Abstract
The analyst of the philosophical field has, for the last twenty years, been confronted with a vast “conceptual constellation”, which is structured simultaneously around the claim for realism and the rebirth of ontology. Of all these contemporary philosophies which claim this same common genus (realist ontology) and distinguished themselves by a multitude of specific differences, I will focus on that proposed by the current known as “flat ontology”. I will first elucidate the fundamental structure of flat ontology, which remains invariant within each of the analyzed authors‘s various transformations. This will make possible to question the entity underlying this ontology: “the Something” (Aliquid), defined by these authors as pure singularity, irreducible to its relations. The time will then come to attempt a sort of meta-ontological exercise, in which I will unravel the operations that these authors use to be able to say what they say.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
I will refer to Gabriel from time to time, not because he claims to be a flat ontologist but because his main theses are strictly similar to those of Garcia. It is not a question here of thinking in terms of subjective influence but to notice objective convergence between two authors. It is certainly possible and even probable that Gabriel did not read Garcia (2011) before perfecting his own elaboration in “Why the World Does Not Exist” (2013)? That is not the problem and it is therefore right that most of the serious reviews of his book have associated the two books, such as the precious article of Louis Morelle who declares that Gabriel “reveals in an exemplary manner the weaknesses of ontological liberalism by making visible the flaws that other more subtle or nuanced theorists tend to leave in the shadows” (2015).
- 3.
According to the famous title of Georges Perec, himself customary of facetious lists.
- 4.
Garcia and Harman sometime refer to Meinong. However, this is more of a curtsy than an explicit reference. Therefore, I am here to highlight the nature of the link that unites them to Meinong, by showing how the general structure of their ontology is effectively dependent on him.
- 5.
- 6.
This given being “must belong, therefore, to every object as such: a Nicht-Sein of the same type cannot be set in opposition to it”“(Meinong, 1904, §4, 84).
- 7.
On the theme of the ontological “liberalism” common to all, see also Peter Wolfendale (2014) which devotes a chapter to this notion of “liberalism”.
- 8.
Bryant explains these theses at length (2011, 245 ff.). He gives these three refusals as well as the principle of unlimited ontological extension. For him, these are the 4 fundamental theses of flat ontology. However, it seems to me that these three refusals cannot be considered as “principles” but are rather consequences of the initial structure (extension of the field of objects). Saying “I am not Aristotelian or Kantian” cannot be the principle of a theory but rather its consequence. Otherwise, one risks suspending all the positive ontological contents from a negative, initial and unjustified commitments, in the form of a decree: “I don’t want to be Kantian”.
- 9.
This does not mean that they reject the term “metaphysics”. On this point they have contrasting positions. Thus Harman, according to Heidegger, accepts it. Garcia also accepts it, but in fact, for him, metaphysics is a discipline outside ontology (we will come back to this later). Gabriel, on the contrary, refuses it. These divergences do not alter the community of the gesture: ontology is an autonomous sphere and not dependent on other sciences (logic, physics, metaphysics).
- 10.
“Onticology” is the name that Bryant (2011, 21) gives to his ontological enterprise. From now on, we will use this generic term to qualify the proponents of flat ontology.
- 11.
On his characterization of his second book as a “metaphysical” work, see also his March ‘s 2014 conference.
- 12.
- 13.
These relations are what Harman calls the sensual object as opposed to the real object, which is the aliquid (the object in its “withdrawal”). I don’t have to go into the detail of its quadruple distinction (real object/real qualities. Sensual object/sensual qualities”) in regard to my main object of research here: the nature of the aliquid
- 14.
This term is constantly used by Harman.
- 15.
In doing so, they detach themselves from one of the possible readings of Deleuze. DeLanda is clear on this point, declaring that The Anti-Oedipus (which has given rise to certain interpretations favoring “flux”) is Deleuze‘s least interesting book.
- 16.
See Garcia‘s diagrams (2012, 19).
- 17.
“A thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is in this thing and that in which this thing is.” (Garcia, 2011, 21).
- 18.
We find a theme of Latour (2012): Being qua being means being qua other-Being.
- 19.
Many commentators (e.g., Rabouin, Morelle, Brassier, etc.) have pointed out Harman‘s argumentative weakness, which is discernible in his assertion that “there is no good reason to think that» (i.e., to admit the existence of the world). This assertion is given as self-sufficient, even though we are within the framework of an ontology that says to admit everything, and even though the goal of all ontologies seems to be to determine with reasons what exists and what does not. These commentators noted that Bryant and Garcia were, from this point of view, much more cautious and rigorous, since Garcia, for example, carefully explains the status of this “world”. If I can agree with these commentators, I will nevertheless show further how this lightness of justification, far from being a subjective peculiarity of Harman‘s, is perhaps a constitutive feature of flat ontology.
- 20.
“Being nothing is still being something (since nothing is something, even if it is only a word, a false concept, or the union between a before-thing, the negative contemporaneous with a thing, and the absence following the thing)” (Garcia, 2011, 112).
- 21.
One measures the nature of this problem with Gabriel: the world, as totality of totalities, is energetically rejected but “fields of meaning” as specific worlds”, (fields of fiction, science, religion, etc.) are accepted. It is these particular worlds, defined, as in Garcia, as space or place, that will make possible to say that such object X has an existence in world A (for example, in art’s world) but no longer exists in world B (in world’ science). The world in general (as totality of totalities) is said to be meaningless, but more specific worlds (or sets) as totalities will be accepted as space encompassing singular entities and will thus define the existence, always local, of the something.
- 22.
They will indeed answer that they distinguish between the world (as a set from all sets) and the universe, the particular and specific object of physicists. Nevertheless, I do not evoke this possible proposition in opposition.
- 23.
See for example Bryant‘s statement: “If God exists, even God is linked to a world without which he could not be” (2016, 91).
- 24.
It is in fact a pure stipulation without explanation: Garcia writes: “We name ‘something other than a thing’ either ‘the world’ or ‘all’”. (Garcia, 2011, 81).
- 25.
The English translation of this book forgets to include the beginning of the proposition, whis is « Il n’y a pas d’autre visage à donner à « tout » hormis le fait (que chaque chose y participe et qu’il ne participe à rien)».
- 26.
Flat ontology accomplishes a gesture opposite to that of Badiou. For Badiou, only multiplicity is, to the exclusion of its opposite: the “one”. For onticologists, only singularity is something; multiplicity, because it cannot be closed off, takes on the figure of a non-existent totality. To expend upon flat ontology ‘s paradoxical dependence on Badiou; see Mehdi Belhaj Kacem 2012.
- 27.
Bryant in this regard speaks of his philosophy as “topologie du pli” (2016, 92). Garcia presents different diagrams in his text.
- 28.
By reference to Rimbaud’ s expression in Romance “vous êtes mauvais goût” translated in certain English’s editions by “you are not quite the thing”. This translation appears peculiarly relevant applied to Flat ontology: in ontology, epistemology is not quite the thing!
- 29.
“There are multiple blogs where young people, often male and I believe even exclusively male, measure their philosophy against each other. It’s like the tale of Lucien Philosophers for Sale. Everyone defends his own product, his favorite product” (2019, 282).
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Thomas-Fogiel, I. (2022). Flat Ontology, a Negative Cosmology? The Aliquid and Its Other. In: Mariani Zini, F. (eds) The Meaning of Something. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09610-5_7
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