Abstract
This paper reviews some of the common discussions and criticisms regarding criminal-law dogmatics, some of which are considered less important than their historical weight makes them seem (for example, the debate about their scientific nature) and others are valid in the face of an incorrect practice of dogmatics or, better, in the face of “bad” dogmatics (such as the criticism of the prevalence of the system over the law). A correctly developed dogmatics is claimed, without any pretensions of absolute objectivity, with the positive law as limit and reference, away from an exercise of “art for art’s sake.” A dogmatics that is not isolated from other knowledge nor above them, not hermetic, with respect for the Constitution and fundamental rights and, most especially, focused on the solution of real problems. This kind of solution often does not arise simply from the wording or the language of the positive law. Certain misuses of dogmatics in jurisprudence are reported and the advantages of its correct use for jurisprudence are highlighted. In short, dogmatics is claimed as an important guarantee (not a panacea), with others, of the citizen in avoiding arbitrariness and, therefore, as a limit to punitive power.
This paper belongs to the research projects DER2016-76715-R and PID2019-108567RB-C21 (AEI), as well as to the research tasks of the UIC 166 of Castilla and León. The references related to the topic addressed are endless, so we do not claim to be exhaustive in the citation. In many of the works cited above, there are abundant further references.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Von Kirchmann (1848), especially his well-known sentence “Three corrective words from the legislator and whole libraries become waste paper” (p. 23).
- 2.
It is enough to cite the quotation already made by v. Kirchmann (1848) in Germany; in Spain, to cite only one author and in a work (among many others in which he denies the scientificity of dogmatics) dedicated to the thought of v. Kirchmann, Vives Antón (2017), pp. 233 et seq. with further references.
- 3.
It is important to underline that the school of Vives Antón is integrated by relevant criminal lawyers with serious works (most of whom I have an excellent relationship with), who in my opinion often do dogmatics. For this reason, my mention to its representatives here should in no way be taken as disqualifications, but rather, on the contrary, as opinions to continue the debate. It would be impossible here to mention all the works in which Vives and his followers express criticisms and objections to dogmatics or to the way in which criminal lawyers do it. In some of the following sections, I will especially cite one of the works by Cuerda Arnau (2017) in which further references to others can be found. In any case, I wish to state here for the record that some works by this author [e.g., the most recent (2019), pp. 11 et seq., with very interesting application of her theses to specific problems] in which she insists on the criticisms and on the need (which I fully agree with) not to make dogmatics beyond the law, actually show that our positions are not so far apart and that a “good” dogmatics does not have to incur in the deficiencies that she reports (although it is not possible to demonstrate this here in detail, later on I will offer some example of coincidence). These criticisms are based on Vives Antón’s view of meaningful action (see. the work in which he develops it in a general way: Vives Antón 2011). Vives’ disciples have applied this conception of their teacher to the most diverse subjects in books and works [just to mention one among many, in which quite a few of them have recently written: González Cussac (coord.) (2019)], in many of whom at least misgivings towards dogmatics can be noticed, probably with the exception of Martínez-Buján Pérez, an important developer of Vives Antón’s conception, but admitting the need for dogmatics (based on law), as he acknowledges, I believe, in the foreword to the very interesting book by Martínez-Buján Pérez (2019), foreword in which Vives once again criticizes dogmatics or the way of doing dogmatics and the pretension of its scientificity (pp. 13 et seq.), but he concludes by stating: “In the work of Carlos Martínez-Buján, all these requirements are combined with a special insight to analyze the concepts and a deep knowledge of the existing jurisprudence and dogmatics, so that the reader will find in it a dogmatics that has renounced its complexes and the pretensions of infallibility that arise from them, offering simply, an authentic lesson of Law” (pp. 14 et seq.).
- 4.
For many, summarized in this sense Vives Antón (2017), p. 233.
- 5.
Gimbernat Ordeig (1970), pp. 379 et seq. [1990, pp. 140 et seq.].
- 6.
Nino (1984), p. 103.
- 7.
Atienza (2015), pp. 169 et seq., 189 et seq.
- 8.
And I would even say, although this requires further verification, that some of the criticisms of criminal-law dogmatics [e.g., those of Vives Antón or his disciple Cuerda Arnau, in Spain; see. only Vives Antón (2011), p. 578; Cuerda Arnau (2017), p. 494] are influenced by the use of dogmatics made by a very definite current, that of ultra-normativism of Jakobsian tradition, which here it is not possible to evaluate, but which, in my opinion, differs to a large extent from what dogmatics and its most refined source, the theory of offense, should be, by dissolving the categories of this into others of allocation that are much more vague, general and even manipulable. In this sense, with clarity, among others, Demetrio Crespo (2010), p. 15: “In this way Jakobs has been deconstructing the systematic structure of the theory of offense at its very foundations through the formalism of the categories and the use of vague and imprecise concepts that lack the capacity of subsumption.”
- 9.
Nino (1980), p. 14.
- 10.
Schünemann (2011), p. 447. This author, by the way, continues to vindicate the value of dogmatics and its service to the democratic rule of law. He has done so in multiple works and, recently, citing all of them and many more and in the face of critical positions such as especially those of Vogel (2012), pp. 25 et seq. or Ambos (2016), pp. 177 et seq., in Schünemann (2016), pp. 654 et seq. In these recent works Schünemann has argued that in a liberal constitutional state, criminal-law dogmatics is vital as a “fourth power” against totalitarian pretensions of criminal policy and has even introduced a new paradigm in the global science of criminal law: the paradigm of the analytical-philosophicus mos civitatis iuris, abbreviated as “mapci.”
- 11.
Schünemann (2011), p. 447.
- 12.
Alexy (1991), pp. 326 et seq. [(1997), pp. 255 et seq.]
- 13.
- 14.
Schünemann (2011), p. 448.
- 15.
Kindhäuser (2009), pp. 963 et seq.
- 16.
Gimbernat Ordeig very clearly states (1970), p. 405 [(1990), p. 158].
- 17.
Cuerda Arnau (2017), p. 485.
- 18.
I cannot discuss this idea here, which would require many aspects, but I would like to express that I do not reject the appeal to principles, but I notice that some references to them together with the idea of weighting hide personal preferences, far removed from the law and the Constitution itself.
- 19.
Cuerda Arnau (2017), pp. 486 et seq.
- 20.
Luzón Peña (2016), Cap. 3 paragraph 2 (p. 29).
- 21.
I personally wrote many years ago: “(…) the evaluations that I believe to be most important are those that can be extracted from the law, trying to make them compatible with those that seem more correct from the point of view of material justice, of political-criminal needs, but always within the maximum limit of the letter of the law itself, of the principle of legality” [Díaz y García Conlledo (1991), p. 35].
- 22.
- 23.
Emphasis added.
- 24.
Very clearly and with multiple references, by many, Silva Sánchez (2004), especially pp. 680 et seq.
- 25.
Geertz (1973), p. 30 [(2003), p. 39].
- 26.
Stated by him in its general lines almost half a century ago: Roxin (1973).
- 27.
It is not possible here, unfortunately, to expose and reply to the relevant critical remarks of a specialist such as Díez Ripollés (2021), passim, on Roxin’s way of understanding criminal policy (for him incorrect), whose influence would have had negative consequences for true criminal policy. It is enough to say here, provisionally and as far as this paper is concerned, that even if the German author were to extend, as Díez Ripollés argues, incorrectly the term criminal policy to all evaluation content used in criminal law, this would not contradict the idea that I hold in the text that dogmatic construction does not need to be “pure” and ignore evaluations. We cannot either evaluate here the important reflections that the mentioned author makes in the aforementioned work, pp. 14 et seq., under the heading “The fagocitate (or absorption) of criminal policy by the dogmatics of liability,” which aims to demonstrate the dogmatic excesses (including “going beyond the legal interpretation” or “highlighting a criminal law in force according to a certain concession of society not necessarily coinciding with that of the legislator”), but, I understand, he does not discuss the need for it (in its, for him, fair terms) either.
- 28.
Interesting and with very extensive subsequent references are the recent considerations regarding the “encounters and misunderstandings” of criminal dogmatics and legal sociology offered by Gómez Martín (2019), pp. 165 et seq. Also, recently Miró Llinares (2020), pp. 279 et seq., avoiding the “old and unfruitful debate on the scientific nature of criminal-law dogmatics” (pp. 279 et seq.), extensively argues the need to open criminal law and dogmatics to other fields of knowledge and the risks of “isolationism.”
- 29.
See only, for example, the considerations in this regard of Latin American criminal lawyers such as Sotomayor Acosta (2008), pp. 148 et seq., 164; Zaffaroni (2017), pp. 245 et seq.; Arias Holguín (2018), pp. 49 et seq.; Moreno Hernández (2018), pp. 82 et seq., 371 et seq., 392 et seq., entre otras; (2020), pp. 311 et seq.
- 30.
In the sense stated, for example, by Silva Sánchez (2004), pp. 679 et seq. It is not possible to explain or discuss here, however, the relationship of “universalization” with the criminal-law categories regarding the importance of the a priori categories that would shape criminal-law knowledge (different from those of other branches of law, which would work in the same way in their field), categories that would not operate based on the positive norm, as García Amado (2020), particularly explains pp. 156 et seq.
- 31.
See regarding the importance of fundamental rights and their relationship with dogmatics, warning of certain “postmodern” risks, recently, Moccia (2020), pp. 289 et seq. In a critical work on different aspects of dogmatics (or its approach to certain problems), Parma (2020) arrives at a conclusion that is (to a large extent) comparable and that points to the importance of human rights [even for a “good” non-hermetic dogmatist, of course! Criminal law must move away from the arcane labyrinths of scholars, avoid the excessive pseudo-university artillery, the promiscuity of populist policies and renounce the media oracles that condemn without trial. It must offer solutions, hold on to the humanization of conflict, aspire to freedom equalizations” (p. 333)].
- 32.
It is enough to recall, among others, the reflections of Schünemann in his work referred to above at the end of n. 10.
- 33.
And it is very true that dogmatists, hiding behind the shield of their “science,” of its “purity” or forgetting central aspects of it (contradicting themselves), have come to do much worse things than not criticizing non-democratic regimes. See only, with further references, the recent reflections of García Amado (2020), especially pp. 158 et seq.
- 34.
He critically warns about the conditions under which the theory of offense (remember: the most refined product of dogmatics) “could be linked in the same way to a conservative, progressive, liberal, social, fascist or communist system” Figueiredo Dias (2019), p. 155.
- 35.
Which also refers Greco (2008), pp. 180 et seq.
- 36.
An example (among many possible ones by other authors) of my dogmatic treatment of these issues is given in Díaz y García Conlledo (1999), pp. 335 et seq.
- 37.
It is not possible to develop here the evident connection of this with the impossibility of automatic subsumption in the law by judges, today widely recognized. I will refer, just as a recent example, to the interesting work of Sánchez-Ostiz Gutiérrez (2019), pp. 325 et seq., warning, however, that I do not necessarily agree with all of his proposals (pp. 336 et seq.).
- 38.
In fact, our Penal Code (unlike others) does not even contain a definition of willful intent (and its classes) and recklessness (and I believe, by the way, that it does well).
- 39.
Among them, of course and inexcusably, those that derive from the positive law itself, such as the fact that, in this case, intentional homicide (even with dolus eventualis) is punished much more harshly than reckless or negligent homicide.
- 40.
Again, as a mere example of dogmatic treatment, this time not mine, of this issue: Luzón Peña (2016), Cap. 16 paragraphs. 54 et seq. (pp. 234 et seq.).
- 41.
A new example of our own treatment can be found in Díaz y García Conlledo (2002), especially pp. 656 et seq.
- 42.
Cuerda Arnau (2017), p. 489. In the following, I do not dispute this author’s assertion that case law is in fact becoming less and less predictable, but that this is due to (correct) dogmatics.
- 43.
Schünemann (2011), pp. 445 et seq.
- 44.
Schünemann (2011), p. 460.
- 45.
See Pantaleón Díaz (2018), p. 105. Different data on judicial statistics (not only criminal) can be obtained in “Justicia Dato a Dato,” an annual publication offered by the General Council of the Judiciary: https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Temas/Estadistica-Judicial/Estudios-e-Informes/Justicia-Dato-a-Dato/. The latest available (2019), contains multiple statistical data, but it is sufficient to refer, for the criminal jurisdiction, to the indicators summary on p. 116.
- 46.
Illustrative, even in his title, and from the hand of a sadly famous case in Spain, the work of Pantaleón Díaz (2018), pp. 103 et seq.
- 47.
Roxin (2015), pp. 242 et seq., 736 et seq.
- 48.
Roxin (2015), pp. 275 et seq.
- 49.
Regarding it, with further references, Díaz y García Conlledo (1991), pp. 349 et seq.
- 50.
- 51.
Cuerda Arnau (2019), p. 16.
References
Alexy R (1991) Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung, Nachwort. Antwort auf einige Kritiker, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main [(1997) Teoría de la argumentación jurídica. La teoría del discurso racional como teoría de la fundamentación jurídica, trad. Atienza M/Espejo I, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid]
Ambos K (2016) Zur Zukunft der deutschen Strafrechtwissenschaft: Offenheit und und diskursive Methodik statt selbsbewusster Provinzialität. GA, pp 177–194
Arias Holguín DP (2018) Contexto, interdisciplinariedad y dogmática penal en EH-Terradillos. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, pp 49–62
Atienza M (2015) La dogmática jurídica como tecno-praxis, en EH-Carpizo T. IV vol 1 Estado Constitucional, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, pp 169–196
Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2019) La Justicia Dato a Dato. Año 2019. Estadística Judicial, 2019 (https://www.poderjudicial.es/stfls/ESTADISTICA/FICHEROS/JusticaDatoaDato/Datos%20Anteriores/Justicia%20Dato%20a%20Dato%202019.pdf) (diversos años en https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Temas/Estadistica-Judicial/Estudios-e-Informes/Justicia-Dato-a-Dato/)
Cuerda Arnau ML (2017) La función de la dogmática (Una crítica desde la concepción significativa de la acción), en EH-Mir, B de F, Montevideo/Buenos Aires, pp 485–495
Cuerda Arnau ML (2019) La concepción significativa de la acción v. las pretensiones sistemáticas, en Vives Antón, T S (Cuerda Arnau M L, compiladora) Pensar la libertad. Últimas reflexiones sobre el Derecho y la Justicia, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, pp 11–46
Demetrio Crespo E (2010) Crítica al normativismo funcionalista. RDPCrim, 3ª época, 3, pp 13–26
Díaz y García Conlledo M (1991) La autoría en Derecho penal. PPU, Barcelona
Díaz y García Conlledo M (1999) El error de prohibición: pasado, presente y futuro, en LH-Torío, Comares, Granada, 1999, pp 335–368
Díaz y García Conlledo M (2002) ¿Es necesaria la cooperación necesaria?, en LH-Cerezo, Comares, Granada, 2002, pp 645–669
Díaz y García Conlledo M (2011) Der Einfluss der Roxinschen Taterschaftstheorie (insbesondere bretreffend die Mittateschaft) auf die spanische Rechtslehre und Rechtsprechung: kritische Betrachtungen. GA, pp 259–283 [(2011) La influencia de la teoría de la autoría (en especial de la coautoría) de Roxin en la doctrina y la jurisprudencia españolas. Consideraciones críticas. NFP (Colombia) 76, pp 15–48]
Díaz y García Conlledo M (2017) Actuación en el marco de un aparato organizado de poder: ¿autoría o participación?, en EH-Mir, pp 509–521 [(2017) Das Handeln im Rahmen eines organisatorischen Machtapparates: Täterschaft oder Teilnahme? GA, pp 711–719)
Díez Ripollés JL (2021) La política criminal en las ciencias penales: un análisis crítico de la contribución de Roxin. Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminología (RECPC) 23-02:1–32
Figueiredo Dias J (2019) Sobre la crisis del paradigma penal, en LH-Jorge vol 1, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Servicio de Publicaciones, Madrid, pp 147–163
García Amado JA (2020) Neokantismo y derecho penal. Sobre el papel y el sentido de la dogmática penal y sobre el papel de los penalistas, en LH-Luzón vol I, Reus, Madrid, pp 153–166
Geertz C (1973) The interpretation of cultures. Selected essays. Basic Books, New York, 1973 [(2003) La interpretación de las culturas, trad. Bixio A L, 12ª reimpr., Gedisa, Barcelona]
Gimbernat Ordeig E (1970) Hat die Strafrechtsdogmatik eine Zukunft? ZStW 28:379–410 [(1990) ¿Tiene un futuro la dogmática jurídico-penal?, en: Estudios de Derecho Penal, 3ª ed., 1990, pp 140–161]
Gómez Martín V (2019) Dogmática penal y Sociología jurídica: encuentros y desencuentros, en LH-Jorge Barreiro vol 1, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Servicio de Publicaciones, Madrid, pp 165–180 [(2018) Diritto Penale Contemporaneo 2/2018: pp 149–161]
González Cussac JL (coord.) (2019) Lenguaje y dogmática penal. Actas del II Congreso Ibero-Americano de Derecho Penal y Filosofía del Lenguaje, Tiranto lo Blanch, Valencia
Greco L (2008) Dos formas de hacer dogmática jurídico-penal. Revista Discusiones 8:177–181
Kindhäuser U (2009) Die deutsche Strafrechtsdogmatik zwischen Anpassung und Selbstbehauptung. Grenzkontrolle der Kriminalpolitik durch die Dogmatik? ZStW 121:954–964
Kirchmann JH (1848) Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Ein Vortrag gehalten in der juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin, Julius Springer, Berlin [(1961) La jurisprudencia no es ciencia, trad. y escrito preliminar de Truyol y Serra A, 2ª ed. con una nota adicional, Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Colección Civitas), Madrid –reimpr. 1963- (existen otras ediciones)]
Luzón Peña D-M (2016) Lecciones de Derecho Penal. Parte General, 3ª ed., Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia
Martínez-Buján Pérez C (2019) La autoría en Derecho penal. Un estudio a la luz de la concepción significativa de la acción. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia
Miró Llinares F (2020) Cientismo, dogmatismo y Derecho penal, en LH-Luzón, vol I. Reus, Madrid, pp 279–288
Moccia S (2020) El rol de la dogmática penal ante la transformación de la política criminal, en LH-Luzón, vol I. Reus, Madrid, pp 289–300
Moreno Hernández M (2018) Dogmática Penal y Política Criminal. Ibáñez/Ubijus, México
Moreno Hernández M (2020) Hacia una dogmática penal latinoamericana más acorde a sus realidades, en LH-Luzón, vol I. Reus, Madrid, pp 311–326
Nino CS (1980) Los límites de la responsabilidad penal. Una teoría liberal del delito, Astrea, Buenos Aires
Nino CS (1984) Consideraciones sobre la dogmática jurídica (con referencia particular a la dogmática penal), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México (1ª reimpr. 1989)
Pantaleón Díaz M (2018) La utilidad de una buena dogmática para una buena jurisprudencia (y viceversa). El ejemplo de la sentencia de la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Supremo 805/2017, de 11 de diciembre (caso «Madrid Arena»), en: Libertas 7:103–120
Parma C (2020) En busca del futuro del Derecho penal, en LH-Luzón, vol I. Reus, Madrid, pp 327–333
Roxin C (1973) Kriminalpolitik und Strafrechtssystem, 2. Aufl. (1., 1970), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York [(1972) Política criminal y sistema del Derecho penal, trad. e introducción de Muñoz Conde F, Bosch, Barcelona]
Roxin C (2006) Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 4. Aufl., C. H. Beck, München [(1997) Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I: Fundamentos. La estructura de la teoría del delito, trad. de la 2ª ed. alemana por Luzón Peña D-M/Díaz y García Conlledo M/de Vicente Remesal J, Civitas, Madrid]
Roxin C (2015) Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 9. Aufl., Water De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston [Autoría y dominio del hecho en Derecho penal, trad. de Cuello Contreras J/Serrano González de Murillo J L, Marcial Pons, Madrid]
Roxin C, Greco L (2020) Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 5. Aufl., C. H. Beck, München, 2020
Sánchez-Ostiz Gutiérrez P (2019) El mito de la mecánica aplicación judicial de la ley, en LH-Jorge vol 1, pp 325–338
Schünemann (2011) Was heiβt und zu welchem Ende betreibt man Strafrechtsdogmatik? Zu Fischer’s These der “fremden seltsamen Welten” anhand aktueller BGH-Urteile zu Begriff und Funktion der “besonderen persönlichen Merkmale” im Strafrecht. GA, pp 445–461
Schünemann (2016) Über Strafrecht im demokratischen Rechtsstaat, das unverzichtbare Rationalitätsniveau seiner Dogmatik und die vorgeblich progressive Rückschrittspropaganda. ZIS, pp 654–671 (http://www.zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2016_10_1051.pdf) [(2019) El Derecho penal en el Estado democrático de Derecho y el irrenunciable nivel de racionalidad de su dogmática, trad. de Roso Cañadillas R/Pérez-Sauquillo Muñoz C, Reus/B de F, Madrid/Buenos Aires/Montevideo]
Silva Sánchez JM (2004) Straftatsystematik deutscher Prägung: Unzeitgemaβ? GA 2004, pp 679–690
Sotomayor Acosta JO (2008) ¿El Derecho penal garantista en retirada? RP 21:148–164
Vives Antón TS (2011) Fundamentos del Sistema Penal, 2ª ed., Acción Significativa y Derechos Constitucionales, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia
Vives Antón TS (2017) Reivindicación del pensamiento de un fiscal prusiano, en: EH-Mir, B de F, Montevideo/Buenos Aires, pp 233–242
Vogel J (2012) Strafrecht und Strafrechtswissenschaft im internationalen und europäischen Rechtsraum. JZ 67:25–31
Zaffaroni ER (2017) ¿Hacia dónde irá la ciencia jurídico-penal?, en: EH-Mir, B de F, Montevideo/Buenos Aires, pp 243–250
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Díaz y García Conlledo, M. (2023). Criminal Law and Legal Theory: Not Just Legal Dogmatics, but Never Without It. In: Demetrio Crespo, E., García Figueroa, A., Marcilla Córdoba, G. (eds) Crisis of the Criminal Law in the Democratic Constitutional State. Legal Studies in International, European and Comparative Criminal Law, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13413-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13413-5_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-13412-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-13413-5
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)