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The Potential of Artificial Intelligence in the Development of (Equity) Crowdfunding

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Artificial Intelligence and Economics: the Key to the Future

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems ((LNNS,volume 523))

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Notes

  1. 1.

    More generally, this term can be understood as a macro phenomenon of dissemination and promotion of financial investments through the opportunities offered by new technologies. It has also been defined as “a new financial industry that applies technology to improve financial assets” (Schueffel 2016, p. 46). The European institutions have been dealing with this for a long time (European Commission 2016a, b, p. 12); the European Parliament invited the European Supervisory Authority to monitor technological developments, analyzing the risks and benefits for investors and consumers (see European Parliament 2017a, b, p. 7), as well as the European Commission to “develop a global action plan in FinTech as part of its strategies for the Capital Markets Union and the Digital Single Market”. The International Organization of Securities Commissions was also interested: (IOSCO 2017, p. 4 Fig. 1) highlighted eight macro areas of operation of FinTech actors: (1) payments; (2) insurance; (3) Financial planning; (4) equity and loan-based crowdfunding; (5) blockchain/DLT (crota currencies, smart contracts, asset registration and monitoring); (6) investments and trading (high-frequency trading, robo-advisory); (7) information research and analysis (Big Data, predictive analysis, etc.); (8) security (digital identity, encryption, fraud management). For the European Parliament (European Parliament 2017b), “FinTech should be understood as finance enabled or provided by new technologies, affecting the entire financial sector, from banks to insurance, pension funds, investment advice and market infrastructures”. For a first attempt (in Italy) to systematically address issues relating to FinTech, see Paracampo 2017, p. 1 et seq. Today we can talk about the “global fintech revolution”: (Kauffman and Ma 2015). See, from a legal point of view, (Alpa 2019, p. 378), which drew attention to the rapid evolution of the sector, which the legislator is struggling to cope with. More recently, there are many studies aimed at framing it in a more complete way to offer suitable ideas for its regulation: cf. (Restoy 2021, Ehrentraud et al. 2020, Amstad 2019).

  2. 2.

    Financial Stability Board 2019, p. 2, n.1.

  3. 3.

    For the reconstruction of the more general phenomenon of FinTech as an effect clearly linked to the crisis, (cf. Arner et al. 2016; Bavoso 2021, p. 4) explores the decisive role of banks in the financial crisis, identifying a determining factor in the consequent expansion of p2p after the crisis.

  4. 4.

    On the decisiveness of the platforms for the development of crowdfunding see (Davidson 2019).

  5. 5.

    For a focus on the importance of the role of the platform in facilitating collection, see, already a few years ago, (IOSCO 2017, p. 11). On the role of platforms in the context of the market in general, cf. (Colangelo and Zeno-Zencovich, 2016; De Franceschi 2016) speaks of “engines of innovation”.

  6. 6.

    The P2P relationships generated by the platforms have acquired an ever increasing importance, almost ousting, in some respects, the traditional banking channels. Such a trend was considered a good option for alternative finance and risk diversification; but the issues underlying these changes are largely still unexplored, starting with the framing of the platforms. For Bavoso (2021), as things stand, it has been difficult to identify relevant regulatory challenges emerging from these channels of finance.

  7. 7.

    See Zetzsche et al. (2020), Colangelo and Zeno-Zencovich (2016). For Bavoso 2021, p. 3, there is a “inadequate definition of the nature and role that P2P platforms perform in the financial system. In other words, without a comprehensive conceptualization of P2P lending, it has been difficult to pin down relevant regulatory challenges that emerge from this alternative market-based channel of finance.”

  8. 8.

    In addition to the aforementioned factor of the economic crisis that exploded since 2008, the facilities offered by the internet to digital communications have favored an increase in “proximity” (Laudonio 2014, p. 13), offering a decisive contribution to this particular form of meeting between complementary interests.

    On the trend of crowdfunding in the various countries of the Union, see European Commission (2018b). To date, the platforms carry 34% of alternative finance transactions across the EU. In 2018 alone, $ 2,624 million was raised for businesses on crowdfunding platforms, with an annual growth of 140%. Of these figures, debt-based financing represents 81% compared to the equity-based model, which covers 17%: see Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2020). In the United Kingdom, compared to the sharp decrease in loans in the years following the crisis (from 44.5 to 38 billion pounds between 2008 and 2012), there was a sharp increase in loans originating on peer-to-peer platforms, which reached 2.3 billion pounds in 2017 (and many applicants-offerors had or would have been denied a “classic” loan in the Banks): see (Bavoso 2021, p. 2).

  9. 9.

    In this regard, see the interesting study by Gil Gomez et al. (2021), that presents a quantitative vision of the study of crowdfunding, through a bibliometric analysis of the most relevant publications. It has been verified that crowdfunding represents a topic of growing interest, especially since 2010; the first country for scholars to deal with it is the USA. A more unitary and generalized vision from a juridical point of view can be found in Kleiner (2021).

  10. 10.

    See, already several years ago, (European Commission 2016a, b); followed suit (European Commission 2018c), which had identified the European brand for crowdfunding platforms as a tool for progress aimed at achieving the single capital market. With another communication (European Commission 2018), the absence of a Euro-unit regulatory framework on crowdfunding was identified as an obstacle to growth in the single market for the suppliers of the related services, mainly due to divergent national approaches. Ultimately, the intention is to strengthen the competitiveness of the Eurozone: cf. (Siclari 2016, p. 481). Therefore, the proposal for a Regulation, then definitively approved, was welcomed with favor, thanks to the “clearer and simpler rules”: cf. (European Commission 2019). However, there was no lack of criticism and perplexity even before its final approval (Staikouras, Panagiotis 2020).

  11. 11.

    The full name is as follows: REGULATION (EU) 2020/1503 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 October 2020 on European crowdfunding service providers for business, and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 and Directive (EU) 2019/1937. The legislative process was initiated by the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European providers of crowdfunding services for businesses, com (2018) 113 final 2018/0048, 8 March 2018, (available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/ALL/?uri = CELEX%3A52018PC0113); the European Parliament approved an amended text on 27.03.2019: Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European providers of crowdfunding services for businesses, COM (2018) 0113 - C8-0103/2018 - 2018/0048 (COD), 9 November 2018, with a legislative Resolution on the Proposed Regulation attached (the text is available at the following link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0364_EN.html#title), 1) sent to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. After the definitive review and the response of the European Central Bank to the request for an opinion from the Council of February 2020, the final wording of the proposal dated 17 April 2020 was confirmed and definitively approved: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business.

  12. 12.

    For a summary of AI development see (Buchanan 2021, Appendix I, Russell 2021). The term Artificial Intelligence was coined by John McCarthy in 1953. There are a variety of AI definitions: the essence of AI is “the ability to make appropriate generalizations in a timely fashion based on limited data” (Buchanan 2021, p. 538). AI is deemed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as “the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks that have traditionally required human intelligence” (FSB 2017, p. 4).

  13. 13.

    And this is true precisely in consideration of the fact that it is an investment whose operations, right from the start of the offer, presuppose a certain degree of complexity. There are already studies that suggest that the intellectual capital and the capillarity and precision of the information conveyed (including on social networks) “have a positive and significant impact on fundraising success and are perceived as quality signals of crowdfunding campaigns by external investors”: (Battaglia et al. 2020).

  14. 14.

    Machine Learning can be considered as a subset of Artificial Intelligence, its origins are attribuited to (McCulloch and Pitts 1943). ML “uses algorithms to automatically optimize through experience with limited or no human intervention” and it “is primarily derived from sources such as experience, practice, training”, etc. (Buchanan 2021, p. 538).

  15. 15.

    “The regulatory rationale concerning crowdfunding was twofold. First, to enable fast growing start-ups to gain better access to financing of their business projects, especially at an early transformational stage in which scaling is crucial for their business model” (Bajakic et al. 2021, p. 12).

  16. 16.

    See, for an overview of the international trend of the phenomenon, (Alvisi 2014). The Italian legislator has dealt ex professo only with the equity type. The discipline is contained, as regards the sources of primary rank, in the articles 50-quinquies and 100-ter of the T.U.F. (Legislative Decree no. 58 of 24 February 1998); the Consob Regulation, adopted—by virtue of the legitimacy and delegation contained in the aforementioned regulations—with Resolution no. 18592 of 26 June 2013, contains the detailed rules. Several changes to the existing system have followed one another over time in a rather whirlwind manner: see (Macchiavello 2018a, b).

  17. 17.

    On whose examination v. (Macchiavello 2021).

  18. 18.

    Alternatively, in addition to not intervening, the Union could still have adopted more “mild” regulatory solutions: a set of minimum standards capable of promoting best practices by leveraging the reputational capital of companies; or include crowdfunding in the single code of EU rules, with an approach based on the final “product” rather than on the definition of the entire and particular investment process. The Commission has justified the choice of a more pervasive legislation also by virtue of the checks carried out in discussions with the representatives of the Member States: cf. (European Commission 2018b). In particular, the Commission states: “The initiative has two specific objectives. The first objective is to enable platforms to scale cross-border, namely by creating a licensing regime that can be used across the EU without requiring further authorization in each EU country. The second objective is to ensure that platforms are subject to a framework ensuring proper management of platforms and protection of fund providers, by focusing on sound risk management—notably on business conduct, fit and proper, risk management, due diligence—and on adequate information disclosure. This should increase investors’ trust to engage cross-border.”

  19. 19.

    While the “type of life” is actually lived, the real and actual manifestation of the law, the “lifestyle” (“stile di vita”) is a new "model declared" by the Legislator, a new direction towards which to orient the associates: cf. (Gorassini 2001; Gorassini 2019, p. 73 ss.).

  20. 20.

    Art. 2, par. 1, lett. i) defines an investor as “any natural or legal person who, through a crowdfunding platform, grants loans or acquires transferable securities or admitted instruments for crowdfunding purposes”.

  21. 21.

    Art. 2, par. 1, lett. j) defines the sophisticated investor “any natural or legal person who is a professional client by virtue of point (1), (2), (3) or (4) of Section I of Annex II to Directive 2014/65/EU or any natural or legal person who has the approval of the crowdfunding service provider to be treated as a sophisticated investor in accordance with the criteria and the procedure laid down in Annex II to this Regulation”. The subsequent letter k) of the same provision residually qualifies unsophisticated investors as those who do not belong to the previous category. The distinction is inspired by that between professional and retail client provided for by Directive 2014/65/EU, but keeping some attention to the peculiarities of crowdfunding.

  22. 22.

    The aforementioned provision provides verbatim: “1. For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: […] (44) ‘transferable securities’ means those classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital market, with the exception of instruments of payment, such as: (a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares; (b) bonds or other forms of securitized debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such securities; (c) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices or measures”.

  23. 23.

    In fact, in this regard it is highlighted in recital no. 13 that the choice to allow “cover […] and permit […] crowdfunding services related to transferable securities” involves “transferability [which] is an important safeguard in order for investors to be able to exit their investment since it provides the possibility for them to dispose of their interest on the capital markets. And this also for a discourse on costs, which it is hoped to be lower: cf. (Bajakic et al. 2021, p. 9)”.

  24. 24.

    And this also for reduction of costs, which it is hoped to be lower: see (Bajakic et al. 2021, p. 9).

  25. 25.

    Precisely with the intention of expanding the investment possibilities through the crowdfunding platform, in the final stages of the legislative process of the European regulation, art. 2, par. 1, lett. n), the definition of “admitted instruments for crowdfunding purposes”, thus opening to the possibility of negotiating “shares of a private limited liability company that are not subject to restrictions that would effectively prevent them from being transferred, including restrictions to the way in which those shares are offered or advertised to the public”, based on the legislation in force in each Member State; the hope is thus achieved not to prevent the “inclu[sion] within the scope of this Regulation” (this is the expression of whereas no. 13). This approach marks a reversal of the trend compared to the previous formulations of the proposed Regulation, in which the decision to exclude financial instruments other than transferable securities from the scope of application of the regulation was made explicit (see the previous whereas no. 11) “Because those securities entail risks for investors that cannot be properly managed within this legal framework.”

  26. 26.

    With the Law of 30 December 2018, n. 145, “Legge di Bilancio 2019”.

  27. 27.

    Only particular categories of professional investors can access it.

  28. 28.

    This observation remains a suggestive hypothesis; in any case, even if “the commonly accepted view is that crowdfunding is used when other sources of funding are not accessible, […] there are grounds for arguing that crowdfunding is not merely a ‘last resort’” (Di Pietro, p. 528).

  29. 29.

    Especially where it is believed, perhaps from a somewhat simplifying perspective, that “in essence, the revolution, if at all, of FinTech is represented by the entities that have been offering technology-based products and services” (Bavoso 2021, p. 2); see (Arner et al. 2016).

  30. 30.

    The legislator could (and could have) intervened to favor and/or limit certain tendencies that reality manifests, on the basis of an eminently political choice.

  31. 31.

    (Citi 2018) “AI and ML are ‘only scratching the surface’ in terms of potential application to financial services” (Buchanan and Wright 2021, p. 558). However, crowdfunding is not explicitly included among the FinTech activities most practiced with AI, but only activities that constitute one or more segments of the same.

  32. 32.

    On the importance of machine learning and its increasingly important influence on the financial services sector, see (Buchanan and Wright 2021), which focused on the impact of this technology on the financial services industry in the UK.

  33. 33.

    Just consider the fact that the platform manager may not be authorized (with consequent cost reduction) to operate as a financial intermediary. This regime is currently applicable both in the USA and, in part, within the EU perimeter. Although, in fact, the mere facilitation of the meeting between offerors and investors does not require authorizations to operate as intermediaries in a formal sense, the debate is still on the danger that the absence of this requirement (which constitutes a guarantee for the market) could represent for investors: see (Worden 2020).

  34. 34.

    Start-ups, like innovative companies, often go in search of the market for people willing to focus (and therefore invest) on their prospect of innovative business and they know that these potential investors are not always among the “usual” ones. The (potential and) “new” investors could be attracted to particular forms of investment and which, perhaps, do not require the use of large sums; they could be subjects not initially and per se interested in investing, but who could be fascinated by a particular project, due to its attractiveness. This capacity, paradigmatically, passes through attention to the quantity and quality of the information conveyed, to which wide categories of investors pay attention; or, more generally, for the high profile of the intellectual capital employed and invested: see (Battaglia et al. 2020).

  35. 35.

    The thesis appears to be supported by some recent research which has emerged as one of the main reasons for seeking equity-crowdfunding were the opportunity to involve passionate about the business: see Di Pietro (2021); unlike angelic investors, who have no real emotional attachment whatsoever, “the crowd behaves completely different, they are getting hooked not because of the opportunity because of the attractiveness that this concept has.” (Di Pietro 2021, p. 542).

  36. 36.

    This can only occur in the presence of information that is not only detailed, but also well structured to allow the potential investor to grasp the fundamental characteristics and perspectives of the project on which to focus: see (Battaglia et al. 2020, Bade and Walther 2021, p. 2501) highlight how, by virtue of the research conducted, “investors allocate more attention to campaigns for which they have information advantages”.

  37. 37.

    This issue will be addressed shortly in the next paragraph.

  38. 38.

    There are, however, more rigid positions on this point: for (Bavoso 2021, p. 26) “there is no evidence suggesting that P2P platforms (or the algorithmic artificial intelligence that they employ) have the capacity to allocate financial resources optimally”.

  39. 39.

    In the donation based, the spirit of liberality underlying the provision of money makes the variables to be considered to converge “supply and demand” decrease and make it easier to manage. Indeed, in this case, the idea of ​​a platform as a “showcase” and not as a device equipped with AI appears more adequate, since it is a question of having to disseminate requests for contributions free of charge to charitable causes/solidarity initiatives, etc., for which it is sufficient for a potential donor to act autonomously; or in any case, the donor may not be activated autonomously, but simply be reached by the advertisements of similar initiatives: in this case too, the functioning and effectiveness and efficiency of platforms should not require refined developments of artificial intelligence. However, the perspectives of analysis on the incidence of AI are not ignored even on the side of donation based-crowdfunding (with regard to the theory of uses and gratification, in particular): it would be found in a positive relation between uses and gratification benefits and the adoption of AI tools for boosting operational performance. See Behl et al. (2020). In the reward based, the argument is similar to the previous one, with the only difference that, in the face of the disbursement of sums, the lenders receive a quid of reward (almost out of gratitude) substantially symbolic, which therefore does not activate all those needs of protection of interests which, on the other hand, are relevant in financial investments.

  40. 40.

    With the involvement of people and the promotion of new ideas and projects compared to the classic market circuits.

  41. 41.

    Markets in financial instruments directive, that means DIRECTIVE 2014/65/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), entered into force from 3 January 2018 throughout the Union and which replaced the previous regulation.

  42. 42.

    The obligation for the intermediary to carry out the “appropriateness assessment” is relevant in almost all investment services, namely for: trading on own account, execution of orders on behalf of clients, receipt and transmission of orders, underwriting of financial instruments and/or placement of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, placement of financial instruments without firm commitment. In the sole investment or portfolio management advice, in addition to the appropriateness assessment, the professional must also carry out an assessment of suitability.

  43. 43.

    Likewise, if the client does not provide the information requested by the investment firm, or if such information is insufficient, the investment firm warns the client that his decision will prevent them from determining whether the service or product is appropriate.

  44. 44.

    This is because in equity-crowdfunding, not only an investor (ordering party) and a professional who receives it and transmits it to another intermediary are involved, but the initiative of an offeror is a qualifying (and indeed decisive) subject, which turns out to be true propulsive moment and which, on the other hand, would not be considered at all if the entire operation were assimilated to the service of reception and transmission of orders.

  45. 45.

    As we will see in the following sub-paragraph, the definition offered by the European Regulation confirms this.

  46. 46.

    (Caratozzolo 2013, p. 277) frames the case as an offer to the public of financial instruments, but recognizes its distinctive traits that allow it to be configured independently and differently from ordinary public savings appeals governed by the T.U.F. (Consolidated Law on Finance).

  47. 47.

    If not even triple bilateral, given that one should also consider the final relationship that is established between offeror and investor and which ultimately qualifies the same type of crowdfunding.

  48. 48.

    It “aims to facilitate the funding of a project by raising capital from a large number of people who each contribute relatively small investment amounts through a publicly accessible internetbased information system. Crowdfunding services are thus open to an unrestricted pool of investors who receive investment propositions at the same time and involve the raising of funds predominantly from natural persons, including those that are not high-net worth individuals” (whereas n. 10).

  49. 49.

    To finance economic activities by investors and to be financed by the “project owners”.

  50. 50.

    They already find their source and discipline in MiFID II, but they are distinct from each other: they are indicated respectively in points 7) and 1) of Annex I, section A of the aforementioned Directive.

  51. 51.

    In fact, it states: “this Regulation should apply to crowdfunding services that consist of the joint provision of reception and transmission of client orders and the placement of transferable securities or admitted instruments for crowdfunding purposes without a firm commitment basis on a public platform that provides unrestricted access to investors. The joint provision of those services is the key feature of crowdfunding services compared to certain investment services provided under Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), even though individually those services match those covered by that Directive.”.

  52. 52.

    Provided as a financial service in point 5) of Annex I, Section A, of Directive 2014/65/EU.

  53. 53.

    Thus underlines the whereas no. 21, which in fact recalls how the platforms are required to consider “objective criteria” for the matching of interests, calculating “key financial figures […] without any scope for discretion”.

  54. 54.

    In reality, looking at lending-based crowdfunding, other and different qualification issues emerge, especially if the financing offers concern financial products or instruments: see (Macchiavello 2018a, b, p. 1).

  55. 55.

    Nonetheless, de iure condito this possibility is precluded in the European Union system, given that the new Regulation does not provide for the operator’s obligation for the service to proceed with the assessment of suitability, which is instead a characterizing and unfailing requirement of investment advice according to the MiFid setting.

  56. 56.

    The latter, on the basis of current EU law, operating only in the case of the provision of a investment advice service.

  57. 57.

    On which there is already a substantial bibliography. The European Supervisory Authorities (ESA 2015) had already dealt with it several years ago; (ESA 2016). Among the many contributions, please refer to Fein (2015, 2016), Linciano et al. (2019), Cuzzola (2020).

  58. 58.

    A series of issues should be addressed: for example, is it possible for a person to provide advice and, while maintaining impartiality and independence, to make the interests of a client of advisory service converge with those of another whose campaign you promote on your platform? The limit and the potential conflict of interest should be verified on this front.

  59. 59.

    That is, of those schemes which, despite and beyond the change in the systems and institutions of reference, reveal themselves as constant and unavoidable and indeed condition the life of law and its evolution: see (Gorassini 2007, p. 7 and 20).

  60. 60.

    For a study on the motivations underlying the investment in equity-crowdfunding and on the importance of the relationship, especially of the more informal partnerships that are established between entrepreneurs offering and investors (unlike what happens with business angels) thanks to the involvement generated by the collection through crowdfunding and the consequent emotional attachment, see (Di Pietro 2021). This could give an edge to this type of investment.

  61. 61.

    It is starting from the institution of the Consortium èrcto non cìto which Gaius deals with (Gai 3.154), as a peculiar form of union and asset management between brothers on the death of their father, that the idea of ​​society develops; the same institution referred to is considered as “naturalis societas”. The beginnings of society are therefore inextricably linked to fraternity. See Anselmo (2001), Onida (2007).

  62. 62.

    Who would have thought they could, in a few minutes, get to know a reality located on the other side of the globe, appreciate its aims and objectives and decide to invest by joining a company that is tens of thousands of kilometers away?

  63. 63.

    To date, indeed, despite the pursuit of cross-border transactions (also thanks to the push of the political decision-maker), reality manifests a certain anchoring and a preference for investments on local realities, or in any case close, also (or above all) geographically, to the location of the investor: see Bade and Walther (2021). This does not disavow what has been proposed but, on the contrary, it would be proof of confirmation: the “spatial” limit that can be found can be overcome precisely with the aid of AI: the work of machine learning for the identification of complementary profiles between offerors and investors and the facilitation of convergence would allow the removal of the aforementioned geographical barriers and the elimination of any hesitation in this regard.

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  1. Università “Mediterranea” of Reggio Calabria, Reggio Calabria, Italy

    Pasquale Cuzzola

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  1. Dipartimento PAU, Mediterranea University of Reggio Calabria, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Calabria, Italy

    Domenico Marino

  2. Dipartimento PAU, Mediterranea University of Reggio Calabria, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Calabria, Italy

    Melchiorre Monaca

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Cuzzola, P. (2023). The Potential of Artificial Intelligence in the Development of (Equity) Crowdfunding. In: Marino, D., Monaca, M. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Economics: the Key to the Future. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 523. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14605-3_15

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