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Building Back Worse? The Prognosis for Health Equity in the Post-pandemic World

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The Unequal Costs of Covid-19 on Well-being in Europe

Part of the book series: Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making ((HWBRPM))

Abstract

The concept of health equity—in a simplified view, socially patterned inequalities in health outcomes that are unfair or unjust and avoidable—originated in the work for the World Health Organization’s European regional office, and was foregrounded by the work of WHO’s Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2005–2008). Yet as political scientist Julia Lynch observed pre-pandemic, ‘systematic efforts to reduce inequalities in the “fundamental causes” of health have been vanishingly rare’. The pandemic brought into vivid focus both inequalities in economic security and vulnerability and inequalities in health outcomes, in the form of economically and racially patterned differences in infection, hospitalization, and mortality rates as well as gendered impacts on daily routines and economic futures.

It might be supposed that an overdue increase in policy attention to reducing those inequalities will characterize the post-pandemic world. More likely, however, is the opposite outcome: a decline in the political salience of health (in)equity and, in most countries, its eventual disappearance from the policy agenda. Adopting the conceptual lens of political economy and drawing primarily from the experience of the United Kingdom, but drawing from other (mainly European) jurisdictions as appropriate, I identify at least four reasons for this prognosis:

  1. 1.

    Increased concentration of wealth at the very top of the economic distribution, in a context where ultra-wealth was already becoming ungovernable and its overt and covert influence on politics outsized. Relatedly,

  2. 2.

    The tendency of the income support and fiscal stimulus programmes implemented in response to the economic contractions associated with lockdowns to inflate asset prices, and therefore the incomes and wealth of asset owners, as observed notably in property and share prices.

  3. 3.

    In a less conspicuous process, the upward redistribution of resources from the tax base as a whole (which is ultimately responsible for repayment of pandemic-era borrowing) to the buyers of government bonds—disproportionately, wealthy individuals and large individual investors such as pension funds. Only a strongly progressive tax system could avoid this impact, and they are few and far between.

  4. 4.

    A widespread decline in the ability of democratic institutions to provide the accountability that might ensure renewed interest in health (in)equity.

On the basis of currently available data, probably only the first of these patterns is universal; exceptions may be found to the others. However, it remains to be seen whether the exceptions will be sufficiently influential to ensure that health (in)equity remains on, or returns to, the policy agenda. I conclude with a sketch of the generic policies that would be needed to change the situation identified by Lynch in the post-pandemic world, and leave the reader to judge their (im)probability.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, deaths among care home residents accounted for 44% of all Covid-19 deaths during the first year of the pandemic in Austria, 57% in Belgium, 39% in Denmark, 43% in France, 47% in Sweden, and 34% in the UK. The cited source warns against direct comparisons among countries, because of differences in how data were collected.

  2. 2.

    Similar, sometimes even more dramatic patterns were observed in North America. On the Canadian city of Montréal, where the maps of low household income and high proportion of residents self-identifying as Black are very similar, see Rocha et al. (2020); on the Washington, DC region of the US, see Tan et al. (2022).

  3. 3.

    Considerably more likely in the wake of the refusal by a scientifically illiterate US Congress, in April 2022, to appropriate funds for continuing the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programme of supporting vaccine delivery in low-income countries (Diamond & Roubein, 2022).

  4. 4.

    I have not provided an inventory of the features of these proposals, most of which are for now largely speculative. The OECD version is notably short on specifics. For a comparison between two more specific “Green New Deal” proposals and a more radical alternative organized around the contentious idea of degrowth, see Mastini et al. (2021). Just before the pandemic hit, the European Commission (2019) unveiled a proposal for a “European Green Deal” organized around the goal of decarbonizing energy systems by 2050. Another important pre-pandemic, more explicitly equity-oriented set of proposals is presented in UNCTAD (2019). Interestingly, none of these proposals incorporates a specific focus on health inequalities, perhaps suggesting the limited salience of the issue for non-specialist audiences.

  5. 5.

    In North America, increases were even more extreme, with house prices in the US rising by 33% in the two years after the start of the pandemic, with much higher increases in some regions (Where the Lawns, 2022).

  6. 6.

    Incredibly, the UK government in April 2022 announced plans to reduce staffing at the Health Security Agency, responsible for pandemic planning and response, by 40% after budget cuts were imposed by the finance ministry (Mason et al., 2022). Disturbing parallels exist between this action and the US Congressional decision described in note 3, above.

  7. 7.

    Mazzucato consistently avoids using the terminology of neoliberalism, although that is clearly what she is talking about; colleagues like Thomas Marois (2021) who likewise write about mechanisms for stimulating innovation do not share that hesitation.

  8. 8.

    A terminological note: in public finance, the terms “progressive” and “regressive” have a technical, rather than a normative meaning. A progressive tax or tax system is one that is charged at a higher rate or attaches to a larger proportion of a household’s resources as one moves up the income or wealth scale. A regressive tax does the reverse. For example, consumption taxes are almost always regressive because lower-income households normally spend a larger proportion of their incomes for immediate needs. An income tax that is charged at an increasing rate on higher incomes is progressive in the absence of deductions available only to the well off, which can be plentiful and vitiate the progressivity of the tax. A progressive expenditure is one the incidence of which is proportionately more generous to households or communities with fewer resources. Although the point is outside the scope of this chapter, for equity purposes it is important to assess the overall progressivity or regressivity of tax and benefit systems combined, which is difficult because of the importance of valuing in-kind services like public education and health care so is seldom done. For a valuable, more detailed discussion, see Byrne (2021), Chap. 6.

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Acknowledgements

The editors’ comments on an earlier draft of this chapter resulted in substantial improvements. All remaining problems are of my own making.

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Correspondence to Ted Schrecker .

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Schrecker, T. (2022). Building Back Worse? The Prognosis for Health Equity in the Post-pandemic World. In: Dalingwater, L., Boullet, V., Costantini, I., Gibbs, P. (eds) The Unequal Costs of Covid-19 on Well-being in Europe. Human Well-Being Research and Policy Making. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14425-7_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14425-7_2

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