Abstract
This contribution analyzes recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the relationship between the presumption of innocence and provisional detention in the light of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings that highlight certain differences with the doctrine held by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as we will try to develop in the following sections, although they are limited to the interpretation of this principle in a strictly community context.
This paper has been developed within the framework of the Research Project, Criminal Law Crisis of the Rule of Law: Manifestations and Trends, co-financed by the Castilla-La Mancha Regional Government and FEDER Funds (SBPLY/17/180501/000223). This article pays tribute to Prof. Vicente Gimeno Sendra, with all my gratitude, admiration and affection. The Spanish version of this article was published at ASENCIO MELLADO, J.M. (dir) (2020). Derecho probatorio y otros estudios procesales: Vicente Gimeno Sendra. Liber amicorum Castillo de Luna: Madrid. págs. 1841–1860.
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Notes
- 1.
In the abovementioned Explanations by the Praesidium of the European Convention to the CFREU (2007/C 303/02), the full content of Art. 48 which, in its paragraph 2, refers to “the rights to defense,” is taken into consideration. Hence, it can be said that Art. 48 contains what could be called “the basic legal position of the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings” and that, therefore, the correspondence of Art. 48 with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 6 of the ECHR, which lists, in a more extensive manner, the fundamental rights covered by the aforementioned statute, particularly: (a) to be informed of the charge; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense; (c) to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance; (d) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses for and against oneself; and (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if one does not understand or speak the language used in the hearing, aspects which have been the subject of more detailed study, among others, in Aguilera Morales (2004), pp. 1543–1571; López Escudero (2008), pp. 759–776; Sanz Hermida (2019), pp. 1459–1505.
- 2.
The recognition of the presumption of innocence is referred to in other important international human rights instruments such as Art. 11.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; Art. 14.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966; Art. 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), November 22, 1969; Art. 66 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998; Art. 40.2b.i) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, to name a few of the most important.
- 3.
In fact, the ECtHR has defined the right to the presumption of innocence in Art. 6.2 of the ECHR, together with the rights of the defense that Art. 6.3 of the ECHR lists in a non-exhaustive manner, as particular manifestations of the general principle set out in Art. 6.1. (ECtHR Ruling (ECtHRR) of 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium Case, no. 6903/75, paragraph. 56, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1980:0227JUD000690375).
- 4.
ECtHRR of 12 December 1986, Cases Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, number 10590/83, paragraph. 77, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1988:1206JUD001059083.
- 5.
ECtHRR of 12 December 1986, Cases Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, number 10590/83, paragraph. 77, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1988:1206JUD001059083.
- 6.
Thus, some authors critically underscore the ups and downs of the ECtHR, which, on the one hand, in many cases extends the requirements of the presumption of innocence beyond the evidentiary process, and, on the other hand, despite the autonomous nature of Art. 6.2, which is separate from the right to a fair trial, the Court has not managed to construct a “perfectly outlined” concept of the presumption. Allué Burza (2005), pp. 384–385.
- 7.
The ECtHR points out that criminal proceedings generally involve “a complex interaction of different aspects of the procedure, so that it is often artificial to try to categorize a case from which perspective and in relation to which of the rights set out in Article 6 it is necessary to examine it” [ECtHRR, 13 September 2016, Ibrahim and Others v. United Kingdom, (Cases 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09), par. 274, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0913JUD005054108].
- 8.
Cf. inter alia SPI (Fourth Chamber) of 4 October 2006 (Case T-193/04), par. 221, ECLI:EU:T:2006:292; JCFI (Third Chamber) of 8 July 2008, Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case T-48/05), par. 209, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257.
- 9.
ECtHRR of 25 March 1983, Case Minelli v. Switzerland, No. 8660/79, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1983:0325JUD000866079.
- 10.
In our legal system, some authors had already been expressing their opinion on precisely this aspect. Specifically, Gimeno Sendra points out that the presumption of innocence must unfold its effects in the investigative phase, “preventing acts that limit fundamental rights in general, and provisional detention in particular, from being adopted without the prior existence of well-founded reasons for participation in the punishable act of the accused and after a motivated resolution in which all the requirements of the principle of proportionality are met.” Nevertheless, he emphasizes that the doctrine of the Spanish Constitutional Court in relation to this guarantee has been extremely sparing in claiming its validity in the investigative phase and has been fundamentally redirected to the evidentiary stage. Cf. Gimeno Sendra (2015), pp. 203–204; Gimeno Sendra (2017), pp. 479–480.
- 11.
Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott of 17 April 2013, Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v. European Commission, (Case C 501/11 P), par. 115, ECLI:EU:C:2013:248.
- 12.
Cf. inter alia, CJEU (Sixth Chamber) of 8 July 1999, Hüls AG v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case C-199/92 P), aps 149-150, ECLI:EU:C:1999:358; CJEU (Sixth Chamber) of 8 July 1999, Montecatini SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case C-3235/92), aps. 175–176, ECLI:EU:C:1999:362; STG (Sixth Chamber) of 12 April 2013, International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) v. European Commission, (Case T-442/08), par. 93, ECLI:EU:T:2013:188.
- 13.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also established a broad concept of the presumption of innocence, which includes both the prohibition of prejudices regarding the guilt of the accused; its link to the scope of the evidence in the terms summarized above; the treatment of the investigated person as not guilty by both the judicial authorities and the rest of the public authorities, including its application to the scope of preventive detention, aspects that are analyzed in depth by Llobet Rodríguez (2018), pp. 493 and following. And this broad conception is also maintained in General Comment n. 32 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which states that “According to article 14, paragraph 2 everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g., by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused” and, among other things, adds that “the length of pre-trial detention should never be taken as an indication of guilt and its degree.”
- 14.
Ovejero Puente (2017), pp. 431–455.
- 15.
- 16.
ECtHRR of February 10, 1995, Allenet de Ribemont v. France, n. 15175/89, paras. 35–36, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1995:0210JUD001517589; ECtHRR, 28 October 2004, Case YB et al. v. Turkey, (n. 48173/99 and 48319/99), para. 43, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:1028JUD004817399.
- 17.
ECtHRR of 21 September 2006, Pandy v. Belgium, 13583/02, par. 43 ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0524JUD005346607. This doctrine is followed by the CJEU, inter alia, in JCFI (Third Chamber) of 8 July 2008, Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case T-48/05), par. 210, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257.
- 18.
Opinion of Advocate General Yves Bot of 20 March 2014, Kalliopi Nikolaou v. Court of Auditors of the European Union, (Case C 220/13 P), par. 51, ECLI:EU:C:2014:176.
- 19.
ECtHRR (First Chamber) of 10 July 2014, Kalliopi Nikolaou v. Court of Auditors of the European Union, (Case C-220/13 P), par. 35, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2057 and the ECtHR’s caselaw cited therein.
- 20.
Cf, inter alia, ECtHRR of 28 November 2002, Marziano v. Italy, No 45313/99, par. 31, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:1128JUD004531399.
- 21.
Although international normative texts usually refer to the “accused,” as is done in the ECHR, this expression, according to the ECtHR, has an “autonomous” meaning in the context of the Convention and should not be delimited based on its meaning in domestic law. The legislation of the defendant state is certainly relevant, but it is merely a starting point for this purpose. The eminent place that the right to a fair trial occupies in a democratic society advocates a “material” rather than “formal” conception of the term “accusation” in Article 6. This requires the Court to set aside appearances and analyze the reality of the proceedings in question to determine whether there really is an “accusation” in the terms of Article 6. Cf., inter alia, ECtHRR, 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium, n. 6903/75, especially paras. 42 and 44, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1980:0227JUD000690375.
- 22.
In this sense, the HCR of 16 March 2016 states that legal entities have the same rights as natural persons “notwithstanding the necessary modulations,” particularly affirming, as far as this commentary is concerned, the importance of the presumption of innocence which, also in these cases, places the burden of proof on the accuser, which in the context of the current regulations on the criminal liability of legal persons, means that it is necessary to prove that there has been a serious breach of supervisory duties by the legal person (HCR 966/2016, March 16, rapporteur H.E. Mr. Manuel Marchena, ECLI:ES:TS:2016:966).
- 23.
López Escudero (2008), p. 762.
- 24.
Nieva Fenoll (2016), p. 4.
- 25.
As expressed by Musacchio (2009), pp. 1–10.
- 26.
As pointed out by Ramos Méndez (2016), pp. 392 et seq.
- 27.
The above-mentioned Roadmap contains a proposal of six indicative measures to strengthen and give effect to procedural rights of suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings at EU level. These measures, which are not a numerus clausus and their order is not binding either, range from the right to translation and interpretation (measure A), information on rights and Information about the charges (measure B), to legal advice and legal aid (measure C), to communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities (measure D), special safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable (measure E) or the green paper on pre-trial detention (measure F). These provisions have resulted, to date, in a number of European directives that refer to different rights of the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings, such as the right to translation and interpretation [Directive (EU) 2010/64 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 20, 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings]; information [Directive (EU) 2010/64 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 20, 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings]; to legal assistance [Directive (EU) 2013/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 22, 2013, on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty]; the rights of minors suspected or accused of a crime [Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 11, 2016, on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings] or the right to legal aid [Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 29, 2016, on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings]. On the origins of the Directive, its processing, and the criticisms it received during that process, cf. Cras and Erbežnik (2016), pp. 25–36.
- 28.
This is based on Art. 82.2 TFEU, which states that, “To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States.” To that end, paragraph (b) of that Article provides that such rules shall relate, inter alia, to the rights of individuals in criminal procedure.
- 29.
This aspect was criticized, along with others that will be referred to later, as opening the door to possible reversals of the burden of proof, limiting its application to the criminal process, or, to highlight some of the most important objections, not establishing a rigid rule of inadmissibility of evidence obtained through the violation of fundamental rights. On these aspects, see more extensively, Villamarín López (2017), pp. 6–7; Cras and Erbežnik (2016), p. 28. For some, it Is truly a missed opportunity, Lamberigts (2016), pp. 36–42.
- 30.
In fact, the broad framework of the Directive has been the subject of criticism since its adoption, for departing from the roadmap designed by the Council in 2009 referred to above, and for considering that its articles rather set out general principles of law, rather than providing a legal framework for the protection of the rights of the suspect or defendant. Arangüena Fanego (2019), p. 20.
- 31.
In this regard, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 32, notes that “It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g., by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused. Defendants should normally not be shackled or kept in cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals. The media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence.”
- 32.
Cf. JCFI (Third Chamber), of 8 July 2008, Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case T-48/05), par. 210, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257 citing ECHR, of 21 September 2006, case Pandy v. Belgium, 13583/02, par. 41–42, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0524JUD005346607.
- 33.
Thus, with respect to the latter, safeguarding the principle particularly requires that in carrying out their duties the members of a court do not start from the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the act of which he is accused. The presumption of innocence is undermined by statements or decisions that reflect the feeling that the person is guilty, that incite the public to believe in his guilt, or that prejudge the judge’s assessment of the facts (JCFI (Third Chamber) of 8 July 2008, Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v. Commission of the European Communities, (Case T-48/05), nr. 210, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257).
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
CJEU (First Chamber) of 19 June 2014, FLS Plast A/S v European Commission, (Case C 243/12 P), par. 27, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2006 and caselaw cited.
- 37.
López Escudero (2008), pp. 761–762.
- 38.
ECtHRR of October 7, 1988, Salabiaku v. France, No. 10519/83, aps. 28–30, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1988:1007JUD001051983; ECHR, 25 September 1992, Pham Hoang v. France, No. 13191/87, aps. 32–35; ECLI:CE:ECHR:1992:0925JUD00131918730.
- 39.
Opinion of Advocate General Pitruzzella, delivered on 19 November 2019, Criminal proceedings against DK, (Case C 653/19 PPU), par. 30. ECLI:EU:C:2019:983.
- 40.
Arangüena Fanego points out that in the Directive these rights are defined as “absolute, so that their exercise is not subject to any condition and no negative consequences can be drawn from such exercise,” thus clearly departing from the questionable doctrine of the ECtHR in these aspects. Aguilera Morales (2004). Other authors, however, qualify this alleged absolute value, taking into consideration the last sentence of Recital 28: “This should be without prejudice to national rules concerning the assessment of evidence by courts or judges, provided that the rights of the defence are respected.” Cras and Erbežnik (2016), p. 32; or, among other aspects, the literal wording of the provisions of Art. 7.3, which refers to the “the use of legal powers of compulsion” which can be interpreted in very different ways by the Member States. Lamberigts (2016), p. 36.
- 41.
The rights to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself are analyzed in this section because of their important link to evidentiary aspects. However, for some authors, the regulation of these rights must be analyzed from the perspective of the presumption of innocence as a rule of treatment. Villamarín López (2017), p. 14.
- 42.
ECtHRR (Fourth Chamber) of 27 October 2016, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-439/16 PPU), ECLI:EU:C:2016:818; ECtHRR (First Chamber) of 19 September 2018, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-310/18 PPU), ECLI: EU:C:2018:73; CJEUR (First Chamber) of 12 February 2019, Criminal proceedings against RH, (Case C-8/19 PPU), ECLI:EU:C:2019:110; CJEUR (First Chamber) of 28 November 2019, Criminal proceedings against DK, (Case C-653/19 PPU), ECLI:EU:C:2019:10.
- 43.
ECtHRR (First Chamber) of 19 September 2018, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-310/18 PPU), par. 47, ECLI:EU:C:2018:732.
- 44.
Opinion of Advocate General Michal Bobek of 11 October 2016, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-439/16 PPU), aps. 61 et seq., ECLI:EU:C:2016:760.
- 45.
Aspects also highlighted in the Opinion of Advocate General G. Pitruzzella, delivered on 19 November 2019, (Case C 653/19 PPU), aps. 40 et seq., ECLI:EU:C:2019:983.
- 46.
Gimeno Sendra (2017), pp. 479–480.
- 47.
ECtHR (First Chamber) of 19 September 2018, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-310/18 PPU), par. 48, ECLI:EU:C:2018:732.
- 48.
CJEUR (First Chamber), of 12 February 2019, Criminal proceedings against RH, (Case C-8/19 PPU), aps. 49, ECLI:EU:C:2019:110.
- 49.
CJEUR (First Chamber) of 28 November 2019, Criminal proceedings against DK, (Case C-653/19 PPU), aps. 33 and 34, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1024.
- 50.
Opinion of Advocate General Michal Bobek of 11 October 2016, Criminal proceedings against Emil Milev, (Case C-439/16 PPU), par. 82, ECLI:EU:C:2016:760.
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Sanz Hermida, Á.M. (2023). Presumption of Innocence and Pre-Trial Detention in the Light of Directive (EU) 2016/343. In: Demetrio Crespo, E., García Figueroa, A., Marcilla Córdoba, G. (eds) Crisis of the Criminal Law in the Democratic Constitutional State. Legal Studies in International, European and Comparative Criminal Law, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13413-5_11
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