The Netherlands as a Country of Immigration

Abstract

Migration is leaving its mark on Dutch society. The Netherlands may not be a ‘nation of immigrants’ like Australia, the United States or Canada, where the majority of people are descended from migrants or have a migrant background themselves. But it is a ‘country of immigration’. Approximately one person in four was born abroad or has at least one parent who was. We begin this chapter by sketching four current trends in this respect.

Migration is leaving its mark on Dutch society. The Netherlands may not be a ‘nation of immigrants’ like Australia, the United States or Canada, where the majority of people are descended from migrants or have a migrant background themselves. But it is a ‘country of immigration’. Approximately one person in four was born abroad or has at least one parent who was. We begin this chapter by sketching four current trends in this respect.

First, the number of immigrants per annum in the past decade has been higher than at any time in the previous century.¹ As of 2010 more than 150,000 immigrants were arriving in the Netherlands each year, and since 2015 that figure has exceeded 200,000. Consequently, immigration is now the main source of population growth. Net immigration (immigration minus emigration) has outstripped the birth surplus (the number of births minus the number of deaths) since 2015. Whilst international migration is quite sensitive to the economic cycle and is therefore volatile,² it is unmistakably a consistent driver of current population growth. This becomes apparent when we compare the birth surpluses of residents with and without a migrant background: the former has been higher than the latter since 2002. And since 2015 there has actually been a mortality surplus in the ‘indigenous’ Dutch population: the number of deaths per annum has exceeded the number of births, resulting in negative growth.

Secondly, in recent years not only has the scale of immigration changed but so too has its nature. Whereas large groups of migrants once came from a small number of countries, smaller groups are now arriving from all corners of the world. Together with the long-established migrant population and their offspring, this has resulted in a sharp increase in diversity by origin.

Thirdly, Dutch society has increasingly become one of ‘transient’ migration: many newcomers leave again after only a few years. On average, the duration of a migrant’s stay in The Netherlands is now shorter than it was a few decades ago.

Finally, we observe that changing immigration patterns have resulted in greater variance between communities in the ethnic composition of the population.

In this chapter we explore these four trends in more detail, since they provide the empirical context for the core policy challenges we present later in this report.

2.1 Increasing Immigration

In the wake of the Second World War, technology in the field of transport and telecommunications advanced enormously.³ This led to a significant decrease in the cost of international, and even intercontinental, migration. Travel became faster and cheaper, and the rise of telecommunications made migration less psychologically punishing as migrants were now more easily able to keep in touch with family and friends in their countries of origin. This was one of the reasons why the scale of international migration increased so much.⁴

The Netherlands, with its relatively open economy and society, shared in this global development. As can be seen in Fig. 2.1, it experienced rising immigration from the 1950s onwards. Although numbers fluctuated from year to year (the blue line), the overall trend (the red line) was steadily and strongly upward. That consistent increase hides various form of migration, however.

Fig. 2.1

Migration to the Netherlands, 1946–2018 (× 1000)

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

2.1.1 Postcolonial Migration

The somewhat erratic pattern in the course of immigration on an annual basis was caused in part by the so-called ‘postcolonial effect’.⁵ In the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, there was a fairly substantial influx resulting from the decolonization of the former Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). In the period 1974–1980, the independence of Suriname left its mark on immigration levels. And a third postcolonial flow of migrants has come from the Dutch Caribbean.

2.1.2 Labour Migration

The British geographer Paul White states that western Europe as a whole faced several overlapping waves of migration following the Second World War. The first consisted of low-skilled labour migrants from southern Europe, Turkey and the Maghreb. They filled the gaps at the bottom end of the jobs market created by the unprecedented economic growth of the post-war period.⁶ This wave ended with the recession of 1973, as a result of which labour shortages disappeared and western European countries introduced more restrictive controls. In the Netherlands, however, this first wave ended relatively late. Whereas neighbouring countries stopped recruiting labour migrants in 1973, it was another 2 years before official Dutch efforts to do so more or less came to a standstill.⁷ In the meantime, moreover, a large number of illegal immigrants⁸ were granted residence status.⁹

After the 1973 recession, low-skilled labour migration to the Netherlands and the rest of western Europe remained relatively modest in scale. This only changed from the 1990s onwards, as more and more people from the former Eastern Bloc countries – in particular Poland – began to find their way into the Dutch labour market. Since 2007, finding work has been the main motive cited by non-Dutch migrants for coming to the Netherlands. That was the year in which workers from the central and eastern European states which had joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 no longer required a work permit, and also when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU. Even before 2004, however, there was substantial labour migration from Poland to the Netherlands. Those migrants were mainly so-called ‘Aussiedler’: Poles who also held a German passport.¹⁰

2.1.3 Family Migration

The first wave of migration by low-skilled workers, which ended in the Netherlands in 1975, was followed almost immediately by a second wave fuelled by family formation and reunification. A substantial proportion of the so-called ‘guest workers’ from Turkey and Morocco decided to remain permanently and so brought their families to join them. Moreover, this wave of family migration in the wake of labour migration persisted for many years because many children of the original Turkish and Moroccan migrants found partners in their country of origin and brought them over as well. Between 1976 and 2005, family migration was the most common form of immigration in the Netherlands.¹¹

2.1.4 Postindustrial Migration

Starting in the 1980s, the Netherlands was also confronted with what White calls “postindustrial migration”.¹² This third wave, he explains, consisted largely of asylum seekers, highly skilled workers and irregular migrants. It is their arrival, first and foremost, which changed the pattern of international migration in western Europe from the end of the Cold War onwards; in the words of Belgian sociolinguist Jan Blommaert, that went from “people from a small number of countries of origin to a small number of host countries” to “people from a very large number of countries of origin to a very large number of host countries”.¹³

In the Netherlands, it was mainly asylum seekers who shaped the picture of immigration during this third wave. One significant causal factor was the political unrest in central and eastern Europe after the fall of Communism. The war in former Yugoslavia triggered high immigration figures in the first half of the 1990s, as did the Kosovo crisis in the final 2 years of that decade. In addition, the Netherlands had to deal with an influx of asylum seekers from Asia and Africa. Although the figures fluctuated, in general they remained quite substantial into the first years of the new millennium. Then, following a period of relative calm lasting about a decade, they again rose sharply from 2013 onwards. In 2014 in particular, large numbers of Eritreans registered at Dutch asylum reception centres. This was due not only to continuing instability in their homeland in the Horn of Africa, but probably also because Switzerland tightened its admission policy for this group at around that time. Many therefore seem to have chosen the Netherlands as an alternative.¹⁴ Starting in 2014, Syrian asylum seekers also found their way to northwest Europe, the Netherlands included, in large numbers.¹⁵

2.1.5 Decline of ‘Traditional’ Migrant Groups and Increase in ‘Smaller’ Ones

To illustrate Blommaert’s observation, in Fig. 2.2 we have broken down immigration by origin into a few aggregated groups. People from Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Dutch Caribbean form the four large ‘classic’ non-European/Anglosphere origin groups. Since the 1980s, however, their share in this cohort has declined sharply, with the numbers coming from Turkey, Morocco and Suriname in particular falling steadily.¹⁶ Immigration from Suriname decreased sharply after 25 November 1980, the end of the 5-year period following the country’s independence during which people there could choose between staying and thus automatically exchanging their Dutch nationality for Surinamese citizenship or remaining Dutch – but on condition that they emigrated to the Netherlands.¹⁷

Fig. 2.2

Immigration by origin (excluding Dutch background), 1996–2018 (× 1000)

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

Meanwhile, immigration by Turks and Moroccans declined because of a decrease in international family formation by these two groups. Policy measures to limit marriage migration played a role in this,¹⁸ but anyway by this time the size of the Turkish and Moroccan communities, including a large second-generation population, meant that more potential marriage candidates were available closer to home and so there was less incentive to ‘import’ a bride or groom from the country of origin.

As mentioned above, arrivals from other non-European/Anglosphere countries rose during the postindustrial migration era, mainly as a result of increasing asylum migration. These newcomers came from a whole range of countries, including many which had not previously experienced much migration to the Netherlands.¹⁹ In addition, cheap holiday flights to far-flung destinations and the arrival of the internet caused many long-distance romances to blossom. These regularly resulted in marriage migration to the Netherlands and thus also contributed to the rise of the ‘smaller’ origin groups in immigration statistics.

Since the 1990s, highly skilled migrant workers have come to the Netherlands in fairly large numbers from all parts of the world. These talented individuals are not greatly hindered by the absence of a network of fellow migrants in their destination country, or by language barriers (see Box 2.1). They are often already assured of a job upon arrival and English is increasingly the ‘lingua franca’ in highly educated circles.

Box 2.1: High-Skills Migration as a Source of Diversity

As of 2015, some 33% of academic staff at Dutch universities were foreign nationals. Of these, 58% were citizens of another EU member state, 6% had another European nationality and 36% were non-Europeans. The top five countries of origin for this group were Germany (5% of all academic staff), Italy (3%), China (3%), Belgium (2%) and India (2%), followed by the United Kingdom, the United States, Spain, Iran and Greece.

Likewise, in highly specialized companies such as ASML, which produces machinery used in the manufacture of computer chips, we see that high-skills migration results in greater diversity. This firm needs a lot of people with very specialist technical knowledge. Because there are not enough suitable candidates in the Netherlands to fill all these positions, ASML also recruits abroad – mainly through secondment agencies and universities, but also via its own offices in Asia and the United States. In all, no fewer than 115 different nationalities are represented in the ASML workforce. Of the nearly 500 new staff who joined the company in the Netherlands in the third quarter of 2017, some 49% were non-Dutch.*

• *Source: authors’ conversation at ASML.

Figure 2.2 also shows that immigration from the European/Anglosphere countries has changed in character, with the proportion of people with a German or Belgian background declining. This is due mainly to the sharp increase in labour migration from the former communist EU member states from 2003 onwards.²⁰ Until 2006 this mainly meant immigrants from Poland. Since then, however, Bulgaria and Romania have also contributed substantially. In addition, the reasons already mentioned for the increase in immigration by ‘smaller’ non-European/Anglosphere groups apply to this category as well.²¹ Finally, the relatively strong rise in house prices in the Netherlands has played its part in reducing the share of people with a German or Belgian background in the immigration figures for the European/Anglosphere group.²²

2.1.6 Immigration Is Likely to Remain High in the Future

As Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show, the trend in immigration to the Netherlands is upward. As of the beginning of 2020, there were no indications that this would change in the short term and that immigration would start to decline.

Fig. 2.3

Immigration to the Netherlands, 2000–2040 (× 1000)

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

However, there are signs of possible shifts in the types of migrant coming to the Netherlands. Immigration from central and eastern Europe may well fall due to the ageing and shrinking population there, for example, as well as the convergence of prosperity levels between the eastern and western parts of the EU.²³

The number of asylum migrants finding their way to the Netherlands is also likely to decrease slightly. It is seems improbable that the figures of 2015 and 2016, which saw more initial asylum claims than ever before – with the exception of 1994 – will be reached again any time soon. Statistics Netherlands assumes in its current population forecast that asylum migration will remain at its current level for the next 10 years or so.²⁴ Because conflicts abroad are a strong determining factor when it comes to asylum migrant numbers, they fluctuate considerably. Moreover, it is not easy to predict which countries will generate international flows of refugees. It is therefore certainly conceivable that – just as with Eritreans and Syrians today, and with Somalis, Iraqis and Afghans in the 1990s – the future will see an influx from countries that have not previously experienced large-scale migration to the Netherlands.

Statistics Netherlands also assumes that labour and student migration from outside the EU will continue to increase in the future.²⁵ Fuelling the latter, it expects the internationalization of universities to continue.

In short, both past experience and the population forecast from Statistics Netherlands indicate that continuing substantial immigration can be expected for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, it is quite possible that this will include ‘new’ groups of immigrants.

2.2 Increasing Ethnic Diversity

Not only has the number of migrants to the Netherlands increased, their origins are also more and more disparate. In January 1972, some 9.2% of the population had a migrant background; as of the beginning of 2018, this proportion had risen to more than 23% (see Fig. 2.4). This is a first indication that diversity by origin has increased significantly. Figure 2.5 also shows that the population with a migrant background has become increasingly varied; to demonstrate this, for the years 1972, 1995 and 2018 we divided that population into those with and without a European/Anglosphere²⁶ background, then broke down the latter group by the four ‘classic’ countries of origin (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Dutch Caribbean) plus ‘other’.

Fig. 2.4

Composition of the Dutch population by origin in 1972, 1995 and 2018

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

Fig. 2.5

Size and breakdown by origin of the Dutch population with a migrant background on 1 January 1998 and 2018

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

In the early 1970s, the vast majority of those with a migrant background had their origins in Europe or the Anglosphere – predominantly either neighbouring countries or the former Dutch East Indies.²⁷ And, as described in 2.2, by this time the Netherlands was already experiencing immigration by guest workers and their families from Turkey and Morocco as well. The share of the four ‘traditional’ non-European/Anglosphere groups in the population with a migrant background was approximately 10%. Continuing family migration by Turks and Moroccans, as well as postcolonial migration from Suriname – mainly in the period 1974–1980 – and then from the Dutch Caribbean from the second half of the 1980s, increased this share to 34.5% by 1994. From then on, however, that proportion stabilized. This was mainly because the group with another non-European/Anglosphere background grew considerably in size; in 1972 it accounted for just 2.8% of the total population with a migrant background, but by 1995 – fuelled by postindustrial migration – that figure had risen fourfold. In the most recent year for which we have figures, 2018, some 23.6% of persons with a migrant background living in the Netherlands were of this so-called ‘other non-European/Anglosphere’ origin.

Figure 2.5 shows the size and composition by origin of the population with a migrant background in 1998 and in 2018. This reiterates the fact that the Netherlands is a country of immigration, the total number of people falling into this category having increased by more than 1.3 million in those 20 years alone.

Diversity by origin has increased considerably, too. The proportions with roots in the main ‘traditional’ countries of origin, both non-European/Anglosphere (Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and the Dutch Caribbean) and European/Anglosphere (Indonesia/Dutch East Indies, Germany and Belgium), declined from 70% in 1998 to 54% in 2018. Also striking is that some of the most prominent groups in 2018 had been negligible just 20 years earlier. There were now more people with a Polish²⁸ background than a Belgian or Dutch Caribbean one, for example, whilst the number originating in Syria was only marginally smaller than the figure for Belgium.

2.2.1 Emigration

Besides increasing immigration, other demographic factors such as emigration, births and deaths have also strongly influenced the increasing diversity by origin in the Netherlands. We look first at emigration. Year on year, this fluctuates far less than immigration. In fact, as Fig. 2.6 shows, its level was relatively stable through the second half of the twentieth century with the exception of the 1990s. At first sight, no clear trend either upward or downward is discernible during this period; the only noteworthy point is a decrease in emigration in the 1950s.²⁹

Fig. 2.6

Immigration, emigration and net migration in the Netherlands, 1946–2018 (× 1000)*

*Emigration figures are after administrative corrections. (More information on these administrative corrections can be found in an article by Nicolaas (2006)). For the sake of clarity, emigration is expressed in negative terms

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER) cites increasing prosperity at home and economic tensions in the principal destination countries as the main reasons why emigration fell from the early 1950s onwards. This decline was structural in nature, although that is not really apparent from Fig. 2.6. The post-war baby boom caused the overall population to grow by an unprecedented 28% during this period, from 9.3 million in 1946 to 11.9 million in 1963. That led to the emigration rate – the number of emigrants per inhabitant – dropping significantly in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s (see Fig. 2.7). Starting in 1963, it then rose again slightly. As well as Dutch nationals, these emigrants included ‘guest workers’ returning home. Mainly from Italy and Spain, their departures peaked during the 1967 recession when approximately 26,000 did not have their employment contracts renewed. Almost half of those affected left the Netherlands as a result.³⁰

Fig. 2.7

Emigration from the Netherlands per 1000 inhabitants, 1946–2018*

*Emigration figures are after administrative corrections

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

During the 1970s and 1980s, the scale of emigration from the Netherlands remained fairly stable. And the same applied to the emigration figure per capita. In the 1990s, however, there was an upturn.³¹ Emigrant numbers then increased sharply at the beginning of the twenty-first century, reaching a record so far of 154,200 in 2017. The composition of this most recent group differs significantly from that in the first two decades following the Second World War. Whereas the post-war wave consisted almost exclusively of people with a Dutch background, about two-thirds leaving the country permanently in the first years of the new millennium had a migrant background.³²

Another important difference compared with the 1950s and 1960s is that non-economic factors nowadays seem to be a major driver of emigration. According to researchers at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (Nederlands Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut, NIDI) and Statistics Netherlands, a desire to emigrate is now often motivated by negative views of the quality of life in the Netherlands – due to ‘overpopulation’, pollution, noise and so on – or of Dutch society, often expressed through critical attitudes towards the ‘national mentality’, the crime rate or multiculturalism, for example.³³ That said, economic factors do still play a part as well. Relatively low property prices in Belgium and Germany, for instance, have encouraged quite substantial emigration from the Dutch border areas to these two neighbouring countries.³⁴

2.2.2 A Closer Look at Net Migration

The immigration and emigration trends described above resulted in positive net migration (immigration exceeding emigration) almost every single year from 1961 to 2002 (see Fig. 2.6). The only exceptions were 1967, a year of recession, and 1982, at the nadir of the economic malaise which had begun in the mid-1970s. In 2003 the tide turned, with emigration outstripping immigration for a number of years, but the situation reversed again from 2008 onwards. The most recent figures indicate that net migration remains positive, due mainly to record numbers of immigrants arriving in the past decade and a half. These include large groups of labour migrants from the central and eastern European countries which joined the EU on either 1 May 2004 or 1 January 2007. Even more recently, they have been joined by a relatively high number of asylum seekers.

As well as the scale of migration, the respective compositions of the immigrant and emigrant populations can be important in shaping the development of a country’s diversity by origin. We illustrate this in Fig. 2.8, distinguishing between those with a Dutch and a migrant background in the net migration figures for the period 1996–2018. Unfortunately, this data is not available for previous years. We do, however, have figures for the nationalities of migrants going back to 1977. Since these provide some indication of the composition of the migrant population by origin, they are also included in Fig. 2.8.

Fig. 2.8

Net migration in the Netherlands by origin and nationality, 1977–2018 (× 1000)*

*Emigration figures are after administrative corrections

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

An initial look at Fig. 2.8 shows that, from 1996 onwards, net migration by people with a migrant background was very clearly positive. In other words, significantly more of them came to the Netherlands than left. Numerically, the total ‘surplus’ in the period 1996–2018 was 916,000 persons – equivalent to approximately 6% of the total Dutch population in 1996. Interestingly, though, there was also a brief period of negative net migration by this group in 2005 and 2006. That is probably attributable to the strong economic growth in Turkey at the time, coinciding with a perceived negative discourse around migrants in the Netherlands.³⁵

What generates less attention but has still had a considerable effect upon the diversity of the nation’s population is that 247,000 people with a Dutch background left the Netherlands in the same period. If we go a little farther back in time and look at net migration broken down by nationality, we find that positive net migration of people with a migrant background and negative net migration of those with a Dutch background has been a persistent trend since at least 1977. The only time when there was a ‘surplus’ of Dutch nationals settling in the country was a brief period in the mid-1980s, probably accounted for by a relatively large number of Antilleans (who are Dutch citizens) migrating to the European Netherlands due to major social and economic setbacks on their home islands – in particular, the closures of the oil refineries on both Curaçao (Shell) and Aruba (Exxon) in 1985.³⁶

2.2.3 Differences in Natural Population Growth

Differences in the rate of natural population growth – that is, the number of births versus the number of deaths, also known as the birth surplus (or deficit) – influence diversity by origin as well. If this rate is higher amongst small origin groups than larger ones, diversity increases. And in the Netherlands it goes without saying that those small groups have migrant backgrounds. Moreover, migrant groups in general tend to have higher birth surpluses than ‘indigenous’ populations because they are younger overall. Consequently, their mortality rates tend to be lower than average and their birth rates higher.³⁷

In order to compare the birth surpluses of the populations with a Dutch background and with a migrant one, in Fig. 2.9 we show both for the period 1996–2018. To further clarify the situation, we have divided the latter into those with European/Anglosphere and non-European/Anglosphere backgrounds.

Fig. 2.9

Birth surplus by origin, 1996–2018 (× 1000)

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

The birth surpluses of the ‘Dutch’ and ‘non-European/Anglosphere’ groups were about the same in the second half of the 1990s and into the new millennium. As the latter group was far smaller numerically, however, its relative surplus was much higher. This led to an increase in diversity by origin. To be more precise: in the period 1996–2018 the Dutch population rose by just over 620,000 because more people with a non-European/Anglosphere background were born than died. Over the past 20 years, in fact, natural population growth has accounted for a larger share of the increase in the non-European/Anglosphere population than net immigration. In other words, the second generation has played a greater part in this group’s growth than the first.

Figure 2.9 further reveals that the effect of the differences in birth and mortality rates between population groups is accelerating. Since 2002 the birth surplus in the ‘non-European/Anglosphere’ group has been higher in absolute terms than in the population with a Dutch background. Indeed, as of 2015 the latter group has been experiencing a birth deficit (also known as a mortality surplus) – the first time since the Second World War that its natural population growth has been negative.

Meanwhile, the population with a European/Anglosphere migrant background had only a modest birth surplus in the period 1996–2018, and actually experienced mortality surpluses in 1996 and 1997. This was in part because a relatively large proportion of this group lived in border areas with an ageing and falling population, and in part because its largest component subgroup – those with a Dutch East Indies background – was also ageing considerably by this time.

2.2.4 Diversity by Origin Continues to Increase

From the above analysis, it is evident that diversity by origin in the Netherlands is set to increase in the coming decades. This is a result not only of increasing immigration, but also of the differences in birth surpluses between those sections of the population with and without a migrant background. Even if the borders were to be closed completely and immigration were to cease, both the size of the group with a migrant background and its diversity by origin would continue to increase for decades to come. This is due to the high birth rates and low mortality rates in this still relatively young cohort. The Statistics Netherlands population forecast reproduced in Fig. 2.10 illustrates this clearly.³⁸ All three ‘migrant background’ groups plotted display an upward trend in terms of their share of the total population. The percentage of people with a Dutch background is therefore declining, and according to the Statistics Netherlands will continue to do so until well into the twenty-first century.³⁹

Fig. 2.10

Share of persons with a migrant background in the Dutch population, 1996–2060

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

2.3 Increasing Transience

2.3.1 Migrants Stay Shorter

Dutch society is becoming one of ‘transient’ migration. On average, those coming to live in the Netherlands are staying for shorter and shorter periods of time. This has significant consequences for institutions. Schools, companies and voluntary associations increasingly have to deal with the phenomenon of people leaving in the middle of a school year, a production process or, say, a sports season.

Figure 2.11 shows that, of the foreign-born immigrants who arrived in the Netherlands in 1995, almost 20% left again within 2 years. This proportion had increased to more than 35% by 2010, partly due to increased migration for work and studies. Figure 2.11 also includes the 1995 Statistics Netherlands forecast that more than 50% of immigrants to the Netherlands would eventually leave again, a prognosis it revised in 2010 to almost 75%.

Fig. 2.11

Departure rates (observed and forecast) of foreign-born immigrants by year of immigration and length of stay in the Netherlands

Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

This issue of temporary versus permanent migration appears to be particularly pertinent when it comes to recent labour migration from within the EU.⁴⁰ Amongst Polish workers, for instance, there is considerable variety in this respect. A substantial number return home once they have accumulated sufficient resources, others commute back and forth on a regular basis, depending upon the availability of jobs, and others still move on to other European countries for work. Nevertheless, the number of eastern European labour migrants who settle permanently in the Netherlands seems to be increasing. One important indicator here is the rise in the number of families sending their children to school in the Netherlands.

It also appears that more and more people are just ‘passing through’ the Netherlands on a multinational migration trajectory. They include Somalis who move on to the United Kingdom and Poles who work in various European countries. In this context, we use the term ‘liquid migration’.⁴¹ The classic image of migration involves a person leaving their home country for a specific destination elsewhere and settling there more or less permanently. The idea of ‘liquid’ mobility, by contrast, reflects the emergence of a more ‘fluid’ or ‘transient’ migrant population, of whom some stay and put down roots, some eventually move on and others return home at some point.

2.3.2 Durations Unknown

Another aspect of this increasing transience is that it is not clear in advance who is going to stay and who is going to leave again, or when. This is something local authorities, for example, would dearly like to know in order to tailor their integration policies accordingly. The general trends revealed by the figures presented above point to increased transience, to an unprecedented degree. Consequently, we can never be sure in advance whether a particular newcomer will remain in the country permanently or only temporarily, making it hard to tell who to invest in with regard to social and civic integration and who not to.

In this section we examine whether any patterns related to transience can be identified. Do certain groups of migrants, such as those who come to work or study, leave earlier than others – family migrants, for instance? Hans Schmeets of Statistics Netherlands has investigated these questions in more detail.⁴² Using data from his agency’s System of Social Statistical Datasets (Stelsel van Sociaal-statistische Bestanden SSB), he tracked two cohorts: migrants who registered in the Netherlands in the period 1999–2005 and those who did so between 2006 and 2010. Whilst 36% of the former stayed in the country for less than 5 years, the figure for the latter was 47%.

2.3.3 Motives for Migration

The shorter average length of stay may be related to the motives people have for migrating. Students, for example, settle mainly in large cities and in general stay on for only a limited period after completing their studies. In order to analyse this factor in more detail, Fig. 2.12 shows the average length of stay by reason for migration for both cohorts.

Fig. 2.12

Duration of stay of non-Dutch immigrants by reason for migration, 1999–2005 and 2006–2010 cohorts

© WRR (2020) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (Schmeets, 2019)

In the ‘99-05’ cohort, over 60% of immigrants remained in the Netherlands for more than 5 years. The proportion was higher for asylum and family migrants, just exceeding 70%, and lower for student and labour migrants. When comparing the two cohorts, the general trend towards greater transience becomes quite apparent: the percentage staying less than 2 years increased from 16% to 24%. Only with asylum migrants is this pattern not observed. It is quite plausible that the country of origin plays a role here. After all, opportunities to return vary. Asylum migrants from former Yugoslavia, for example, are generally able go back there if they so wish, now that the region is at peace again. Which is not the case with places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The overall picture is that asylum migrants stay longest in the Netherlands, followed by family migrants.

Labour and student migrants, on the other hand, remain for shorter periods. Fewer asylum migrants arrived in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2010 than in the previous 5 years, but those who did stayed longer. By contrast, more students came and more of them stayed only relatively briefly. The motive behind a person’s migration does therefore partly explain the increase in the proportion of ‘short-stay’ immigrants. We say partly because there are always exceptions in patterns of this kind, such as the many Somali refugees who moved on from the Netherlands to a third country between 2002 and 2007.⁴³

2.3.4 Other Characteristics

For fairly obvious reasons, this variation in duration of stay by reason for migration correlates quite closely with the variation by country of origin. For the majority of immigrants from Suriname, Morocco and Turkey in the two cohorts examined by Schmeets, the motive for coming to the Netherlands was family-related. Those with Anglosphere and Mediterranean backgrounds were more likely to come for work reasons, whilst asylum seekers tend to hail originally from Arab countries, sub-Saharan Africa and central Asia. And study is the main motive bringing migrants from east Asia and Indonesia to the Netherlands. That said, however, and even after correction to take into account motives for migrating, country of origin does also seem to have some autonomous effect with regard to duration of stay. Additional analyses reveal, for example, that about 20% of labour migrants from east Asia, Scandinavia and the Anglosphere stay longer than 10 years. Amongst their counterparts from Arab countries, central Asia and Morocco, the figure is no more than 10%.⁴⁴

Variations in duration of stay can thus be explained in part by motives for migration and country of origin, but other more individual characteristics may also play a part. For example, being reunited with a partner or having children who become ‘rooted’ in the Netherlands may reduce the chance of return or onward migration. Researchers at the Ministry of Justice who examined whether the arrival of family members in the Netherlands affects how long labour migrants remain in the country⁴⁵ found that those who remain without close relatives here are more likely to leave again than those who are reunited with their families.

Although at least some marriage migrants do entertain the idea of ‘returning home’ at some point, having school-age children in particular tends to cause the postponement of such plans.⁴⁶ The main reasons for this are the youngsters’ well-being and the often better educational opportunities in the Netherlands. Moreover, parents often want to spare their children the trauma of migration. After all, they already know what it is like to suffer a language deficiency and to have to prove oneself in a different type of society. All things considered, such individual characteristics also play their part in personal choices about whether or not to stay permanently in the Netherlands.

2.4 Diversity Between Communities

2.4.1 Considerable Diversity by Origin

In an earlier publication⁴⁷ we calculated the diversity by origin of Dutch neighbourhoods, municipalities and regions. For this exercise, we first divided everyone living in the country into eighteen categories by country or region of origin. Naturally, the largest of these is the Netherlands itself. Almost 80% of the population fell into this group in 2015. The other seventeen included Turkey, Morocco, Anglosphere countries, Arab countries, sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia and so on. We then compiled a diversity index covering every Dutch neighbourhood, municipality and region. This was a version of the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is used to measure various forms of diversity. It produced a figure, between 0 and 1, indicating the probability that two randomly selected persons from the area in question belong to different origin groups. The higher the figure, the greater that chance. A low HHI score thus indicates considerable homogeneity, a high one considerable heterogeneity (what we refer to as ‘diversity’). The average for the whole of the Netherlands in 2015 was 0.38.

As Fig. 2.13 shows, however, there are wide variations in HHIs across the country. More than two-thirds of the Dutch population live in a municipality where the chance that two residents belong to different groups is about one in three or higher. In the nation’s three largest cities, that rises to more than two in three. A high degree of diversity by origin is thus an everyday reality for large sections of Dutch society. However, the nature of that diversity also varies widely from place to place (see Box 2.2).

Fig. 2.13

Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices by municipality, 1 January 2015

© Jennissen et al., (2018) | Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)

Box 2.2: Types of Municipality

In addition to the ‘average’ Dutch community’ in terms of diversity by origin, we have also identified eight particular distinctive types (see also Fig. 2.14):

• Majority-minority cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague). In these ‘superdiverse’ metropolitan cities, the majority of residents have a migrant background. The number of different countries of origin is particularly varied.

• Metropolitan suburbs (such as Capelle aan den IJssel and Diemen). These communities are also very diverse ethnically, although the majority of their population still has a Dutch background. Diversity is increasing faster than in the adjacent majority-minority cities.

• Larger provincial cities (such as Utrecht, Eindhoven and Arnhem). These also have a very high degree of diversity, but the proportion of people with a Dutch background remains much higher than in the three largest cities and their suburbs.

• Medium-sized towns with one specific migrant group (such as Gouda, Almelo and Delfzijl). These are characterized by the presence of a single large non-European/Anglosphere minority group, often as a result of the recruitment of guest workers from a specific country of origin or of settlement by Antilleans on relatively large scale.

• Expat communities (such as Amstelveen and Wassenaar). Towns with a large population of highly skilled migrants drawn from countries all over the world. By comparison, they have relatively few residents with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Dutch Caribbean background.

• Horticultural districts (such as Westland, Zeewolde and Horst aan de Maas). Rural or semi-rural areas with a substantial Polish and, to a lesser extent, Bulgarian population working mainly in the extensive local horticulture sector.

• Border communities (such as Vaals, Kerkrade, Terneuzen and Baarle-Nassau). Here it is mainly residents with a German or Belgian background who ensure a relatively high degree of diversity.

• Homogeneous communities (such as Urk, Staphorst and Grootegast). The vast majority of residents, more than 90%, have a Dutch background.

Fig. 2.14

Examples of Dutch communities with distinctive forms of diversity by origin

© Bovens et al. (2020)

2.4.2 Limited Variation in Duration of Stay

Looking at the average durations of migrant stays in the distinctive types of community listed in Box 2.2, we find that these do not vary widely between them. The one exception is the expat communities, where stays are generally short; more than half of their incoming migrants leave the Netherlands again within 5 years.

2.5 Conclusions: More Migration, More Diversity, More Transience

The main findings of this chapter are as follows

• Migration to the Netherlands has increased considerably in recent decades. As of 2010, more than 150,000 immigrants were arriving each year. Since 2015 that figure has exceeded 200,000.

• Immigration has become the main source of population growth. An increasing proportion of the population has a migrant background. At the beginning of 2020, the figure was 24.2%.

• Diversity by origin has also increased considerably. It is no longer possible to define this solely in terms of ‘traditional’ groups, such as those with a German, Belgian, Indonesian/Dutch East Indian, Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccan or Dutch Caribbean background. New countries of origin account for an ever-growing proportion of those with a migrant background.

• Diversity by origin is set to increase further in the coming decades. This is due not only to continuing immigration, but also to differences in birth surplus figures between sections of the population with and without a migrant background.

• The Netherlands is increasingly becoming a society of transient migration. On average, those coming to live here are staying for shorter and shorter periods of time. More than a third of newcomers in 2010 left within 2 years, and 47% within 5 years. It is expected that almost 75% of those arriving now will eventually leave again.

• It is difficult to predict in advance who is going to stay and who is going to leave again, or when. On average, asylum migrants remain the longest of all. Then come family migrants, whilst labour and student migrants tend to stay for shorter periods.

There are wide variations in terms of diversity by origin across the Netherlands, but less so when it comes to duration of stay. Expat municipalities have the highest rate of turnover, with more than half of new arrivals leaving the country within 5 years.