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Time and Time Again

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Phenomenology

Part of the book series: Palgrave Philosophy Today ((PPT))

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Abstract

Husserl’s analysis of temporality is central to his account of intentionality. Influenced by Brentano, James, and Stern, he proposed an intrinsic temporal structure (retention-primal-impression-protention) for consciousness, one that can account for both our perception of temporal objects, such as melodies, and a unifying, prereflective self-awareness. This model of intrinsic temporality can also be applied to action. Husserl and later phenomenologists further developed this view as part of a genetic phenomenology that relates directly to an enactive-dynamical account of perception and action.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are interesting and complex historical and philosophical connections between James and Husserl that have been well summarized in the scholarly literature. See Gallagher (1998) for a more complete account of the connections between Brentano, Stumpf, Stern, and James, and the history of philosophical-psychological reflections on time in the German tradition of Herbart, Lotze, Wundt, and Volkmann.

  2. 2.

    The role of the narrative scale is important in this regard. See Chap. 8 for further discussion.

  3. 3.

    Another example is when the meaning of a word in a sentence is deferred until a phrase or the sentence is complete, so that the word itself, as it is read or sounded, motivates a certain anticipation towards the fulfillment of its meaning. Such things often slow down our reading and make us go back over text to get clarification. See Gallagher (1998) for other examples of effects of content on experienced temporal sequence.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA

    Shaun Gallagher

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Gallagher, S. (2022). Time and Time Again. In: Phenomenology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11586-8_6

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