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The 4SECURail Formal Methods Demonstrator

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Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification (RSSRail 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13294))

Abstract

The need for high-quality standard interfaces is widely recognized as a mandatory step to reduce procurement costs and create safely operating complex railway infrastructures. That is why European initiatives like EULYNX have been set up precisely with the purpose of supporting standard interfaces development. The exploitation of formal methods during the phase of standardization plays an essential role in raising the quality of the generated specifications. 4SECURail is a recent project that aims to precisely show, with a structured evaluation (known as the formal methods demonstrator), how formal methods might help to improve the quality of a specific signalling interface selected as case study. This paper describes the experience gained with the experiment.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://eulynx.eu, https://www.ertms.net/.

  2. 2.

    https://shift2rail.org/.

  3. 3.

    https://4SECURail.eu (November 2019–November 2021).

  4. 4.

    This has been done by comparing the formal semantics (in the form of an LTS) of the three versions of the system and mechanically proving that they are strongly equivalent.

  5. 5.

    https://www.eulynx.eu/index.php.

  6. 6.

    https://public.3.basecamp.com/p/jGh4E3ZdE8T1RtoxvbWLCYss.

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Acknowledgements

This work has been partially funded by the 4SECURail project. The 4SECURail project received funding from the Shift2Rail Joint Undertaking under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 881775 in the context of the open call S2R-OC-IP2-01-2019, part of the “Annual Work Plan and Budget 2019”, of the programme H2020-S2RJU-2019. The content of this paper reflects only the authors’ view and the Shift2Rail Joint Undertaking is not responsible for any use that may be made of the included information. We are grateful to the colleagues of the Work Stream 1 of project 4SECURail, and in particular to Alessandro Fantechi, Stefania Gnesi, Davide Basile, Alessio Ferrari and Maurice ter Beek, for the comments and suggestions during the project.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Scienza e Tecnologie dell’Informazione “A. Faedo”, Via G. Moruzzi 1, 56124, Pisa, Italy

    Franco Mazzanti & Dimitri Belli

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  1. Franco Mazzanti
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  2. Dimitri Belli
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Correspondence to Franco Mazzanti .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université Gustave Eiffel, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France

    Simon Collart-Dutilleul

  2. Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark

    Anne E. Haxthausen

  3. ClearSy, Aix en Provence, France

    Thierry Lecomte

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Mazzanti, F., Belli, D. (2022). The 4SECURail Formal Methods Demonstrator. In: Collart-Dutilleul, S., Haxthausen, A.E., Lecomte, T. (eds) Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification. RSSRail 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13294. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05814-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05814-1_11

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