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Risk Modeling and Analysis

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IoT Supply Chain Security Risk Analysis and Mitigation

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Computer Science ((BRIEFSCOMPUTER))

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Abstract

Securing the supply chain of information and communications technology (ICT) has recently emerged as a critical concern for national security and integrity. With the proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their increasing role in controlling real world infrastructure, there is a need to analyze risks in networked systems beyond established security analyses. Existing methods in literature typically leverage attack and fault trees to analyze malicious activity and its impact. In this chapter, we develop a security risk assessment framework borrowing from system reliability theory to incorporate the supply chain. We also analyze the impact of grouping within suppliers that may pose hidden risks to the systems from malicious supply chain actors. The results show that the proposed analysis is able to reveal hidden threats posed to the IoT ecosystem from potential supplier collusion.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hierarchical decomposition refers to a process that takes a component in a system and considers it as a system in itself, returning subsystems and additional components.

  2. 2.

    In other words, given two dependencies a, b ∈ D, there may be some node x such that x ∈ Da and x ∈ Db. In such a case it would be invalid to compute ℓ(D) simply from the suppliers of a and b, denoted by sa and sb respectively, because sa and sb are not independent.

  3. 3.

    The precise legal relationships that may constitute a supplier group are left unspecified here, but may include ownership, partnership, or membership in joint ventures or cartels whether legally recognized or not.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. New York University, Brooklyn, USA

    Tim Kieras

  2. University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, USA

    Junaid Farooq

  3. New York University, Brooklyn, USA

    Quanyan Zhu

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  1. Tim Kieras
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Correspondence to Tim Kieras , Junaid Farooq or Quanyan Zhu .

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Kieras, T., Farooq, J., Zhu, Q. (2022). Risk Modeling and Analysis. In: IoT Supply Chain Security Risk Analysis and Mitigation. SpringerBriefs in Computer Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08480-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08480-5_2

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