Keywords

Does God intend that sin ever occur? We argue in this book, on the basis of the Christian Scriptures, for the affirmative answer.

1.1 The Reliability of the Scriptures

Let us begin by explaining our reliance on the Christian Scriptures. We are assuming here that the Christian Scriptures are consistent and depict God accurately. There is not space to argue for this assumption here. Even if our readers reject a high view of the accuracy of the Scriptures, our project should still be of interest, however, since if it is granted only that the testimony of the Scriptures carries some evidential force, then the passages we discuss should dispose the reader of the Scriptures to believe that God intends that sin occur. Finally, if they will not accept even that the Scriptures carry weak evidential force, they may still be interested to know, as a matter of literary inquiry, what the Scriptures do, in fact, teach, in our view.

1.2 Clarification of Terms

We now proceed to clarify our terms somewhat. We use the word ‘sin’ here to refer to a morally wrong action. We do not reserve it for the property of being sinful, or the aspect of an action in virtue of which it is sinful, or for only those wrong actions directed against God. Neither do we use it to refer to just anything that is morally evil: a disposition to steal might be evil or sinful, yet it is not a sin—a sin is an action, as we use the word here. We do not presuppose that every sin is serious, or equally important (cf. John 19:11), or performed knowingly or intentionally (cf. Leviticus 4:2). We assume that it is an objective matter whether an action is wrong, but this does not matter for our argument here. Our argument here makes no assumption concerning the nature of wrongness, or over whether it is constituted by God’s will. Nor do we make any assumption over whether the necessary conditions for an action’s being a sin are as incompatibilism has them or as compatibilism has them; that is, we take no stand here in the debate over the freedom of choice or freedom of the will.

1.3 The Meaning of ‘Intention’

We do not use the word ‘intend’ in a special technical sense, but have in mind the normal meaning. The exact nature of this normal meaning of the word ‘intend’ has been much debated by philosophers, but our argument does not appeal to specific controversial features of intention. We assume that intention is a mental state, but we do not attempt precisely to define which mental state. A key feature of intention, so it seems to us, is that it differs from mere foresight; it does not follow from the fact that some consequence is foreseen, even foreseen with certainty, that it is intended. For example, one can foresee with reasonable confidence that one’s walking in shoes will wear down the soles of one’s shoes, yet it does not follow that one intends that one wear down the soles of one’s shoes. Similarly, fighter pilots may foresee with a high degree of certainty that their aircraft will emit a sonic boom when travelling over the speed of sound, but it does not follow that they intend to make their aircraft emit a sonic boom. Occasionally one comes across the phrase ‘oblique intention’. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) seems to have introduced the phrase, and he writes:

A consequence, when it is intentional, may either be directly so, or only obliquely. It may be said to be directly or lineally intentional, when the prospect of producing it constituted one of the links in the chain of causes by which the person was determined to do the act. It may be said to be obliquely or collaterally intentional, when, although the consequence was in contemplation, and appeared likely to ensue in case of the act’s being performed, yet the prospect of producing such consequence did not constitute a link in the aforesaid chain. (Bentham 1789: 81)

We do not think that such a usage of ‘intentional’ is helpful, and we do not include ‘oblique intention’ when we use the word ‘intention’.

We think that the most precise locution is the verb ‘intends’ followed by ‘that’ and a sentential phrase. We think that this is more precise than using the adjective ‘intentional’ or ‘intended’ of a noun or noun phrase, or the adverb ‘intentionally’. Suppose that some officers of the law intend that they arrest Mr Hyde. It does not follow, we say, that the officers intend that they arrest Dr Jekyll, even though, since Mr Hyde is Dr Jekyll (we may assume), arresting Mr Hyde is the same thing as arresting Dr Jekyll. In other words, even though the sentence ‘the officers arrest Mr Hyde’ implies ‘the officers arrest Dr Jekyll’, we deny that the sentence ‘the officers intend that they arrest Mr Hyde’ implies ‘the officers intend that they arrest Dr Jekyll’. The reason for this is that the word ‘that’ creates what philosophers call ‘an opaque context’ (Quine 1960: §30) into which one cannot substitute equivalent terms such as ‘Mr Hyde’ and ‘Dr Jekyll’ (in this example). When we consider the adjective ‘intentional’, however, it does not seem as though an opaque context is created; it seems to us that the sentence ‘the arrest of Mr Hyde was intentional’ implies ‘the arrest of Dr Jekyll was intentional’, even if perhaps it was not intentional under the description ‘arrest of Dr Jekyll’. Similarly, when we consider the adverb ‘intentionally’, that does not seem to create an opaque context either; it seems to us that the sentence ‘the officers intentionally arrest Mr Hyde’ implies ‘the officers intentionally arrest Dr Jekyll’, even if they do not intentionally arrest him under the description ‘arrest of Dr Jekyll’. If the reader disagrees and thinks that these, along with ‘intends that’, do create opaque contexts then it will not matter for what follows. If the reader thinks, on the other hand, that ‘intends that’ does not create an opaque context, then that will make our task in what follows easier.

1.4 Does God Desire that Sin Occur?

We do not discuss here whether God desires or wants that sin occur. Some will say that it is possible to intend that something occur without desiring that it occur. Intending that one do something unpleasant, like going to the dentist, would be a possible example: arguably, one does not desire that one go to the dentist. Others will deny this, and insist that intending that something occur is just one way of desiring that it occur (cf. Davidson 1963, 1978, reprinted in 2001). We take no stand here on that. Our assertion here is, again, just that God intends that sin occur.

We do, however, affirm that God hates sin, and that it is abhorrent to him. (See, for instance, our discussion of Habakkuk 1:13 later in this book.) Again, we take no position on how one analyses the affective dimension to God’s nature, but we do affirm, at a minimum, that expressions such as ‘God hates sin’ should be warranted expressions for the Christian.

1.5 Willing, Decreeing, and Intending

Much of the older literature uses the word ‘wills’ or ‘decrees’ of God. We quote quite a lot of this literature below. It seems to us that the word ‘wills’ and the word ‘decrees’ in this context do mean the same as ‘intends’, but we prefer to avoid these words ourselves, as they seem to us less clear than ‘intends’.

1.6 The Distinction between Evil and the Existence of Evil

By the word ‘occur’, we mean simply ‘happen’ or ‘are done’. We do not mean to confine ourselves to whether God intends quite generally that sin occur, but also to take in, with respect to any particular sin that occurs, whether God intends quite particularly that it occur.

Traditionally, some have distinguished between evil and the existence of evil. Augustine of Hippo (354–430) was perhaps the first explicitly to draw this distinction:

Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is not a good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good. (Augustine 1887a: 267)

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) discusses the consequent distinction between intending/willing evil and intending/willing that evil exist or occur:Footnote 1

Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words ‘that evil should be or be done’. (Aquinas 1920: Ia.Q19.a9)

The coherence of this distinction has been vigorously rejected by many, for example by Jacobus/James Arminius (1560–1609):

For they distinguish between the fall and the event of the fall. […] They say that God willed that the fall should occur, but did not will the fall. […] The […] distinction is verbal, and not real. He, who willed that the fall should occur, willed also the fall. He who willed that the fall should occur, willed the event of the fall, and He, who willed the event of the fall, willed the fall. (Arminius 1853: 305)

You will not escape by the distinction that ‘it is one thing to will a thing per se, and another to will it as to the event,’ unless, by the ‘event’ of a thing, you understand that which results from the prolongation and the existence of the thing itself, which is not your sentiment. For you say that ‘God wills the event of sin,’ that is, ‘that sin should happen, but does not will sin itself;’ which distinction is absurd. For the essence of sin consists in the event, for sin consists in action. God, also, wills sin itself, in the mode in which He wills that sin should happen, and He wills that sin should happen in the mode in which He wills sin itself. He does not love sin per se. He wills that sin should happen for His own glory; He wills also sin for His own glory. I speak this in the sense used by yourself. Show, if you can, the difference, and I will acquiesce. (Arminius 1853: 385, punctuation original)

We do not commit ourselves to Augustine’s distinction, but our question is, in its terms, whether God wills that sin come to be—that it occurs—rather than whether God wills sin.

1.7 Can God Sin?

We take it for granted that God does not (and cannot) sin. And our arguing that God intends that sin occur should not be taken to offer anyone any encouragement to sin.

1.8 The Majority Report

Now, if there is a majority report among Christian philosophers and theologians over whether God intends that sin should occur, then it is probably in the negative. We believe the average lay Christian would also oppose the idea: ‘sins are surely’, we suspect they would say, ‘foreseen but unintended consequences of God’s activity’. We therefore swim against the tide, though, as we trust will become plain, we do not do so alone.

1.9 Augustine

We have already quoted Augustine on the distinction between evil and the existence of evil. Here is the full context of the quotation:

Nothing, therefore, happens but by the will of the Omnipotent, He either permitting it to be done, or Himself doing it. Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is good. Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is not a good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exists, is a good. For if it were not a good that evil should exist, its existence would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good,Footnote 2 who without doubt can as easily refuse to permit what He does not wish, as bring about what He does wish. (Augustine 1887a: 267)

Here Augustine talks about God’s permitting sin, but adds that God can refuse to permit what He does not wish. This suggests that God does, in a way, wish that evil exist.

Augustine continues a few chapters later in the Enchiridion:

These are the great works of the Lord, sought out according to all His pleasure, and so wisely sought out, that when the intelligent creation, both angelic and human, sinned, doing not His will but their own, He used the very will of the creature which was working in opposition to the Creator’s will as an instrument for carrying out His will, the supremely Good thus turning to good account even what is evil, to the condemnation of those whom in His justice He has predestined to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom in His mercy He has predestined to grace. For, as far as relates to their own consciousness, these creatures did what God wished not to be done: but in view of God’s omnipotence, they could in no wise effect their purpose. For in the very fact that they acted in opposition to His will, His will concerning them was fulfilled. And hence it is that ‘the works of the Lord are great, sought out according to all His pleasure,’ because in a way unspeakably strange and wonderful, even what is done in opposition to His will does not defeat His will. For it would not be done did He not permit it (and of course His permission is not unwilling, but willing); nor would a Good Being permit evil to be done only that in His omnipotence He can turn evil into good. (Augustine 1887a: 269)

In this case as well, it seems to us that Augustine thinks that God wishes that sin occur. Augustine continues:

For God accomplishes some of His purposes, which of course are all good, through the evil desires of wicked men: for example, it was through the wicked designs of the Jews, working out the good purpose of the Father, that Christ was slain and this event was so truly good, that when the Apostle Peter expressed his unwillingness that it should take place, he was designated Satan by Him who had come to be slain. How good seemed the intentions of the pious believers who were unwilling that Paul should go up to Jerusalem lest the evils which Agabus had foretold should there befall him! And yet it was God’s purpose that he should suffer these evils for preaching the faith of Christ, and thereby become a witness for Christ. And this purpose of His, which was good, God did not fulfill through the good counsels of the Christians, but through the evil counsels of the Jews; so that those who opposed His purpose were more truly His servants than those who were the willing instruments of its accomplishment. (Augustine 1887a: 270)

Augustine’s examples here seem clearly to be of sinful actions, yet are nevertheless, according to Augustine, intended by God: Augustine explicitly says that ‘it was God’s purpose’ that the contents of Agabus’s prophecy, that Paul should be sinfully bound by the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem, should come true. Finally, Augustine also says, recapitulating earlier pronouncements:

For in the very fact that they acted in opposition to His will, His will concerning them was fulfilled. And hence it is that ‘the works of the Lord are great, sought out according to all His pleasure,’ because in a way unspeakably strange and wonderful, even what is done in opposition to His will does not defeat His will. For it would not be done did He not permit it (and of course His permission is not unwilling, but willing); nor would a Good Being permit evil to be done only that in His omnipotence He can turn evil into good. (Augustine 1887a: 270)

The emphasis here of Augustine’s phrase ‘in the very fact’ is telling: the sinful opposition to God’s will is, Augustine says, what fulfils his will, that is, was in some sense willed by God himself. Augustine is clearest, however, in his On Grace and Free Will concerning Shimei son of Gera:

He inclined the man’s will, which had become debased by his own perverseness, to commit this sin, by His own just and secret judgment. (Augustine 1887b: 461)

In the chapter after that one, Augustine writes:

God stirs up enemies to devastate the countries which He adjudges deserving of such chastisement. […] For the Almighty sets in motion even in the innermost hearts of men the movement of their will, so that He does through their agency whatsoever He wishes to perform through them—even He who knows not how to will anything in unrighteousness. (Augustine 1887b: 462)

Finally, in the chapter after that, Augustine states:

[I]t is, I think, sufficiently clear that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills wherever He wills, whether to good deeds according to His mercy, or to evil after their own deserts. (Augustine 1887b: 463)

1.10 Aquinas and the Mediaevals

We have already mentioned that Aquinas quotes in his Summa Theologiae Augustine’s distinction between evil and the existence of evil. In a response in the same article, Aquinas states:

God […] neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done. (Aquinas 1920: Ia.Q19.a9.ad3)

There are, however, odd statements in the mediaeval period to the effect that God intends that sin occur:

For it is clear that God acts in the hearts of human beings inclining their wills whithersoever he wishes, either to goods out of his mercy, or to evils because they deserve it. (Lombard 1880: 1332A)Footnote 3

1.11 Martin Luther

Aquinas’s view above has largely defined the Roman-Catholic response to our question whether God intends that sin occur, but on the Protestant side there has been a more mixed response. Martin Luther (1483–1546) seems to have held that God intended that people should sin:

God works evil in us, i. e., by means of us, not through any fault of his, but owing to our faultiness, since we are by nature evil and he is good; but as he carries us along by his own activity in accordance with the nature of his omnipotence, good as he is himself he cannot help but do evil with an evil instrument, though he makes good use of this evil in accordance with his wisdom for his own glory and our salvation. In this way he finds the will of Satan evil, not because he creates it so, but because it has become evil through God’s deserting it and Satan’s sinning; and taking hold of it in the course of his working he moves it in whatever direction he pleases. […] But why does he not at the same time change the evil wills that he moves? This belongs to the secrets of his majesty, where his judgments are incomprehensible [Rom. 11:33]. It is not our business to ask this question, but to adore these mysteries. […] The same must be said to those who ask why he permitted Adam to fall, and why he creates us all infected with the same sin, when he could either have preserved him or created us from another stock or from a seed which he had first purged. He is God, and for his will there is no cause or reason that can be laid down as a rule or measure for it[.] (Luther 1957: 94–95)

This approach has not been maintained by the Lutheran tradition more generally, however. The 1685 Theologia Didactico-Polemica of J. A. Quenstedt (1617–1688) is cited by Heinrich Schmid (1811–1885):

God indeed permits, but He does not will, that which is permitted, which occurs […] while He does not will it. (Schmid 1899: 189)

1.12 John Calvin

The Reformed tradition has been split on this question. John Calvin (1509–1564) held that God indeed did intend that sin occur:

God wills that the perfidious Ahab should be deceived; the devil offers his agency for that purpose, and is sent with a definite command to be a lying spirit in the mouth of all the prophets (2 Kings 22:20). If the blinding and infatuation of Ahab is a judgment from God, the fiction of bare permission is at an end; for it would be ridiculous for a judge only to permit, and not also to decree, what he wishes to be done at the very time that he commits the execution of it to his ministers. (Calvin 1846: 199)

It offends the ears of some, when it is said God willed this fall; but what else, I pray, is the permission of Him, who has the power of preventing, and in whose hand the whole matter is placed, but his will? (Calvin 1847: 144)

1.13 The Reformed Tradition in Opposition

On the other hand, many that have followed Calvin in almost every other respect have diverged from him here. For example, Francis Turretin (1623–1687), a representative of the ‘high orthodoxy’ of Calvinism, states:

God, therefore, properly does not will sin to be done, but only wills to permit it. (Turretin 1992: I.517)

We have already had cause to quote Jacobus Arminius, against whose work the ‘high orthodoxy’ of Calvinism was a reaction. Arminius not only rejected the distinction between sin and its occurrence, but was emphatic that God did not intend that sin occur:

God voluntarily permits sin; therefore, He neither wills that sin should happen, nor wills that it should not happen. (Arminius 1853: 396)

In Great Britain, several of the Puritans followed this line. One example is Richard Baxter (1615–1691):

God neither willeth that it shall be, (because it is sin) nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be. (Baxter 1675: II.10)

Another example is Stephen Charnock (1628–1680):

He [God] never said, Let there be sin under the heaven. (Charnock 1853: II.147)

Richard A. Muller (1948–) says the same when summarizing the Reformed tradition:

God does not will positively that sins occur. (Muller 1985: 222)

1.14 The Reformed Tradition in Agreement

As indicated, there have, however, been thinkers in the Reformed tradition that have affirmed that God does intend that sin occur. Jerome Zanchius (1516–1590), as interpreted by Augustus Montague Toplady (1740–1778), states:

From what has been laid down, it follows that Augustine, Luther, Bucer, the scholastic divines, and other learned writers are not to be blamed for asserting that ‘God may in some sense be said to will the being and commission of sin.’ For, was this contrary to His determining will of permission, either He would not be omnipotent, or sin could have no place in the world; but He is omnipotent, and sin has a place in the world, which it could not have if God willed otherwise; for who hath resisted His will? […] to say that He willeth sin doth not in the least detract from the holiness and rectitude of His nature. (Zanchius 2001: 21)

Within the movement of ‘high orthodoxy’ in Reformed scholasticism, Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) wrote:

Either God willed sin, or he nilled it, or he neither nilled it nor willed it. He cannot be said to have nilled it, because if he had nilled it, then it would not have existed. And it is not the case that he neither nilled it nor willed it because those things are of no concern to him that he neither wills nor nills, which would mean that sin would be outside the providence of God; for the concern of God and the providence of God are one and the same […] It follows that he willed it, although as we said, with a willing permission, not efficaciously. (Van Asselt 2011: 236)

Within the Puritan movement, William Perkins (1558–1602) is one of those that affirm that God intends that sin occur:

God willed the fall of Adam, yet not simplie but onely that it should come to passe. (Perkins 1606: 37)

Paul Bayne (c.1573–1617) is another:

As God willed that sin should be, so he willed that it should be by the will of man freely obeying the seducing suggestion of the Devil[.] (Bayne 1658: 76)

Somewhat later is William Tucker (1731–1814), who states:

Sin, or moral evil, is no accidental thing, but a wise and holy ordination of God. […] Sin could not have existence, without, or contrary to the divine will: its being, must be the consequent of the divine purpose. This appears demonstrable, from the infinite wisdom and unlimited power of God, by which He might, with the most perfect ease, have prevented its being; from its increase, and the extensive spread of its dire effects, when God could have stopped its progress in a moment, at any period of time, had it been his pleasure […] These things, among others, indubitably prove, that the being of moral evil was a certain consequence of the divine purpose. […] God, did eternally will the existence of moral evil. […] It is certain, then, that the existence of sin was the ordination of the divine will[.] (Tucker 1835: 102, 107–109)

Within North America, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is another example:

I believe, there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best […] that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. (Edwards 1957: 407–408)

1.15 The New-England Theologians

The New-England divinity—the movement in theology that took its inspiration from the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards—gives very explicit affirmations to the effect that God intends that sin occur.

Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803) in his System of Doctrines, first published in 1793, says that he sees no difference between God’s providential operation in bringing it about that good deeds occur and his providential operation in bringing it about that evil deeds occur:

According to divine revelation, God superintends, orders, and directs in all the actions of men, and in every instance of sin; so that his hand and agency is to be seen and acknowledged in men’s sinful actions and the events depending on them, as really and as much as in any events and actions whatever. (Hopkins 1854: 110)

If God has such control over sin, why would God bring it about? Hopkins writes:

It is abundantly evident and demonstrably certain from reason, assisted by divine revelation, that all the sin and sufferings which have taken place, or ever will, are necessary for the greatest good of the universe, and to answer the wisest and best ends, and therefore must be included in the best, most wise, and perfect plan. (Hopkins 1854: 90–91)

Joseph Bellamy (1719–1790) is useful for offering us more concrete considerations on what the New-England theologians took the good ends to be for the sake of which God intends that sin occur. His work The Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin (1760) is his own contribution to the topic of our theme, and there he writes:

If [Satan] hoped to bring our glorious Monarch into contempt in his dominions, among his creatures, he is disappointed; for God is more loved, honored, revered, extolled, and praised, than if these things had never happened. If he hoped to lessen his authority, and bring his law into contempt, that it should be looked upon a light matter to transgress, he is in this also disappointed; for never would it have appeared so infinitely heinous, and so shockingly dreadful a thing to transgress, if these things had never happened. Or if he hoped, at least, that the execution of divine vengeance would lessen the manifestations of divine goodness, and diminish the happiness of the intellectual system, he is also disappointed in this; for God has shown his wrath in such a manner as to render the riches of his glorious grace infinitely the more conspicuous in the sight of all the inhabitants of heaven; and their love and joy arise unspeakably higher than if these things had never happened. Yea, all things have worked for good, and turned out well. His pride has been the means of a great increase of humility among finite intelligences, as it has led them to see what they might have come to if left of God. His fall has been the means of our confirmation; his ingratitude, of our being forever the more sensible of the rich goodness of God; his setting up to be independent, the means to bring us to a more absolute and entire dependence on God, the only immutable being; and his aiming at supremacy, seducing mankind, and raising all this confusion in the system, has occasioned the Almighty to assert his supremacy, and set his own Son at the head of the creation, and in him to bring all things to an everlasting establishment, in a way most honorable to God, and the most advantageous to the system. So that he is disappointed in every respect. He meant all for evil; but lo, God meant all for good, to bring to pass as it is at this day. (Bellamy 1853: 78–79)

Bellamy thinks that God designed not just the permission of sin, but its occurrence too, for the benefits that accrue to God and saved humanity, benefits that couldn’t logically have happened without sin’s occurring.

Nathaniel Emmons (1745–1840), like Hopkins, writes frankly in a sermon entitled ‘Human and Divine Agency Inseparably Connected’:

[I]t is equally important that all the actions of both saints and sinners should be ascribed to the divine agency. […] [W]e find the exercises and conduct of sinners, by which they are formed for destruction, ascribed to the operation of God upon their hearts. (Emmons 1842: 368–369)

Building on this, he goes on to say:

If the actions of men may be ascribed to God as well as to themselves, then God will be glorified by all their conduct. Whether they have a good or bad intention in acting, God has always a good design in causing them to act in the manner they do. Joseph had a good design in visiting his brethren, and in conducting with propriety under both the smiles and frowns of providence; and God had a good design in guiding the motions of his heart and the actions of his life. So that God will be for ever glorified by the life and conduct of Joseph. Joseph’s brethren had a malevolent intention in abusing him and finally selling him into Egypt; but God had a good design in both foretelling and guiding their wicked actions. So that God will be glorified by all their conduct. And since God equally governs all the actions of all men, whether good or bad, he must be glorified by the conduct of the whole human race. All the wrath, all the malice, all the revenge, all the injustice, and all the selfishness, as well as all the benevolence of mankind, must finally praise him, or serve to display the beauty and glory of his character. His intention and his agency, which always go before theirs, and which is always wise and benevolent, turns all their conduct to his own glory. At the great and last day, when all human hearts shall be unfolded, and all human conduct displayed, the hand and counsel of God will appear in all, and shine the brighter by every act of disobedience and rebellion in his creatures. Their bad intentions will be a foil, to display the glory of God to the best advantage. (Emmons 1842: 373–374)

In another sermon, ‘The Agency of God Universal’, Emmons makes it clear how readily he believes God will use sinful actions as his means:

[God] perfectly knows his own designs, and the best means to accomplish them; and he has all means and second causes in his hand, which he will certainly employ to answer his own purposes. When he has occasion to form light, he will form light; when he has occasion to create darkness, he will create it; when he has occasion to make peace, he will make it; when he has occasion to create evil, he will create it; and he is constantly doing all these things according to the counsel of his own will, and for the accomplishment of his own purposes. (Emmons 1842: 387)

We therefore see in the New-England Theologians an enthusiastic agreement with the assertion that God intends that sin occur.

1.16 Recent Reformed Perspectives

Benjamin B Warfield (1851–1921) of Princeton writes uncompromisingly:

That the ‘will of God includes the fall of the first man,’ no Calvinist (be he Supralapsarian, Sublapsarian, Post-redemptionist, Amyraldian, Pajonist) either doubts or can doubt. No Theist, clear in his theism, can doubt it. (Warfield 2000: 113, fn 81)

It should be noted that Warfield writes ‘the fall’, not ‘the permission of the fall’.

Among more recent authors, A. W. Pink (1886–1952) argues:

Clearly it was the divine will that sin should enter this world, or it would not have done so. God had the power to prevent it. Nothing ever comes to pass except what He has decreed. (Pink 1964: 207)

John Piper (1946–) states:

God wills that sin come to pass (for example, the murder of his Son, Acts 4:27–28, Isa 53:10). (Piper 2008: 234)

On the other hand, John Benson of Ardwick wrote in 1836 a whole book against the idea, The Revival and Rejection of an Old Traditional Heresy (Benson 1836).

In what follows, we defend the view put forward by Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Maccovius, Perkins, Baine, Edwards, Tucker, the New-England Theologians, Pink, and Piper against the opposite view, defended by Aquinas, Baxter, Turretin, Arminius, Quenstedt, Charnock, and Benson that God does not, and cannot, intend that sin occur.