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The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness

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A Philosophy of Person and Identity

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 21))

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Abstract

It is often thought that being able to have I-thoughts is a definition of self-consciousness. But how can a creature develop such thoughts? In this chapter I will first show that using such a language-related definition of self-consciousness leads to a paradox: if that is what self-consciousness is, no one could ever come to be self-conscious. Then I will look at the question whether other animals than human beings have (self-)consciousness. I will sketch an evolutionary account of how living organisms might gradually acquire some form of consciousness and self-consciousness. In its most primitive form, life itself already means that there is a distinction between self and everything else, in that a living organism maintains its own organisation. In further steps towards a full-blown (self-)consciousness, the interplay between perception and movement will be crucial. More complex forms of perception reveal more aspects of the external world, but they are always already accompanied by an awareness of where the organism itself is, and what it can do in its surroundings. Thus, consciousness, as literally a point of view, is always at the same time self-consciousness. Consciousness and self-consciousness have developed gradually, and always hand in hand.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bermúdez (1998).

  2. 2.

    Thus, many philosophers are of the opinion that thinking always occurs in some kind of language; see e.g., Fodor (1975).

  3. 3.

    Bermúdez (1998, p. 13).

  4. 4.

    Impossible according to some people, but not according to others. See e.g., De Waal (1997).

  5. 5.

    Still, there always remains the problem of self-reference in self-consciousness: a being with a sense of self refers to that very same self. But that sense of self is always present in living organisms as soon as there is consciousness; it is a form of mineness that accompanies all experience, as Damasio (1999, 2010) calls it. It does not make its first appearance when the self is explicitly referred to. I thank Katrien Schaubroeck (2018) for her illuminating remarks on this point. See also Dooremalen (2020).

  6. 6.

    Cited in Oosterom (2016).

  7. 7.

    Cited in Oosterom (2016). See also Eskens (2014).

  8. 8.

    In the following I shall not always say “other animals” or “animals other than human beings”.

  9. 9.

    Arluke (1990).

  10. 10.

    Sometimes ascribed to Fats Waller, sometimes to Louis Armstrong, as answer to the question: what is jazz?

  11. 11.

    Nagel (1974).

  12. 12.

    Indeed: whereas Lynne Bake defines personhood as having the capacity of a first-person perspective, Nagel defines consciousness as having a first-person point of view. I will return to this topic in Sect. 8.3.

  13. 13.

    Griffin (1992, p. 24).

  14. 14.

    An evolutionary biologist would never speak of a ladder going from low to high. There is no direction in evolution, certainly not from low to high, nor from simple to complex.

  15. 15.

    See for a first attempt Meijsing (1997). See also Meijsing (2006).

  16. 16.

    See e.g., Dennett (1978); Metzinger (2003).

  17. 17.

    Maturana and Varela (1973).

  18. 18.

    What I attempt to do here is to give an account of (self-)consciousness based on autopoietic embodiment. What is known in philosophical literature as autopoietic enactment or autopoietic embodiment is, although partly overlapping with this, mainly an attempt to account for cognition, and not (self-)consciousness, based on autopoiesis. See e.g., Di Paolo (2005), and Thompson (2007).

  19. 19.

    In Chap. 2 it was already mentioned that, according to Aristotle, all living creatures are characterized by a soul that is or takes care of metabolism.

  20. 20.

    See Chap. 4 on Ian Waterman, the man without proprioception.

  21. 21.

    See Chap. 3 on Damasio (1999, 2010).

  22. 22.

    See Campbell (1974).

  23. 23.

    Cf. Nagel (1986).

  24. 24.

    Gibson (1979, p. 8).

  25. 25.

    See also Neisser (1993).

  26. 26.

    See Gallup (1977); Lethmate and Drücker (1973); Povinelli (1987); Plotnik et al. (2006); Reiss (2011).

  27. 27.

    Gallup (1977).

  28. 28.

    Povinelli (1987).

  29. 29.

    Held and Bauer (1974).

  30. 30.

    Wemelsfelder (1993).

  31. 31.

    Kornhuber and Deecke (1965).

  32. 32.

    Wemelsfelder (1993).

  33. 33.

    Gibson (1979, p. 205).

  34. 34.

    Bermúdez (1998).

  35. 35.

    Damasio (1999, 2010).

  36. 36.

    Locke (1690, Book II, Chapter XXVII section 9).

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Meijsing, M. (2022). The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness. In: A Philosophy of Person and Identity. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_8

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