Abstract
The chapter focuses on emancipation theory in Bourdieu and Marx and discusses the Bourdieusian criticism of the Marxian perspective. At the core of Bourdieu’s theoretical and empirical work stands the analysis of the nature of domination and the mechanisms by which it reproduces social structures and makes them acceptable. The role played by the habitus and the body becomes increasingly central in Bourdieu’s theory of domination and is pivotal in the notion of symbolic violence. Therein we see Bourdieu’s radical anti-intellectualism. However, surprisingly, the body—and the concrete dominated subjects—disappear in his (rare) texts on the emancipation process, the achievement of which is assigned to discursive practices. More surprisingly, Bourdieu puts Marx in the dock , charging his philosophy of praxis with intellectualism. If we look at the theory of praxis which Marx develops at least from Theses on Feuerbach onwards, when he breaks with the idealist conception of the philosophical criticism and begins to develop a thought aimed at defining the features of a theory of practical transformation of the world, we realise that the Bourdieusian criticism is groundless. For Marx, emancipatory proletarian praxis is a dialectical relationship between the self-transformation of proletarians and the transformation of the objective circumstances. The consciousness—the target of Bourdieusian polemic against Marx—is not a set of dispositions which is in the order of representations alone, detached from effectiveness of practices, as Bourdieu claims. It is a mediation between the misery of proletarian life and praxis. The emancipation from unfreedom is a self-liberation, and the consciousness is interwoven with the proletarian praxis. Although both Bourdieu and Marx embark from similar criticism to intellectualism, they reach different outcomes. While Marx’s criticism turns into revolutionary praxis, in Bourdieu it remains anchored to the scientific rationality of discourse.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
“The ‘mentalist’ vision, which is inseparable from belief in the dualism of mind and body, spirit and matter, originates from an almost anatomical and therefore typically scholastic viewpoint on the body from outside. […] Intellectualism, the scholastic spectator’s theory of knowledge, is thus led to ask of the body, or about the body, problems of knowledge” (Bourdieu 2000: 133).
- 2.
The subtitle of the 1997 first edition speaks of Éléments pour une philosophie negative. We could be inclined to see it also as a reference to Adorno’s negative philosophy.
- 3.
In this regard, some have sought—not without foundation—to identify a significant similarity with the classical phase of Frankfurt School critical philosophy. See, among others, Bauer et al. (2014).
- 4.
For instance, in Pascalian Meditations: “One has to construct a materialist theory which (in accordance with the wish that Marx expressed in the Theses on Feuerbach) is capable of taking back from idealism the ‘active side’ of practical knowledge that the materialist tradition has abandoned to it. This is precisely the function of the notion of habitus which restores to the agent a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying power” (Bourdieu 2000: 136). References to these Theses of Marx’s are scattered across many of Bourdieu’s writings: see, for instance, Bourdieu (1977: vi; 1992: 52). On this question, see Macherey (2008) and Denunzio (2013).
- 5.
As highlighted by Iordanis Marcoulatos: “They both see embodied significance—in the form of the multifaceted actuality of the lived body—as the mediating ground between these theoretical divisions; the experience of the lived body is the de facto dissolution of the subject/object dichotomy which is the key target in the work of both thinkers” (Marcoulatos 2001:1).
- 6.
On this aspect, little addressed by the critical literature on Bourdieu, I take the liberty of referring the reader to my own, Paolucci (2017).
- 7.
Bourdieu dedicated his lectures at the Collège de France from 1989 to 1992 to an analysis of the state (Bourdieu 2014).
- 8.
One of the most exhaustive definitions of the concept of “symbolic violence” appears in Pascalian Meditations: “Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications which their social being is the product” (Bourdieu 2000: 170). For an analysis of this notion—one of Bourdieu’s most original and striking—I take the liberty of referring the reader to my own, Paolucci (2010). See also: Addi (2001); Bauer et al. [eds.] (2014); Mauger (2005); Terray (2002); Weininger (2002).
- 9.
Here the reference to John Austin is explicit. In fact, the English linguist is a constant presence in Bourdieu’s work, though the sociologist also notes that one of Austin’s limits is his failure to consider the social conditions in which performative utterances take place. See Austin (1962).
- 10.
Pierre Macherey highlights this blind spot of Bourdieusian theory when he observes: “Does the sociologist […] not perhaps run the risk of returning to the position of the scholastic spectator, who looks at the world from the other side of the glass, as if he too were in another world—a world without burdens and constraints in which the pure reflexive consciousness of necessity reigns? […] It is hard to see how sociology, which disposes of the means to tell the world as it is, can, beyond this observation, contribute to its transformation and thus have—a point which Bourdieu never desists from—an authentically liberating vocation simply by linking the explanation of the world to its transformation” (Macherey 2014: 63–64).
- 11.
For a critical reflection on this aspect of Bourdieu’s thought, see Butler (1997).
- 12.
The fact that Bourdieu’s polemic does not tell us which Marxian sources he is referring to, and indeed often refers to Marx and Marxism indiscriminately, makes it rather difficult to reply to this.
- 13.
These are not the only passages in which Bourdieu polemicises with Marx on the subject of consciousness (and “becoming-conscious”), for there are also others. See, for example, the essay “Culture and Politics” (included in Sociology in Question), where Bourdieu accuses Marx of having addressed the problem of class consciousness as a theory of knowledge, and not as a question pertaining to the deep dispositions of the body: “From the very beginning, in Marx himself, the problem of the awakening of class consciousness has been posed rather as philosophers pose the problem of the theory of knowledge. I think that what I’ve said this evening helps to pose the problem rather more realistically in the form of the problem of the shift from the deep-seated, corporeal dispositions in which a class lives without articulating itself as such, to modes of expression both verbal and non-verbal (such as demonstrations)” (Bourdieu 1993a: 167). In another essay included in this same volume, “Strikes and Political Action,” Bourdieu writes “The notion of the awakening of consciousness may be defined in maximalist or minimalist terms: is it a question of sufficient consciousness to be able to think and express the situation (the problem of the dispossession and reappropriation of the means of expression) and to organize and direct the struggle, or merely of sufficient consciousness to delegate these functions to apparatuses capable of fulfilling them in the best interests of the delegators (fides implicita)? In fact, this way of posing the problem is typically intellectualist: it’s the approach that comes most naturally to intellectuals and also the one that most conforms to the interests of intellectuals, since it makes them the indispensable mediation between the proletariat and its revolutionary truth. In fact, as Thompson has often shown, class consciousness and revolt can spring from processes that have nothing to do with the kind of revolutionary cogito that intellectuals imagine […]. If one accepts, as some texts by Marx suggest, that language can be identified with consciousness, then raising the question of class consciousness amounts to asking what apparatus of perception and expression the working class has in order to understand and speak of its condition” (1993b: 175–176).
- 14.
In a well-known passage in the Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu made explicit the reasons why he had dropped the notion of ideology: “If I have little by little come to shun the use of the word ‘ideology’, is not only because of its polysemy and the resulting ambiguities. It is above all because, by evoking the order of ideas, and of action by ideas and on ideas, it inclines one to forget one of the most powerful mechanisms of the maintenance of the symbolic order, the two fold naturalization which results from the inscription of the social in things and in bodies […] with the resulting effects of symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 2000: 181).
- 15.
It is worth pointing out that the Marxian term “die Praxis” simply means “practice,” and not in the sense of putting theory into practice, or its application. When Marx juxtaposes “die Theorie” and “die Praxis,” as he does in his Theses on Feuerbach, he does so in order to give meaning to practice conceived in a new way (as we shall see further on).
- 16.
“The critique of political economy,” Emmanuel Renault notes, “is the fulfilment of the Marxian historicisation of critique. It presupposes the historicisation of the theme of critique (it is not an external critique, but an internal critique that exposes the contradictions of capitalism), the historicisation of the form of the critique (Capital exposes the truth of its object, while also proceeding to examine the historical conditions of the validity of this exposition), and the historicisation of its object (which is no longer religion or politics, but the level of real history: the economy)” (Renault 1995).
- 17.
The same volume of MECW also includes the seven notebooks (Marx 1975b). Here it is not my intention to enter into the merits of the debate that has arisen around Marx’s doctoral dissertation and its relationship with his later works. We need only mention the fact that one part of the critical debate (today in the minority) has advocated an interpretation according to which the materialist conception of history is already present in nuce in this youthful text. Among those who have fed the discussion, it is worth mentioning: Löwith (1964), Dal Pra (1965), Cornu (1955–58), Rossi (1963, 1977), Cingoli (1981), Löwy (2002) and, more recently, Tomba (2011) and Musto (2011).
- 18.
Massimiliano Tomba points out that at this point, Marx fully subscribed to Bauer’s perspective, according to whom, as he wrote to Marx on March 31, 1841, “theory is the strongest praxis.” Different is the perspective of Karl Löwith; he believes he can discern, already in this early text, the affirmation of “a new kind of philosophy” according to which “the liberation of the world from non-philosophy is at the same time the liberation of non-philosophy from philosophy. […] Through the realization of reason in the real world, philosophy as such is suspended, enters into the practice of existing non-philosophy. Philosophy has become Marxism, an immediately practical theory. Therefore, Marx is forced to attack in two directions: against the real world, and against existing philosophy. This is so because he seeks to unite both in an all-inclusive totality of theory and practice. His theory can become practical as criticism of what exists, as a critical differentiation between reality and idea, between essence and existence. In the form of such criticism, his theory prepares the way for practical changes” (Löwith 1964: 95).
- 19.
Mario Rossi does not believe that we can observe the materialist conception of history in nuce already in these early texts. Indeed, he openly polemicises against those who lean towards such an interpretation (such as the aforementioned Cornu and Löwith). Above all examining the texts that accompanied the Dissertation, Rossi instead highlights that here we have “a body of critical observations and reflections in which … the young philosopher documents his position, which—contrary to what it would appear from the Dissertation—is a position of crisis and intense problematicity” (Rossi 1963: 561).
- 20.
According to Löwith (1964), conversely, this perspective is already fully developed in these early pages.
- 21.
Henri Lefebvre observes, in this regard: “The works of Marx’s youth, which have too often been taken, and are still taken, as ‘philosophical works’, contain precisely this radical critique. Philosophy must be superseded. It realizes itself by superseding itself and abolishes itself by realizing itself. The becoming-philosophy of the world gives way to the becoming-world of philosophy, revolutionary realization and superseding of philosophy as such. Each philosophical notion, inasmuch as it enters into the ‘real’ (into praxis), becomes world, it is accomplished. Inasmuch as it is accomplished, every philosophy is superseded” (Lefebvre 2000: 62–63).
- 22.
- 23.
In the context of a discussion on the contents and aims of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx affirms the need for philosophy to shift the terrain of intervention, and to descend—in a Feuerbachian manner—from heaven to earth and grapple with the real world: “Now philosophy has become mundane, and the most striking proof of this is that philosophical consciousness itself has been drawn into the torment of the struggle, not only externally but also internally. But, if constructing the future and settling everything for all times are not our affair, it is all the more clear what we have to accomplish at present: I am referring to ruthless criticism of all that exists, ruthless both in the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict with the powers that be” (Marx 1975f: 142). It would not be out of place to see, in these words, an anticipation of the eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach. On this theme, see D. Bensaïd (1995).
- 24.
Quotation translated from German by the author. The Korsch’s text Der Standpunkt der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (1922), published in Marxismus und Philosophie. Schriften zur Theorie der Arbeiterbewegung 1920-1923 (Amsterdam: Stichting beheer IISG 1993), is not included in the English version [Marxism and Philosophy. Partial Trans. F. Halliday. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971].
- 25.
- 26.
This is a well-known passage from the Manuscripts, but given its relevance to the argument that we are advancing it is worth citing it at length: “In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is quite sufficient. It takes actual communist action to abolish actual private property. […] When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need—the need for society—and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process the most splendid results are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring them together. Association, society and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies” (Marx 1975d: 313).
- 27.
For this reading, see among others, Wacquant (2002); Fowler (2011, 2020), a version of which is published in Paolucci (2018). Of a totally different opinion is Fabiani, who considers that Bourdieu’s project consists in replacing Marxism with another general theory (Fabiani 2016). For a critique of this interpretation and of the overall perspective adopted by Fabiani, see Joly (2018) and Fowler’s review of Joly’s book (Fowler 2018).
- 28.
“The degree to which the social world seems to us to be determined depends on the knowledge we have of it. On the other hand, the degree to which the world is really determined is not a question of opinion; as a sociologist, it’s not for me to be ‘for determinism’ or ‘for freedom’, but to discover necessity, if it exists, in the places where it is. Because all progress in the knowledge of the laws of the social world increases the degree of perceived necessity, it is natural that social science is increasingly accused of ‘determinism’ the further it advances” (Bourdieu 1993c: 25).
- 29.
For this reading see, among others, Jenkins (1992).
- 30.
See also Bourdieu (1990), first essay on the field of philosophy.
- 31.
References
Addi, Lahouari. 2001. Violence symbolique et statut du politique dans l’oeuvre de Pierre Bourdieu. Revue française de science politique 6: 949–963.
Austin, John L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. London: Oxford University Press.
Bauer, Ullrich, Uwe H. Bittlingmayer, C. Keller, and F. Schultheis. 2014. Pierre Bourdieu und die Frankfurter Schule: Eine Fortsetzung der Kritischen Theorie mit anderen Mitteln? In Bourdieu und die Frankfurter Schule: Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie im Zeitalter des Neoliberalismus, ed. Ullrich Bauer, Uwe H. Bittlingmayer, Carsten Keller, and Franz Schultheis, 43–82. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Bensaïd, Daniel. 1995. Marx l’intempestif. Grandeurs et misères d’une aventure critique (XIX–XX e siècles). Paris: Fayard.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977 [1972]. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1984 [1979]. Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 1990 [1982; 1987]. In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Translated by M. Adamson. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 1991a [1971]. Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field. Trans. Jenny B. Burnside, Craig Calhoun and Leah Florence. Comparative Social Research 13, 1–44.
———. 1991b [1981]. Description and Prescription: The Conditions of Possibility and the Limits of Political Effectiveness. Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. In Language and Symbolic Power, 127–136. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 1991c [1984]. Social Space and the Genesis of ‘Classes’. Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. In Language and Symbolic Power: 229–251. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 1991d [1984]. Language and Symbolic Power. Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 1992 [1980]. The Logic of Practice. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 1993a [1984]. Culture and Politics. Trans. R. Nice. In Sociology in Question, 158–167. London: Sage.
———. 1993b [1984]. Strikes and Political Action. Trans. R. Nice. In Sociology in Question, 168–176. London: Sage.
———. 1993c [1984]. The Sociologist in Question. Trans. R. Nice. In Sociology in Question, 20–35. London: Sage.
———. 1998 [1994]. Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action. Translated by R. Johnson and Others. Cambridge: Polity.
———. 2000 [1997]. Pascalian Meditations. Translated by R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
———. 2001 [1998]. Masculine Domination. Translated by R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
———. 2002 [1998]. Counterfire: Against the Tyranny of the Market 1. Translated by C. Turner. London: Verso.
——— 2003 [2002]. Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2. Translated by L. Wacquant. London: Verso.
———. 2008 [2002]. Political Interventions. Social Science and Political Action. Texts selected and introduced by Franck Poupeau and Thierry Discepolo. Translated by D. Fernbach. London: Verso.
———. 2014 [2012]. On the State. Lectures at the College de France, 1989–1992. Translated by D. Fernbach. Cambridge: Polity.
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge.
Cingoli, Mario. 1981. Studi sul primo Marx. Milano: Unicopli.
Cornu, Auguste. 1955–58. Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels. Leur Vie Et Leur Œvre. 2 vols. Paris: Puf.
Dal Pra, Mario. 1965. La dialettica in Marx. Bari: Laterza.
Dardot, Pierre. 2015. De la praxis aux les pratiques. In Marx & Foucault. Lectures, Usages, Confrontations, ed. Christian Laval, Luca Paltrinieri, and Ferhat Taylan, 184–198. Paris: Éditions de La Découverte.
Denunzio, Fabrizio. 2013. Soggetto, prassi e lavoro astratto. Bourdieu lettore della prima Tesi su Feuerbach. Critica Marxista 6: 74–78.
Fabiani, Jean-Louis. 2016. Pierre Bourdieu. Un structuralisme héroïque. Paris: Seuil.
Fowler, Bridget. 2011. Pierre Bourdieu: Unorthodox Marxist? In The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays, ed. Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, 33–59. London: Anthem.
———. 2018. Is Bourdieu’s Too Deterministic? Books and Ideas 20 September.
———. 2020. Pierre Bourdieu on Social Transformation, with Particular Reference to Political and Symbolic Revolutions. Theory and Society 49: 439–463.
Jenkins, Richard. 1992. Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge.
Joly, Marc. 2018. Pour Bourdieu. Paris: CNRS Éditions.
Karsenti, Bruno. 2013. D’une philosophie à l’autre. Les sciences sociales et la politique des modernes. Paris: Gallimard.
Korsch, Karl. 1993 [1922]. Der Standpunkt der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. In Marxismus und Philosophie. Schriften zur Theorie der Arbeiterbewegung 1920–1923. Amsterdam: Stichting beheer IISG (Marxism and Philosophy. Partial Trans. F. Halliday. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
Lefebvre, Henri. 2000 [1965]. Metaphilosophy. Translated by D. Fernbach. London: Verso.
Löwith, Karl. 1964 [1941]. From Hegel to Nietzsche. The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Translated by D. E. Green. New York: Columbia University Press.
Löwy, Michael. 2002 [1970]. The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx. Translated by B. Pearce. Leiden: Brill.
Lukács, György. 1954. Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des jungen Marx. 1840–1844. Budapest: Ferenc Jànossy.
Macherey, Pierre. 2008. Marx 1845. Les ‘Thèses’ sur Feuerbach. Paris: Éditions Amsterdam.
———. 2014. Geometria dello spazio sociale. Pierre Bourdieu e la filosofia. Verona: Ombre Corte.
Marcoulatos, Iordanis. 2001. Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu on Embodied Significance. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (1): 1–27.
Marx, Karl. 1975a [1840–41]. Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Translated by J. Dirk, and Sally R. Struik. In MECW, vol. 1: 25–108.
———. 1975b [1839]. From the Preparatory Materials. Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy. Translated by R. Dixon. In MECW, vol. 1: 403–509.
———. 1975c [1944]. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction. Translated by M. Milligan, B. Ruhemann. In MECW, vol. 3: 175–186.
———. 1975d [1844]. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944. Translated by M. Milligan and D. J. Struik. In MECW, vol. 3: 229–347.
———. 1975e [1844]. Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform”. By a Prussian. (Vorwärts! No. 60). In MECW, vol. 3: 189–206.
———. 1975f [1843]. Marx to Ruge, September 1843. In MECW, vol. 3: 141–145.
———. 1976 [1845]. Theses on Feuerbach. Translated by W. Lough. In MECW, vol. 5: 3–5.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1975 [1845]. The Holy Family: or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company. Translated by R. Dixon and C. Dutt. In MECW, vol. 4: 3–235.
———. 1976 [1932]. The German Ideology. Translated by C. Dutt. In MECW, vol. 5: 19–539.
Mauger, Gérard. 2005. Sur la violence symbolique. In Pierre Bourdieu, théorie et pratique, eds. Hans-Peter Müller and Yves Sintomer, 84–100. Paris: La Découverte,
Musto, Marcello. 2011. Ripensare Marx e i marxismi. Roma: Carocci.
Nordmann, Charlotte. 2006. Bourdieu/Rancière. La politique entre sociologie et philosophie, Paris: Éditions Amsterdam.
Paolucci, Gabriella. 2010. Una sottomissione paradossale: la teoria della violenza simbolica. In Bourdieu dopo Bourdieu, ed. Gabriella Paolucci, 171–210. Torino: Utet.
———. 2014. The State and Economics. A Bourdieusianan critique. In Re-Thinking Economics: Exploring the Work of Pierre Bourdieu, ed. Asimina Cristoforou and Michael Lainé, 61–73. New York: Routledge.
———. 2017. Gettati nell’ordine. Appunti su assoggettamento e soggettivazione in Bourdieu e Foucault. Cartografie sociali, II, 4.
———, ed. 2018. Bourdieu e Marx: Pratiche della critica. Milano: Mimesis.
Pinto, Louis. 2014. Sociologie et philosophie: libres échanges. Bourdieu, Derrida, Durkheim, Foucault, Sartre. Montreuil-sous-Bois: Éditions d’Ithaque.
Renault, Émmanuel. 1995. Marx et l’idée de critique. Paris: Puf.
Rossi, Mario. 1963. La prima idea del “rovesciamento pratico” in alcuni scritti giovanili di Marx. Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 18 (4): 561–591.
———. 1977. Da Hegel a Marx. III. La Scuola hegeliana. Il giovane Marx. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Sabot, Philippe. 2013. Sujet, pouvoir et normes: de Foucault à Butler. In Michel Foucault. À l’épreuve du pouvoir, eds. Edouard Jolly and Philippe Sabot, 59–75. Villeneuve d’Ascq,: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Terray, Émmanuel. 2002. Réflexions sur la violence symbolique. In Les sociologies critiques du capitalisme. En hommage à Pierre Bourdieu, ed. Jean Lojkine, 11–23. Paris: Puf.
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2013 [2011]. Marx’s Temporalities. Leiden: Brill.
Wacquant, Loïc J.D. 2002. De l’idéologie à la violence symbolique : culture, classe et conscience chez Marx et Bourdieu. In Les sociologies critiques du capitalisme en hommage à Pierre Bourdieu, ed. Jean Lojkine, 25–40. Paris: Puf.
Weininger, Elliot B. 2002. Pierre Bourdieu on Social Class and Symbolic Violence. Alternative Foundations of Class Analysis, 4.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Paolucci, G. (2022). Putting Marx in the Dock: Practice of Logic and Logic of the Practice. In: Paolucci, G. (eds) Bourdieu and Marx. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06289-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06289-6_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-06288-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-06289-6
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)