Abstract
Since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes. This chapter begins the book’s reaction to this fact. It does so by spelling out and offering a first defense of Thesis 1. As stated in the Preface, that is the thesis that disputes are micro-political conflicts, in other words, micro-wars. This chapter also distinguishes the conflictual craft championed in this book from the dogmatic craft and from that of Pyrrho of Elis described by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Skepticism.
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Notes
- 1.
This book is neutral on disagreements that have been associated with mathematics, logic or empirical science.
- 2.
PH II 8.
- 3.
PH I 13.
- 4.
For more recent takes in that direction, see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, New York, Harper and Row, 1974; Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, and so on.
- 5.
Michel Foucault, History of Madness, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Angela Davis, The Angela Y. Davis Reader, MA, Blackwell Publishers, 1998; Cornel West, Black Prophetic Fire, MA, Beacon Press Books, 2014; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York, Routledge, 1990; and Gayle Rubin, Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader, North Caroline, Duke University Press, 2011.
- 6.
Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435–450; and Daniel Dennett, “Quining Qualia” in A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Modern Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- 7.
The notion of “physicalist-driven philosopher” introduced here is not to be confounded with the more usual one of “physicalist”. For instance, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers are “physicalist-driven philosophers”, even though they are not usually called “physicalists”. See Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, in Chalmers, David (ed.). Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002; David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; and The Character of Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
For my own view on Chalmers, consider Felipe G. A. Moreira, “The Obscurity of the Physical: An Objection to Chalmers’ Conceivability Argument”, in Filosofia Unisinos 21(3), Set/Dec 2020: pp. 296–302, https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.07, 2020.
- 8.
Whether as Thomas White and Mark Rowlands indicate, not only human beings are holders of logos is an issue regarding which this book is neutral. See Thomas White, In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier, MA, Blackwell, 2007; and Mark Rowlands, Can Animals be Persons?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
- 9.
“Gumnosophistai” has been traditionally translated to “naked wise men”. However, I wish to rely on a more gender-neutral vocabulary. This is why I replace the term “men” for “persons”. I also prefer the term “bare” over the term “naked”. The reason is that “bare” hopefully reminds readers of the expression, “bare particular”. A bare particular has been understood as a substance that merely instantiates universals but, in itself, has no property of its own at all. A bare wise person, accordingly, is one that when stripped from one’s clothes or any other cultural features, such as earrings and necklaces, still has the property of being a person. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. James Miller, trans. Pamela Mensch, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018: (9.61).
- 10.
Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1960; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980; and Kit Fine “Essence and Modality”, in Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 8: 1994: pp. 1–16.
- 11.
Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles / Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1979; and Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic” in Negotiations, 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York, Columbia University, 1995.
- 12.
Plato, The Republic of Plato (2nd edition), trans., Allan Bloom, New York, Basic Books, 1991: 368d.
- 13.
Note that Sextus was inserted in a context in which most people were pious in taking the Greek Gods to exist and to be provident. Hence, the norm that one is to be pious counted for him as an appearance, that is, as a way of handing down a custom. Sextus indicates so in stating that in “following ordinary life without opinions, we [skeptics] say that there are gods and we are pious towards the gods and say that they are provident”. See PH III 2.
- 14.
According to Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a king who was punished by being compelled to roll an immense rock up a hill. He then had to watch the rock roll back down. Such actions had to be repeated eternally. For readings of this myth, see Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus: And Other Essays, New York, First Vintage International Edition, 1991; and Thomas Nagel, “The absurd”, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- 15.
Willard Van Orman Quine, Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1992: pp. 20. For a detailed discussion of these virtues, see Willard Van Orman Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, New York, McGraw-Hill Education, 1978: pp. 40–48.
- 16.
In other places, I provided more detailed takes on Anselm and Hirsch that further corroborate the reading of them proposed in Chapter 2. See Felipe G. A. Moreira, “Anselm, Intuition and God’s Existence”, in Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel,Volume 50, Issue 2, April 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00403-w, 2021; and “An Apology of Carnap”, in Manuscrito (Unicamp), Vol 37, Número 2, pp. 261–289, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0100-60452015005000001, 2014. That more thorough readings of Aristotle, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein could likewise further corroborate Chap. 2’s take on them is a dispute that I may handle in a future occasion. Also see Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2: The Revised Oxford Translation, trans. W. D. Ross, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984; Metaphysics: Books 1-9, trans. Hugh Tredennick with the original Greek text, MA, Harvard University Press, 1933; Saint Anselm, Proslogion with A reply on behalf of the fool, trans. M. J. Charlesworth, with the original Latin text; Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979; Proslogion, trans. Thomas Williams, Indiana, Hackett Publishing, 1995; David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1974; and Eli Hirsch, Quantifier Variance and Realism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.
- 17.
Thomas Nagel, “Dennett: Content and Consciousness” and “Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved”, in Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969–1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- 18.
“Synthesis” is a term that is often associated with Hegel’s works. In using it in the stated sense, though, I do not wish to suggest that I champion a Hegelian approach.
- 19.
PH I 23.
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
PH I 3.
- 22.
PH I 10.
- 23.
PH I 36 and PH I 164, respectively.
- 24.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (9.88).
- 25.
PH I 168.
- 26.
PH III 280.
- 27.
Myles F. Burnyeat, “Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?” in Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy Vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- 28.
PH I 23.
- 29.
PH I 146.
- 30.
PH I 148.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
Oswaldo Porchat, Rumo ao Ceticismo, São Paulo, Editora Unesp, 2007; Otávio Bueno, “Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic”, Principia 9, 2005; “Is the Pyrrhonist an Internalist”, in Diego Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism, Leiden, Brill, 2011; “Disagreeing with the Pyrrhonist”, in Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, New York, Routledge, 2013. Also consider Robert J. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Jutification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; Jonathan, Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist”, in Michael Frede and Myles F. Burnyeat (eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 1997; Otávio Bueno and Plínio Junqueira Smith, “Skepticism in Latin America”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016; Plínio Junqueira Smith, Uma Visão Cética do Mundo: Porchat e a Filosofia, São Paulo, Editora Unesp, 2017, and so on.
- 34.
For such a discussion, consider, besides the aforementioned Butler and Rubin, Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, London, Lowe and Brydone, 1953; Catherine MacKinnon, Are Women Human?, MA, Harvard University Press, 2006; Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012; Julia Serano, Outspoken: A Decade of Transgender Activism and Trans Feminism, Oakland, Switch Hitter Press, 2016, etc.
- 35.
A rule that has been usually adopted in Brazil runs as follows: when referring both to men and women, one is to adopt a masculine plural term. Suppose that one is in front of an isentão and of an isentona. To follow this rule would be to refer to both of them by using the masculine plural term “isentões”. The term “isentonas” is the plural of “isentona”. Usually, such term is applied when one aims to refer to two or more women who wish but fail to be politically neutral concerning macro-political disputes. These issues will play an important role in Sect. 3.2 (a) as well as in Sect. 7.2 (b).
- 36.
Michael N. Forster, “Hegelian vs. Kantian Interpretations of Pyrrhonism: Revolution or Reaction?”, Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie Vol. 10, 2005: 70.
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Moreira, F.G.A. (2022). Introduction. In: The Politics of Metaphysics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12346-7_1
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