Keywords

1 Introduction: Critical Urban Theory

Cities have offered, over the last half century, attractive case studies for the social sciences, and more specifically for the analysis of ecological systems and statistical data. However, it is with the appearance of critical urban theory that the problems, challenges, and opportunities present in urban social reality have been conceptualized and contextualized with greater rigor.

Far from seeing the city as a mere container for social processes, we must understand that urban space is both an active part and result of disputes that have occurred and continue to occur within it. Critical urban theory (CUT), influenced by the Frankfurt School, shares this school’s philosophical criticism of the commodification of political and social institutions but transfers its analysis to a local scale. This is useful in terms of both interpreting and transforming society.

The radicality of this theory resides in the “right to the city” theorized by Lefebvre (1996), through which is expressed an ambition to move toward social justice (Fainstein, 2011). Marcuse (2007, 2012), within the framework of critical urban theory, proposes three major action strategies: exposure, proposal, and politicization. The first emphasizes in-depth analysis of problems, so that they can then be communicated to relevant social actors. In other words, this step involves diagnosing the causes of a problem and facilitating self-treatment. Second, through critical urban theory, strategies and real goals capable of addressing the fundamental causes previously identified should be proposed. Finally, a third step is linked to the politicization of the responses proposed to address the problem identified. This involves focusing on the activating discourses and elements that can weave together alternatives. Depending on the case, this can also involve mobilizing the media and even academia.

As we will see as the chapter progresses, CUT is an appropriate tool with which to understand the phenomena and dynamics that neoliberalism and capitalist urbanization produce in cities (Brenner, 2009a; Marcuse et al., 2014; Bossi, 2019). Below, we analyze the economic and political context in which Western cities find themselves. On the one hand, we see how the process of rescaling has brought cities to the fore, turning them into an important terrain of ideological dispute. On the other hand, we analyze the challenges and threats that neoliberalism and its global economic dynamics pose for urban democracy. Finally, we gather alternatives and new trends that are working toward the democratization of cities. Among these, from an integral perspective, it is worth studying the contributions of urban movements and participatory practices promoted by some local governments in the development of contemporary urban policy.

2 Rescaling and How Cities Became Central

As Brenner (1999) correctly points out, globalization is a process with a multiscale and multitemporal evolution. However, it is not until 1970 that, in the global West, new manifestations of statehood, including city networks, and the European Union itself, take on greater relevance in the global economic panorama. It is for this very reason that we affirm that globalization cannot be reduced exclusively to flows of people, goods, or capital in the world market. The loss of sovereignty experienced by national states through this process is undeniable (Wriston, 1992; Ohmae, 1995). That said, we attribute this hollowing out process to the very political and economic power of certain states. These states, through their state capacities and “selective” relational conditions, have allowed their own relative weakening in favor of the economic interests of capital (Jessop, 1990, 1994, 2016). We emphasize here the idea of “strategic selectivity” proposed by Jessop (1990, 1994, 2016), which is grounded in the Gramscian theory of the relational state. This is based on the fact that the modern state, whether on a local or national scale, does not always select its strategies rationally or according to an exclusively business logic. If we understand the state as a set of relations between institutions and/or social organizations, which have the function of defining and applying binding collective decisions in a specific territory, we then also understand that, due to power asymmetries that run through these, certain groups can access state authority more easily than others, thus favoring the implementation of some public policies over others (Telleria & Lekue, 2020).

The idea of rescaling thus refers to the transformation, or the appearance of a new balance of powers between different scales, which may be less stable, but probably more proportionate. Taking Europe as an example, we observe how states are being immersed in a dual process of rescaling (Sevilla Buitrago, 2017). On the one hand, we see how they have had to create new institutional frameworks and policies in order to reposition themselves within new forms of supranational government. On the other hand, they have granted new forms of governance at local levels, such as public-private partnerships (Harmes, 2006; Franquesa, 2007; Ahedo & Telleria, 2020), and are offering greater autonomy in terms of economic planning. Through this process, on the one hand, cities continue to agglomerate immobile infrastructure (energy sources, communication networks, business headquarters, etc.). On the other, states, who during Keynesian-Fordism were in charge of currency regulation, legislation, the provision of social welfare and the management of space on a large scale (Lefebvre, 1978: 298) cede, to some extent, this power at the local level.

In accordance with this logic, Sassen (1991, 1993) identifies cities as territorially specific urban places, in which production and reproduction processes decisive for globalization are carried out. Cities are nodes in the networks of the financial service industry and transnational companies.

Swyngedouw (1996, 1997), along the same lines, proposes the term “glocalization” with reference to the manifestation of global economic trends on a local scale. On the one hand, this implies a reconcentration of industry and population in urban areas, which brings about a differentiation of zones and cities which are more developed than others (even within a national territory). This is what Smith (1984) would call “uneven spatial development.” As we will see in the next section, this occurs as capitalist production processes develop in specific space-times. Capital establishes itself in a specific place and begins to generate profit, until reaching a point where, due to various issues – such as competitiveness – the rate of profit begins to decline below acceptable levels. At this moment, capital moves on in search of a more profitable place. This produces an imbalance between cities and territories. During the Fordist-Keynesian project, the state itself was in charge of compensating for these imbalances (Dunford & Kafkalas 1992; Brenner, 2003a, 2009b; Jessop, 2009).

On the other hand, the management and governance of cities is subject to the dominant economic policy, which implies a reduction of the welfare state, typically managed and implemented at the national level, and increased deregulation of fiscal responsibilities (Brenner, 2003a; Peck, 2012).

Thus, paradoxically, the aforementioned autonomy transferred from states to cities has a priori meant a reduction in autonomy overall. Soja (2000: 218) draws attention to this dynamic as follows: “The practices of daily life, the public domain of planning and governance, the formation of urban community and civil society, the processes of urban and regional economic development and change, the arena of urban politics, the constitution of the urban imaginary, and the way in which ‘the city’ is represented, are all increasingly affected by global influences and constraints, significantly reducing what might be called the conceptual autonomy of the urban.”

3 Scalar Instability: Neoliberalism in Cities

The restructuring of scale is part of a set of neoliberal strategies that are “deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution” (Brenner et al., 2011: 20). These regulatory phases are intrinsic to situationally specific processes of neoliberalism, that is, they are always specific to their place and time, as well as to different institutional structures inherited from local, national, or international states.

As stated by Brenner et al. (2010: 330), neoliberalism by definition “represents an historically specific, unevenly developed, hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring.” Peck and Tickell (1994: 322) also point out that the neoliberal alternative built from the crisis of Keynesian Fordism is highly unstable temporally and spatially: business cycles swing ever more violently, while localized growth seems increasingly fragile and short-lived.

Within the framework of critical urban theory, Harvey (2003, 2006) takes the Schumpeterian concept of Schöpferische Zerstörung or “creative destruction” to explain these booms and economic crises. For Smith himself (1984), who explained the phenomenon through “swing theory,” it is nothing more than the pendulum effect of capitalist exploitation. We base our own analysis on the idea of the codependency of capitalism on external markets identified by Luxemburg (1933). Observing the nature of capital, we understand that it will move to wherever the rate of profit is highest, developing those areas and underdeveloping those where the rate of profit is lower, or in decline. Contradictorily, it is this very development that reduces the high rate of profit. An increase in competitiveness, reduction of unemployment, increase in wages, the appearance of trade union organizations, and, in general, the regulation of production, reduce the return on capital (Jessop et al., 1999).

Capital, subsequently, moves on toward underdeveloped areas, exploiting the opportunities and higher rates of profit available. Thus, a back-and-forth movement takes place through the continuous migration of capital between developed and underdeveloped areas. Capital shifts from fixed to circulating capital and back again to fixed capital. This can happen at all spatial scales. However, Smith (1984) asserts that it is on the urban scale that this pattern has gone the furthest.

Creative destruction, then, serves to describe the geographically unequal, socially regressive, and politically volatile trajectory of institutional-spatial changes that have crystallized in the profound transformation of the institutional infrastructures on which Fordism-Keynesian was based, at all scales (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).

Following phases of socio-spatial destruction caused by deindustrialization and neoliberal crises, which have been characterized by offensives against organized labor, a reduction in and privatization of public services, and a criminalization of the urban poor, we are currently at a moment of construction of a phase of neoliberalism adapted to and guided by urban regeneration and business-oriented urban development (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015). In this context, the moments of creation identified by Brenner and Theodore (2002) in relation to six areas of regulation around which changes are orientated are interesting. These areas include: the wage relationship; inter-capitalist competition; financial and monetary regulation; forms of governance; international configurations and uneven spatial development. The moment of destruction in the wage relationship, for example, can be understood as the continuous attacks on organizations, union agreements, and collective bargaining agreements, and its analogous moment of creation would take the form of competitive deregulation, that is, the atomized renegotiation of working conditions.

At a global level, we do identify four categories of adaptations of neoliberalization that have been implemented by states (Jessop, 2002): pure neoliberalism, neo-corporatist, neo-statist, and neo-cumunitarianism. However, to approach the case of cities, we favor a different framework. Specifically, this is a temporal interpretation of the aforementioned dynamic of creative destruction in three phases (Brenner & Theodore, 2002): proto-neoliberalism, the neoliberalism of “cuts” (roll-back neoliberalism), and the neoliberalism of deployment (roll-out neoliberalism).

First of all, “proto-liberalism” refers to the emergence of the city as a battlefield. In the midst of economic restructuring, a moment in which a decline in industry provoked economic dislocations, the strategies adopted by cities promoted economic growth through deregulation initiatives. This occurred despite the fact that the sociopolitical agreements inherited from Fordism-Keynesian institutions based on redistribution were maintained. This was a time of instability and dispute between models, turning cities into battlefields. The refusal of the United States Federal Government, in coordination with the financial sector, to renegotiate New York City’s debt in the 1970s economically stifled an urban development model characterized by public employment and the wide provision of services. Above all, however, this act fulfilled its deterrent function for other cities in the following decades (Ahedo & Telleria, 2020).

Secondly, “cutbacks neoliberalism” makes reference to the withdrawal of states from government control of resources and the destruction of the welfare state. It is from 1980 onward that this begins to take shape in local administrations, through spending reduction formulas, with the ultimate aim of reducing spending in state administrations. In the same vein, fiscal austerity measures were also implemented, including the reduction of social benefits and wage cuts in the public sector. In many cities, “good practice” manuals were approved with the intention of promoting administrative efficiency and a favorable climate for what we would today call “business-oriented urbanism” or “entrepreneurial cities” (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997). More recently, linked to the financial crisis of 2008, austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012) has become the most common way of managing the financial restrictions affecting local governments.

In this context, a transition process in urban governance began. This process is more concerned with promoting a place and economic growth through public-private partnerships than with social welfare (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard, 1996). In this phase, city councils began to take on megalomaniac policies for large events and internationally competitive urban marketing emerged. Strategies connected the local with the global, all within the framework of interscalar competition between cities (Cox, 1993). On the other hand, cities also began to prioritize spaces within their own territories, through spectacular and attractive urban projects (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).

Thus, we arrive at a third phase: deployment neoliberalism. After the destructive period of cut-back neoliberalism, the so-called roll-out neoliberalism strengthened the patterns that urban entrepreneurship had experimented with. Once neoliberal modes of management have been normalized, there is a move toward depoliticizing the economy through technocrats. This is a reconstitution of the classical liberal project through the facilitating intervention of public institutions (especially state institutions). The truth is that local policies are made subservient to the interests of private capital. We are, therefore, witnessing an institutionally created neoliberal project (Jones & Ward, 2002).

Given these conditions, institutions, regardless of scale, have tried to regulate the system through what Jessop (1992) would call “institutional fixes.” Rejecting the idea that these arrangements have favored the welfare state characteristic of Keynesianism, Jessop points out that this has been replaced by the post-Fordist pattern of a Schumpeterian work state. In this sense, the state – local or national – strengthens its role in promoting competition (not only of national companies, but at all levels and sectors of the system of production). Institutional fixes, by means of patches of questionable durability, focus their efforts on fostering institutional innovation in order to promote the structural competitiveness of economies, by dismantling prior political frameworks through and for new models (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). This certainly results in maintaining and reproducing the new and old patterns of creative destruction, achieving stability in one area at the cost of instability in another (Jessop, 2016).

This said, it should be noted that institutional restructuring that occurs on an urban scale is mutable according to the moment of crisis and can also present points of weakness that can serve as windows of opportunity for the democratization of cities.Footnote 1

Given the above, we understand neoliberalism as a constant and emerging, as well as contradictory (Harvey, 2014), state strategy, which through deregulation and competition seeks to generate competitive advantages in specific places (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In other words, contrary to the strategies of pure neoliberalism (Jessop, 2002) such as austerity policies, privatizations, reduction of direct taxes, etc., current neoliberalism can be reinterpreted “as a contradictory practice of state intervention, which attempts to lead state institutions to dismantle regulatory restrictions, promote market-mediated forms of governance, and protect the interests of transnational corporations” (Brenner, 2003b).

4 The Democratizing Reform of Cities

At this point, it might seem that the discourse that there is no alternative has been successfully imposed. However, there are numerous experiences and processes that have aimed to reclaim the democratizing potential of cities in a global context. In this respect, we can see how, on the one hand, rescaling has brought the site of decision-making closer to cities. This does not mean that democratization has occurred, but it does imply a certain reduction in institutional infrastructure, which can facilitate a questioning of the urban neoliberal model, at least in a local context. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if neoliberalism itself has, at some point, opened a window of opportunity in which processes of transformation of reality can gain strength.

In the above contextualization, we have tried to present the dynamics and transformations that constitute the chaotic environment in which we find ourselves today. We believe that understanding this context is necessary in order to understand the challenges posed and identify opportunities to propose, regardless, more democratic alternatives in urban contexts.

First of all, we would like to bring to the fore a concept that, in a context where governance is made up of various actors, interest groups, and networks, can serve us as a control and coordination tool. “Colibration” is the term that Dunsire (1990, 1993) coined to refer to intervention in an existing balance between various figures. It refers to the implementation of control measures to tip the balance between two opposing positions and expressions. In this way, colibration as a tool of governance can serve, on the one hand, to identify which antagonistic forces and actors exist in a specific case and, on the other, to judge whether equilibrium or isostasy occurs in line with specific public policies. In addition, if necessary, it can facilitate intervention, not directed so much toward harmony, but rather to altering a possible imbalance in favor of the side or interests that need the most support (Dunsire, 1990: 17). Ultimately, it is about implementing control measures to tip the balance between two opposing positions and expressions.

This tool is fundamental for the recovery of the local autonomy of governments, since it tries to provide fundamental norms of governance, establishing some “rules of the game” that aim to promote collectively agreed goals (Jessop, 2016). That is to say, taking advantage of the privileged strategic position of the state or a local administration,Footnote 2 it aims to rearticulate both decision-making processes and the power of the actors who take part in these, in order to guarantee the democratic quality of governance. Ultimately, we return to a reflection on the idea of strategic selectivity mentioned above. Here, colibration can act as a barrier and firewall for certain sectors and also promote less favored sectors in relationship systems.

This is not only about promoting good governance from institutions, nor about monitoring it while disregarding the social fabric. It is about adjusting governance, making use of the “collaborative advantage” (Font, 1997) and making the government or local administrations vanguard actors that confront neoliberalization processes as they are expressed in the fragmented set of actors that constitute local governance. In short, we bring to the fore the idea that “colibration is a critique of political economy, forms of domination, and ideology” (Jessop, 2016: 229).

Second, we must emphasize the opportunities that participatory processes offer. In Western urban contexts, since the beginning of the millennium, participation, guided and directed by institutions as a means to legitimize projects and even strategies, has been an important topic of debate. Some perspectives reject it because of its top-down logic, while others view it as a possible loophole through which to take part in and find ways to implement more inclusive alternatives (García-Espín & Jimenez, 2017; Blanco et al., 2018).

Although colibration can function as a guarantor that the community fabric is part of public policy-making processes, it is necessary to go a step further and establish stable mechanisms of participation (Telleria & Ahedo, 2015). The aim of this is, on the one hand, to influence the urban agenda and, on the other to investigate the co-production of public policy.

This last concept of co-production (Parés, 2017; Arnanz et al., 2018; Osborne et al., 2016) is evolving into a proposal that goes beyond the implementation of participatory processes or mechanisms, and points toward a logic of “globally participated public policies” (Subirats et al., 2009). Contrary to classic interpretations (Rosentraub & Sharp, 1981), we consider that today co-production does not refer only to the spontaneous and strategic appearance of individuals or interest groups in relation to specific public services. Instead, it is better understood as a new tool – if not a new model – of governance that proposes collective participation as a fundamental axis on which to make decisions (Sorrentino et al., 2018; Nabatchi et al., 2017).

It is certainly an innovative tool, so far subject to little empirical study. However, due to its adaptive capacity in response to changes in power relations, it shows great potential. In fact, in recent years, facilitated by new municipalism, innovative experiences and processes have been witnessed from the point of view of deepening democracy in the following urban policies (Blanco & Subirats, 2012; Telleria, 2020): public space, housing, sustainability, and mobility. Despite the fact that these issues are not novel, the way of addressing them generates a substrate necessary to advance in the democratic reform of the cities. The so-called double legitimation is still yet to be achieved. This legitimization must occur “downward,” by social and popular sectors that defend this model (also at the polls), and upward. In this case, this means overcoming impediments at other levels of government that act against these processes of democratic deepening. These impediments include the imposition of spending ceilings and, as in the case of remunicipalization processes initiated by different cities in the Spanish State, through judicial implements. The judiciary fulfills in this area, with speed and efficiency, the function of protecting the private interests of large economic corporations against municipal policies that pursue the general interest, including the improvement of services, and even the reduction of public spending.

On the other hand, one of the main assets in the struggle to democratize cities is what Castells (1974) would call “urban social movements”Footnote 3 and participation by irruption, or spontaneous disruptive action from below.

When the master framework of urban movements changed (Telleria & Ahedo, 2016), these movements shifted, starting in the 1980s and 1990s, from demanding greater representative democracy and social/identity related rights, to demanding to be part of and embedded in institutional systems. After verifying the limits and resistance to change that the representative model offered, the master framework transformed, articulating discourses that vindicated participatory democracy and ultimately economic democracy, as the movements against evictions and the squatting movement have demonstrated (Martínez, 2011; Bonet i Martí, 2012; González García et al., 2019).

In this sense, the neoliberal instability that we have been discussing has meant that the moments of greatest impact of urban movements on the urban agenda have varied. Brenner et al. (2012: 18–19) claim that the transformative potential of collective action depends on two basic factors: “the objective position, power, and strategies of those currently established in positions of domination; and the objective position, power, and strategies of those who are mobilizing in opposition to established forms of urbanism.”

5 Conclusions: Toward Counter-Neoliberalization

We understand that the democratizing reform of cities depends on the conjunction of different forces and strategies that, from within and outside the state, are committed to supporting practices and projects that reinforce the participation of all sectors, especially those furthest removed from power. Linked to this reflection, we emphasize the importance of not isolating scales of action. As has been demonstrated, action oriented toward the same objective is essential. It is of little use to advocate for the radical democratization of urban spaces if the contradiction with the principles of global neoliberalism is not brought to the fore. Based on the strategic logic of critical urban theory, we have tried to illustrate the complex characteristics of today’s cities, as well as their potential to generate processes of democratic deepening in the current context of neoliberal intensification. Although, quantitatively, there have been many experiments in this area, contemporary reality is still very volatile and disconnected. It can be safely be said that there is still a long way to go before its consolidation, both in the social fabric and in local administrations, might enable it to serve as an effective tool in processes of counter-neoliberalization.

The abovementioned points toward a need for collective action to be oriented toward counter-liberalization, dismantling its inherited and rearticulated structures, constraining the market and developing new alternative frameworks. This means a move from disarticulated counter-liberalization based on local action, toward a stage of deep socialization in which neoliberalized normative regimes are dismantled (Brenner et al., 2010).

In this sense, the wave of protests and mobilizations in the spring of 2011, regardless of their different roots across different urban centers, represented a turning point from which to understand what Walliser and De la Fuente (2018) define as “new urban activisms.” This turning point for territorial collective action (it was a turning point for collective action in general within and outside the borders of the Spanish State), not only marked an increase or resurgence of mobilization, but it was also qualitatively expressed in other parameters. These mobilizations culminated, in many cases, with the institutionalization of the movement and the appearance of movement candidates and confluences in various cities. These have undoubtedly influenced and conditioned the urban agenda. Janoschka and Mota (2018) summarize the new lines of action on the urban agenda proposed by “City Councils for Change” as follows: (1) Stop predatory expansive urbanization. (2) Re-municipalize services privatized during previous administrations. (3) Recover public space. (4) Regenerate democracy through the implementation of new participatory mechanisms. The momentum generated by municipalism in the Spanish state has been able to raise issues and even carry out projects such as the remunicipalization of water in Valladolid, the achievement of sovereignty for the direct management of cleaning and rescue services in Cádiz, and the process of negotiation around and recovery of empty houses owned by banks for social housing, which occurred in Barcelona (Roth et al., 2019).

It should also be noted that, simultaneously, urban movements less linked to territory have resurfaced, including feminist or environmental movements. Transcending different scales, they are reactivating the effectiveness lost by the cycle of protests that made up the alterworld and global movements (Tarrow, 1998). These urban movements of “glocalized urban protests” (Köhler & Wissen, 2003; Martí i Costa & Bonet i Martí, 2008) continue to prosper and influence the urban and international agenda. They put very diverse issues on the table, including mobility, the reduction of harmful gas emissions at national and global levels, community defense against evictions, and a gender perspective in local public policies. In this sense, these movements can play an important role in a multi-scalar scenario such as the one we have described. Finally, despite the high degree of uncertainty generated by the COVID pandemic at the present time, there is evidence that shows (Atlas de la Pandemia en EspañaFootnote 4) that this dynamic of democratic deepening in urban contexts has been maintained and even intensified, through collective action and institutionalized mechanisms.