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Introduction

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A Philosophy of Person and Identity

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 21))

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Abstract

This chapter opens with an operation I had some time ago, under full anaesthetic. I was out of it, for the time being. This story sets the stage for the philosophical questions this book deals with: Where was I when I had no experiences? Was I really not there? What are we, exactly? When do we still exist and when no longer?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It may be that not everybody experiences the period of anaesthesia as completely non-existent; there may well be individual differences. A lovely example of someone who apparently had the same experience is this: in the music program Top 2000 a gogo, the Dutch Paralympics athlete Marlou van Rhijn, who had had to undergo many operations as a child, said that at the age of 11 she went into the operating theatre loudly singing the Beegees song Night Fever until the needle of the anaesthetics went in, and resumed singing exactly where she had left off the moment she regained consciousness (van Rhijn 2021). Apparently for her too there had been no time at all between the start of the period of unconsciousness and the end of it.

  2. 2.

    That does not alter the fact that there are people who, sincerely, claim that they do not exist or that they are dead. This is called Cotard’s syndrome; it is a syndrome that sometimes occurs in people who are extremely depressed.

  3. 3.

    Dennett (1991, p. 356).

  4. 4.

    Nagel 1974.

  5. 5.

    Dennett (1991, p. 359). Literally, he speaks of representations and not of impressions.

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Meijsing, M. (2022). Introduction. In: A Philosophy of Person and Identity. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_1

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