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Markets and Institutions: Economics and the Rough Understanding of Organizations

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Confronting Mainstream Economics for Overcoming Capitalism

Part of the book series: Marx, Engels, and Marxisms ((MAENMA))

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Abstract

In this chapter, we examine the theme of institutions (or the organization of markets), and more specifically the way in which the neoclassical mainstream has tried over the last decades to “endogenize” them, in order to integrate them into its general theoretical corpus. We show that most of the so-called neo-institutionalist works, very often non-mathematized and supposedly distinct from the neoclassical current, actually seek to refer to the standard general market equilibrium model to sound more scientific and be accepted academically. We will see how these analyzes represent a defense of private property rights, a justification of the established social order, and a certain vision, extremely restrictive and oriented, of democracy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One of the bases used to write this chapter was a long survey elaborated for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, a few months before I joined the CNRS as a full-time researcher: Herrera (1996). The discreetly critical aspect of its initial content meant that this draft, although self-censored and commissioned as an OECD working paper, did not obtain the internal visa authorizing its publication. It thus remained a mimeo. The present, liberated text of this chapter has little to do with the original one, which was too polite—because it was excessively polished.

  2. 2.

    Veblen (1899a, 1899b, 1900).

  3. 3.

    For example, Mitchell (1913), Commons (1931), Ayres (1944), and Clark (1957).

  4. 4.

    Menger (1996 [1833]).

  5. 5.

    Arrow and Debreu (1954).

  6. 6.

    This was the pioneering position of Coase (1987 [1937]). And also that of Hicks (1969).

  7. 7.

    Among others: Williamson (1975).

  8. 8.

    Williamson (1985). Also see authors as different as: Alchian (1977), Hirschman (1986), and Coase (1988).

  9. 9.

    De Janvry et al. (1993).

  10. 10.

    Williamson (1995).

  11. 11.

    Coase (1987).

  12. 12.

    Lin and Nugent (1995).

  13. 13.

    Bertrand (2003).

  14. 14.

    For an example of typology: Matthews (1986).

  15. 15.

    Coase (1960).

  16. 16.

    Stiglitz (1988, 1995, 2001).

  17. 17.

    Boland (1979).

  18. 18.

    Cf. Ménard (1990).

  19. 19.

    See, for example, North (1984).

  20. 20.

    North (1990a). Earlier: North (1987).

  21. 21.

    Williamson (1975).

  22. 22.

    Akerlof (1984).

  23. 23.

    North (1984).

  24. 24.

    Hayami and Ruttan (1984).

  25. 25.

    Menger (1996 [1833]).

  26. 26.

    Hayek (1953).

  27. 27.

    North and Thomas (1973). See also the concentrated and early version: North and Thomas (1970).

  28. 28.

    North (1991).

  29. 29.

    Nabli and Nugent (1989).

  30. 30.

    Cf. the articles relating to institutions published in the volumes of Handbooks of Development Economics successively coordinated by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (1988), J. Behrman and the same Srinivasan (1995), T.P. Schultz and J.A. Strauss (2008), then D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (2010).

  31. 31.

    North (1981).

  32. 32.

    North (1990a).

  33. 33.

    See: Shleifer (1995); and, in the same document: Blanchard (1995).

  34. 34.

    Banque mondiale (1996).

  35. 35.

    Clark (1924).

  36. 36.

    Banque mondiale (1997).

  37. 37.

    Fogel and Engerman (1974a, p. 233). Also see: Fogel and Engerman (1974b).

  38. 38.

    See: Fields (1981), and: Rutherford (1989).

  39. 39.

    Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Favereau (1989).

  40. 40.

    Mahieu (1989).

  41. 41.

    On the issue, for example, of communautary ownership of land (and the very powerful attacks on it) in Papua New Guinea, read: Herrera and Tetoe (2011, 2012, 2015).

  42. 42.

    For an analysis of the Japanese firm, complementary to that of O.E. Williamson: Aoki (1986).

  43. 43.

    Schneider and Libercier (1995).

  44. 44.

    Lévi-Strauss (1962, p. 44).

  45. 45.

    Here: Schultz (1968).

  46. 46.

    For example, Barnum and Squire (1979) and Singh et al. (1986).

  47. 47.

    De Janvry et al. (1991).

  48. 48.

    Matoussi and Nugent (1989).

  49. 49.

    See: http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/jean-jacques-laffont/.

  50. 50.

    Laffont and Matoussi (1995).

  51. 51.

    Here: Marshall (1920 [1890]). Also: Johnson (1950).

  52. 52.

    Cheung (1968, 1969a, b).

  53. 53.

    Stiglitz (1974).

  54. 54.

    Ziegler (2005).

  55. 55.

    Squire and Van der Tak (1975).

  56. 56.

    Akerlof (1976, 1984).

  57. 57.

    See: Arrow (1972a, b).

  58. 58.

    Herrera (2010a).

  59. 59.

    See: Laffont (1982) and Tirole (1988).

  60. 60.

    The World Bank (1997, p. 53).

  61. 61.

    North (1987). On the crucial role of the State in maintaining the stability of property rights: De  Long (1989).

  62. 62.

    The World Bank (1997, pp. 35–38).

  63. 63.

    North (1990a).

  64. 64.

    Cf De Soto (1986).

  65. 65.

    Buchanan (1975). A little before, in parallel: Niskanen (1971, 1975).

  66. 66.

    North (1987).

  67. 67.

    Findlay and Wilson (1987).

  68. 68.

    Coase (1989 [1937]).

  69. 69.

    North (1979).

  70. 70.

    Idem. Also: North (1981).

  71. 71.

    North (1981, p. 21).

  72. 72.

    North (1990a).

  73. 73.

    North (1990b).

  74. 74.

    North (1987).

  75. 75.

    Friedman (1962).

  76. 76.

    See: Lipset (1959).

  77. 77.

    Read: Helliwell (1994).

  78. 78.

    Helliwell, et al. (2013).

  79. 79.

    In particular: Schwarz (1992).

  80. 80.

    Barro (1996).

  81. 81.

    See: Gastil (various years).

  82. 82.

    Here: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House.

  83. 83.

    Consult the website  www.freedomhouse.org, and immediately afterward, consult a doctor in case of prolonged exposure to this ideological irradiation.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Kojm (2012). Available on: http://fr.scribd.com/doc/115962650/Global-Trends-2030-Alternative-Worlds.

  85. 85.

    See: Krueger (1974, 1990, 1993).

  86. 86.

    Among other examples: Bhagwati (1982), Wellisz and Findlay (1986), Scully and Slottje (1991), and Scully (2002).

  87. 87.

    Central Intelligence Agency(various years).

  88. 88.

    Gillis et al. (1990, p. 267). For a very different perspective: Herrera (2010b, 2017a).

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    Rémy Herrera

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Herrera, R. (2022). Markets and Institutions: Economics and the Rough Understanding of Organizations. In: Confronting Mainstream Economics for Overcoming Capitalism. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05851-6_4

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