Abstract
It is often thought that being able to have I-thoughts is a definition of self-consciousness. But how can a creature develop such thoughts? In this chapter I will first show that using such a language-related definition of self-consciousness leads to a paradox: if that is what self-consciousness is, no one could ever come to be self-conscious. Then I will look at the question whether other animals than human beings have (self-)consciousness. I will sketch an evolutionary account of how living organisms might gradually acquire some form of consciousness and self-consciousness. In its most primitive form, life itself already means that there is a distinction between self and everything else, in that a living organism maintains its own organisation. In further steps towards a full-blown (self-)consciousness, the interplay between perception and movement will be crucial. More complex forms of perception reveal more aspects of the external world, but they are always already accompanied by an awareness of where the organism itself is, and what it can do in its surroundings. Thus, consciousness, as literally a point of view, is always at the same time self-consciousness. Consciousness and self-consciousness have developed gradually, and always hand in hand.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Bermúdez (1998).
- 2.
Thus, many philosophers are of the opinion that thinking always occurs in some kind of language; see e.g., Fodor (1975).
- 3.
Bermúdez (1998, p. 13).
- 4.
Impossible according to some people, but not according to others. See e.g., De Waal (1997).
- 5.
Still, there always remains the problem of self-reference in self-consciousness: a being with a sense of self refers to that very same self. But that sense of self is always present in living organisms as soon as there is consciousness; it is a form of mineness that accompanies all experience, as Damasio (1999, 2010) calls it. It does not make its first appearance when the self is explicitly referred to. I thank Katrien Schaubroeck (2018) for her illuminating remarks on this point. See also Dooremalen (2020).
- 6.
Cited in Oosterom (2016).
- 7.
- 8.
In the following I shall not always say “other animals” or “animals other than human beings”.
- 9.
Arluke (1990).
- 10.
Sometimes ascribed to Fats Waller, sometimes to Louis Armstrong, as answer to the question: what is jazz?
- 11.
Nagel (1974).
- 12.
Indeed: whereas Lynne Bake defines personhood as having the capacity of a first-person perspective, Nagel defines consciousness as having a first-person point of view. I will return to this topic in Sect. 8.3.
- 13.
Griffin (1992, p. 24).
- 14.
An evolutionary biologist would never speak of a ladder going from low to high. There is no direction in evolution, certainly not from low to high, nor from simple to complex.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Maturana and Varela (1973).
- 18.
What I attempt to do here is to give an account of (self-)consciousness based on autopoietic embodiment. What is known in philosophical literature as autopoietic enactment or autopoietic embodiment is, although partly overlapping with this, mainly an attempt to account for cognition, and not (self-)consciousness, based on autopoiesis. See e.g., Di Paolo (2005), and Thompson (2007).
- 19.
In Chap. 2 it was already mentioned that, according to Aristotle, all living creatures are characterized by a soul that is or takes care of metabolism.
- 20.
See Chap. 4 on Ian Waterman, the man without proprioception.
- 21.
- 22.
See Campbell (1974).
- 23.
Cf. Nagel (1986).
- 24.
Gibson (1979, p. 8).
- 25.
See also Neisser (1993).
- 26.
- 27.
Gallup (1977).
- 28.
Povinelli (1987).
- 29.
Held and Bauer (1974).
- 30.
Wemelsfelder (1993).
- 31.
Kornhuber and Deecke (1965).
- 32.
Wemelsfelder (1993).
- 33.
Gibson (1979, p. 205).
- 34.
Bermúdez (1998).
- 35.
- 36.
Locke (1690, Book II, Chapter XXVII section 9).
References
Arluke, Arnold. 1990. The Significance of Seeking the Animal’s Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 13–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0007713x.
Bermúdez, José Luis. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge MA/London: MIT Press.
Campbell, Donald T. 1974. Evolutionary Epistemology. In The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. P.A. Schilpp, 413–463. La Salle: Open Court.
Damasio, Antonio. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
———. 2010. Self Comes to Mind. Constructing the Conscious Brain. London: Penguin Cornerstone.
de Waal, Frans B.M. 1997. Good Natured. The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978. Where Am I? In Brainstorms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, ed. D.C. Dennett, 310–323. Hassocks: Harvester Press.
Di Paolo, Ezequiel A. 2005. Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4: 429–452. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y.
Dooremalen, Hans ed. 2020. Hier Ben Ik. Liber Amicorum voor Monica Meijsing [Here I Am. Liber Amicorum for Monica Meijsing]. Tilburg: Brave New Books
Eskens, Erno. 2014. Een beestachtige geschiedenis van de filosofie [A Beastly History of Philosophy]. Leusden: ISVW Uitgevers.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gallup, Gordon G., Jr. 1977. Self-Recognition in Primates. A Comparative Approach to the Bidirectional Properties of Consciousness. American Psychologist 32: 329–338. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.32.5.329.
Gibson, James J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Griffin, Donald R. 1992. Animal Minds. Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
Held, Richard, and J.A. Bauer. 1974. Development of Sensorially Guided Reaching in Infant Monkeys. Brain Research 71: 265–271.
Kornhuber, Hans H., and Lüder Deecke. 1965. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkürbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflügers Archiv für die Gesamte Physiologie des Menschen und der Tiere 284: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00412364.
Lethmate, Jürgen, and Gerti Drücker. 1973. Untersuchungen zum Selbsterkennen im Spiegel bei Orang-Utans und einigen anderen Affenarten. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 33: 248–269. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1439-0310.1973.tb02094.x.
Locke, John. 1690/1959. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Collated and Annotated by A. Campbell Fraser. New York: Dover Publications.
Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. 1973. Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living. In Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1980, ed. H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, vol. 42, 59–138. Boston: D. Reidel.
Meijsing, Monica. 1997. Awareness, Self-Awareness and Perception: An Essay On Animal Consciousness. In Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics. Perspectives from the Netherlands, ed. M. Dol, S. Kasanmoentalib, S. Lijmbach, E. Rivas, and R. van den Bos, 48–61. Assen: Van Gorcum.
———. 2006. The Development of the First-Person Perspective. A Gradualist Approach. Manuscrito, Revista Internacional de Filosofia 29 (2): 677–705.
Metzinger, Thomas. 2003. Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83: 435–451. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914.
———. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neisser, Ulric. 1993. The Self Perceived. In The Perceived Self. Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of Self-Knowledge, ed. Ulric Neisser, 3–21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oosterom, Rianne. 2016. Een olifant is ook maar (g)een mens (An Elephant Is Just (Not) a Human Being). Trouw, 18 Oct 2016.
Plotnik, Joshua M., Frans B.M. de Waal, and Diana Reiss. 2006. Self-Recognition in an Asian Elephant. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (45): 17053–17057. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0608062103.
Povinelli, Daniel J. 1987. Monkeys, Apes, Mirrors, and Minds: The Evolution of Self-Awareness in Primates. Human Evolution 2: 493–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02437424.
Reiss, Diana. 2011. The Dolphin in the Mirror: Exploring Dolphin Minds and Saving Dolphin Lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Schaubroeck, Katrien. 2018. Commentaar op hoofdstuk 8 van Waar was ik toen ik er niet was? (Commentary to Chapter 8 of Where Was I When I Wasn’t There?). Bij Nader Inzien, 22 Mar 2018. https://bijnaderinzien.com/2018/03/22/waar-was-ik-toen-ik-er-niet-was-deel-4-zelfbewustzijn/. Accessed 16 Feb 2022.
Thompson, Evan. 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wemelsfelder, Françoise. 1993. Animal Boredom. Towards an Empirical Approach of Animal Subjectivity. Leiden Dissertations.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Meijsing, M. (2022). The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness. In: A Philosophy of Person and Identity. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-09523-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-09524-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)