Abstract
The aim of this research is to clarify the legal framework under which the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) operates its paradiplomacy, as well as to provide a basis for a better understanding of its paradiplomacy. This will be done by portraying the exact driving factors behind the institutionalization of the Kurdistan Region’s paradiplomacy, and exploring the tools and methods used to do so. By focusing on the practical and first-hand involvement in the development of the Kurdistan Region’s paradiplomacy, this research will illustrate how the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its representations abroad have evolved, specifically from 2005 up until 2021.
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Notes
- 1.
The first cabinet of the KRG, established on July 4, 1992, had established a Ministry of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation. The understanding at the time had been that through this Ministry the KRG would have access to the international community. The region had been left nearly destroyed after years of violence and conflict and plundering of villages and towns and the KRG sought to approach the international community through humanitarian aid. Through incoming humanitarian aid, the KRG managed to create ties with other states and establish representations abroad.
- 2.
The boundaries of the Kurdish designated autonomous areas were first outlined during World War I and shifted throughout the century to reflect areas historically inhabited by Kurds.
- 3.
In 1994 a civil war broke out between the two main leading parties of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, thus creating two separate administrations in the Region: KDP and PUK. This also led to a split in the KRG Representations abroad that lasted until the official unification of the KRG in 2005.
- 4.
The KRI reached out to its neighbors and to the Arab states to communicate the KRI’s values, aims, and expectations for the new Iraqi state. We encouraged them to be diplomatically present in Baghdad first before showing diplomatic presence in Erbil, as it would be the only way Baghdad would allow it.
- 5.
The Kurds have an extensive history of engaging with international actors regarding Kurdish issues, one that predates the twentieth century. However, it was the policies of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish liberation movement during the 1940s to the late 1970s, that afforded the Kurds of Iraq sustained international attention.
- 6.
Before this, I had been the Minister of State at the Office of the then Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, in charge of international relations. PM Barzani had the idea to establish a DFR and place me as its Minister, which I wholeheartedly accepted. In September 2006, a decree was signed to appoint me as the Head of the Department of Foreign Relations, with a ministerial rank. All I had to work was the PM’s vision for the DFR to coordinate the KRG’s paradiplomacy. When we started this endeavor, there was no office, no instructional manual, and no foreign diplomatic presence in the KRI. I along with my small team built the DFR from scratch. Today we have 40 diplomatic offices in the KRI and 14 KRG offices abroad.
- 7.
KRG Representations are present in the US, the UK, Belgium, France, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Iran, Australia, Poland, and Russia.
- 8.
Sudan’s Consulate has since 2018 been temporarily discontinued, first due to financial reasons provided by the state which then and now due to political turmoil in Sudan. Belarus’ honorary consulate has also been shut down in November 2021 due to their role in the Poland-Belarusian migration crisis.
- 9.
The building of the Erbil International Airport had been a joint venture between a Turkish company, Makyol-Cengiz, and a British company, Scott Wilson. The then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had come to the 2010 opening ceremony of the airport, delivering a speech under the Iraqi and Kurdistan flag. It became clear to the KRI the power of commerce and commercial diplomacy in forging a new era of relations with neighbors who have traditionally been against Kurdish national aspirations.
- 10.
Speaking as a former Minister of State, a current Minister, and the previous Head of the DFR, we can consider a third sector, just as crucial as the private and public sector, which is the civil society. The Kurdistan Region has focused on supporting democratic values such as the freedom of speech and the rule of law. The region has a history of its people being deprived of such rights, being persecuted for their beliefs, and fighting for freedom. Therefore, we chose the path of democracy to right these wrongs. We are committed to democracy and democratic values, which enable the region to further develop relations with the rest of the free and democratic world. Policies have been implemented targeting women and engaging the youth as well as developing institutions.
- 11.
Then PM Nechirvan Barzani’s goal was to create a lucrative investment law to attract Foreign Direct Investment and build the energy industry to develop KRI’s infrastructure and ensure internal security and stability.
- 12.
The KRI is presented as an international partner that stands for the core values of peace and stability, welcomes and supports Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, protects religious minorities, and fights terrorism and extremism. After 2014, representing the KRI had become easier as I had much to communicate to the outside world and they wanted to listen. The fight with ISIS had been ongoing and the KRI was proud to be the frontline fighters against this brutal terrorist organization. The frontline had been 1050 km in length and the war had been very costly and deadly to the KRI and to its Peshmerga fighters. Despite this, we proudly hosted up to 2 million refugees and IDPs from Syria and the rest of Iraq. Therefore, representing the KRI began to include presenting ourselves as a partner to the international community in furthering peace and stability and a partner in protecting refugees, IDPs, religious and ethnic minorities.
- 13.
In fact, the Kurdish political actors were heavily engaged in the political process in Baghdad and were interested in making Iraq work. The KRG was devoted to achieving a democratic, federal Iraq to safeguard its rights, protect its people, and ensure stability for Iraq and the greater region. The Kurds had experienced too much oppression and war. The KRI could and can only benefit from a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq, strong in its institutions rather than in its militarization.
- 14.
Article 117 First, this Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.
- 15.
Article 121 First, the regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government.
- 16.
Article 141 Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution.
- 17.
Article 120 Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not contradict this Constitution.
- 18.
Article 121 Fifth, the regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region.
- 19.
Article 4 The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. Second, the scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the provisions of this article shall be defined by a law and shall include: a. Publication of the Official Gazette, in the two languages; b. Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as the Council of Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages; c. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two languages; d. Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with the educational guidelines; e. Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality such as bank notes, passports, and stamps.
- 20.
Article 111 Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.
- 21.
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution.
- 22.
Article 114 First, to manage customs, in coordination with the governments of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region, and this shall be regulated by a law. Second, to regulate the main sources of electric energy and its distribution. Seventh, to formulate and regulate the internal water resources policy in a way that guarantees their just distribution, and this shall be regulated by a law.
- 23.
Article 115 All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.
- 24.
In 2005, the Kurdish leadership at the time, President Masoud Barzani and the late President Jalal Talabani, played a major role in convincing the people that we would be better off as part of a federal, democratic, pluralist Iraq, in which we would have legitimate, constitutional recognition. Iraq was recognized as a state by the international community, the United Nations, and the Security Council. By joining Iraq as a constitutionally recognized federal region, it would allow the Kurdistan region to become a de jure entity, instead of the de facto entity it was recognized by until 2003.
- 25.
Article 140 First, the executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Second, the responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.
- 26.
Article 9 First, the Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in the political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority. Article 121 five, the regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region. It is interesting to note that the Popular Mobilization forces (Hashd ash’Sha’bi), formed in 2014 in response to ISIS, was ordained in 2018 by then Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi as a component of Iraq’s national guard, receiving financial salary from the federal government, yet the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga have not.
- 27.
Article 140.
- 28.
Article 112 First, the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.
- 29.
The federal government of Baghdad was not honoring the KRG’s oil practices prior to the adoption of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 as per article 141 of the Iraqi constitution, nor were they interested in abiding by article 112 of the constitution which stipulated the federal government of Iraq must together with the federal regions draft a hydrocarbon law, and can together with the federal regions manage the oil & gas industry if, and only if, it is distributed in a fair manner that is in proportion to the true population distribution of Iraq. Per article 112 the federal government of Iraq together with the federal regions must draft a hydrocarbon law that is reflective of the population distribution; The KRG drafted its own Oil & Gas Law due to delays in the drafting of the Hydrocarbon Law (Rogg and Rimscha 2007) which has yet to be drafted. Given that the federal government has shown no political will to update the national census nor pass a national hydrocarbon law, the KRG manages its own oil and gas industry.
- 30.
Article 121 Second, Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the percentage of their population. While the Peshmerga were battling ISIS, the KRG was at the same time in a dispute with the federal government over these multiple constitutional violations. Then Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki placed a halt on the KRI’s portion of the federal budget in retaliation for the KRG Ministry of Oil wanting to independently sell the oil of the Region. This action together with the war and humanitarian crisis caused a socioeconomic crisis in the KRI.
- 31.
The KRI also saw a dramatic increase in diplomatic activity in the Region; humanitarian aid increased to address the needs of the nearly 2 million displaced persons and refugees in the Region. Furthermore, international forces partnered with the Peshmerga forces and provided them with military training.
- 32.
In 2012, 70% of US $11 billion trade between Turkey and Iraq was accredited to trade with the Kurdistan Region (Kurdistan Democratic Party 2012).
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Bakir, F.M., Mustafa, S.D. (2023). Legal Framework, Institutionalization, Tools, and Motives of Kurdistan Iraq’s Paradiplomacy. In: Gürbey, G., Hofmann, S., Ibrahim Seyder, F. (eds) Between Diplomacy and Non-Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09756-0_4
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