Successive National Policy Models

Abstract

How can the government manage the arrival of large numbers of very different immigrants? Before addressing this question in the next chapter, here we first analyse how Dutch integration policy has developed since 1960. A number of national policy models have been introduced during this period, but for different reasons none is able to deal adequately with contemporary patterns of migration and integration.

How can the government manage the arrival of large numbers of very different immigrants? Before addressing this question in the next chapter, here we first analyse how Dutch integration policy has developed since 1960. A number of national policy models have been introduced during this period, but for different reasons none is able to deal adequately with contemporary patterns of migration and integration.

We then look at the development of Dutch immigration policy. As with integration policy, this is characterized by a high degree of volatility. Moreover, there is little coherence between migration and integration policies. We end this chapter with a brief discussion of the inadequacy of past national policy models and then formulate the most important policy issues raised in this report.

4.1 Changing National Models for Integration Policy

In Dutch post-war integration policy, four successive national models can be discerned. On one hand each was a response to the migration patterns of the time, whilst on the other they were rooted in specific contemporary views of migration, integration and citizenship (see Table 4.1).¹ The criteria we have used to distinguish these models are as follows.

• 1. The policy diagnosis: what are the themes of integration policy?

• 2. The concept of integration: how is this defined?

• 3. The policy remedy: what substantive directions does the policy take?

• 4. The policy design: what is the relationship between general and specific (targeted) policy?

To be clear, these are ideal-type distinctions in which we highlight the central features of the models concerned.² In reality, their delineation is not so sharp and they overlap to a certain extent.

Table 4.1 Dutch policy models for integration (1960-present)

Each of the four models we have identified was developed in the context of a specific pattern of migration.³ For this reason we first take a brief look at those patterns. The first three – laissez-faire, multiculturalism and disadvantage-driven – arose in the period of postcolonial and guest-worker migration (1960–1995). This was when most immigrants to the Netherlands came from a limited number of countries: the former Dutch East Indies, Suriname, the Dutch Caribbean, Turkey and Morocco.

The fourth model, focusing upon ‘citizenization’ within Dutch society, took shape around the turn of the millennium. During this period, groups of refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere were applying for asylum in the Netherlands in quite considerable numbers. Mobility within the European Union (EU) was also increasing, as were the numbers of highly skilled and student migrants coming from both within and outside the EU. These new trends resulted in a substantial growth of diversity by origin.

We should point out here that the names we have coined for the four models do not coincide with the policy idiom used by the Dutch government at the time. It never spoke explicitly of a ‘laissez-faire’ policy, for example, or of ‘multiculturalism’. Our models are in fact analytical constructs highlighting the fact that concepts of ‘integration’ and the associated policy have been subject to shifting interpretations over the past few decades.⁴

These changes, over a relatively short period of 60 years, reveal a high degree of policy volatility . More than a decade and a half ago, in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on Integration Policy noted that consistency in this domain had been very limited over the years. With the one exception of the lack of evidence-based policy. Instead, it has always been determined to a large extent by ideology.⁵ It is also striking that, since the 1990s, the political responsibility for integration policy has been assigned to no fewer than four different ministries – Internal Affairs, Justice, Housing and Social Affairs and Employment at different times.

This volatility can be explained in part by the learning process Dutch society and government have been through in shaping a migration and integration policy. For a long time the Netherlands was “a reluctant country of immigration”.⁶ It was not until 1998 that its political establishment officially recognized that it had, de facto, become a country of immigration.⁷ Another factor is unforeseen processes: many migrants did not return home, as they had been expected to, and unemployment amongst certain groups increased rapidly during the 1980s. A third explanation is changes in migration patterns, such as increased diversity by origin. These processes necessitate continuous policy adjustment, so each of the models we have identified was or is to some extent a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of an earlier one.⁸

We briefly discuss the characteristics of each model below, also explaining why, in itself, none of the four provides an adequate response to the challenges arising out of increased diversity by origin and the shorter average duration of migrants’ stays in the Netherlands.

4.1.1 Laissez-Faire

The first model is a ‘laissez-faire’ approach in which, as far as possible, responsibility for the integration of migrants is left to the market and civil society. Enduring participation in the labour force and the help of migrant networks eventually enabled the post-war ‘guest workers’ to secure a place in Dutch society. Until well into the 1970s, however, official policy towards them had the characteristics of a laissez-faire model. There were no concerted government efforts aimed at their integration, mainly because the idea that their stays were only temporary still predominated. As ‘guests’ they were supposed to remain for a limited period only and then return home once their work was done.⁹ This conviction that the Netherlands was not a country of immigration was enshrined in the basic principle underlying the 1976 Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet).

At the local level, there were some modest policy initiatives during this period intended to tackle the socio-economic disadvantages experienced by migrants, particularly with regard to housing, but these were still based upon the assumption that they were not going to become permanent residents. The pressing issues in this respect related mainly to overcrowded and unsafe boarding houses in the major Dutch cities (see Box 4.1).¹⁰

Box 4.1: Unsafe Accommodation

The availability and quality of housing for foreign workers became an urgent issue in the 1960s. The newcomers found themselves living in overcrowded hostels, guest houses or private boarding houses. Neighbours and other local residents complained about the nuisance these caused. Much of the accommodation was unlicensed and did not meet basic safety requirements. When an immigrant boarding house in Amsterdam burnt down in December 1970, nine residents were killed. Campaign groups were subsequently established in several cities to denounce the poor conditions immigrants were forced to live in.

Successive Dutch governments were unwilling to build additional housing especially for labour migrants, however, at a time of widespread shortages. Many Dutch citizens had been on the waiting list for a home for years. The authorities held employers responsible for accommodating the foreign workers they recruited. But three-quarters of immigrants were arriving outside of formal recruitment procedures and employers felt no obligation to house either them or those whose contracts had expired. Once foreign workers started bringing in their families as well, the crisis in the housing market only worsened.

In the summer of 1972, riots broke out in one Rotterdam neighbourhood. Tensions between local residents and foreign workers had escalated in part because the city council intervened too late. The construction of large social housing developments and the exodus of ‘indigenous’ working-class families to the suburbs eventually eased the problem.

Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and again in 2007, history repeated itself. Large numbers of central and eastern Europeans came to the Netherlands to work, but adequate accommodation for them was in short supply. Just as in the 1960s and ‘70s, these labour migrants often found themselves dependent upon the informal private housing sector. Their situation was a core theme of the 2011 report of the Ad-Hoc Parliamentary Committee on Labour Migration, but that still failed to generate adequate solutions.¹¹ The COVID-19 pandemic has again thrown this deficiency into sharp relief.¹²

One major criticism of the laissez-faire policy was that it did not take into account the permanent settlement of large groups of migrants from Morocco and Turkey, or the integration-related challenges that posed in such areas as housing, education and labour-market participation. During the 1970s and ‘80s, it was finally and reluctantly accepted that many ‘guest workers’ were never going to leave and so there was a growing need for government direction and intervention.¹³ In response, a ‘minorities policy’ was introduced to promote the integration of migrants into Dutch society.¹⁴

Laissez-faire policies remain relevant when dealing with the now increasing diversity of migration because some groups, in particular highly skilled professionals, enter and participate in the Dutch labour market without any great problem. Nevertheless, laissez-faire as a general principle is not appropriate. Many asylum and family migrants have great difficulty finding jobs and need targeted government support.¹⁵ Furthermore, this type of policy pays little attention to social cohesion in the neighbourhoods and communities where many migrants settle. Our research shows that in localities where diversity by origin is high, residents have a less positive view of neighbourhood relations and feel less at home and safe.¹⁶ In other words: self-evident conviviality does not come about automatically where there is a great variety of origin groups. This issue requires that local governments play an active role.

4.1.2 Multiculturalism

A second policy model is multiculturalism. This is a somewhat ambiguous term because it refers both to actual situations in which multiple cultures are found side by side and to a normative approach which accepts or even promotes the coexistence of different cultural traditions.¹⁷ Multiculturalism as a policy model pursues integration whilst at the same time allowing social groups to retain their own culture and identity. Its Dutch version assumes that the principal path towards the effective integration of immigrants is through their own communities and self-organization, with a certain degree of institutionalization when it comes to cultural pluralism seen as a precondition for emancipation and integration. In the Netherlands, the ethnic minorities policy of the 1980s and early 1990s to a great extent reflected this multicultural model. It was based upon a group-focused approach aimed at preserving migrants’ own cultures and identities.

One aspect of that policy was to subsidize and consult migrant organizations.¹⁸ At least in part, our multicultural model was in line with the long-standing Dutch tradition of ‘pillarization’ (‘verzuiling’): the division of society into parallel communities according to religious and/or social convictions, with each operating its own civil society organizations – places of worship, schools, political parties, public broadcasters and even sports and social clubs. Following the same principle, the government facilitated education in migrants’ own languages and cultures and subsidized their own cultural, political and social organizations.¹⁹ It also consulted representatives of the largest groups as part of its decision-making processes.

In the 1980s and early 1990s this policy came under fire for failing to provide an adequate response to the evident socio-economic disadvantage suffered by many migrant groups. In fact, the critics claimed, the continuing pursuit of distinct sociocultural identities was maintaining or even reinforcing socio-economic disadvantage.²⁰ Multiculturalism was also said to ignore certain problems and structural inequalities by adopting a culturally relativist attitude – for example, with regard to the position of women.²¹ It might also create an undesirable form of ‘pillarization’, in which separate schools, churches, newspapers, broadcasters and other organizations for each ethnic group enabled their own self-exclusion and so forestalled proper integration into the host society.²²

Due to the persistent educational disadvantage and poor labour-market position of large migrant groups, the multicultural model fell out favour over the course of the 1990s. In 2003, the government decided to abolish programmes to teach migrants in their own languages (see Box 4.2). Nonetheless, one of the model’s most important instruments was retained for much longer: the Minorities Policy Consultation Act (Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid, WOM), which came into effect in 1997, would function for another 16 years. This law provided for regular policy consultations between national migrant organizations and central government. It was not until June 2013 that parliament voted for its repeal.

How does multiculturalism relate to increased diversity? One relevant aspect is that it addresses issues such as intercultural competences and cultural sensitivity in the workplace. Such qualities are important for people and institutions having to deal with a high degree of diversity by origin.

Nevertheless, multiculturalism is insufficiently equipped to deal with increased diversity. First of all, for practical reasons alone this model is difficult to apply in a society with a very large number of migrant groups, some with only a short average stay. A second critique is that multiculturalism centres on specific groups with fixed traditions and customs, but essentialism of this kind fails to recognize that culture is always subject to change. Seeking to acknowledge cultural identity can also have the effect of magnifying differences between groups, making them more pronounced than they really are, whereas increased diversity in fact tends to blur intergroup boundaries and lead to mixing and hybridization.²³ Mixed relationships are an indicator of this. Figures from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS), for example, show that 30% of all married or cohabiting Dutch-born people with a Surinamese background have a partner with a Dutch background. For those with a Dutch Caribbean background, the figure is 49%. But at 6% and 8% respectively, the proportions for people with a Turkish or Moroccan background are considerably lower.²⁴ Finally, the multicultural model pays little heed to a shared framework of values and norms which enables people from many different countries of origin and staying in the country for different lengths of time to live together harmoniously.

Box 4.2: The Mother-Tongue Dilemma

One particular characteristic of multiculturalism in the Netherlands was the facilitation of teaching in migrants’ own languages. But after more than twenty years of experimentation with mother-tongue education in various forms, in 2003 the government decided to abolish these programmes. The principal reason cited at the time was lack of quality and results. The practical effect was that the government shifted responsibility for familiarizing new generations with the languages spoken by their forebears to the migrant communities themselves.²⁵ As a result, mosques, community centres and other providers now offer extracurricular language and culture lessons to children with a migrant background. This approach has the disadvantage that there is little or no control over the quality and content of the lessons.

At many schools in the Netherlands it is common practice for pupils to be instructed to speak only Dutch at school and at home, even when that is not their first language. One frequently heard argument for this approach is that multilingualism hinders learning of Dutch, and by extension the other subjects taught in Dutch. This assumption runs counter to scientific insights into the interaction between learning a first and a second (or even third) language in children, however. In fact, a good command of their mother tongue facilitates the learning of a new language because general linguistic skills and concepts already acquired can be ‘transferred’, as it were, to the second tongue.²⁶ Various positive effects for cognitive, social and personal development have also been recorded in bilingual learners proficient in both languages.²⁷

Given the current multilingual diversity in the classroom, on the other hand, it is very difficult in practical terms to offer all children mother-tongue education. This does not mean, though, that monolingualism should be a strict norm.²⁸ For example, students with the same mother tongue can help each other, parents can assist them and teachers can use translation apps and multilingual social robots.²⁹

4.1.3 Disadvantage-Driven Policy

The third policy model focuses upon enhancing socio-economic participation by eliminating disadvantages in the fields of employment, housing and education. Just as the multicultural model was a reaction to laissez-faire thinking, so this policy was developed in response to multiculturalism’s apparent shortcomings. Unlike its forerunner, disadvantage-driven policy targeted the migrant as an individual, not their community. Nevertheless, members of certain groups were still very much at its heart, in particular those with a Dutch Caribbean, Moroccan, Turkish or Surinamese background.

Achieving proportionate or full participation in the labour market is a core goal of policies centring on disadvantage. Their underlying assumption is that socio-economic participation is a crucial precondition for integration. Only when immigrants can stand on their own two feet will they also find their way in society in other respects. Within this model there is a strong role for active government policies, especially in the fields of education, housing and employment. One influential document in its design was the 1989 WRR report Immigrant Policy (Allochtonenbeleid), which warned of a growing social gap between people with and without a migrant background. It pointed out that unemployment amongst certain groups of migrants had risen to more than 40% of their active population and that those affected faced the risk of structural exclusion from the labour market which could be carried over into future generations. The WRR found that the government regarded migrant groups too much as a ‘problem category’, rather than offering them opportunities to achieve greater self-determination. Partly as a result of this, many members of these groups were over-reliant upon public provision in the form of benefits, other welfare assistance and social housing.

In line with these findings, during the 1990s the Dutch government linked integration directly with an activation policy towards the labour market and the welfare state.³⁰ Intervention in sociocultural domains was scaled back as much as possible, since culture and identity were now deemed matters of private concern. This decade also saw a return to universal policy, which came to take precedence over measures targeting specific groups. The evolution of policy aimed at compensating schools for their pupils’ educational disadvantage, for instance, shows how ‘ethnicity’ began to play less and less of a role. Eventually, the level of the parents’ schooling was made the primary benchmark (see Box 4.3). However, this ‘universal’ criterion turned out to take insufficient account of specific educational challenges related to the arrival of intra-EU labour migrants and highly skilled professionals. For this reason there is now a new arrangement, in which the mother’s country of origin is once again taken into consideration (see Box 4.3).³¹

Box 4.3: Compensating for Educational Disadvantage and the Role of Origin

There is a long-running debate about the role of ethnicity in determining educational disadvantage. Dutch primary schools receive financial compensation for pupils who have been unable to develop to their full ability due to circumstances at home. From 1985 this was calculated using a weighted combination of ethnicity and the schooling and occupations of the children’s parents or guardians. The occupation factor was subsequently dropped, however, and later ethnicity as well. With effect from 2006, schools thus received no additional budget for migrant pupils whose parents had attended further or higher education.³²

It has now become apparent that this arrangement can cause financial problems for some schools. Those with a large number of pupils with a Polish or Romanian migration background, for example, or attended by the children of highly skilled migrants. The current algorithm releases additional funding only for pupils with less well-educated parents, whereas both these groups tend to have a relatively good schooling. But that certainly does not mean that their children will be proficient in the Dutch language when they start attending a school here, making it inevitable that it will have to devote extra effort to teaching them Dutch so that they can participate fully in regular education. A lack of funding for this purpose is experienced as a problem by many primary head teachers.³³

At the behest of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science,³⁴ Statistics Netherlands has therefore developed a proposal for a new weighting system. This uses five key criteria to determine whether a child has an educational disadvantage:

• the level of both parents’ schooling;

• the mother’s country of origin;

• the duration of the mother’s residence in the Netherlands;

• the average schooling of all mothers in the school; and,

• whether or not the parents are in a debt management programme.

Under this plan, origin – specifically, the mother’s country of origin – thus again becomes one of the factors determining educational disadvantage, together with how long the mother has lived in the country.³⁵

The disadvantage-driven model has been criticized as one-sided by overemphasizing adversity and ignoring the overall improvement in the social position of migrant groups, particularly the second generation. It has also come under fire for reducing integration-related issues to personal problems facing individuals and thus ignoring structural changes in the economy which have particularly affected the position of low-skilled migrants.³⁶ As a result, it is claimed, the resulting policy could be counterproductive since it promotes an image of migrants as being unable or even unwilling to participate in the labour market. In addition, it glosses over sociocultural themes such as traditional gender roles, which also handicap labour-market participation. In fact, this model adopts a laissez-faire approach when it comes to sociocultural matters, fuelled by a strong belief that participation in the labour market leads more or less automatically to desirable outcomes in that domain.³⁷

As the basis for a generic policy model, disadvantage is too limited a theme to cope with the increased diversity we are witnessing today. Many current immigrants do not suffer any socio-economic disadvantage and their labour-market participation is not a structural problem. Moreover, the social position of the second generation is improving. The children of asylum migrants and former guest workers are showing clear progress in their educational attainment and, in part at least, in their position in the labour market.³⁸ Nevertheless, a disadvantage-driven policy is still beneficial for certain specific groups more alienated from that market, such as many family and asylum migrants.

Finally, this model pays little attention to problems of social cohesion resulting from the increased diversity of the migrant population and its rate of turnover. It assumes that improving the social position of migrant groups will automatically lead to greater cohesion. But this is not the case. Our analyses show that, even in neighbourhoods populated by large numbers of migrants with a strong labour-market position, conviviality is a complex issue.³⁹

4.1.4 Citizenization

Our fourth policy model is citizenization. This again adds a sociocultural dimension to integration policy and, albeit implicitly, also recognizes the increased diversity of international migration. In the Netherlands, this model is intertwined with the civic integration policy launched in the late 1990s and reflects general changes in attitudes towards participation and citizenship. It places a stronger emphasis upon individual responsibility and upon the duty of people forming part of a community to contribute actively to it.⁴⁰ This trend can be traced in a series of new of laws: the 1998 Civic Integration for Newcomers Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers), followed by the 2007 Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering) and its 2013 and 2021 namesakes.

The act of 2013 was based upon one of the keys points in the coalition agreement establishing prime minister Mark Rutte’s first government in 2010 and its policy paper the following year on ‘integration, cohesion and citizenship’ (Integratie, binding en burgerschap): anyone who settles permanently in the Netherlands has a personal responsibility to integrate into Dutch society.⁴¹ This requirement is in turn derived from what the government views as a core Dutch value: it is up to every citizen, and likewise everyone living in the Netherlands, to contribute to society to the best of his or her ability and to be as self-reliant as possible in that respect. For many immigrants, civic integration is a precondition for long-term residency and the gateway to acquiring Dutch citizenship. The principal pillars of this process are learning the Dutch language and acquiring a thorough knowledge of Dutch society. Since 2017, newcomers obliged to participate in a civic integration programme have also been required to sign a ‘participation declaration’ (‘participatieverklaring’), a legal document in which they acknowledge and accept the core values of Dutch society.⁴² Not all migrants coming to the Netherlands are subject to that obligation, however, and others (known colloquially as ‘oldcomers’) have been here since it before it was introduced.

The 2011 policy paper on integration, cohesion and citizenship was also instrumental in the repeal of WOM (see above). Henceforth, universal policy would be the rule. Particularly since Rutte has been premier, national policy towards the integration of migrants has shifted away from regarding this as a separate issue and incorporated it into more general domains such as education, social affairs, housing and home affairs. This trend is referred to as ‘mainstreaming’. One exception is the specific policy concerning civic integration, but this has seen its funding diminish due to a greater emphasis upon newcomers taking personal responsibility for their incorporation into Dutch society.⁴³

Criticism of this model is directed at both civic integration policy and mainstreaming. The former, for instance, is said to ‘moralize’ or ‘culturalize’ integration because it places such a strong emphasis upon cultural knowledge of Dutch society.⁴⁴ Sociocultural adaptation or assimilation, it is argued, is overexaggerated as a condition for successful participation.⁴⁵ Especially since 2013, serious concerns have also been expressed about the policy’s focus upon individual responsibility, the abolition of state funding for integration-related activities, the disappearance of a supporting knowledge infrastructure due to budget cuts, the marketization of the system and the poor quality of civic integration programmes. These factors have resulted in a decrease in the number of people required to undergo civic integration who actually complete their trajectory successfully within the prescribed period.⁴⁶ The latest Civic Integration Act, which entered force in 2021, seeks to address a number of these issues. For example, it gives local authorities greater responsibility and more resources to shape the civic integration activities in their areas.

The main critique levelled against mainstreaming is that it risks diluting integration as a policy priority.⁴⁷ If not accompanied by a coherent policy vision with harmonization across the various domains now tasked with a role in promoting integration, the issue is in danger of disappearing ‘off the radar’.⁴⁸

On the other hand, a universal policy of citizenization could well suit the increased diversity of the migrant population. When this varies very widely in terms of origin and length of stay, it is extremely difficult to implement targeted policy for specific groups. It is also appropriate that migrants not automatically be labelled as ‘disadvantaged’ but are instead addressed by the government as ‘citizens’ (whether or not they are actually Dutch nationals) with their own responsibility to participate fully in society. Nevertheless, specific policy may still be required in the case of specific problems affecting specific groups, such as poor labour-market participation or discrimination.⁴⁹

Another issue is how civic integration policy relates to increased diversity. In classic ‘immigrant nations’ like the United States and Canada, diversity is an important feature of the national self-image. By contrast, Dutch policy ignores not only this factor but also problems of declining cohesion at the local level under the influence of increased diversity. Social cohesion is linked to sociocultural adaptation by migrants, but little attention is paid to facilitating their conviviality with non-migrants.

Finally, Dutch civic integration policy in its current form is ill-adapted to the short average stays of some of the ‘new’ migrant groups. Many EU labour migrants, as well as highly skilled professionals from elsewhere in the world, have no intention of remaining permanently in the Netherlands and no desire to become Dutch citizens. They would, however, benefit from facilities enabling them to learn the Dutch language quickly and to familiarize themselves with the country, its society and its culture. What participation and integration requirements are appropriate for newcomers who are only ‘passing through’? Even the new Civic Integration Act fails to address this question adequately.

4.1.5 Summary

• None of the four policy models for integration provides a satisfactory response to the reality that the Netherlands is now a country of immigration with increased diversity by origin and a shorter average length of stay (see Table 4.2).

• What is needed is a pragmatic combination of different approaches tailored to specific policy challenges. The laissez-faire model is relevant for highly skilled migrants who find their way into the Dutch labour market without major problems. Multiculturalism is important because of its focus upon intercultural competencies and cultural sensitivity. A disadvantage-driven policy is useful for groups largely alienated from the labour market, such as asylum migrants. And the citizenization model recognizes the relevance of universal policy in a highly diverse society.

Table 4.2 Limitations of existing policy models with regard to increased diversity by origin and length of stay

4.2 Little Coherence Between Migration and Integration Policies

The prevailing policy model governing immigration to the Netherlands has changed on a number of occasions since 1960, but never has there been much coherence with integration policy. In this section we briefly discuss the different emphases within national migration policy over the years.

The leeway available to the Dutch government to regulate migration is limited by European policy and international treaties. Since the second half of the 1990s, for example, labour migration from central and eastern Europe has increased substantially.⁵⁰ This is due to the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 and the principle of the free movement of labour within the Union. In addition, some aspects of the immigration of non-EU citizens fall outside the scope of Dutch admissions policy because the Netherlands is committed to compliance with international treaty obligations. These include the provisions of the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as well EU regulations such as the Family Reunification Directive. These treaties are particularly relevant to asylum and family migration.

Despite these limitations, there remains scope for national policy in this area.⁵¹ Table 4.3 summarizes the changing accents in migration policy between 1960 and the present day. Again, these are ideal-type distinctions. The true situation is more diffuse because ‘old’ and ‘new’ measures are often in place side by side. Moreover, by definition admissions policy is restrictive and selective. Nevertheless, differences in emphasis over time can be discerned. Table 4.3 shows that there has been a gradual shift from a recruitment-based policy aimed at low-skilled labour migrants to a more selective one prioritizing the highly skilled. The different emphases at different times were in large part a reaction to contemporary migration patterns and to evolving views concerning the function of migration policy for the Dutch economy and society.

Table 4.3 Dutch migration policy, 1960-present

The 1960s and ‘70s were characterized by the recruitment of low-skilled workers for the expanding Dutch economy. The government signed recruitment contracts with several Mediterranean countries, allowing employers to look actively for workers in them. Prospective migrants were also allowed to seek work in the mining, shipbuilding, metal and textile industries after entering the country on a tourist visa. The Foreign Labour Act (Wet Arbeidsvreemdelingen, WAV) of 1969 permitted the free movement of labour within the Benelux countries. This period of active recruitment coincided with the laissez-faire policy with regard to integration: no thought was given to the link between migration and integration as it was assumed that migrants would eventually return to their own countries.

The legal recruitment of labour migrants ended in 1975, in the wake of the economic recession of 1973.⁵² Irregular migration to the Netherlands continued, however, especially from Morocco and Turkey. The 1970s and ‘80s are known as the ‘years of tolerance’. During this period it remained relatively easy to enter the country and obtain a tax number without holding an official residence permit and so work semi-legally in certain sectors of the Dutch economy.⁵³ The migration policy of the time can be characterized as liberal – as reflected, for example, in the easing of restrictions on family migrants and the Nationality Allocation Agreement (‘Toescheidingsovereenkomst’) between the Netherlands and Suriname. This provided that anyone born in the then colony but settled in the Netherlands by 25 November 1975, the date of Surinamese independence, retained their Dutch citizenship. And for the next five years, until 25 November 1980, it remained relatively easy for Surinamese to acquire Dutch nationality. These arrangements and the economic malaise in the new republic prompted a mass exodus to the Netherlands: between 1974 and 1980, more than 110,000 people arrived from Suriname.⁵⁴ Throughout these years the link between migration policy and integration issues remained a topic only rarely discussed. Nevertheless, the influx from Suriname went hand in hand with serious integration-related problems encompassing the labour market, education and housing.⁵⁵

The period of liberal migration policies was followed by one of increasing restrictions. In particular, a series of measures was introduced to combat irregular migration. The conditions governing labour and family migration were also tightened and a new Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet) entered force in 2000 with the aim of making the Netherlands less attractive for asylum seekers. This was in part a response to the large numbers of refugees who had arrived in the 1990s, mainly from former Yugoslavia and from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. After 2000 their numbers dipped sharply and did not start rising again until 2013, peaking in 2015.⁵⁶ Still, though, there was no coherent link between migration and integration policies. Major concerns did arise regarding the socio-economic positions of both the traditional groups and the new asylum migrants, however. Many of the latter, especially, were in a very weak position in the labour market.⁵⁷

After the turn of the millennium, the restrictive policy took on a more selective character. The Highly Skilled Migrants Scheme (Kennismigrantenregeling) launched in 2004 was an important element in this shift, as was the 2006 policy paper entitled ‘Towards a Modern Migration Policy’ (Naar een modern migratiebeleid).⁵⁸ That document stated as one of its key pillars that policy should focus upon “the need for migrants existing in Dutch society as a whole”, whilst “participation in society is expected from the migrant who chooses the Netherlands.” Also at its heart was the point of a selective migration policy: “By stating clearly which migrants the Netherlands wishes to admit, the government is not abandoning its basic principle that our admissions policy is restrictive, but rather is combining that with the principle of selectivity. The contribution migrants are able to make to Dutch society should therefore play a much greater role in admissions policy than has hitherto been the case.”⁵⁹

The principle of selectivity comes to the fore primarily in the form of the Highly Skilled Migrants Scheme and a number of comparable arrangements designed to attract those with particular know-how and abilities to the Netherlands, or to retain them here, in order to strengthen the nation’s economy. By contrast, it plays little or no part in asylum and family migration. In these domains, international treaties and European directives define the extent to which nation states can be selective. For example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that a Dutch measure to make family migration more selective by raising the income threshold when bringing in a partner from abroad to 120% of the national minimum wage was in breach of the EU Family Reunification Directive. On the other hand, the government was able to introduce the Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet inburgering buitenland, WIB) in 2006. This requires persons wanting to come to the Netherlands as family migrants to pass the basic civic integration examination before arriving in the country. Its enactment contributed towards a fall in immigration from Morocco and Turkey.⁶⁰

The basic principles underlying this ‘modern’ migration policy align with the citizenization model of integration, in particular its emphasis upon active participation in Dutch society. More than ever before, efforts are now being made to link migration and integration policies. Yet they are still far from being coherent with one another. When it comes to migration, for instance, the main focus is strengthening the Dutch economy. Issues of conviviality arising out of increased diversity receive hardly any consideration, even though – as we have shown in Chap. 3 – the arrival of intra-EU labour migrants and highly skilled professionals who only stay in the country for a few years clearly impacts the social cohesion of neighbourhoods and communities.

In the light of the high net immigration figures from 2010 onwards and then the refugee crisis of 2015, the ability of the Dutch society to absorb migrants in such numbers became a topic of serious debate. During the annual parliamentary policy debate of 2018, for example, the longer-term consequences for a wide range of policy areas, integration included, of the growth and changing composition of the Dutch population was raised on several occasions.⁶¹ The questions now being posed are new ones touching on the mutual coherence of migration and integration policies.

4.2.1 Summary

• As with integration, migration policy is characterized by a high degree of volatility. There is little continuity in its substance and shape.

• There is currently a shift in favour of selective migration policy, in which the interests of the Dutch economy are prioritized more than in the past.

• There is only a weak link between migration and integration policies. Potential problems of limited labour-market participation and social cohesion are not considered systematically when formulating immigration policy.

4.3 Inadequate National Models and Local Variation

The policy models for integration outlined above are national ones. But the substantial differences we have previously identified between local communities concerning the extent to which they have to deal with increased diversity make it clear that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model is not going to suffice.

In the recent past, local policies have often diverged from the national models. In particular, the citizenization policy dominant since the turn of the millennium has not always been followed by local authorities. Some, Amsterdam amongst them, held onto elements of multiculturalism – most notably co-operation and consultations with migrant organizations. Caelesta Poppelaars and Peter Scholten go so far as to describe national and local policies as “two worlds apart”.⁶²

In Chaps. 2 and 3 we have identified eight specific types of community in the Netherlands, in addition to the ‘average’ one. This, once again, is an ideal-type classification: some places fall into two of more categories. It is especially important to realize that Dutch towns and cities differ widely in the extent to which they have to deal with the consequences of migration. Diversity by origin is very high in the three biggest cities, whereas there are communities in the north of the country, in particular, with virtually no migrant residents. There are differences in migrants’ origins, too, and in the length of their stays in the Netherlands. Horticultural districts have to cope mainly with temporary labour migrants from central and eastern Europe, border communities with the presence of Germans who often still work in their own country and expat communities with highly skilled but short-term migrants from Europe and elsewhere in the world, whilst the three major cities play host to almost every migrant group, including many international students.

In Chap. 3 we established that many Dutch local authorities, with the sole exception of those with homogeneous populations, face two major social policy tasks: (1) organizing the reception and integration of newcomers; and (2) strengthening social cohesion for all these residents. How these duties are interpreted, however, depends very much upon the local context.

4.3.1 Summary

National policy models for integration are inadequate because there are so many differences between communities in terms of the origins of their migrant residents and the durations of their stays. Scope for local variations in the reception and integration of newcomers, efforts to foster social cohesion and the promotion of labour-market participation are therefore essential.

4.4 Conclusion: A Reassessment of the Policy Agenda

The Netherlands is a country of immigration, although political recognition of this fact has come about only reluctantly. Partly because of that, integration policy in recent decades has been highly reactive and ideologically determined. Whenever views on participation and integration have changed, new policy models have been developed. And the same applies to migration policy: its emphasis has shifted repeatedly in response to evolving patterns of migration and changing views concerning its function for the Dutch economy and society. Furthermore, the new diversity is set to have very different impacts in different communities, with the resulting policy challenges quite possibly varying from one place to another – and sometimes even between neighbourhoods. This means that there can be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for the integration of migrants.

For the future of Dutch society, it is important that policy become less volatile and ad hoc. Instead, it needs to be given a solid and permanent foundation. But one with scope for local variations and bearing in mind the necessity to facilitate conviviality of all groups in society. In making this reassessment of integration and migration policy, there are therefore three key starting points.

• 1. A systematic policy is required for the reception and integration of all immigrants, rather than reacting in an ad-hoc manner to current migration patterns. This calls for greater coherence between migration and integration policies and for a stronger focus on labour-market participation and social cohesion.

• 2. Besides the current integration policy aimed at specific groups, the government should also focus on facilitating conviviality between all groups in society.

• 3. There must be scope for local variations. There are so many differences between communities in terms of the origins of their migrant residents and the durations of their stays that customization is necessary when it comes to the reception and integration of newcomers and to fostering social cohesion.

These points of departure lead us into the next three chapters, in which we deal in turn with the three policy challenges they raise: organizing reception and integration of all (Chap. 5); strengthening the social cohesion of communities (Chap. 6); and making migration and integration policies more coherent with one another (Chap. 7).