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Malaysia-Singapore Geopolitics Spatialised: The Causeway as a Palimpsest

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Border Urbanism

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Abstract

While scholars in the region have extensively mapped research on Malaysia–Singapore relations, little has been stated about the participation of physical border landscapes in such geopolitics. The Causeway, a historic road and rail linkage between Singapore and Johor and the southernmost state in Peninsular Malaysia, serves as a case study to analyse the geopolitical landscape. The study elucidates research interests in governments’ relations and their impacts on everyday people's bordering process. The spatial transformations of the Causeway have been discussed in three phases, (i) namely the instigation of its checkpoints in 1967, (ii) its expansion in 1976–1989, and (iii) its partial transformation into a halved bridge in 2003. Until today, the Causeway's significance for people in Johor and Singapore remains, as evidenced by the massive volume of people and goods that traverse between the state capital and city-state daily. Moreover, economic and political developments are tangibly acted out in this border space and will continue to do so in years to come.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Tuas Link, completed in 1998, is the second land infrastructure that bridges industrial areas of Singapore and Johor.

  2. 2.

    The state of Johor, on behalf of Malaysia, is obligated to supply Singapore with water for 3 cents per 1000 gallons until 2061 under the 1960 and 1961 Water Agreements.

  3. 3.

    Before their separation, the Causeway was managed and maintained by the Johor Causeway Control Committee under a railway operator in British Malaya (Alphonso and Lau 2011).

  4. 4.

    While Malaysia’s UMNO favours prioritising Malay rights in its communal polity, Singapore’s PAP practises multiracial and meritocratic principles.

  5. 5.

    Iskandar Malaysia is an economic development project in Johor’s curtilage that saw substantial foreign direct investments into the state.

  6. 6.

    The ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, which had been governing Malaysia for 60 years since its independence in 1957, was defeated in the 2018 elections.

  7. 7.

    The RTS, a metro system to link Singapore and Johor Bahru, is projected to be completed in 2024.

  8. 8.

    In the 1970s, Malaysia was the leading exporter of raw materials, equipment, and machinery to Singapore (Abidin 2008). In 2016, Singapore was Malaysia’s top trading partner, while the latter was the former’s third largest (World Bank 2018a, b).

  9. 9.

    A short form for Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands began in 1989 as a complementary triadic agreement to make the sub-region more attractive for investors.

  10. 10.

    In comparison, 25,000 people and 50,000 vehicles enter the USA from Mexico through the border between San Diego and Tijuana (Khor 2017).

  11. 11.

    According to 2015 statistics from the Human Resource of Malaysia, approximately 350,000 non-permanent Malaysian residents work in Singapore (Malaysian Digest 2015).

  12. 12.

    These included the Communist Insurgency (1946–1960) and the Indonesian Landing (1964).

  13. 13.

    Then Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, likened the communist threat to “having a second Cuba in the region of Asia” (Mohamad 2015; King 1965b).

  14. 14.

    Of Malaya’s 6.2 million population, 49.8% were Malays, 37.1% Chinese, and 11.1% Indians (Federation of Malaya 1961). Singapore’s 1.4 million population was 13.6% Malays, 75.1% Chinese, and 8.6% Indians (Colony of Singapore 1959).

  15. 15.

    The period between August 1965 and June 1966 before Malaysia officially implemented immigration controls.

  16. 16.

    In the 1960s, people moved casually between Johor and Singapore for everyday activities, such as purchasing lottery tickets or having a quick meal.

  17. 17.

    In some cases, traders were unable to export goods to Singapore, even after paying tariffs (King 1965a).

  18. 18.

    Konfrontasi, marked by bombings and acts of subversions between Indonesia and Malaysia, was ignited by Indonesia’s protest against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.

  19. 19.

    Of 13,910 Malaysians crossing the Causeway daily in 1965, 10,300 were Johoreans (The Straits Times 1967e).

  20. 20.

    It was expanded in 1964, 1976, and 1989 to 1991 (Alphonso and Lau 2011).

  21. 21.

    This came several months after the Johor Chamber of Commerce, trade associations, and customs department proposed to enlarge or build a new Causeway (The Straits Times 1972a).

  22. 22.

    The number of vehicular lanes on the Causeway increased from three to six.

  23. 23.

    Between 1981 and 1991, Malaysia enjoyed a substantial increase in foreign investment of around US$1 billion per annum through Johor, much of which hailed from Singapore (Bhaskaran 2016).

  24. 24.

    In 1996 and 1998, Lee Kuan Yew criticised Malaysia’s affirmative action, remarking that it privileged Malays (Ooi 2008).

  25. 25.

    These include disputes over Singapore land occupied by the Malaysian Railway (KTM), the sovereignty of Pedra Branca, revised prices on water sales to Singapore, and the Singapore air force access to Johor airspace.

  26. 26.

    Via the Malaysia-Singapore Joint Ministerial Committee for Iskandar Malaysia (JMCIM) and the Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA), which administers state and private investments from Singapore.

  27. 27.

    Mahathir, who switched allegiance to Pakatan Harapan in April 2017, became Prime Minister for a second time.

  28. 28.

    Many development projects, either underway or approved, such as the greenlighted KL-Singapore high-speed rail link, have been halted pending a thorough review.

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Correspondence to Chiew Hui Tan .

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Tan, C.H., Chung, S. (2023). Malaysia-Singapore Geopolitics Spatialised: The Causeway as a Palimpsest. In: Zaman, Q.M., Hall, G.G. (eds) Border Urbanism. The Urban Book Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06604-7_9

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