions this dependency would not be accompanied by anxiety; it would be interconnected through trust.

1.2.5 Emotionality and Motivation

Emotions establish a connection between my needs and the world. They evaluate the environment according to my perception. For hominines, who lived only in immediate relationships, a sufficiently strong emotion directly triggered an activity. For societal human beings, however, the connection between emotions and activity is no more a direct one, it is a problematic one. I must explore my emotions and mentally establish the connection between my needs and the world to find out what possible action is best for me. Due to the relation between possibility and the world, my emotions do not determine my actions anymore, but I can and must relate to them. I can use their evaluating function as a means, as a source of knowledge, to examine my relation to the world. Thus, feeling and thinking, emotionality and rationality, are not opposites. Only through our emotions can we experience and understand our relation to the world. Therefore, manipulating or denying one’s emotions is self-damaging. Denying my emotion means denying my needs means denying myself.

The societal mediation of existence also has an influence on motivation. Motivation is a future-related evaluation. It evaluates the future results of a current activity by relating envisaged positive changes in the quality of life to the efforts and risks involved. If this cognitive-emotional assessment comes to a positive conclusion, it can result in a motivated activity. This assessment of possibilities and efforts involved depends on an actual interconnection between societal participation and one’s livelihood, on whether it is conceivable and, thus, recognisable at the societal as well as individual level. Will I really improve my quality of life if I take part in the cooperation? At the immediate-cooperative level of the hominines, the connection between one’s own participation in the cooperation and one’s livelihood was obvious, so to speak. Provided it was relevant, the motivated activity took place. However, at the societal level, one’s insight regarding the connection between societal participation and one’s own existence is not self-evident anymore, it is problematic. I can act according to my insight in a conscious manner, but this insight might be wrong. And vice versa, people can act even if they lack awareness of the connection, if they are forced or force themselves to do so. However, in this case the activity is no more emotionally endorsed and, therefore, does not promise a truly improved quality of life as a result of the effort; in a self-disciplining act, it must be enforced against oneself (cf. Kaindl 2008).

The well-known distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” motivation (cf. Deci and Ryan 1985) often makes no sense. It separates the inner life from the outer world—instead of understanding it in its context. Our inner life and thus our motivation depend on external conditions, and these in turn are created by individuals. The more they can dispose of their affairs collectively, the more motivated they are. One could therefore understand “intrinsic motivation” as a kind of “unconstrained motivation” in which I can consciously and voluntarily decide to take corresponding actions. However, this is only possible if I can also co-dispose over the conditions of my actions. In contrast, “extrinsic motivation” can be understood as “forced motivation” or simply: “coercion”. Situations of coercion occur when I do not have a say in the conditions of my actions. However, coercion is not only an external phenomenon, but I can also coerce myself, for example, when I cannot currently change the conditions, assess an action as necessary and therefore perform it (cf. Shah and Kruglanski 2000). Finally, I can make extreme efforts, even sacrifice myself, to achieve a subjectively important goal—even if the current actions are not enjoyable or are dangerous. All these aspects of motivation—voluntariness, disposition over conditions, coercion, self-coercion, sacrifice and so on—can occur in mixed form. A simple distinction “intrinsic” versus “extrinsic” is not useful here.

1.2.6 Reasons

The relation between possibility and the world means neither arbitrariness nor determination. Each human act is based on reasons. Reasons establish a connection between objective conditions and subjective acting. Reasons are always my reasons. My reasons are founded on my premises. Premises are the material, symbolic, and social aspects of reality that are important to me. However, I am not exposed to the world in a passive manner, I choose in society—and, thus, I do so influenced by society—the aspects important to me: my bank account or my free-time activity, my dog or my friends. Traditional psychology tends to perceive acting as a direct result of conditions. However, people do not simply react to conditions (stimulus → response) but act for reasons to which they can consciously relate. The idea that actions are based on reasons is essential. If a person is denied the status of reasoned actions—and his/her actions are qualified as confused, crazy, hysterical, emotional—the person is not taken seriously. The person’s needs and ideas about reality are ignored.

1.2.7 Intersubjectivity

My conscious behaviour in the world, my relation of possibility, allows for a clear distinction between myself and the world and, thus, also between myself and other people. I can understand that they also have a relation of possibility to the world. Like me, they have reasons and intentions. That is the basis for seeing other people not as mere “social instruments” but as individual “centres of intentionality”, as subjects like me, people with their own needs, reasons, premises and intentions. This acceptance of others as subjects is the basis of intersubjectivity, which allows me to include others in my activities. But this is not self-evident. Under certain conditions—exclusion conditions—it can make sense to not include others but, rather, treat them as the objects of my actions. This can be seen most clearly in times of war, when other people are often not treated as people anymore.

1.2.8 Self-Hostility

Excluding activities are not only a burden for other people but mediately also for me—namely in two ways: at the interpersonal level, the people I exclude have reasons to treat me with suspicion, dominate me and exclude me as well. At the transpersonal level, my excluding activities strengthen the structures of the →logic of exclusion (p. 17), which render excluding behaviour functional in the first place. Therefore, I—either personally or structurally—support the circumstances that restrain or harm me in a direct or indirect manner. My exclusion of others and my hostility is also self-exclusion and self-hostility. But since this is contrary to my productive needs of disposal (cf. p. 117), that is, I cannot consciously harm myself, I have to negate and mentally block out the connection between hostility and self-hostility, that is, repress it. The repression is only justifiable if I in turn repress the fact that I am repressing—and so on. This is the source of a dynamically generated and continuously confirmed unconscious.

1.3 Capacity of Inclusion Relationships

We have the option—particularly visible today—to utilise other people as instruments for the satisfaction of our own needs. I can try to control them, dominate and use them. Thus, I implicitly deny them their subjectivity and degrade them to objects. This comes naturally to us in circumstances where we do it all the time and where the rule of egoistically seeking one’s own advantage prevails. But “by isolating myself from him, he isolates me from himself” (Holzkamp 1983, p. 379, transl. M.R.).

The logic of exclusion is experienced interpersonally as an excluding behaviour. However, it is a structural relationship. It is subjectively functional for persons whom I have excluded to exclude me in return for the satisfaction of their own needs. Exclusion works reciprocally: generally speaking, by excluding others, I cause them to exclude me. I implicitly encourage my exclusion. I re/produce and maintain the structures which make exclusion functional because it “makes sense”. While I can personally cushion exclusion and include others individually, the logic of exclusion as a structural relation can only be overcome societally (cf. next chapter).

Recognising other people as subjects follows from the possibility of intersubjectivity. However, intersubjectivity is an interpersonal relationship. The societal possibility of inclusive conditions is one we cannot present at this point. It requires the theory of society and its concept of mediation, and it will be dealt with in the next chapter.

So far, we know two things: We are indirectly connected—that is, in a transpersonally mediated way—with almost everyone else; in interpersonal relationships we are able to act inclusively. Due to our relation of possibility, we can recognise other people as subjects, and the question remains on how to find out their needs and include them. There are many options for that. Day by day, we include the needs of persons close to us—by speaking, knowing, anticipating and trusting—in inclusive relationships, in which this behaviour is subjectively functional. Such relationships of interpersonal inclusion can also be found in capitalism, for example, with relatives or friends. The point, however, is whether inclusion circumstances can be generally societal. Can interpersonal capacity also be a societal one?

2 Theory of Society

In this chapter, we intend to develop the social-theoretical basics needed to establish the possibility and quality of an inclusive society, which we will call commonism (Chap. 6). So, our theory does not refer to a specific society—for example, capitalism—but to the essentials of a theory of society in general. The general theory of society builds on the theory of the individual, as developed in the previous section. It is the other side of the same coin, the coin of the individual and society. A society is a cooperation structure in which and with which people produce* their life conditions.

In the process, society encourages people to act in a way that ensures its preservation. At the same time, the overall societal necessities are only individual possibilities (cf. Chap. 5, 1.2). Thus, for all societies the question arises of how to ensure—despite the relation of possibility—that societal necessities will, indeed, be generally fulfilled by the people. Figure  5.1 illustrates the concept tree.

Fig. 5.1

Illustration of the argumentative structure of the general theory of society

2.1 Elementary Form and System Form

Each form of society possesses typical, historically specific characteristics. These represent the material, symbolic, and social manner in which the people proactively produce* all necessary life conditions in this society (cf. p. 10). The focus is not only on “production” but also on reproductive activities; not only on the material conditions of our life but also on the symbolic and social ones. The concept of production* becomes clearer if we comprehend it as the interaction of an individual-interpersonal level (elementary form) and a systematic-transpersonal level (system form). This dual meaning, we believe, includes the connection between individual possibilities and societal necessities.⁴

An elementary form represents the obvious interpersonal course of action to secure one’s own livelihood. The elementary form embodies the dominant rationality of action, ensuring survival under the given societal conditions. For example, in capitalism, it is rational to do paid work or employ others as wageworkers and exploit their labour. Each individual has good reasons to adopt the obvious forms of action, and this is done by the vast majority of the society. As it ensures survival, this rational activity at the same time maintains and renews the existing societal structures—even if they are unpleasant or very repressive. Therefore, individual existence and societal structures are inseparable. I maintain my existence within the societal structures and, thus, reproduce them. But there are still possibilities (cf. p. 115) at the individual level and no determination. However, as people need to secure their own existence one way or the other, there is huge pressure—even manifest duress at times—to accept the obvious forms of action and use them. From the systemic point of view, not everyone must take up the elementary form of action. It is enough if a sufficient number of people act in conformist ways. For the purpose of transformation, a relevant question is whether there are also good reasons not to abide by the obvious forms of action but create different, nonconformist action patterns to ensure one’s life conditions. We will come to that later.

The elementary forms of action are in line with the systemic structures of action. The system form represents the dominant transpersonal structures of action, in which and with which people produce* their life conditions. In capitalism, for example, these are the logic of realisation of value and the state; the dominant societal structures of action we introduced as forms of re/production (cf. p. 10). These structures of action come about through the totality of elementary actions. Thus, elementary actions are conformist actions which create and maintain the system form. In a society in →coherence (p. 126), these elementary actions cover all societal necessities.⁵ However, it is not only the elementary form that produces the system form; the system form simultaneously “produces” the elementary form, for it provides the frame which encourages the elementary actions ensuring existence.

In the fabrication this reciprocal relationship of elementary form and system form the systemic level is dominant. The system form dominates the elementary form. The systemic level of society is the level of generality. It predefines what is generally valid, therefore, in which way in general the life conditions are proactively produced*. In this context the systemic level is independent of the individual actions, it sets the frame. The dominating generality cannot be levered out interpersonally, it can only be overcome as a whole, which means, it would have to be replaced by a different generality. This finding has led traditional transformational approaches to turn the element-system-relation into a first-then-sequence: first achieve a different society, then different elementary actions. If we were to proceed that way, we would disregard, that society is not an entity separated from human beings, which can be imposed as “liberation” from above. A free society can only be built by the people themselves. It is the people, who, acting differently in proactively producing their life, produce different societal conditions on the way. If societal transformation is understood to be mainly a political process, relatively independent of the form of re/production, then it is no wonder that people ensure their existence according to the old elementary form, thus maintaining and renewing the old systems, which was to be overcome.

Coherence

Coherence means context and cohesion. A society is in a state of coherence, if all necessary societal functions are met in such a way, that society can reproduce, ergo maintain itself. This “state” is not to be taken in a static sense; it is rather a dynamic process. Consequently, coherence has to be permanently established. Societal functions are not only necessary, because they are desired subjectively, but because they are objectively essential. The production* of useful items is necessary for the survival of people. In Capitalism, functioning markets are necessary to ensure the distribution of products, resulting from separate production and so on.

A significant challenge for each societal coherence is the congruence of what is desired and what is produced; in other words, of needs and the means created for their satisfaction. Thus, coherence becomes a historically subjective concept, insofar as the actual satisfaction of needs cannot be objectively measured, only subjectively felt. Feeling, in turn, depends on the historical state of possibilities. In 1990, a mobile phone was hardly given any attention; today, it is crucial for the satisfaction of our communication needs. Whether a deficit in the satisfaction of needs is endured, results in a revolt, or leads to a repressive adaptation, are also a question of subjectivity.

Bottom line: Coherence is established when objective societal necessities are in line with individual desires. Incoherence occurs if subjective desires are not met by society to an extent that endangers the preservation of society. It can be caused by many factors, which cannot be established categorically but only empirically.

The elementary form and the system form deal with the same thing from different perspectives. The elementary form looks at the actions that ensure the individual’s existence. The system form views the sum of actions that ensure the future existence of society. Each combines three identical aspects, albeit at different levels: production*, mediation and utilisation. We analyse them in what follows.

2.2 Production*, Mediation and Utilisation

The production* of life conditions, as we generally say (cf. p. 10), is realised through the production* of the means—means of consumption in the broadest sense—that we need for our life.⁶ These means of consumption vary throughout history. In principle, they can be classified into three groups: material means (e.g., food products), symbolic means (e.g., knowledge and culture) and social means of cohabitation (e.g., care). All three groups of means are in permanent development, reflecting the development of needs. Regardless of the point of view—whether we look at immediate actions from the elementary perspective or at average actions from the system form—what is desired must be provided. As shown, there is a more or less large individual space of possibilities, while in the sum, that is, societally, the necessities arise.

The utilisation of the means produced can be divided into re/productive and consumptive utilisation. When the means are used for further processes of re/productive production*, they represent means of re/production (e.g., a machine or diapers). If they serve the immediate satisfaction of needs, they pertain to so-called consumptive utilisation, or just consumption. This utilisation requires mediation, insofar as the means must be transferred from the place of production* to the place of their re/productive or consumptive utilisation. In societies with a low level of task division, mediation tends to be organised in an interpersonal way (in family or local relationships or largely interpersonal markets); in modern societies with a high level of task division, it is predominantly transpersonal (state and transpersonal markets).

In contrast to the aspects of production* and utilisation, the aspect of mediation must be differentiated according to the elementary and system forms.

2.2.1 Interpersonal Mediation

Mediation at the level of the elementary form refers to the interpersonal relationships people engage in when producing their life conditions. It is the form in which we cooperate directly. Interpersonal cooperation displays two different characteristics: conditionality and the cooperation form.

• Conditionality: If cooperative interpersonal relationships require conditions to be met in order to come about, they are conditional (or demanding) relationships; otherwise, they are unconditional (without presuppositions). Conditional relationships, for example, are exchange relationships, where the cooperative act demands each side to fulfil its share of the bargain (transfer of commodity/value). Relationships in families may serve as examples of unconditionality. So, a yelling child gets fed “unconditionally”. The child gives something back “in return”; however, this “return” is not paired with the (previous) “offering”.

• Cooperation form: Conditionality, in turn, is expressed through two opposing cooperation forms: inclusive (enclosing) and excluding (debarring) relationships. Excluding relationships involve extended possibilities for one party and limiting consequences for the other, possibly putting one activity up against the other. If I prevail in applying for a job, this is done at the expense of the losing applicant. In inclusive relationships, cooperative activities complement and support each other. If many users unite their WLAN routers to a common open Wi-Fi network,⁷ everybody in reach of the network has free access to the internet. The unconditional inclusive cooperation form will be the basis of our utopia.

2.2.2 Transpersonal Mediation

Mediation at the level of the system form refers to the transpersonal relationships people engage in when producing their life conditions. It is the way people cooperate in an indirect or mediated manner (German: “mittelbar” or “vermittelt”—“with means”, the terms apply almost literally). Mediated cooperation relations rely on the help of means—material, symbolic and social—for the purpose of the satisfaction of our needs. We, and the people we closely relate to, do not produce most of our means of satisfaction ourselves. The coffee we drink in the morning was produced somewhere in the global south. This “somewhere” marks the point: it does not matter who has produced the means of satisfaction, where, and how. They only have to be produced within the societal context. The same applies to symbolic means—for example, the book read, the computer program used—or social means—for example, the work organisation in our job. Direct relationships are exceeded by the fact that they take place via means, therefore indirectly or mediately. Relationships via means connect people unknown to each other in a global net of cooperation. Similar to interpersonal cooperation relations, we can also distinguish between conditionality and cooperation form as far as transpersonal mediation is concerned.

• Conditionality: in contrast to the individual level of possibilities, mediation at the societal level of necessities is always conditional. Here, global limits must be respected and the balance between production* and utilisation must be kept. Indeed, these conditions may temporarily be infringed on (which is happening at the moment); however, they must work out in the long run to maintain humanity’s life conditions.

• Cooperation form: the form of mediation, on the other hand, once again corresponds to interpersonal cooperation. Only its character now becomes a structural one: exclusion and inclusion at the societal level now figure as exclusion and inclusive conditions.

As for the relation of production*, mediation and utilisations mediation proves to be dominant. A society is a human cooperation network with a historically specific form of cooperation, the actual form of re/production. How the produced* means circulate in society is decisive for the form of re/production. Mediation connects those who produce the means (re/producers) with those who need the means (consumers). Thus, the form of mediation dominates societal cooperation and, consequently, production*. If, for example, mediation in capitalism rests mainly on the exchange of equivalents, then producers must be oriented towards generally accepted prices and produce in a cost-efficient way. At the same time, a whole part of production* (the so-called reproduction) is steered towards the private sphere, because mediation on the basis of the exchange of equivalents cannot produce or maintain it. (cf. Chap. 1, 3.2 and Chap. 5, footnote 5). In summary, we can say that the systemic level of mediation is decisive for the preservation of society and the individuals within. We will use this insight later on as a criterion in our commonist seed form theory (Chap. 7, 3).

For example, solidarity economy focuses on changes within the enterprise itself, such as democratic structures, ecological production, equal pay and so on. Usually, mediation is still thought of and organised by a regulated market. However, if mediation is dominant, one cannot simply produce differently within the old mediation form. In practice, we witness solidarity economy enterprises being torn between their own goals and market competition. Commons focus on changing mediation—they build a coordination beyond the state and the market and can, therefore, attain solidary goals in production.

Property

Property is one of the first legal forms anchoring exclusion. Property is a relation between people in which one party can exclude another from the disposal of things. As this exclusion must be enforced against the will of the parties concerned, property always involves force. In premodern times, it was the direct force of personal rulers. Today, it is the state claiming the monopoly on violence and enforcing it through its executive powers. In short: property is a relation of domination that organises the disposal of resources through exclusion. Ending property as the limitation of disposal would seriously undermine structural exclusion. However, at the same time, a new form of →collective disposal (p. 145) of resources and means must be developed. This can only assume an inclusive shape, as there are no longer means of domination forcing people to do things against their will. At the same time, resources, means of consumption and living spaces must be produced, cultivated and—if necessary—improved. Therefore, disposal always involves practical activity and participation and can only be done cooperatively in a collaborative society. Traditional Marxism sought to overcome exclusion through property by making society the “proprietor”. However, so-called societal property—the result of “socialisation”—is still property, and it is contaminated by the historically developed exclusion function. This contradiction is similar to that of the “withering of the state” (cf. p. 55), in which the state is supposed to disappear even though it has previously been extremely strengthened. In the case of property, this contradiction surfaces through its extreme strengthening by →nationalisation (p. 50), which cannot bring about socialisation in the end and, thus, neither societal property. Indeed, we think it is important to acknowledge that property simply represents a certain form of disposal, namely a closed form. The opposite is not a different form of property, but a different form of disposal, namely an open form: an inclusive interpersonal and transpersonal →collective disposal (p. 145) of life conditions, forming the material base of →voluntariness (p. 144).

2.2.3 Disposal

Closely linked to the question of mediation is that of the disposal of means. Only by disposing of means can I unfold my capacity to participate in the societal proactive production* of life conditions. The possibility of disposing of means ranges from open to closed. An open disposition, and thus disposition on a large scale, makes my societal participation easier. I can take part in decision making on the utilisation of means of re/production and means of consumption. On the other hand, closed forms of mediation monopolise decisions. Only a limited number of people have means at their disposal and decide on their use. This limits the participation of others in the societal process.

In capitalism, property guaranteed by the state represents a closed, highly exclusive form of disposal, for it is the exclusive right of the owner and excludes all others. Throughout history, rights of disposal have often been more open; for example, in mediaeval villages those in need were entitled to gather harvest residues from the fields. Research on enclosure reveals an ever increased shut-down on disposal.⁸ Whereas in earlier times forests were open to many users for gathering wood, pig feed, hunting small animals and so on, disposal has become more and more limited. Apart from property-based exclusive disposal secured by the state, there were and still are numerous social protections of collective disposal; they have been established on the basis of local conventions and non-formal laws and partly still hold today. It is important to acknowledge that the form of disposal is closely linked to the form of mediation. Thus, exchange as a form of mediation requires a closed form of disposal. In capitalism the exclusion from disposal is exercised by property secured by the state. This exclusion from disposal is necessary for (at least) three reasons: first, the excluded have no access to means of consumption and are forced to perform paid work in order to buy them; second, decision making on the use of the production means and, thus, on the purpose of production is monopolised by the owner; third, the collectively produced product is appropriated in an equally monopolistic fashion. If it were not for this exclusion, in all three cases people would act in such a way that capitalism would collapse: (1) means of consumption would be acquired freely, (2) means of production would be used for the satisfaction of needs and (3) the results would be available to everybody. Open forms of disposal are linked to other forms of mediation. This statement does not specify the particular forms.

The continuum between open and closed mediation points at the human-societal possibilities. While a closed mediation limits the participation of people and, thus, the productive dimension of needs, an open mediation refers to the possibility of a collective, conscious design of the societal process. Such a form of collective disposal would make it substantially more difficult to exclude other people and would encourage the inclusion of a multitude of needs, as far as utilisation, production*, and preservation of means are concerned. However, such a collectively open disposal cannot simply be demanded; it requires a societal (mediation) process which integrates the participation of all in a positive way. Then I will have no reasons to limit the disposal of others; on the contrary, I will be reinforced if others, too, have the power of disposal. How this can become true we want to develop in the next chapter.

2.2.4 Relation Between Interpersonal and Transpersonal Mediation

The concepts of interpersonal cooperation and transpersonal mediation encompass two social spaces that incorporate and create each other. The social space opened up by interpersonal cooperation is the concrete space where each person produces society and, at the same time, socialises; therefore, it is the space where one realises one’s own capacity for product-related participation (utilisation and production*) in societal possibilities. The diverse totality of all overlapping interpersonal spaces constitutes the transpersonal system we call society. Society, on the other hand, is the system defining the structure in which the interpersonal spaces unfold. They both incorporate and generate each other: society is present in the interpersonal space and makes it what it is (in a positive and in a negative sense); society is a combination of countless interpersonal spaces. We are dealing with two levels of mediation that are, at the same time, identical and different: the space of interpersonal cooperation, which is none other than a part of societal mediation, and the space of overall societal mediation, which is none other than the transpersonal totality of all interpersonal cooperation.

Interpersonal and transpersonal mediation share a certain relation: they can either be opposed or correspond to each other. If transpersonal mediation is structured according to the logic of exclusion, it is evident that I should prevail at the expense of others. Nevertheless, interpersonal cooperation is often inclusive. In families, friendships, shared flats or at the workplace, it is often more common to include other people and their needs, although, here too, exclusion lines operate. This is understandable, as a lot of these social connections would disintegrate were the societal exclusion logic to prevail. If I wanted to pursue a career at the expense of my colleagues, a successful cooperation between us would be difficult. That is why a society excluding both transpersonal and interpersonal mediation would be self-destructive. So, a tension exists within capitalism between excluding transpersonal mediation and a tendency towards inclusive interpersonal cooperation.

However, there is the option of an inclusive transpersonal mediation being in line with an inclusive interpersonal cooperation. Evidently, such mutual-inclusive relationships at the transpersonal and interpersonal level comply with our perspective of a free society. The overall societal condition of balancing production* and utilisation, however, constitutes an absolute barrier. To be sure, the prerequisite of a balance between give and take can be ignored interpersonally and between groups but not in all of society (Meretz 2017a). Everything needed and consumed must be re/produced. Even a free society must “keep its feet on the ground”, in the figurative and literal sense.

The concepts developed here might appear complicated and, in fact, they are. We are aiming at providing general specifications on the connection between the human being and society. The problem is that we cannot experience society as a transpersonal cooperation with our senses. We can only perceive its effects interpersonally and directly in small doses. The state, patriarchy, the market; we do not experience them directly, we only experience their effects. Nevertheless, we need the abstract dimension of words to conceptually understand the interpersonal experience (cf. also Chap. 1, 2.2).⁹

2.3 Capacity and Domination

The individual-societal capacity to proactively produce life conditions in the widest sense is an exclusively human trait. No other creature can do it. Pippi Longstocking got to the heart of that: “I’ll make the world the way I like it”. However, this capacity also opens up the possibility of limiting our capacity to make a world to everyone’s liking; if we make a world that only pleases one part, it will displease others, as it is done at their expense. The satisfaction of the needs of the privileged at the expense of others is also endangered, insofar as it cannot be guaranteed, and they will face “reciprocal” exclusion.

We believe that, so far, throughout all the historical forms of society, we have not yet been able to realise our human-societal capacity in an unlimited form. This also applies to capitalism, which claims to be the realisation of freedom and reason. The form that limits human capacity is domination and it pervades history in its entirety. It is the domination-based assertion of some people at the expense of others. Domination is not one-sided, for the underlying power is never absolute, but it always needs a certain measure of consent. Consent is achieved through the promise of securing one’s own existence by accepting domination. There have been different forms of domination. We can roughly divide them into two groups: the personal form and the impersonal form or domination via structures.

2.3.1 Personal Domination

We come across personal domination when people restrict and repress others in interpersonal relationships and assert themselves at their expense. Personal domination can take many different forms, including direct threat and exercise of violence, as well as psychological pressure and disregard for declared needs by those with exclusive disposal of the means to satisfy them. In addition, personal domination can be exercised by using transpersonal structures of domination interpersonally. Thus, the interpersonal debasement of people with disabilities takes advantage of ableist structures. If direct and mediated forms of domination pervade the different levels of the social hierarchy, and these dominate social cooperation altogether, we are dealing with societies of personal domination. Such societies can appear in many forms: slavery, feudalism, patriarchal “tribal societies” or village communities. However, the differences are only gradual, and they stand in qualitative contrast with a different type of domination, domination via structures.

2.3.2 Domination Via Structures

Dealing with domination via structures always involves an →independent self-replicating (p. 155) transpersonal structure. But structures do not dominate, people do. Transpersonal structures materialise in peoples’ actions. The independent self-replicating structures represent imperatives, which we—more or less—must follow in order to secure our existence. We reproduce these imperatives by following them—that is, in how we act, produce, organise and so on. We create them and are simultaneously “shaped”—or simply controlled—by them (cf. p. 19).

In contrast to personal domination, where the presence of dominating persons was the symbol of one’s own lack of freedom, domination via structures has no clear opposite. Or, in other words, domination via structures can be exercised by anyone. Indeed, in concrete situations there is an identifiable person exercising domination, even if this “just” means filling a position and thus, enjoying privileges that the person uses “quite normally” with no “evil” intentions. Nevertheless, rulers and subjects are no longer easily distinguished; it is not clear which side of the barricade they belong to. The barricades are spread crisscross. Certainly, domination is experienced in interpersonal relationships; however, its causal source is somewhere else. Its fundamental origin derives from—and its functionality goes back to—the structural, substantial domination of capitalism and its conditions of exclusion.

2.3.3 Personalisation of Structures

Even today, many critics of capitalism still claim that the question “cui bono”—“who profits?” makes the rulers identifiable and nameable. It is a question that inevitably generates a personalised answer. But personalising can only identify the profiting person, sometimes also a group of people (“the Bilderberg group”, “the rich”, “the bankers” etc.). However, the structures which give actions their excluding function remain in the dark. Personalised criticism is directed at the acting people, not the prevailing conditions they are subject to. But it is these conditions of acting which must be changed, so that they will not encourage the individual actor to exploit and dominate others. The rejection of this criticism often points out that it makes a difference whether individual people are subject to interpersonal excluding behaviour or, on a larger scale, are excluded via the destruction of habitats; whether ordinary people take advantage of others, or investors with gigantic capital ignore necessities of life. That is certainly true. However, the difference still lies within the same frame of exclusion logic, where there are always those who benefit, on the one hand, and those who pay, on the other. This also applies to collective agency, for example, that of trade unions. A union is designed to advance the interests of workers against the economic power of companies and their managers. However, in the societal exclusion matrix, these collective interests are opposed to other partial interests at whose expense they prevail (cf. Chap. 2, 2.1). How often is the argument of “jobs” presented to overrule almost all other interests?

As important as it might be to fight individual forms of discrimination, it is also problematic to separate them from structural causes. Generally speaking, conditions of exclusion that level or minimise exclusions at one point, often create new exclusions at another. At the level of difference, be it gender, skin colour, education, age and so on, the logic of exclusion cannot be overcome, because the difference is only the vehicle, but not cause of exclusion. On the contrary: difference can be a source of unfolding and strength if given the chance to develop within general inclusive conditions.

2.4 Capacity and Inclusive Society

We concluded the section on the theory of the individual with the statement that people can treat other people as subjects, and this is what they do in interpersonal relationships. But can inclusive conditions be general in society? Is the intersubjective capacity also a societal one? Bourgeois theorists such as Frederick von Hayek (1936) always stressed that people are capable of respecting the needs of others at the interpersonal level—in manageable groups—but not at the societal-transpersonal level. Here, apart from some exceptions, the “free-for-all battle” starts whether you like it or not. The appropriate self-praise of the market economy proclaims that people support the well-being of everybody else by seeking their self-interest, also at the expense of others—such a contradictory promise. (“Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone”—John Maynard Keynes, cf. Albert 2001.)

Our criticism of this idea is twofold. Bourgeois theorists consider inclusion to be a morally motivated act of the individual. As people know and appreciate each other from the family, the “tribe” or the village, they take care of one another. Furthermore, for most bourgeois theorists mediation is a mystery and, therefore, so is society. In 1986, in an interview with woman’s magazine Woman’s Own, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher went as far as drawing the following conclusion: “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” Society and mediation can, at best, be imagined as an event of individuals exchanging things.

All these ways of thinking underestimate or negate the capacity of the societal organisation people engage in. They judge the general human capacity by the current forms of organisation, structured by a logic of exclusion, instead of asking what could be possible in society. We pointed out above (and gave specific examples) that people are able to engage in inclusion relationships at the interpersonal level. Our simple question is: why should this not be possible at the transpersonal level? In our view, a societal generalisation is possible if (at least) these five elements are generalised: needs, awareness, disposal of conditions, trust, security.

In an inclusive society, inclusion is not just an ethical-moral action; it is encouraged by the societal structures. Acting according to the structural suggestions is subjectively functional for me, because in that way I can satisfy my needs best. To accomplish that goal, I must not only include the needs of the people in my vicinity, those interpersonally accessible, but also of those with whom the contact is only mediated. Thus, the reference to needs is generalised, my actions include the needs of all the people I am related with in society. This general form of inclusion requires a collective form of disposal of conditions and people who consciously design their conditions in their society. An inclusive society is capable of building this disposal, and for this we must take the time to realise the consequences of our actions on others. Our actions can be changed only if we can analyse them and use these insights. This requires expanding our consciousness, dealing with our vicinity, raising our level of awareness, perceiving societal connections.

If my needs, and those of others, are taken into consideration and if the conditions are at our collective disposal to give them a long-term base, the result is transpersonal trust. Transpersonal relationships no longer rely on distinction, domination and contracts, but rest on relatedness, a leap of faith and agreement. This trust can become sustainable by moulding institutions which objectify relatedness, trust and agreements. The particular quality of institutions is their ability to provide societal services independent of concrete people.

A free society, therefore, is an institutionalised organisational form of human cohabitation beyond the state. In contrast to the state and its institutions, which supposedly mediate the opposing interests deriving from the logic of exclusion, institutions in the free society beyond the state represent direct objectifications of the logic of inclusion. Thus, they do not reside outside the dominant societal logic (like the state) but are an integral part of it, namely of the logic of inclusion. They are embedded in the societal mediation. This provides security for everybody, because fundamentally different needs may indeed create →conflicts (p. 146), but these are not enforced in the mode of opposing interests at the expense of a groups of “others”. Even though there are conflicts, nobody needs to be afraid of being different or of falling through the societal safety net. A free society lies within the reach of human capacity. Embedded institutions allow for a general awareness and collective disposal of the conditions of our actions. Then we can relate to each other’s needs and, thus, cooperate on the basis of trust and security.

But can this possibility of a societally mediated organisation on the basis of a logic of inclusion become a reality? What conditions are needed for that? What questions must be answered and what problems solved? These and other questions will be addressed in the next chapter.

3 Summary

Each utopia theory must confirm its theoretical foundations. Utopias of societal development need at least two: a theory of the individual and a theory of society. In other words, we need a scientific concept of the human being and one of society. For us, they are two sides of the same coin.

Here is a summary of our findings on key issues:

• A concept of the human being covers general characteristics and not historically specific traits.

• People are societal and live in society. For the human being, society is a space of action possibilities. Thus, their relation to the world is one of possibilities.

• People have needs. Their concrete shape depends on the societal possibilities of satisfaction. All needs have a sensual-vital and a productive dimension.

• The sensual-vital dimension of satisfaction is that of enjoyment, the productive dimension is that of disposal of the societal conditions to ensure the sources of satisfaction.

• People always act for a reason. To ask for reasons is to ask about subjective functionality. Emotions evaluate the connection between reasons and possibilities, disposal and limitations.

• My disposal of conditions can either limit or eliminate (exclude) or support and comprise (include) the disposal of others.

• People can acknowledge and include the needs of others in their actions. They can engage in intersubjective relationships.

• Each society consists of a systemic structure, which is the result of many elementary actions. The systemic structure and elementary form of actions depend on and create each other.

• The societal structure represents the frame for actions and, thus, has a certain degree of independence. Particular actions relate to each other through material, symbolic and social means: they are mediated.

• The form of this mediation determines the quality of re/production and, thus, the form of society.

• Mediation is inclusive when the systemic conditions encourage the inclusion of the needs of others for the satisfaction of my needs; that is, when this inclusion is rendered functional.

• The creation of inclusive relationships is within the range of interpersonal capacity, which can be transpersonally generalised to create an inclusive society.

• This requires a generalised awareness and a collective disposal of conditions.