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Development Cooperation Through Maritime Silk Road: China’s Big Ambitions and Mixed Responses from Southeast Asia

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New Nationalisms and China's Belt and Road Initiative

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Abstract

Southeast Asia is a strategically important region for China’s Maritime Silk Road and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. As a signature foreign policy doctrine in the development domain, BRI has served China’s national economic and geopolitical interests of the “Chinese dream” and “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, while using economic statecraft and development diplomacy to promote a Chinese vision of “community with common destiny.” Nonetheless, this nationalist strategy has intensified great power and regional rivalries, as illustrated by competing initiatives from global and regional powers such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. Instead of fully engaging with BRI or siding with China’s rivalries, regional countries have favored hedging as a dominant strategy with some variations and shifts over time. This chapter examines BRI footprints and responses in the region of maritime Southeast Asia. Through case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, I demonstrate how foreign policy and domestic political considerations have shaped these countries’ responses to BRI. Changing ruling elite preferences, nationalist sentiments, and opposition politics have contributed to inconsistencies, reversals, and even renegotiations in BRI implementation across these countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, Chen (The Jakarta Post, 2022) argues that the primary determinant is changing domestic politics such as ruling elites’ priorities and preferences as well as domestic social responses, while external relational factors such as South China Sea disputes and U.S. policy towards Asia were secondary contributing factors. Wang (2022) proposes that variations in foreign policymaking styles and processes among Southeast Asian countries have resulted in different calculations of political and societal risks and therefore varying implications for Chinese-funded projects.

  2. 2.

    For CAFTA, China and ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement as early as 2002, followed by a series of sectoral agreements and a formal conclusion in 2010.

  3. 3.

    China also established a separate bilateral free trade agreement with Singapore in 2008, which builds on the China-ASEAN FTA and further liberalizes trade in goods. The China-ASEAN Expo, first proposed by then Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2003, has been held annually to promote trade under CAFTA.

  4. 4.

    At the multilateral front, China has expectedly enjoyed the largest voting power and subscription at the newly formed AIIB, though its ability to use the institution to reach its own foreign policy goals has so far been limited, considering AIIB is a multilateral regional development institution with more than 100 regional and non-regional members who are either donors or eligible recipients.

  5. 5.

    In 2013, Xi Jinping first introduced the BRI concept during his visit to Kazakhstan, where he proposed greater collaboration between China and Central Asia to build a “Silk Road Economic Belt.”

  6. 6.

    Between 2015 and 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission collaborated with the State Oceanic Administration to elaborate MSR directions through the Vision and Action Plan for Promoting Co-development of Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road and the Maritime Cooperation Proposal for Development of One Belt One Road.

  7. 7.

    In his speech at the University of Indonesia in 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken re-elaborated key points of FOIP including advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, defending the U.S.-led “rules-based order”, strengthening ties with regional countries, guaranteeing “ASEAN centrality”, and promoting “broad-based” prosperity through foreign direct investment, diplomacy, trade, while helping closing the gap on infrastructure (Blinken, 2021).

  8. 8.

    ADB estimated that ASEAN countries need roughly US$3 trillion in infrastructure investment between 2016 and 2030 (ADB, 2017). The Vision of ASEAN Connectivity 2025 also listed sustainable infrastructure, seamless logistics, and people mobility as its key priorities (ASEAN, 2022).

  9. 9.

    As Roy (2005) points out, Southeast Asian countries historically have been wary of Chinese domination, and they are more likely to engage in mixed strategies of hedging, soft balancing, and some economic engagement rather than bandwagoning.

  10. 10.

    Based on project analysis using Chinese development finance data from AidData (2021a, 2021b) and Custer et al. (2021). Some earlier infrastructure and connectivity projects include the 200 MW Jeneponto Coal-Fired Power Plant Construction Project which was constructed by a Chinese private firm and financed by $ the China Development Bank, and the National Air Bridge Project which was financed by a concessional loan from China EximBank.

  11. 11.

    China became Indonesia’s largest trading partner in 2013 and a top export destination, and accounts for more than 16% of Indonesian exports by 2020 (Herman, 2020). By 2020, China has also become one of the largest foreign investors in Indonesia, following Singapore and surpassing Japan (BKPM, 2022).

  12. 12.

    In the field of SSC, Indonesia has balanced between the principles of solidarity with Global South countries and pragmatist cooperation with Global North, by pursuing a new integrated framework of South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC).

  13. 13.

    According to AidData (2021a), Indonesia received US$9.54 billion in China’s official finance with diplomatic intent between 2000 and 2017. By contrast, Malaysia and Cambodia with smaller economic size received US$12.75 billion and US$8.64 billion, respectively.

  14. 14.

    Based on data from OECD (2022)and U.S. Department of State and USAID (2022). In 2020, Indonesia received US$200 million from the United States in ODA, compared to US$330 million received by the Philippines and US$67 million received by regional countries on average.

  15. 15.

    Based on OECD data, Indonesia’s top donors in ODA between 2018 and 2019 have been Germany, Japan, France, Australia, and the United States (OECD, 2022).

  16. 16.

    Malaysia has been an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Group of Seventy-Seven (G77), along with other groupings or coalitions of Global South countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2022). When Mao in China promoted communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, Malaysia’s first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman pursued a balancing strategy and relied on the West to counter the threat (C.-C. Kuik, 2015). Bilateral tensions later eased as Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and as China adopted reforms and open-up policy in 1978.

  17. 17.

    Despite its colonial history, Malaysia established diplomatic relations immediately with Japan after it gained independence from Britain in 1957.

  18. 18.

    Malaysia’s then Minister of International Trade and Industry Mustapha Mohamed proposed that ports in Malaysia such as Kuantan, Port Klang, Pinant, and Johor Port could all serve as important links for MSR (Asia News Monitor, 2014).

  19. 19.

    Kuik (2015) argues that the power asymmetry between the two countries is due to the enormous disparities in territory, population, and resources. This coupled with geographic proximity has forced Malaysia to adopt a pragmatic stance of acceptance towards China’s rising power. However, Kuik also argues that domestic politics, in particular ruling elites’ preferences, have also shaped bilateral relations as they seek to enhance their own political authority in the domestic arena.

  20. 20.

    In 2015, China and Malaysia held joint military drills named Peace and Friendship, which marked the first bilateral military exercise between China and an ASEAN country (Asia News Monitor, 2015).

  21. 21.

    According to Philippine Statistics Authority (2020b) data, China (including Hong Kong) ranks first as both the top exporting destination and importing country in 2020. When excluding Hong Kong, mainland China ranks first as importing country and third as exporting destination.

  22. 22.

    According to the National Economic and Development Authority, Japan has provided 36.44% of cumulative ODA to the Philippines, in comparison to China’s 2.02% and the United States’ 1.81% (NEDA, 2021). However, a key difference between the United States and other donors is that the United States provides ODA to the Philippines primarily in the form of grants, while Japan, Korea, and China have all prioritized the use of loans. The Philippines has also relied heavily on multilateral development finance through ADB, the World Bank, and more recently the China-led AIIB. Across multilateral donors, ADB ranks top with a 28.52% share of cumulative ODA to the Philippines, followed by World Bank with 20.97% and AIIB with 3.12%.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. California State University San Marcos, San Marcos, CA, USA

    Xiaoye She

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  1. Xiaoye She
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Correspondence to Xiaoye She .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université Côte d’Azur, Nice, France

    Julien Rajaoson

  2. University of Yaoundé II, Yaounde, Cameroon

    R. Mireille Manga Edimo

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She, X. (2022). Development Cooperation Through Maritime Silk Road: China’s Big Ambitions and Mixed Responses from Southeast Asia. In: Rajaoson, J., Edimo, R.M.M. (eds) New Nationalisms and China's Belt and Road Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08526-0_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08526-0_19

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-08525-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-08526-0

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