Abstract
§1. A glimpse of Frege’s logicism can doubtless already be caught in a letter to Gauss. He writes to his correspondent that he is “each day more convinced that the necessity of our geometry cannotbe demonstrated, not, at least either by or for a human understanding. Geometry must not be situated at the same level as arithmetic, which is purely a priori, but rather in the neighborhood of mecanics.” The geometer’s necessity can be “demonstrated” neither “by” nor “for” human understanding: the geometer, which is to say each one of us, draws a figure that is just as individual as it is particular. He draws “in general”, in a way that is not properly deictic. But the arithmetician’s a priori demonstration does not then appeal to the phenomenal individual, to the type of individual the philosopher is fond of, whose essence alone he dutifully hunts down. As Nietzsche puts it, the individual – for example, that red house over there – is what the “philosophical man” cares about: to be as “reasonable” as “the man of science”, the philosopher raises “everyday banality” to the rank of “problem”. The Thing that interests him is the individual phenomenon. And it can now be foreseen that the ideographer (who “imitates” arithmetic) cares only about a new sort of individual, one without phenomenality, and without Husserlian-Heideggerian φαινόμενον in particular. This is why the pair Sinn/Bedeutung (sense/reference) is already lying in wait beneath this 1879 debate which has explicitly only to do with signs.
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Notes
- 1.
Relate and compare this generality to the first distinction of the Begriffsschrift concerning general and individual signs. Cf. Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze (zweite Auflage, herausgegeben von Ignacio Angelelli, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1964; § 1. French translation (and edition) by Corinne Besson, G. Frege, Idéographie, Vrin, Paris 1999. English Translation and Edition by Terrell Ward Bynum, Conceptual Notation and related articles, at the Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972.
Cf. also a passage from Grundlagen der Arithmetik (§ 13, p. 21 of the Enlish translation by J. L. Austin, Blackwelle, Oxford 1950) in which these questions appear:
“In geometry, therefore, it is quite intelligible that general propositions should be derived from intuition; the points or lines or planes which we intuit are not really particular at all, which is what enables them to stand s representatives (Vertreter) of the whole of their kind. But with numbers is different; each number has its own peculiarities (ihre Eigenthümlichkeit).”
- 2.
The Divine Service of the Greeks.
- 3.
Stante the famous version in Sein und Zeit, § 9. The fact remains that Heidegger distrusts, in the very same work, the ich-Akten.
- 4.
This type of otherness was at the centre of Gérard Lebrun’s work, L’envers de la dialectique: Hegel à la lumière de Nietzsche, Editions du Seuil, Paris 2004. N.B.: the circle of the absolute (of absolute knowledge) is an image.
- 5.
Vide Begriffsschrift,English translation, op. cit., p. 105c-106a.
- 6.
The French translations that I consulted (Imbert, Besson) render Bereich the same as un Gebeit, tending to translate ‘Bereich’ into ‘domain’, that is, Gebiet. Why? It is obvious that ‘the’ Bereich in question is not ‘one’ Gebiet, some general domain: yet ‘another’ Gebiet. So the first line of the quotation in question announces that this umpteenth Gebiet is not one but ‘the’ Bereich (an important and common notion in Heidegger). Bynum alone marked the difference: he translated ‘Bereich’ as ‘province’, op. cit., p. 106a.
- 7.
Cl. Imbert, Pour une histoire de la logique. Un héritage platonicien, P.u.f., Paris 1999, p. 161.
- 8.
Cf. Der Gedanke p. 66.
- 9.
This is how Bernard Bourgeois translated Darstellung: cf. p. 184, § 18 of Science de la logique from the Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques (Vol. I), Vrin, Paris 1970. My original is Volume 8 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Suhrkamp), p. 63 sq..
- 10.
Begriffsschrift XI (Angelelli).
- 11.
Ibidem XII. « English translation, op. cit., pp. 105c-106a. Cf. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze (zweite Auflage, herausgegeben von Ignacio Angelelli, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1964. Traduction (et édition) française par Corinne Besson, G. Frege, Idéographie, Vrin, Paris 1999 (p. 7). In this circumstance Frege recalls an old disappointment (we will come back to it later), of a ἀδικία of old and always: it goes for it — we limit ourselves for the moment to a suggestion — of the gap remaining between the true of the judge and the true of the true-speaking.
- 12.
Cf. « quelque chose d’anticipé », « etwas Antizipiertes », § 18, from Hegel’s Logique in l’Encyclopédie
- 13.
It was W. Van Orman ‘Gavagai’ Quine who established the connection of meaning and ousia in the 1950s.
- 14.
‘Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift’, in the cited Angelelli edition of the Begriffsschrift (pp. 106–114). French translation: “Que la science justifie le recours à une idéographie,” Gottlob Frege, Écrits logiques et philosophiques, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1971 (pp. 63–69). English translation, ‘On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation’, in Conceptual Notation and related articles, op. cit., pp. 83–89.
- 15.
The original text is found on page 107 sqq. The English translation, op. cit., is found on p. 84b. Bynum translates ‘anschauliche Vertreter’ as ‘perceptible representative’.
- 16.
Martin Heidegger, somewhere in the final essay, Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, which we will consider further below.
- 17.
As said in the Nachlaß on page 157 l. 8 (in French, G. Frege, Écrits posthumes, Éditions Jacqueline Chambon, Nîmes 1994, pp. 170b I.19). Further below, I focus my attention on the text 156b-158a. E12. English translation Posthmous Writings (Blackwell, Oxford 1979), p. 145 l. 12.
- 18.
Mark Textor, the author of Frege on Sense and Reference, a Routledge Philosophy Guidebook (London and New York, 2011), was my remote Virgil for numerous Fregean questions, in particular the relationship between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). I distance myself from his general approach, his Guidebook falls into a bit too much charm, to which he succumbs, not surprisingly, in his general sketch of the analytical commentary of Frege’s famous distinction. It constitutes an important aggiornamento of it (in relation to Dummett’s theses in particular). His book is truly a pure product of the analytical tradition, imbued with the Vorhandenheit-θεωρία coupling I address later. The transcendental illusion of the sign-of, and finally of the proper name, presupposed and sought everywhere, clarifies it entirely.
- 19.
Les fondements de l’arithmétique = Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, p. 225 = 115. The French translation, by a very young Claude Imbert, appeared in 1967 from Éditions du Seuil, Paris, within the collection “L’ordre philosophique,” edited by Paul Ricœur and François Wahl. The famous translation by J.L. Austin (1950) says more literally: « In arithmetic we are not connected with objects we come to know as something alien from without through the medium of the senses, but with objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin, utterly transparent to it. » It is cited on the first page of Frege on Sense and Reference, op. cit..
- 20.
The classic article on the subject is Michael Murray’s ‘Heidegger and Ryle: Two Versions of Phenomenology’, in Heidegger & Modern Philosophy (ed. Michel Murray), Yale UP, New Haven and London 1978, pp. 271–290.
- 21.
Something not understood by my Virgil, that Mark Textor who knows German so well. Cf. the insight given on pages 110–112 of Frege on Sense and Reference. The principal thesis of the book centers on Frege’s analytical studies (the only ones that exist, in truth). It is found in the Introduction: it states that the Frege of the first ideography did not much care for the distinction between meaning (Sinn) and meaning [Bedeutung: as well as meaning, reference, denotation, referent…].
- 22.
Begriffsschrift XII, previously cited. In addition to a Thing in its own right, I recall that arithmetic is a domain among others, ‘one’ Bezirk and not ‘the’ Bereich (the kingdom, or ‘province’ in Bynum’s English translation) which is the only ideography. The domains are plural, the kingdom is unique.
- 23.
* Cf. ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstan’ (1892), p. 197, which also appears in Nachlaß. In the second section of my text here, I address at length this passage (thus an object/Vertreter in its turn), together with the notion of contingency that I find in the late Heidegger.
- 24.
Cf. What I was saying above: “But since this is a gaze that, indeed, sees nothing, how is it possible to see such a Vertreter ‘at the border’ of all that ‘is’? Hence the parentheses surrounding the word diplopic”.
- 25.
Heidegger evoked for this speech a certain dicienne/deiknumi: a saying (itself) who is a showing of (itself): a Zeichen capable of zeigen, a sign capable of monstration.
- 26.
Michael Dummett’s opponents insist, it seems to me, on naturalness, and Dummett (and his sodaux) on artificiality. They are both right: before the absolute of the language in question.
- 27.
Cf. The Zeichen capable of zeigen that I just evoked.
- 28.
‘Ueber die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift’, in Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, op. cit., p. 107 a ll. 20–23. English translation, op. cit., p. 84a
- 29.
Ibidem.
- 30.
To use a common term in Frege’s work, as well as in Heidegger’s.
- 31.
‘Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift’, NS [= Nachgelassene Schriften, eds. Gottfried Gabriel et alii, Erster Band, Meiner V., Hamburg 19832], p. 13c. English translation, Posthmous Writings, op. cit., p. 12c.
The rest of the quotation makes clear that Frege wants to identify ideography as a lingua characterica «destined, above all, to mathematics». This lingua will not be a calculus: rather, it will be limited to «pure logic». But is it the «pure» logic, sometimes mentioned in this same fragment, the same «pure thought» that he often evokes elsewhere? Or is it a ‘special’ form of logic?
- 32.
According to a Platonic tradition (θήρα τῆς οὐσίας) deeply anchored in the Tradition. They are one with each other, which «Gavagai» Quine perpetuates in his classic book, From a logical point of view, wherein he advocated for the coincidence of meaning and ousia.
- 33.
I owe the notion of quissitas to a scholar I knew in my youth: Emmanuel Martineau. He was aiming at the notion of Dasein in Sein und Zeit.
- 34.
Let us not forget that these impressions and images indelibly strike «each of us individually». This text should be paralleled with the famous “Thought” passage that insists on sensory singularity, the ante-linguistic individuality of “each of us”. The analytics go to the opposite end of the spectrum: this passage from ‘Thought’ assures us that we only arrive at language later — in particular its dialogical conventions of an ‘I’ and a ‘you’; each of us is first immersed in our singular impressions of the senses.
Where, then, is the place of natural language? Where lies “the fight with language” led by logic and above all the logician—and when does it begin? Language as we know it (conventional, dialogical, etc.) always begins later than logic (das Logische).
It is because Frege is, decidedly so, both influenced by the traditional synonymy between ‘Sein’ and speech and taken with the final stage of the seasons of ‘Being’, where it identifies with logic. Frege must thus play all the angles. He therefore maintains that “each of us” is first of all subjected to sense impressions, and only afterwards to language and identification (an I, a you…). It is thus only later that the struggle between language and logic begins.
This ‘later’ is yet another episode in the absolute of speech — and of ideography so clearly affecting logic — in Frege’s work.
- 35.
See, among others, the first words of ‘Einleitung in die Logik’, one of the fragments from Nachlaß (NS 201–212): « We can express a thought without asserting (behaupten) it. But there is no word or sign in language whose function (Aufgabe) is simply to assert something. This is why, apparently even in logical works, predicating is confused with judging. As a result one is never quite sure whether what logicians call a judgment is meant to be a thought alone or one accompanied by the judgment that it is true. », in Posthumous Writings, op. cit., p. 185 (my emphasis). In short, judgment is neither of the world of senses nor of the internal world—as much as thought, whose ‘expression’ is Behauptung. ‘Judgment’s last residency’ is quite mysterious…
- 36.
Cf. the abundantly profound question of “ontico-theological constitution” in Martin Heidegger.
- 37.
‘What is Φύσις and how is it determined’ in Wegmarken, Klostermann, 19782, p. 242. This text, which really concerns ἐπαγωγή, echoes other texts by Heidegger, according to which western metaphysics is logic. They were all noted by Barbara Cassin and Michel Narcy in the commentary on the book Gamma de la Métaphysique (Vrin, Paris, 1982). If I had not read this commentary in time, the title of which is La décision du sens, I would probably never have noticed the gist of my own argument! Cf. pages 2–21 of the volume.
- 38.
*It is curious, the extent to which logic, the logical thing (das Logische) is imbued with the subjectivist element, when das Logische aspires to the greatest of objectives: independence. It wants to be as independent as Being—as the content, for example, of the gaze…. This also concerns the Seyn of the Beiträge, despite all its circumlocutions.
The notion of Auseinandertreten is difficult to convey in French as in English: the French translator’s version is dis-cession (p. 131, Introduction à la métaphysique (Gallimard, Paris 1967)) and the English version is disjunction (p. 130, Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale U.P., New-Haven 2000)). For the original, see Einführung in die Metaphysik (Niemeyer, Tübingen 19,764), 94.
- 39.
In their commentary on the book Gamma de la Métaphysique, of which I gave the reference above, Cassin and Narcy evoke both Lukasiewicz and Heidegger.
- 40.
Towards the end of ‘Thought’ it is clearly stated that thoughts are beyond ‘our control’.
- 41.
According to Strawson.
- 42.
According to Heidegger (Einführung in die Metaphysik).
- 43.
Lukasiewicz.
- 44.
Heidegger speaks (in Nietzsche) about a « responsable » man.
- 45.
Questions IV, Le Séminaire du Thor 1969, Question IV, p. 260. (I confess that it is difficult for me to believe in these seminars, they make too much of the history of French philosophy. I find it regrettable that they were translated and published in German (and integrated, later, into the Gesamtausgabe). They were also translated into English.)
- 46.
As has just been suggested, at least— later, and again in the next chapter, I will make this clearer and give the corresponding references.
- 47.
Frege also promised a certain end of philosophy. Cf., my article in English cited earlier.
- 48.
As I have argued elsewhere…
- 49.
…in that article in English that I have already cited several times.
- 50.
And yet, Heidegger does not make of Dasein any ich sprache when he separates his Dasein from the Husserlian ich-Akte. The fact remains that Heidegger’s numerous ambiguities towards logic are eloquent. Without a doubt, every logician, no matter their side, knows that logic is weakened by the subjectivist element that it supports and contains.
- 51.
Added by the English language translator of the Begriffsschrift.
- 52.
We (i.e., the philosopher-ideographer), with and through “our” signs, know that the rules and laws in question are not there. What are these Grundsätze? Frege assumes that everything that gives itself to be seen in the first part, (and it is indeed as much the fundamental as it is the principal of an entire logic, of which the exposition makes everything out of the extension of this part itself), is given first to our thought, in the sense that it is its invention, its concepts. We have to assume that it’s a question of at least three Ideas— one of involvement, one of judgment, one of modus ponens…and even of generality.
It turns out that the “rules”, i.e. the prescriptions needed to think “purely”, although they are, apertis verbis, the thing of the attempted transformation of discursive principles into signs, “cannot be expressed” in/by ideography, due to being, with the laws, the basis of ideography itself. But if the rules are only an image and copy of the laws, it follows that they must be, so to speak, the real thing of the transformation into signs of the Grundsätze. Specifically, the “affirmed” thing in the constative mode, i.e. the law, is the same as the “affirmed” rule in performative mode. … The reign of the ‘subject’, of the Logiker, continues in these lines to the disadvantage of logic itself, i.e. the proposals/inferences from which the work is nevertheless made…
But what are we reading, what is being offered to us in the first and fundamental part of the work (from § 1 to § 12)? The first transformation into signs (but it remains largely hypothetical, on closer inspection, as is each line that ‘follows’ in my own actual paragraphs) therefore concerns the law. Although it never appears, it is/should be only as a rule, such would be the face (εἶδος) of the rule if it ever showed itself. The rule, the prescriptive in general, is nevertheless important, for it prescribes the law ad usum delphini, i.e., ourselves. So what do we do? What do we fix with our gaze? What leaves itself to be seen before our eyes? Well, we have just renounced our signs—and our sight—in the name of the knowledge that obscures them: we know, in effect, that these signs are not made for knowledge which is thus the fate of the unexpressed.
This knowledge has in fact transformed, as if before our eyes, into know-how.
What Frege (the same «we»!) would in the same way come to accomplish, is the insertion of his Ideography into the great Tradition of metaphysics, i.e. philosophy — i.e. logic (cf. n. 36).
- 53.
‘“Negation”, The Frege Reader, p. 354 note D. The gist of this passage is the indefinability of the True. It doesn’t care about any kind of act.
- 54.
As Heidegger himself expresses in the final essay ‘Das Ende der Philosopphie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’, in Zur Sache des Denkens. The collection was published in 1969 but several of its texts, including ‘Das Ende…’ were already widely known.
- 55.
In Sein und Zeit, the function of lumen naturale — the absolute light I speak of in this essay — was associated with the ‘human subject’, with the Dasein, with the Da-sein.
- 56.
The last of the philosophers, all while proclaiming the end of philosophy, sees himself forced, by the force of the novelty itself, to ask, during the interim in which his mouth is agape, the philosophical concepts for a little help, «again».
- 57.
Cf., on the most recent Being-of-being, the “any present, any absent” that this text names. This present as much as this absent are no longer a being et basta.
- 58.
Strawson, for example, wrote from the anhistorial basis of categories. These are the same categories with which Heidegger, always ambivalent towards Aristotle!, was occupied in EM.
- 59.
Der Gedanke’, art. Cit., p. 75a (modified French translated, p. 191b). This passage illuminates the text on the (in)complete, analyzed infra. Heidegger writes in the same vein… cf. my article in English already widely referenced here.
- 60.
And he complained about it, according to Françoise Dastur in an introductory page of her latest (and excellent) book, Figures du néant et de la négation entre Orient et Occident (L’encre marine, Paris 2018).
François Fédier (the indiscretion was communicated to me by an ex-lover, who knows everything about Heidegger) saw Frege’s complete works in Heidegger’s Hütte! I myself rely on the well-known essay that the young Heidegger dedicated to Frege.
- 61.
I have argued this at length in my article ‘Frege and Heidegger’ which I have cited several times.
- 62.
Cf. Einführung in die Metaphysik, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1976, p. 143b. Quoted by Barbara Cassin & Michel Narcy, La décision du sens, Le livre Gamma on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, introduction, text, translation et commentary (Vrin, Paris 1982; p. 12). — I owe an enormous amount to this commentary.
- 63.
‘Prenez un cercle. Faites-le tourner. Il deviendra vicieux.’ Ionesco.
- 64.
‘Logos’, in Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Neske), p. 221c.
- 65.
Cf. in particular Nietzsche, vol. 2, p. 412b, of which I offer here my own translation: “In the early days of metaphysics, being as ἔργον [was] that which makes itself present by being produced (das in seine Hergestelltheit Anwesende). Now [in the Roman world], ἔργον becomes the opus of the operari, i.e. the factum of facere, the actus of agere. Ἔργον is no longer that which is let free into the open of presence (des Answesens), but that which is effected by effecting (das im Wirken Gewirkte), which is made by making (im Tun Geleistete). […] Being, in exiting the initial essence of ἔνέργεια, has become actualitas.” (Nietzsche, 412b) This, for Wirklichkeit.
(I have analyzed the question at length in “Frege and Heidegger,” already cited and graciously translated by Matthew Phillipps and Steven Evans for the collective volume Regelmachen, Regelschaffen, Regeländern, herausgegeben von Manuela Massa, James Thompson and Matthias Kaufmann, Peter Lang, Bern (Vol. 17 of the “Treffpunkt Philosophie” Collection edited by M. Kaufmann).
- 66.
Don Quichotte, volume I, p. 147e-148a, Édition Folio de Jean Canavaggio (Gallimard, Paris 2001). At the very end of the Part One. I recommend reading The Author’s Voice in Classical and Late Antiquity, ed. Anna Marmodoro & Jonathan Hill, O.U.P., Oxford 2013, even though this volume cannot evoke the figure of Cervantes.
- 67.
These are Gilbert Ryle’s own words, “the generalissimo of analytic philosophy,” according to Michael Dummett (his generalissimo in his day).
- 68.
Beware! The vice in question does not constitute the paragon of ‘normality’. Not that! ‘One’ tends, it is true, to imagine somewhere a paradigm, some normality… it is a logical decoy of the two vices that have been discussed so far in my essay.
- 69.
I think Carnap (Meaning and necessity) understood the Inextricable.
- 70.
The aforementioned vice lets itself be detected, in truth, directly from the double bind — a ‘vice’ in turn, encountered above in an autonomous way —, of our own belief that we think ‘objectively’, i.e. logically (i.e. correctly), — and this is the basis of the inferences/judgments of the Begriffsschrift — in spite of the fact that the principia detailed above betray, and as such, the fang marks that Being undergoes by the subjectivist element of thought.
- 71.
Vide in the same latest collection, Zur Sache des Denkens, the most famous of his contributions being the essay ‘Zeit und Sein’ — and compare this essay to the collection’s final contribution, ‘Das Ende der Philosopphie und die Aufgabe ds Denkens’, which is unable to limit his attempt at the expressive plane of λόγοι (the question of logal exposition does not even arise in this text). Proof, no doubt, of the remark I too quickly proffered (in § 5) that Heidegger was not truly concerned with the question ‘λόγοι or not’. In short, Heidegger’s thought did not revolve around — and does not revolve around — the identification of ‘Being and logic’. It was in no way the λόγος of logic that interested him. But more on this later.
- 72.
According to the preceding remark, in view of the late Heidegger, the question of logos in his work would translate into a completely different attitude than that of ‘logic’ (traditional or Fregean). In other words: there is a subterfuge in the logal question in Heidegger: it is much more enigmatic than expected, and, in any case, entirely distinct from the question of Logische that we have been highlighting here.
- 73.
In French, ‘Wink’ is normally translated as ‘indication’. The original of the syntagm: formal indication is formale Anzeige.
- 74.
In the next section we will find in Frege’s indirect discourse the Heideggerian type of provisional.
- 75.
SZ p. 6 l. 20. Heidegger cites Sophiste 242 c.
- 76.
He was even rector of his university and, as often with professors, he secretly or openly fed political aspirations. He had contemplated getting “transferred” to Munich to be close to Him! What scandalizes me again and again: I alas know very well that a very small number of teachers refused “the oath to Fascism”, an oath required to be able to teach in Italy during those years.
- 77.
The discussion begins on p. 177c, and continues, and is decided on, in the following page (178 a-c; but cf. 178 d – 180 abc) of ‘La pensée’, for French translation. For the English translation, see 357 c – 358 a (cf. 358 b – 360 abc), in Gottlob Frege, Collected Papers, Blackwell, Oxford 1984. The English translation puts the numeration of the original in the margins.
- 78.
Cf. ‘Der Gedanke’, in particular p. 76 a.
- 79.
Cf. my article in English
- 80.
In short, I do not subscribe to the current thesis in analytic philosophy that the Fregean judgment is an «internal act». It seems like dreaming to me when I hear such arguments, which I have already considered during the ‘leap’ discussed in Sect. 4.
- 81.
Cf. “Thought”, n. D, p. 333 in the Frege Reader: “I am not here in the happy position of a minerologist who shows his audience a rock crystal: I cannot put a thought into the hands of my readers with the request that they should examine it from all sides. Something in itself not perceptible by any sense, the thought, is presented to the reader – and I must be content with that – wrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form. The pictorial aspect of language presents difficulties. The sensible always breaks in and makes expressions pictorial and so improper. So one fights against language, and I am compelled to occupy myself with language although it is not my proper concern here. I hope I have succeeded in making clear to my readers what I want to call ‘thought’” ‘Der Gedanke’, p. 66, n. 4.
- 82.
‘Thought’, the first lines of the essay. The text continues: All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way: logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. The work ‘law’ is used in two senses. When we speak of moral or civil laws we mean prescriptions which ought to be obeyed but with which actual occurrences are not always in conformity. Laws of nature are general features of what happens in nature, and occurrences in nature always in accordance with them. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth. Here of course it is not a matter of what happens (Geschehen) but of what is (Sein).
- 83.
‘Thought’, notoriously. Heidegger reserves the expression ‘sui generis’ for the word of Being in Einführung in die Metaphysik. But as we have just seen, Being and the true are synonymous in Frege. Therefore, Being for Frege is indefinable.
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D’Oriano, P. (2022). Frege and Heidegger: On Frege’s Style. In: Rogove, J., D’Oriano, P. (eds) Heidegger and his Anglo-American Reception. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 119. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05817-2_16
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