In Chap. 7, I explained the adaptation of the compass to ecological economics. Ecological economics has an ideological orientation, a normative element. We can reconsider the ideological orientation.

Remember the three spheres made from the three data tables? We could choose to change the relative sizes. For example, we could choose to emphasise society. In this case we would make the socio-sphere the largest. The other two spheres might be of the same size, or we might make one of them larger than the other. The different relative sizes and the very notion of sphere can be used to identify different ideological orientations.

For example, I submit that neoclassical economists can come in at least two different stripes – represented by sphere-size manipulations. A pure neoclassical economist only looks at the econo-sphere. The others are ignored, because a priori we are better off if the economy is better off and we enjoy the free market. Because the pure neoclassical economic position is a prioristic, there is no admissible counter-evidence. So, conceptually, the econo-sphere is the most important, and the socio-sphere arrow, if one bothered to construct one, would have a tendency to align with the econo-sphere sooner or later. Any deviance it temporary. For an argument showing why this is an erroneous view, see the appendix.

A less extreme neoclassical economist is one who thinks that society is better off with growth of the economy as a matter of fact, that is, a posteriori . This neoclassical economist also has an eye to society, and wants to vindicate the claim that society is better off with a healthy economy – a healthy economy is correlated with a healthy society and we should be able to observe the correlation. So, such a neoclassical economist might also consider the table for the socio-sphere, and make it smaller than the one for the econo-sphere. When the correlation of economic health to social health is not observed, it is then appropriate for government to intervene. This is a Keynesian conception of economics.

An environmental economist has a strong concern for the natural environment, and realises that we cannot neglect it altogether, but still believes that the prevailing remedy for ills in society or the environment is the economy, because it is thought that middle class or wealthy people pollute less and campaign more successfully against the destruction of the environment. Such an economist might make the econo-sphere the larger one and place the eco-sphere inside. Such an economist might be bold enough to express the value of nature in monetary terms. This the idea of re-inserting the externalities back into the economy. The trick is that nature becomes important in the compass construction because it, too, is part of the larger sphere. We notice nature because it is given a monetary value, and in compass terms, some of it belongs to the econo-sphere. This is a smart move, since the longer indicator arrows are the ones to which we pay special attention. Probably such an economist will not be blind to society, and so might also include the socio-sphere, probably in middle position between the econo-sphere and the eco-sphere – if there is any of the latter that has not been given a monetary value (i.e. remaining externalities). Thus, how we get to the final representation, which tables we include, and their relative sizes, depends on the ideological orientation of the compass constructor.

Now, of course, deciding on which sphere to emphasise does not have to be the decision of one person. The decision can be made democratically too. Not every society is ready to rebel against the conditioning they have received in neoclassical economic thinking. Different sub-groups will be more or less ready. This then becomes interesting, since we can now imagine different groups – ones with different ideological orientations with respect to the relative importance of the three spheres using the same data tables and coming up with different final arrows!Footnote 1 Does this mean that there is no objective truth of the matter about the general quality displayed by an institution?

Rather than this being a cause for alarm and thinking that the exercise of constructing a compass is hopeless because completely subjective, we can use the different compasses to make our disagreements plain. Furthermore, one compass can be used as leverage for critique of an institution or critique of policy. We can also use the compass to predict the success of the institution, according to different standards (orientations). If we get the dependence relation wrong between the spheres, then the risk of failure is higher and the longevity of the institution is shorter. Of course, it might be very difficult to verify this, if there are no comparable institutions around.

1 Infrastructural Sphere

Here is another sphere to add to the mix. It might appeal to policy makers that have control over the infrastructure of a region. It is the infrastructural sphere. The information to construct a compass on the infrastructure of a region might already be in the tables for the other three spheres, but we might have a reason to tease out this information and treat it separately. The motivation for doing this might just be interest, for a report or academic project. It might be instrumental, that is, it might be something we can control or influence. In other words, we are politically and economically placed to address problems in infrastructure, and cannot do much directly about the other spheres. Our interest might also be couched in a wider ideological orientation. For example, we might think that infrastructure is, in some sense, the key to society functioning well, and this might be our priority and therefore, we might make a separate sphere representing the data concerning infrastructure. We extract the relevant data and make that sphere bigger.

There are two general types of infrastructure. They are material infrastructure and informational infrastructure. The material infrastructure includes transportation infrastructure: roads, railway lines, canals, transportation systems, delivery systems and fuel dispensation systems. But it also includes building infrastructure: factories, houses, schools; and resources infrastructure: mines, rivers, forests, stored oil and so on.

Informational infrastructure concerns information and communication. It supervenes onFootnote 2 a material infrastructure. It is agents who communicate. Agents include humans, but also animals, plants (Mancuso & Viola, 2018) and maybe spirits. The spirit of a river can communicate with human agents who are receptive to the communication. Humans communicate to each other through our senses. We use spoken language, writing, noises, art and body language. Communication can be successful or not. Acts of communication enjoy the three general qualities. Horror films belong to discipline, impressionist paintings belong to harmony, an exotic perfume belongs to excitement. They all contain information.

What would we measure in these acts of communication, once we have decided on the overall quality? Rate (frequency), quantity, duration and success. Rate is different from quantity. I can speak with someone every day, but only briefly. On the other hand, I might study the entire oeuvre of a novelist (quantity) during a period of my life (duration). Success is sometimes harder to measure; but not impossible. For example, it is the success in communication of the teacher that we measure by testing students.

Let us add normativity to the sphere, that is, our attitude towards the qualities. There could be some sorts of communication and information sharing that we wish to promote, and some that we wish to suppress. For example, in our institution, we might want to promote correct information about human health, but suppress mis-information. Normal, everyday health information we should like to see in the harmony sector. It should flow easily, regularly, quietly. There should be some such information, but not an overwhelming amount, explanations should be clear and succinct. If pictures accompany text, then these should not be too alarming.

Let us now move to excitement. Say, there is a real and sudden health hazard. Good information about this belongs to the excitement sector because of the suddenness. The quality of information should be good and clear, but also somewhat alarming, since, we should like people to notice and act in some prescribed manner to avoid the health hazard. We might also want a large quantity of information, available through many media. Mis-information, overly complicated, alarming (without solution) and about highly lethal health hazards belong to discipline. Moreover, we might want to supress mis-information about the health hazard. Wanting to supress mis-information is an ideological orientation.

A properly functioning information system would have the right sorts of information in the right places, and mis-information would not circulate very widely. The latter would be detected and replaced efficiently with better information or ignored altogether. For most institutions, we probably want the final arrow in harmony for our infrastructural sphere. If the arrow is in the wrong place, then we should address the problems, and promote the better practices.

If we want to subvert a government, then one effective way to do this is to control some of the information flow and spread mis-information. This adds confusion and frustration in the population. Similarly, we can disrupt the material infrastructure.

Let us then relate that sphere to the other spheres. Let us start with the easier econo-sphere. Some communication practices are costly. For example, printing books is expensive. The production of a film or television series is also expensive. Some communication practices are inexpensive. Blogs, imitating bird calls, speaking face to face are all inexpensive.

Data for the socio-sphere of the information infrastructure is quite interesting. We might be interested in quality and type of information being communicated, it’s breadth and effect (reaching the right people, and not the wrong people), longevity and regularity of circulation. Depending on our ideological orientation, we might favour one type of information over another. So, for example, given my own ideological orientation, I might prefer, for example, a book about indigenous practices over a mass media campaign promoting a luxury consumer good.

Insofar as my democratic ideological tendencies prevail over my other ideological preferences, I might concede to wider public opinion about choices of quality and type of information. The several layers of enquiry and their interplay is what demonstrates the subtlety and artful aspect of compass construction, making it an inescapably philosophical project. It is also what ensures objectivity and robustness or weak objectivity by making the interconnections explicit and plain.

2 The Dance of the Spheres

What do, or can, these spheres represent? In the version of the compass designed to reflect the way of thinking of ecological economists, each sphere represents a table of data. The relative sizes represent our priorities. Söderbaum would call this an ideological orientation. Other ecological economists would resist this, and claim that the ecological economic compass reflects the scientific existential reality – that the economy really does depend on society and society really does depend on the environment. Such an ecological economist would probably accuse anyone who wants to change the relative sizes of the spheres of not seeing clearly, and being blinded by ideology, as opposed to being clear headed, scientific and recognising reality.

This shows us the dangers of using the word ‘ideology’. If we have an ideology, it sounds as though we make a choice, since for every ideology there are alternatives. I do not want to solve the question now, as to whether the ecological economic compass reflects reality or an ideology; but I do want to point out that neoclassical economists who would have the economic sphere be the largest, and who would maintain that it is the economic sphere that holds society together, the a prioristic neo-classical economist, for example, literally cannot appreciate the ecological economist’s conception of the dependence relation between the spheres.

For debates between the two camps, it will be important to recognise where the junctions of disagreement lie. We found out the junctions just now by re-considering the construction of the ecological economics compass. Through this re-consideration, ecological economists can have a sense of how other economists see the situation by constructing ideologically alternative compasses. We can then predict what the other group is going to think is the most pressing issue to attend to, and use this to negotiate trade-offs. We might also find that there are still important points of agreement.

  • Claim 17: The compasses can be used as a basis for mediation between differently oriented groups.

In other words, when we constructed the ecological economics compass, the spheres were used to emphasise the eco-sphere over the socio-sphere, and the latter over the econo-sphere. Moreover, this was done in the full recognition that this is a choice, and that the relative sizes of the spheres could be reversed or changed to reflect another ideology. So, where do we stand with compass construction?

The act of creating a sphere is an act of selection of certain data. We can do this with different purposes in mind. We can do so to reflect scientific and existential reality, we can do this to reflect an ideological perspective or we can do this to reflect what we think is the better sphere of influence of the institution . For example, members of a regional government might think that the environment just has to look after itself, but that society and material infrastructure are things that they can control best. It is only if the economy is overwhelmingly suffering or the ecology is overwhelmingly suffering that the regional government will intervene. Lastly, we might make a selection of certain types of data just out of scholarly interest. To use a term that has come into vogue in philosophy, we operationalise the exercise. That is, rather than looking with candid innocence and best scientific objectivity, we might be interested in what we think we can control and influence, and concentrate on these as an institution. This is a very deliberate meta-choice that we make and we should do so consciously. However, it is not recommended because we forget the wider context of the data. We lose the holism of the reading.

  • Claim 18: The more artificial and unrealistic meta-choices of worldviews are, the more limited the value of the compass reading.

The claim holds for the following reason. The more we are mistaken about reality, the greater the chance that things will go wrong. Our predictions are less likely to be realised. When we select a type of data and then amplify it to count more than what is supported by reality, we are in danger of deceiving ourselves into thinking that we are doing the very best we can to solve the problems around us with our institution when we could do better.

Here is the much safer approach that is equivalent. Construct a compass to reflect reality as best you can as an institution, without forgetting the democratic angle to prevent overlooking important information.

Know, what the responsibilities of the institution are and what it can feasibly influence and how. It is that information in the data table that you target with policy. So, now we are not so much concentrating on the degree relative to the wish spot, but on the content of the data – what we can control or best influence. After selection, we work out which ones need shortening and which ones need lengthening. You can select these data points from the tables and focus on them, but do not then go on to make a separate compass with them because that new compass omits the wider context. The awareness of the limitations of an institution are as important as knowing the strengths. If we obliterate the larger context, what I have been calling the existential and scientific reality, we fool ourselves. Moreover, the justifications for our policies are weaker because we do not include the wider context in the justification.

We also limit ourselves disingenuously. This is because if we become aware that something very good, or something very bad lies outside our power, as an institution, we can seek to support institutions that do have the good or the bad something within their power. Institutions can influence each other. In this manner the institution makes things better for itself indirectly by trying to influence other institutions to address the problem. Alternatively, the institution might seek to gain power over the problem area. After all, this is exactly what happens when laws are passed in parliament. We change the scope of the legal system to cope with a new problem.

Returning then to the spheres and their sizes, we know that by changing the relative sizes we change the relative emphasis of the spheres on the final compass arrow. It is a nice exercise to construct, say, an ecological economics compass and then re-normalise to make the spheres the same size. The data tables are the same. Only the normalised length changes. It turns out that if we have comprehensive tables, the difference is not always very stark. This is because we have already done a lot of work oriented towards ecological economics in our selection of data, that is, by including the relevant data from the ecological systems. If we make a generic compass, we might miss a lot of this data, and for this reason, generic compasses and ecological economics institutional compasses can look very different.

This play of the spheres gives us a visual way of representing the different conceptions of priorities or conceptions of what the world we live in is like metaphysically or existentially. It also gives us a way of understanding the differences in conceptions between people, be they ideological or scientific/ existential.

  • Claim 19: The play of the spheres is equivalent to a normalisation of the length in the data points.

The conception of sphere is a selection of a type of data. We then decide whether or not the selected data is more important than the data points belonging to other spheres. That relative importance is given a number calculation. This is a normalisation technique. When it is ideologically or normatively informed, then it is a normative normalisation, as opposed to a mechanical descriptive normalisation, one made for aesthetics, representation or communication purposes.