It may sound surprising that such fundamental aspects of human coexistence, such as values, are subject to change,Footnote 1 since they are supposed to stand for stability, reliability and permanence. However, we must acknowledge that both values and fundamental rights have changed over time. Slavery was accepted in ancient Greece; nowadays, it would infringe Art 5 CFR. In some countries,Footnote 2 homosexuality was punishable even under criminal law some years ago; nowadays, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation would infringe Art 21(1) CFR.Footnote 3 Human dignity was not really a legal issue in case of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, nowadays, also due to this historic experience, it is the corner-stone of the EU’s common values (Art 2 TEU, Art 1 CFR). This list could be extended. Consequently, we have to acknowledge the evolutionary element of values and fundamental rights, although change might proceed rather slowly. Already with regard to the ‘ethical spirit of EU law’, I have stated “a theory of ethics is [often] relative to the current challenges of the time and the community we are living in”.Footnote 4 The same is true for values and fundamental rights. Likewise, this evolutionaryFootnote 5 element finds an equivalent in the “step-by-step approach inherent to the Schuman declaration”.Footnote 6

Already the Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950 referred to principles, when assigning the task to “an arbitrator”, nowadays, the CJEU. As Robert Schuman pointed out, this arbitrator “will be entrusted with the task of seeing that the agreements reached conform with the principles [!] laid down, and, in the event of a deadlock, he will decide what solution is to be adopted”.Footnote 7 While the CJEU has played an important role (concerning principles and values) and will continue to do so, also the people living in Europe need to get involved in this major issue of shaping EU values.

So far, citizens’ contribution was not major, sometimes they were simply asked what their personal values are, respectively, which values the EU represents. These two questions addressed in various Eurobarometer surveys are summarised below in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 for the period of 2007–2012, as well as in Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 for the period of 2013–2019. For a better overview, the two questions (personal values, values representing the EU) were each divided into two figures. The individual scores have not changed too much over time. Peace, respect for human life and human rights constantly ranked top, as well as respect for other cultures and religion constantly ranked last as personal values. However, some personal scores are quite different from those attributed to the EU. As values of the EU, respect for human life ranked lower compared to personal values; more institutional values such as democracy, the rule of law, and the item ‘respect for other cultures’ on the other hand ranked higher. It is also remarkable, that in 2019 ‘respect for the planet’ was introduced as a new item.

Fig. 5.1
figure 1

Personal values of Europeans 2007–2012 [Eurobarometer 77 (2012), pp. 9 and 12; Eurobarometer 74 (2010), pp. 32 and 33; Eurobarometer 72 (2009), Vol. 2, pp. 148 and 152; Eurobarometer 69 (2008), 1. Values of Europeans, pp. 15 and 22; Eurobarometer 66 (2007), p. 28. See also Frischhut and Werner-Felmayer (2020), p. 636]

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Fig. 5.2
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Values representing the EU 2007–2012 [Eurobarometer 77 (2012), pp. 9 and 12; Eurobarometer 74 (2010), pp. 32 and 33; Eurobarometer 72 (2009), Vol. 2, pp. 148 and 152; Eurobarometer 69 (2008), 1. Values of Europeans, pp. 15 and 22; Eurobarometer 66 (2007), p. 28. See also Frischhut (2019), p. 127]

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Fig. 5.3
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Personal values of Europeans 2013–2019 [Eurobarometer 82 (2014) p. 69; Eurobarometer 84 (2015) p. 79; Eurobarometer 86 (2016) p. 57; Eurobarometer 88 (2017) p. 59; Eurobarometer 90 (2018) p. 55; Eurobarometer 92 (2019) p. 47. All: “European Citizenship”]

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Fig. 5.4
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Values representing the EU 2013–2019 [Eurobarometer 80 (2013) p. 67; Eurobarometer 82 (2014) p. 60; Eurobarometer 84 (2015) p. 87; Eurobarometer 86 (2016) p. 64; Eurobarometer 88 (2017) p. 66; Eurobarometer 90 (2018) p. 62; Eurobarometer 92 (2019) p. 53 | N.B. EU, not EU27. All: “European Citizenship”]

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The next major step in the evolution of values is the ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’. In a joint declaration,Footnote 8 the EP, the Council and the EC have emphasised the importance “to uphold the EU citizens support [!] for our common goals and values [!], by giving them further opportunities to express themselves”.Footnote 9 Values play a role in the “aim to give citizens a say on what matters to them”.Footnote 10 The tentative list of topics that (might) matter for citizens include health, climate change, “social fairness, equality and intergenerational solidarity”, digital transformation, as well as “European rights and values including the Rule of Law”, to name but a few.Footnote 11 Like we have seen so far, besides the internal perspective, also this joint declaration addresses the external one by confirming that Europe needs to take “a leading global role in promoting [!] its values and standards in a world increasingly in turmoil”.Footnote 12 Besides content-related issues, likewise the “Conference, its governance and events organised in its framework, are also based on the values of the EU as enshrined in the EU Treaties and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights”.Footnote 13

This evolution relates to the two intertwined dimensions, the legal and societal one. Kirste has aptly referred to values as a link between constitutional law and a society.Footnote 14 This link also exists between law and morality in case-law. Tridimas has convincingly mentioned that “the Court not only reflects but also shapes political morality. Judicial intervention is not only negative but also positive in the sense that it not only seeks to protect the citizens vis-à-vis public authority but also to promote political and social values”.Footnote 15 This quotation referring to morality and values shows how these concepts are intertwined, and one could add ethics and principles to this statement. In 2015, The Economist has argued that the United States Supreme Court seems to be willing to change its case-law,Footnote 16 if “at least half of Americans [are] on board”.Footnote 17 Values in law and in society mutually influence each other in both directions. The Eurobarometer studies can reveal changing preferences of EU citizens.

The increasing importance of valuesFootnote 18 over time should continue, as values are, amongst others,Footnote 19 essential for a European identity. Already in 1989, the European Parliament emphasised the importance of values for identity (“whereas the identity of the Community makes it essential to give expression to the shared values of the citizens of Europe”).Footnote 20 This requires a close connection between EU values and citizens, as already emphasised by the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ of 1973.Footnote 21 As Callies has stated, the entirety of values forms the “value system of a society, which constructs identity over it”.Footnote 22 This relationship between values and identity has recently received increased attention in the EU.Footnote 23

5.1 An Additional Narrative: Trust

Peace was the initial narrativeFootnote 24 of European integration, founded after the atrocities of the Second World War, both in the case of the Council of Europe,Footnote 25 as well as in the case of what today is the EU. Economic integration was the ‘methodology’, to achieve this ‘objective’ of peace. Peace is also the item, constantly ranked top in all four figures above (Figs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4), both in terms of value of the EU and a personal value. The problem with this narrative is that it might not work for people born decades after the end of the war (1945), who in some cases do not even have grandparents left to tell them about the value of peace, where peace is more than simply the absence of war.Footnote 26 The idea of re-emphasising this narrative and the importance of peace is clearly to be welcomed. The idea of “The WhiteDoveWay”, for instance, proposes a “permanent path of peace, from Northern Ireland to Nicosia”, to make this narrative more visible and experienceable.Footnote 27

Based on what we have seen so far, the author suggests an additional narrative, which does not replace the initial one of peace. This complementary narrative should be trust. Former Commission president Jean Claude Juncker has coined the notion of a ‘polycrisis’, i.e. “various challenges [that] have not only arrived at the same time [and] also feed each other, creating a sense of doubt and uncertainty in the minds of our people”.Footnote 28 The situation of various overlapping crises has not improved. Likewise, a key crisis is the loss of trust of citizens in public authorities. As already mentioned,Footnote 29 ECJ President Koen Lenaerts has aptly expressed that “‘[t]rust takes years to build, seconds to destroy and forever to repair’”.Footnote 30 Trust must therefore be earned, not only between individuals, but even more so in relation to public institutions (such as the EU), which are already fundamentally more distrusted due to geographical distance and the complexity of their structure. Therefore, the European Union should strive to strengthen transparency and integrity to achieve the highest (!) ethical standards, hopefully leading to a high degree of public confidence, as I have outlined in detail elsewhere.Footnote 31 Our world becomes increasingly complex, which makes it difficult for individuals to understand certain details, or at least to have a sufficient overview. Even more important that individuals can trust public authorities. In the Jean Monnet MOOC, organised within this Chair, it was interesting to discuss with students from various countries worldwide, in which country people tend to trust national public authorities. The EU is both geographically and emotionally more distant than the respective national capitals. Hence, taking an ambitious approach is advisable.

5.2 An Additional Value: Environmental Protection

If values enshrined in Art 2 TEU should be changed, this requires a unanimous decision of Member States. However, we have also seen animal welfare added as a value by the ECJ. Moving from humans to animals, the next logical step could be including the environment, especially against the background of the increasingly visible effects of the climate change. Having compared the ‘values’ of Art 2 TEU and those mentioned in the preamble of the Brexit TCA,Footnote 32 it is remarkable that besides democracy, the rule of law and human rights, the “fight against climate change” is addressed (in recital 1). As a preliminary note, it is important to emphasise that EU treaties “shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership” (Art 345 TFEU). Nonetheless, it can debated whether there should rather be discussions on the legal personality of robots,Footnote 33 or rather for the environment,Footnote 34 as challenging as that may be. National court decisions in GermanyFootnote 35 or the NetherlandsFootnote 36 point in the direction of strengthening environmental protection.

Such an additional value can be based on the existing concept of sustainabilityFootnote 37 and especially the cross-cutting clause of Art 11 TEU.Footnote 38 While such a cross-cutting clause is different from a value, it can have a similar function.Footnote 39 In a similar was as some concepts have developed from principles to values,Footnote 40 also this cross-cutting clause of Art 11 TEU can be seen as a milestone towards such a new value.

Unless EU treaties are changed, it is up to the ECJ to decide on additional values, for instance, further developing the principle of sustainability, as well as to rank existing values. As environmental protection can not be achieved via a ranking of the existing values, the author suggests to include environmental protectionFootnote 41 as an additional value of the first sentence of Art 2 TEU, for a more resilientFootnote 42 EU. Having mentioned various kinds of values,Footnote 43 environmental protection should not only be seen as a non-final extrinsic value, i.e. something that is valuable (only) as a means (environment to protect health, quality of life, etc.). Rather, environmental protection should be seen as something that is valued for its own sake, based on intrinsic qualities of the person valuing it (a final intrinsic value). At the same time, environmental protection can be seen as a final extrinsic value, i.e. something that is valued for its own sake, because of external relational properties.Footnote 44 This relational (but still intrinsic) aspect can be seen in the ‘one health’ approach, focussing on the health of humans, animals and the environment, based on the understanding “that the health of humans, animals and the environment are interdependent”Footnote 45.Footnote 46

This idea goes in a similar direction as Ferdinand von Schirach, who recently proposed some additional fundamental rights on top of the rights in the CFR. These six additional rights can be translated as follows:Footnote 47

  • Art 1—Environment: Every human being has the right to live in a healthy environment.

  • Art 2—Digital self-determination: Every human being has the right to digital self-determination. The exploration or manipulation of people is prohibited.

  • Art 3—Artificial intelligence: Every person has the right to have algorithms that burden them to be transparent, verifiable and fair. Essential decisions must be made by a human being.

  • Art 4—Truth: Everyone has the right to expect that statements made by public officials are true.

  • Art 5—Globalisation: Everyone has the right to be offered only goods and services that are produced and provided with respect for universal human rights.

  • Art 6—Fundamental rights actions: Anyone can bring a fundamental rights action before the European Courts for systematic violations of this Charter.

The author supports these claims in the fields of digitalisation, the environment, truth, as well as the procedural perspective. Given the close connection of values and human rights, environmental protection should be strengthened in the two fields of values and human rights.

5.3 A More Communitarian Union

Respecting the ‘rules of the club’ and playing one’s proper part in solidarity with fellow Europeans cannot be based on a penny-pinching cost-benefit analysis along the lines (familiar, alas, from Brexiteer rhetoric) of ‘what precisely does the EU cost me per week and what exactly do I personally get out of it?’ Such self-centredness is a betrayal of the founding fathers’ vision for a peaceful and prosperous continent. It is the antithesis of being a loyal Member State and being worthy, as an individual, of shared European citizenship. If the European project is to prosper and go forward, we must all do better than that.—AG Sharpston, 2019Footnote 48

Let me conclude by recalling an old story from the Jewish tradition that deserves wider circulation. A group of men are travelling together in a boat. Suddenly, one of them takes out an auger and starts to bore a hole in the hull beneath himself. His companions remonstrate with him. ‘Why are you doing that?’ they cry. ‘What are you complaining about?’ says he. ‘Am I not drilling the hole under my own seat?’ ‘Yes,’ they reply, ‘but the water will come in and flood the boat for all of us’.—AG Sharpston, 2019Footnote 49

In the ‘ethical spirit of EU law’, I have argued, “being a community could also be seen as a value, as long as it is not used simply to exclude others”.Footnote 50 The same is true for identity, which establishes a certain delimitation that should not lead to exclusion.Footnote 51 Since the Lisbon treaty, EU law has been ‘lisbonised’, meaning changing terminology from Community, etc. to Union, etc. From a legal perspective, this is not objectionable. However, it might be that the term of ‘community’ would be an important value.Footnote 52 This thought and the opening quote lead us to the common good. The concept of a ‘community’ (Gemeinwesen) can be understood as an entity with sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechten) and the entitlement and, where applicable, the obligation of individuals to a not insignificant extent, directed towards the realisation of a ‘common good’ (Gemeinwohl).Footnote 53

In literature, the common good has already been linked to the EU values.Footnote 54 However, the common good should play an even more important role in the EU. Lobbying is seen negatively because a small group is sometimes able to make its minorityFootnote 55 opinion the rulebook for others. The issues that concern most Europeans should set the agenda for the next years, not those of lobbyists.

The concept of the ‘common good’ must be defined and placed in a specific context. For Rawls, the common good can be seen as “certain general conditions that are in an appropriate sense equally to everyone’s advantage”.Footnote 56 Fan, for instance, has argued “Rawls’ notion of the common good (namely, social justice for modern Western societies) is not suitable for China, because China has a quite different cultural and historical background from the West”.Footnote 57 He finally proposes “that the common good of society is a well-established basic societal order in which everyone can benefit and flourish in pursuing the good life”.Footnote 58 As Fan has argued that “one is not the final source of value claims and cannot exclusively determine the good for oneself”,Footnote 59 also the common good as to be determined in a collective (not individualistic) way by society at large, as debated in the Conference for the Future of Europe. While national constitutional courts have recently focussed on personal autonomy and self-determination,Footnote 60 “the Chinese would not grant a liberal right to the self-determination of the good”.Footnote 61

A stronger emphasis on the value of community and the common good does not end here. In the same opinion quoted at the beginning of this section, AG Sharpston states as follows: “Solidarity is the lifeblood of the European project. Through their participation in that project and their citizenship of European Union, Member States and their nationals have obligations and benefits, duties and rights. Sharing in the European ‘demos’ is not a matter of looking through the Treaties and the secondary legislation to see what one can claim. It also requires one to shoulder collective responsibilities and (yes) burdens to further the common good”.Footnote 62 This goes in a similar direction as Shafik proposing a new ‘social contract’, as “more generous and inclusive social contract would recognise our interdependencies, provide minimum protections to all, share some risks collectively and ask everyone to contribute as much as they can for as long as they can”.Footnote 63

Meulen is right in criticising that sometimes “the modern individual is leading the life of a consumer”.Footnote 64 Hence, we need “a moral perspective that promotes the interests of vulnerable individuals”, as “justice alone is not enough to safeguard the interests of [these] vulnerable groups”.Footnote 65 As “individuals are connected with each other, they have also a moral responsibility towards the well-being of other human beings” (i.e., first claim).Footnote 66 This should be seen as an intrinsic value, not just because of a self-interest.Footnote 67

Human dignity, as we have seen earlier, has been characterised as a ‘super-value’. Frenz has emphasised the communitarian approach concerning human dignity. Through integration into the community, the individual is limited in that he or she may not endanger the existence of this community as a prerequisite for his or her development.Footnote 68

Solidarity and justice are two distinct values, as Meulen argues in his second claim. Solidarity should not replace liberal justice, as “justice protects the rights and interests of individuals as autonomous beings”, whereas solidarity “concerns the commitments and recognition of the well-being of the other without personal interests”.Footnote 69 His concept of humanitarian solidarity (i.e. paying “special attention to solidarity with vulnerable groups in society”Footnote 70) should help “to create an ethical society, in which individuals are not humiliated and are connected with society on the basis of humanitarian solidarity or ‘shared humanity’”.Footnote 71 In his fourthFootnote 72 claim he argues for an approach, also advocated by ‘new communitarians’,Footnote 73 “trying to find a balance between community and autonomy”.Footnote 74 Various recent developments (pandemic, increasing gaps in society, etc.) have shown that the EU should embrace this idea of a communitarianFootnote 75 Union, emphasising the common good and ranking solidarity as a value higher. This goes in a similar direction as the above-mentioned approach of human obligations and responsibility.

One idea that is closely related to communitarianism and solidarity, and is currently found in several areas, is the concept of “leaving no one behind”.Footnote 76 The United NationsFootnote 77 in their 2030 Agenda in the context of their universal values have referred to the following three principles: a ‘human rights-based approach’, ‘gender equality and women’s empowerment’, and to ‘leave no one behind’.Footnote 78 In the EU, this concept can be found in the Green Deal,Footnote 79 in the field of digitalisation,Footnote 80 health,Footnote 81 development policy,Footnote 82 and migration,Footnote 83 to name but a few.

This more communitarian approach can occur at various levels and in various ways. Within the existing legal framework, a stronger emphasis on the common good is advisable for both the EU and its Member States. Still within the existing legal framework, more solidarity at Member State level would also be both advisable and desirable. For the level of individuals, the call for a more communitarian approach takes place outside the legal turf, and shifts the debate from values to virtues.

5.4 From Values to Virtues

Laws can force conformity of overt behavior, but they cannot change the minds from which such views are formulated. At the bottom, we need some moral inspiration that will allow us to change our views by searching more deeply in our minds for principles that will lead to us treating other people, especially disadvantaged groups, with dignity and kindness.—Zhang (2016), p. 8

Most of these claims (communitarianism, common good, and solidarity as a value) address the EU and its Member States, the two levels also addressed in Art 2 TEU. Human obligations, however, address individuals.Footnote 84 Many EU values are more institutional (democracy, rule of law, etc.), while in case of individuals values might also be qualified as virtues.Footnote 85 According to Aristotle, there are two types of virtues: “Some virtues we say are intellectual, such as wisdom, judgment and practical wisdom, while others are virtues of character, such as generosity and temperance.”Footnote 86 As already mentioned above, virtues should be achieved by striving for a golden (not an arithmeticFootnote 87) mean. According to Aristotle, “the equal is a sort of mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean in respect of the thing itself I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, this being one single thing and the same for everyone, and by the mean relative to us I mean that which is neither excessive nor deficient – and this is not one single ting, nor is it the same for all.”Footnote 88 As he has mentioned, in “fear and confidence, courage is the mean”,Footnote 89 in “giving and taking money, the mean is generosity, while the excess and deficiency are wastefulness and stinginess”.Footnote 90 “In honour and dishonour, the mean is greatness of soul, while the excess is referred to as a kind of vanity, the deficiency smallness of soul.”Footnote 91 This Aristotelian approach also inspired the above-mentioned ‘circle of balance’ (Fig. 4.2), which is not an additional value. It should rather be seen in a complementary way. However, the challenge is that a balanced solution cannot be achieved in a mathematical way, as already mentioned.Footnote 92

In the context of compulsory vaccination, the ECtHR has emphasised “the value of social solidarity”.Footnote 93 Regarding Art 2 TEU, solidarity can be strengthened via a ranking of values. However, this ECtHR statement in the end mainly addresses individuals, who decide by their behaviour which contribution they make to the improvement of the situation for everyone. This goes in a similar direction as a recent paper emphasising the role of communitarianism in Africa to overcome the current pandemic.Footnote 94 Bieber has aptly stated that solidarity is a manifestation of the comprehensive principle of mutual responsibility,Footnote 95 where responsibility has a double meaning, on the one hand in the sense of liability and on the other hand in the sense of a standard of action.Footnote 96

Virtues can also play an important role in environmental protection and sustainability. In a recently published book entitled ‘the virtues of sustainability’, Clayton has identified the following virtues of “environmental relevance: for example, simplicity, moderation, and frugality”, patience, cooperativeness and conscientiousness, and humility and harmony with nature.Footnote 97 As she emphasises, “the individual is a member of an interdependent community”,Footnote 98 hence it is important to acknowledge “the interrelatedness of the individual, society, and environment”,Footnote 99 which are key for ‘harmony with nature’.Footnote 100 Ferkany has focused on Aristotelian virtue education for sustainable development and has identified the following virtues: (a) virtues of “cosmopolitan justice” (including “fairness, cooperativeness, goodwill, responsibility, and limited patriotism”), (b) virtues of “right attachment to people, places, and things” (including “love, temperance [or moderation], frugality, and (again) limited patriotism”), and (c) virtues of “proper testimonial credulity” (including “open-mindedness and distinctly intellectual forms of justice, autonomy, humility, and charity”).Footnote 101

In the same book entitled ‘the virtues of sustainability’, Cuomo answers the question, whether respect for nature is a new value.Footnote 102 Respect for nature, which much overlaps with ‘environmental ethics’, is not a new value. It should rather be seen as the return of an old value,Footnote 103 as the more urbanised a society becomes, the more it tends to lose its link to nature,Footnote 104 as opposed to native cultures. She also refers to a “fundamental sense of responsibility [!] within mutually supportive social and ecological relationships, and within landscapes where other creatures and living systems are valued for their agency and inherent [!] worth”.Footnote 105 This intrinsic value is reminiscent of the underlying idea of human dignity. Unsurprisingly, she states that respect for nature is not only a value, but a virtue.Footnote 106 Taking a holistic perspective, destroying nature in the end leads to endangering oneself and the other members of one’s community, as stated in the second quotation by AG Sharpston at the beginning of Sect. 5.3, referring to someone destroying a boat underneath his seat. Likewise, as aptly stated in another context, “the highly contagious nature of COVID-19 implies that it is not possible to overcome the pandemic unless there is a holistic approach to it”.Footnote 107

Fan has aptly stated, one should keep in mind the “historical, cultural and social differences” between the concept-exporting and the concept-importing country or society to answer the question, whether the transfer can be possible and makes success.Footnote 108 Nonetheless, keeping this in mind, we can draw valuable inspiration from other parts of the world. At the end of this ‘future direction of travel’, let’s take a brief and non-exhaustive look outside Europe.

Let us first travel south, to Africa. ‘Afro-communitarianism’, has been described “as a communal driven ethic that puts relationships of identity and good-will as the highest value”,Footnote 109 respectively, as “an ethic that puts solidarity [!] as the centre of its prescriptions and provides a moral and a logical requirement for cooperation”.Footnote 110 The virtues usually mentioned by Afro-communitarians are “generosity, compassion, benevolence, tolerance, kindness and good-will, roughly ones that bring people closer together.”Footnote 111

We can also learn from travelling east, having a look at Confucianism. Fan has referred to the following “basic Confucian traits or virtues”, including “ren (benevolence), yi (appropriateness), li (ritual propriety), zhi (wisdom), xin (fidelity), xiao (filial piety), zhong (loyalty).”Footnote 112 Translations sometimes differ, as Ren has also been translated with humanity and Yi with righteousness.Footnote 113 Ren has been described as “a moral character possessed by an altruistic personality” and Yi as standing for “reciprocity expressed in the Golden Rule: ‘Do not impose on the others what you do not wish others to impose on you.’”Footnote 114 For the question of what could or should be transferred to Europe, one has to be precise regarding the source. Fan, for example, has asserted a “Chinese moral crisis” in terms of a “severe devastation of the Confucian understanding of the good, the virtuous, and a good society”.Footnote 115 Hence, the source of import in this case would be Confucianism in its ‘original’ sense, not the ‘devastated’ version of today.

The rule of law is one of the values of the EU. Clearly, the rule of law can be qualified as an institutional value, focussing on the EU and, as discussed most of the time, concerning Member States. One should not disregard the individual level; hence, we can identify a lacuna, which needs to be filled, while existing values do not need to be replaced. Looking again into Asia, Fan has stated that “Confucian policy is usually termed rule of virtue (dezhi, 德治) rather than rule of law (fazhi, 法治), although laws are unavoidably supplementary to the rule of virtue in the tradition”.Footnote 116 We can take this example to supplement the rule of law with a new rule of virtues, mainly focussing on the individual level.Footnote 117

Last but not least, travelling west, Marshall presents the values of the Lakota tribe, which can clearly also be qualified as virtues, as they address character traits that need to be practised. Having referred to the EU’s old and the suggested new narrative, it is worth mentioning that Marshall presents each value by means of a short story. It is beyond the scope of this book to attempt to take a similar approach for the EU. Likewise, Lakota values also address an individual level and can be seen as virtues, which sometimes might also have a practical background (e.g., bravery, fortitude), but also others (humility, perseverance, respect, honor, love, sacrifice, compassion, generosity, wisdom). Truth, as another value or virtue, was also suggested by Schirach as a proposed additional fundamental right.

North of the Lakota, the Iñupiaq, the native people of Arctic Alaska have also distinct individual values. While some values have a clear practical background (knowledge and language, hard work, domestic skills, hunter success), others are more values of individuals (spirituality, humility, humor), others are much relational (avoid conflict, love for children, sharing, respect for elders, respect for others, cooperation, respect for nature, and responsibility of tribe).Footnote 118 Hence, these values can also be seen as virtues.

As mentioned at the beginning of this Sect. 5.4, “[l]aws can force conformity of overt behavior, but they cannot change the minds from which such views are formulated”.Footnote 119 These individual values or virtues identified south (Africa), east (Confucianism), west (Lakota) and north (Alaska) of Europe (Table 5.1), can also be a valuable source of inspiration, complementing EU values and concepts also identified in Europe, such as the ‘cardinal virtues’: justice (iustitia), temperance (temperantia), courage (fortitudo) and practical wisdom (prudentia).Footnote 120

Table 5.1 Virtues beyond Europe
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