Abstract
This chapter assesses implementation of the United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), and National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) designation processes and outcomes specifically, in Latin America. It shows that NPM designation processes have varied considerably in the region between countries depending on two sets of factors: (i) the degree of official and institutional resistance to designation of effective monitoring; and (ii) pre-existing capacity on the part of domestic structures tasked with monitoring duties. The empirical analysis of four country case studies (Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru and Mexico) demonstrate that even in situations of high levels of state resistance high-capacity candidate agencies can have a powerful, even decisive, impact. Interestingly, strong capacity can co-exist with resistance and can mitigate the pernicious effects of resistance to designation of potentially effective NPMs. These findings are important for any assessment of the potential of NPMs and monitoring of detention facilities more generally. Not only do they highlight key factors that shape domestic processes of treaty implementation during the post-ratification phase, but they also put the spotlight on the central political and institutional conditions that determine the effectiveness of monitoring institutions to protect the rights of persons deprived of liberty.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Rodley (2009).
- 2.
Rodley (2009), p. 15.
- 3.
Carver and Handley (2016).
- 4.
Risse-Kappen et al. (2013).
- 5.
Anaya-Muñoz (2019).
- 6.
OPCAT, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2002.
- 7.
OPCAT, Articles 17 and 24.
- 8.
See: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx. The information on designation provided by the OHCHR needs to be critically assessed against local realities. The OHCHR lists designated NPMs on the basis of the notifications by State parties to the SPT, which may give rise to some discrepancies.
- 9.
This includes the ‘functional’ and ‘personal’ independence of the mechanism (Art. 17; 18(1)), jurisdiction over ‘all places of detention, to all persons deprived of their liberty, and to all relevant information’ (Art. 20), the ability to make recommendations to the relevant authorities, submit proposals and observations concerning existing or draft legislation (Art. 19), a plural and adequately professional and expert membership (Art. 18(2)), the dissemination and publication of an annual report (Art. 21(1)), as well as specific requirements regarding private interviews, regular visitation and witness protection. Significantly, the NPM also has the right to follow-up on their recommendations and State Parties are required to enter into dialogue with the NPM regarding implementation.
Including:
Art. 17; 18(1): guarantees of ‘functional’ and ‘personnel’ independence
Art 18(2): a plural and adequately professional and expert membership
Art. 19(a): powers to regularly examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention
Art. 19(b-c): the ability to make recommendations to the relevant authorities, submit proposals and observations concerning existing or draft legislation
Art. 20: jurisdiction over all places of detention, to all persons deprived of their liberty, and to all relevant information
Art. 21(1): the dissemination and publication of an annual report
- 10.
Article 20, OPCAT.
- 11.
OPCAT directs the SPT to communicate its recommendations to the NPM without prior state consultation or consent. Article 16, OPCAT.
- 12.
https://ganhri.org/. UN accreditation indicates full compliance with the Paris Principles (design safeguards for NHRIs), not performance assessment. Similarly, A status does not ensure compliance with Article 18 under OPCAT.
- 13.
- 14.
Hafner-Burton et al. (2015).
- 15.
Guzman (2008).
- 16.
Anaya-Muñoz (2019), p. 446.
- 17.
Creamer and Simmons (2015), p. 581.
- 18.
Carver and Handley (2016), p. 95.
- 19.
Creamer and Simmons (2015), p. 607.
- 20.
Hathaway (2002), p. 2013.
- 21.
Holmes (2013), p. 134.
- 22.
Association for the Prevention of Torture n.d.
- 23.
Döhler (2018).
- 24.
Moe and Wilson (1994), p. 6.
- 25.
Simmons (2009).
- 26.
Döhler (2018).
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
Chayes and Chayes (1993).
- 30.
- 31.
Anaya-Muñoz (2019), p. 447.
- 32.
Creamer and Simmons (2015).
- 33.
Lupu (2015).
- 34.
Cardenas (2014).
- 35.
Pegram (2010).
- 36.
Cole and Ramirez (2013).
- 37.
Carver and Handley (2016), p. 95.
- 38.
- 39.
Hyman and Kovacic (2013), p. 1474.
- 40.
Dancy and Fariss (2017).
- 41.
Cell designation does not preclude the possibility of overlap and interaction among logics of designation in practice.
- 42.
De Búrca et al. (2014), p. 480.
- 43.
Lupu (2015).
- 44.
Cole (2015).
- 45.
Barkow (2010), p. 59.
- 46.
Lupu (2015).
- 47.
Kim (2013).
- 48.
Krasner (2001).
- 49.
Linz (1990).
- 50.
Elman (2005).
- 51.
Engstrom and Pereira (2012).
- 52.
CAT (2004), Final Observations, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/44/1.
- 53.
MPD (2012), La Defensoría General de la Nación impulsa una campaña nacional contra la tortura.
- 54.
Eaton (2008).
- 55.
APT Information Note, p. 1.
- 56.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2017.
- 57.
- 58.
CAT (2004), para 6a.
- 59.
SPT (2013), Report of the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to Argentina, para 110.
- 60.
Anonymous interview with authors [official at Prison Attorney Office], 2017.
- 61.
Anonymous interview with authors [official at Prison Attorney Office], 2017.
- 62.
O’Donnell (1993), p. 1359.
- 63.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2017.
- 64.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2008.
- 65.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2008.
- 66.
Pegram (2012a), p. 219.
- 67.
GANHRI (2017), Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), Geneva, pp. 37–39.
- 68.
Anonymous interview with authors [former official at Prison Attorney Office], 2017 (PPN).
- 69.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2017.
- 70.
Anonymous interview with authors [official at Prison Attorney Office], 2017.
- 71.
- 72.
Anonymous interview with authors [NPM official], 2018.
- 73.
Anonymous interview with authors [NPM official], 2018.
- 74.
- 75.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2008.
- 76.
Anonymous interview with authors [Court Justice], 2018.
- 77.
Anonymous interview with authors [Court Justice], 2018.
- 78.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 79.
Anonymous interview with authors [NPM official], 2018.
- 80.
Morrissey (2017).
- 81.
Anonymous interview with authors [UN official], 2018.
- 82.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 83.
Anonymous interview with authors [Professor of Public International Law], 2018.
- 84.
Pegram (2012b), p. 30.
- 85.
Anonymous interview with authors [Professor of Public International Law], 2018.
- 86.
Anonymous interview with authors [Court Justice], 2018.
- 87.
Anonymous interview with authors [NPM official], 2018.
- 88.
Pegram (2012b), p. 36.
- 89.
Case data drawn from annual reports, available here: http://www.dhr.go.cr/transparencia/informes_institucionales/informes_anuales.aspx (accessed February 15, 2019).
- 90.
Anonymous interview with authors [Ombudsman official], 2007.
- 91.
Anonymous interview with authors [Professor of Public International Law], 2018.
- 92.
Anonymous interview with authors [Professor of Public International Law], 2018.
- 93.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 94.
Anonymous interview with authors [UN official], 2018.
- 95.
Anonymous interview with authors [NPM official], 2018.
- 96.
Shaffer (2012), p. 225.
- 97.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2014.
- 98.
Pegram and Herrera (2016), p. 299.
- 99.
Anonymous interview with authors, 2008.
- 100.
Pegram and Herrera (2016), p. 25.
- 101.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2014.
- 102.
La República (2013), ONU exhorta a Perú a crear con urgencia mecanismo de prevención contra tortura.
- 103.
CCJHR (2013), Acta de la Decima Sesion Ordinaria.
- 104.
Ibid., pp. 16–19.
- 105.
CNDDHH (2014), Congreso aprobó texto final de la Ley del Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura.
- 106.
Anonymous interview with authors, 2015.
- 107.
Anonymous interview with authors, 2008.
- 108.
CCJHR (2013), pp. 10–11.
- 109.
Anonymous interview with authors [Ombudsman official], 2014.
- 110.
Defensoria del Pueblo.
- 111.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2005.
- 112.
IACHR (1997), Cesti Hurtado v. Peru.
- 113.
Pegram and Herrera (2016).
- 114.
CCJHR (2013), p. 9.
- 115.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2014.
- 116.
Anonymous interview with authors [Court Justice], 2014.
- 117.
Human Rights Watch (2008), La Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos de México: Una evaluación crítica. Human Rights Watch, Washington D.C., p. 85.
- 118.
Beittel (2018).
- 119.
SRT (2014), Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Addendum: Mission to Mexico.
- 120.
NGO Coalition.
- 121.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 122.
Sarre (2009), p. 113.
- 123.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 124.
Lachenal et al. (2009), p. 121.
- 125.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2018.
- 126.
- 127.
Finkel (2012).
- 128.
ICHR (2000), Performance & legitimacy: national human rights institutions, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Versoix, Switzerland, p. 37.
- 129.
Finkel (2012)
- 130.
Ballinas and Becerril (2009).
- 131.
Lachenal et al. (2009).
- 132.
Iriarte and Yaniz (2014)
- 133.
Reforma (2018), Conforman Comité Técnico contra Tortura.
- 134.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2017.
- 135.
Human Rights Watch (2008).
- 136.
ICHR (2000), pp. 40–41.
- 137.
Anonymous interview with authors [NGO representative], 2017.
- 138.
Lachenal et al. (2009), p. 120.
- 139.
Anonymous interview with authors [UN representative], 2013.
- 140.
Amnesty International (1999), p. 2.
- 141.
- 142.
Association for the Prevention of Torture (2019), A major setback for torture prevention in Brazil.
- 143.
Association for the Prevention of Torture (2020), COVID-19 in Latin America: new risks and the crucial need of the preventive approach.
References
Amnesty International (1999) Mexico: Shadow of Impunity. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr41/002/1999/en/
Anaya-Muñoz A (2019) Bringing Willingness Back in: state capacities and the human rights compliance deficit in Mexico. Hum Rights Q 41:441–464
APT Argentina: OPCAT Situation. https://apt.ch/en/opcat_pages/opcat-situation-84/
Arena Pública (2017) CNDH: cada vez más cara y con los mismos resultados. Arena Pública
Association for the Prevention of Torture (2019) A major setback for torture prevention in Brazil. https://www.apt.ch/en/news_on_prevention/major-setback-torture-prevention-brazil
Association for the Prevention of Torture (2020) COVID-19 in Latin America: new risks and the crucial need of the preventive approach. https://www.apt.ch/en/blog/covid-19-latin-america-new-risks-and-crucial-need-preventive-approach
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) Australia: OPCAT Ratification. https://apt.ch/en/opcat_pages/opcat-ratification-3/
Ballinas V, Becerril A (2009) Raúl Plascencia, presidente de la CNDH; es una maniobra de continuismo: Ibarra. La Jornada
Barkow RE (2010) Insulating agencies: avoiding capture through institutional design. Tex Law Rev 89:15–80
Beittel JS (2018) Mexico: organized crime and drug trafficking organizations. Congressional Research Service, Washington
Brysk A (2009) Global good Samaritans: human rights as foreign policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cardenas S (2014) Chains of Justice: the global rise of state institutions for human rights. University of Pennsylvania Press
Carpenter DP (2001) The forging of bureaucratic autonomy: reputations, networks, and policy innovation in executive agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Carver R, Handley L (eds) (2016) Does torture prevention work? University Press, Liverpool
CAT (2004) Final Observations, UN Doc CAT/C/CR/44/1, 10 December 2004
CCJHR (2013) Acta de la Decima Sesion Ordinaria
CELS (2018a) Muertes Naturalizadas: letalidad policial sin control y sin justicia. Buenos Aires
CELS (2018b) Violencia de las fuerzas federales: seis prefectos condenados por torturas. In: CELS. https://www.cels.org.ar/web/2018/09/seis-prefectos-condenados-por-torturas/
Chayes A, Chayes AH (1993) On compliance. Int Organ 47:175–205. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027910
CNDDHH (2014) Congreso aprobó texto final de la Ley del Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura. http://derechoshumanos.pe/2014/12/congreso-aprobo-texto-final-de-la-ley-del-mecanismo-nacional-de-prevencion-de-la-tortura/
Cole WM (2015) Mind the Gap: state capacity and the implementation of human rights treaties. Int Organ 69:405–441. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831400040X
Cole WM, Ramirez FO (2013) Conditional decoupling: assessing the impact of National Human Rights Institutions, 1981 to 2004. Am Sociol Rev 78:702–725. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413492762
Creamer CD, Simmons BA (2015) Ratification, reporting, and rights: quality of participation in the convention against Torture. Hum Rights Q 37:579–608. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2015.0041
Dancy G, Fariss CJ (2017) Rescuing human rights law from international legalism and its critics. Hum Rights Q 39:1–36. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2017.0000
De Búrca G, Keohane RO, Sabel C (2014) Global experimentalist governance. Br J Polit Sci 44:477–486. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000076
Defensoria del Pueblo Informe Defensorial. In: Defensoria Pueblo - Perú. http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/categorias_informes/informe-defensorial/
Döhler M (2018) Discovering the dark side of power: the principal’s moral hazard in political-bureaucratic relations. Int J Public Adm 41:190–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2016.1256893
Eaton K (2008) Paradoxes of police reform: federalism, parties, and civil society in Argentina’s public security crisis. Lat Am Res Rev 43:5–32
Elman C (2005) Explanatory typologies in qualitative studies of international politics. Int Organ 59:293–326. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050101
Englehart NA (2009) State capacity, state failure, and human rights. J Peace Res 46:163–180. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100713
Engstrom P, Pereira G (2012) From amnesty to accountability: the ebbs and flows in the search for Justice in Argentina. In: Payne LA, Lessa F (eds) Amnesty in the age of human rights accountability: comparative and international perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K
Finkel J (2012) Explaining the failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after democratization: elections, incentives, and unaccountability in the Mexican Senate. Hum Rights Rev 13:473–495. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-012-0233-3
GANHRI (2017) Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA). Geneva
García Otero P (2016) Mexican government blocks visit of UN Rapporteur on Torture. PanAm Post
Guzman AT (2008) How international law works: a rational choice theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Hafner-Burton EM, Mansfield ED, Pevehouse JCW (2015) Human rights institutions, sovereignty costs and democratization. Br J Polit Sci 45:1–27. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000240
Hathaway OA (2002) Do human rights treaties make a difference? Yale Law J 111:1935–2042. https://doi.org/10.2307/797642
Holmes E (2013) The politics of torture, human rights, and oversight: the Canadian experience with the UN’s Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). PhD diss, University of Ottawa
Human Rights Watch (2008) La Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos de México: Una evaluación crítica. Human Rights Watch, Washington
Hyman DA, Kovacic WE (2013) Why who does what matters: governmental design and agency performance annual review of administrative law. George Wash Law Rev 82:1446–1516
IACHR (1997) Cesti Hurtado v. Peru
ICHR (2000) Performance & legitimacy: national human rights institutions. International Council on Human Rights Policy. Versoix, Switzerland
Iriarte J, Yaniz L (2014) Nuevo presidente de la CNDH, ¿triunfo de la sociedad civil? In: Nexos El Juego Suprema Corte. https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=4243
Kim D (2013) International nongovernmental organizations and the global diffusion of national human rights institutions. Int Organ 67:505–539. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000131
Krasner SD (2001) Sovereignty organized hypocrisy. Princeton University Press, Princeton
La República (2013) ONU exhorta a Perú a crear con urgencia mecanismo de prevención contra tortura
Lachenal C, Martínez JC, Moguel M (2009) Los Organismos Públicos de Derechos Humanos en México: Nuevas Instituciones, Viejas prácticas. Fundar, Centro de Análisis e Investigación, A.C
Lehoucq F (2005) Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt. J Democr 16:140–154
Linos K, Pegram T (2017) What works in human rights institutions? Am J Int Law 111:628–688. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.65
Linz J (1990) The perils of presidentialism. J Democr 1:51–69
Lupu Y (2015) Legislative Veto Players and the effects of international human rights agreements. Am J Polit Sci 59:578–594. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12178
Mitchell NJ (2012) Democracy’s Blameless leaders from Dresden to Abu Ghraib, how leaders evade accountability for abuse, atrocity, and killing. New York University, New York
Moe TM, Wilson SA (1994) Presidents and the politics of structure. Law Contemp Probl 57:1–44. https://doi.org/10.2307/1192044
Morrissey M (2017) Neoliberalism, development, and the Costa Rican State. Lat Am Policy 8:278–294. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12124
MPD (2012) La Defensoría General de la Nación impulsa una campaña nacional contra la tortura
Newman A (2008) Protectors of privacy: regulating personal data in the global economy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London
NGO Coalition Descripción del mecanismo nacional de prevención propuesto por las organizaciones de la sociedad civil
O’Donnell G (1993) On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: a Latin American view with glances at some postcommunist countries. World Dev 21:1355–1369. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(93)90048-E
O’Donnell GA, Vargas Cullel J, Iazzetta OM (eds) (2004) The quality of democracy: theory and applications. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind
Odio Benito E (2002) Protocolo Facultativo a la Convención contra la Tortura. Rev Costarric Política Exter 3:85–90
Pegram T (2008) Accountability in Hostile Times: the case of the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman 1996–2001. J Lat Am Stud 40:51–82. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0700363X
Pegram T (2010) Diffusion across political systems: the global spread of national human rights institutions. Hum Rights Q 32:729–760
Pegram T (2012a) National human rights institutions in Latin America: politics and institutionalization. In: Goodman R, Pegram T (eds) Human rights, state compliance, and social change: assessing national human rights institutions. Cambridge University Press, New York
Pegram T (2012b) La Defensoría de los Habitantes de Costa Rica: ¿un puente entre el estado y la sociedad? In: Welp L, Whitehead L (eds) Caleidoscopio de la innovación democrática en América Latina. Revista Perfiles Latinoamericanos-FLACSO, Mexico, pp 23–50
Pegram T, Herrera N (2016) Prevalence and prevention of Torture in Peru 1985-2014. In: Carver R, Handley L (eds) Does Torture prevention work? Liverpool University Press, Liverpool
PPN La Procuración Penitenciaria de la Nación: Historia. https://ppn.gov.ar/institucional/informacion-institucional/historia
Proceso (2010) Calderón rechaza la supervisión de la ONU. Proceso
Reforma (2018) Conforman Comité Técnico contra Tortura
Risse-Kappen T, Ropp SC, Sikkink K (eds) (2013) The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rodley N (2009) Reflections on working for the prevention of Torture. Essex Hum Rights Rev 6:15–21
Sarre M (2009) El Protocolo Facultativo de la Convención contra la tortura: un instrumento generador de cambios estructurales necesarios para prevenir la tortura. In: Menendez Marino FM, Cebada Romero A (eds) La Creacion del mecanismo espanol de prevencion de la tortura. Lustel, Madrid
Shaffer G (2012) Transnational legal process and state change. Law Soc Inq 37:229–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2011.01265.x
Simmons BA (2009) Mobilizing for human rights: international law in domestic politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
SPT (2013) Report of the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to Argentina
SRT (2014) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Mission to Mexico, Addendum
Stanley R (2005) Controlling the police in Buenos Aires: a case study of horizontal and social accountability. Bull Lat Am Res 24:71–91
The Economist (2008) Big, expensive and weirdly spineless: a much-needed human-rights watchdog continues to disappoint. The Economist
Tuckman J (2015) UN: Torture in Mexico occurs with “impunity” at hands of security forces. The Guardian
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Engstrom, P., Pegram, T. (2022). Torture Prevention in Latin America: Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty and the Role of National Preventive Mechanisms. In: Burbano Herrera, C., Haeck, Y. (eds) Human Rights Behind Bars. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 103. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11484-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11484-7_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-11483-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-11484-7
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)