Polarity, Non-polarity, and the Risks of A-Polarity

Abstract

For seven decades, the United States functioned as the world’s leading hegemonic power, playing the key role in creating and sustaining an open, liberal rules-based international order. That role was not truly global, however, since it did not encompass the Soviet bloc, nor Mao’s China. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, America’s role became one of unipolarity. That came to an end in the early to mid-years of the 2010s. Revisionist powers, China, Russia, and Iran have increasingly challenged regional and global order. The current configuration of world politics is commonly described as a return to great power competition, but none of the revisionist powers accept the real premises of a rules-based open world order. The U.S. role thus remains unique in sustaining the norms, practices, and institutions of that order. This leads to three key research questions. First, to what extent does the U.S. remain essential for a decent rules-based international order? Second, is the U.S. still capable of playing such a role? Third, what are the likely consequences if the U.S. is unwilling or incapable of doing so? The latter outcome would likely result in a form of a-polarity in which the rules-based system lacks a major power committed to sustaining it. Aspirations for non-hegemonic regime maintenance are a fantasy. The result, instead, would be worsening fragmentation and increasing risk of conflict.