A Rain of Propaganda: The Media Production of the Office of War Information in Stockholm, 1942–1945

Abstract

This chapter examines the media production of the US Office of War Information (OWI) in Stockholm, 1942–1945. While previous research has focused on the organization of OWI and the American view on war propaganda in Scandinavia, little emphasis has been placed on the actual production and circulation of American propaganda in Sweden during World War II. Drawing on previously neglected archival material from the Civilian Security Service’s (Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten) counter-espionage on American propaganda activities in Sweden, this chapter maps the material conditions for US propaganda and the circulation of OWI-supported media (e.g. books, magazines, films, radio and news stories) in Sweden as well as the Nordic countries in general.

During World War II, both Nazi Germany and the Allies invested heavily in propaganda in neutral Sweden. The battle for hearts and minds not only involved widespread dissemination of propaganda, but Stockholm became a veritable hotspot for espionage as well as intelligence gathering on enemies’ propaganda efforts. As a member of the American Legation describes it in a letter back home: “Stockholm at present is probably the most international place in Europe, excepting of course England. Diplomatic representatives with their huge staffs … journalists, business-men, refugees, and dubious types abound”.¹ Throughout the war, the Allies also used Sweden as a key gateway to circulate propaganda in Denmark, Norway and Finland. This chapter studies the media production of the US Office of War Information in Stockholm, 1942–1945. While previous research has focused on the organization of OWI and the American strategies for war propaganda in Scandinavia, little emphasis has been placed on the actual production and circulation of American propaganda in Sweden during World War II.² Moreover, the OWI-supported media (e.g. books, magazines, films, radio and news stories) that were circulated in Sweden and the Nordic countries have not been studied in depth. This raises the following central research questions: How did OWI Stockholm produce and disseminate American propaganda in Sweden? What function did the Stockholm outpost have in the distribution of propaganda in the neighbouring Nordic countries?

The main source material comprises previously neglected archival material from the Civilian Security Service’s (Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten) counter-espionage, reports and hearings from the US Congress on the planning and implementation of US war propaganda, as well as preserved examples of American propaganda in Swedish mass media. Additionally, to further trace American propaganda efforts, the National Library of Sweden’s digital search tool for digitized newspapers has also been utilized.

Approaching US Propaganda

There has been extensive research on the American cultural influence in both Western Europe in general and Scandinavia.³ In a Swedish context, most previous research on aspects of American influence focuses on the Cold War era and the battle over influence between East and West.⁴ However, few contributions deal explicitly with US propaganda in Sweden, with Mikael Nilsson’s comprehensive volume on the United States Information Service (later the United States Information Agency) constituting an exception.⁵ With regard to previous historical research on World War II propaganda, the greatest emphasis has been devoted to the study of Nazi German propaganda directed towards Sweden. In 1946, a government official report concluded that Sweden was “the subject of organized and highly active German propaganda”.⁶ On the one hand, propaganda media such as the illustrated journal Signal, the radio network Radio Königsberg and the newsreel Ufa-journalen spread propaganda in neutral Sweden.⁷ On the other hand, different initiatives attempted to strengthen the institutional bonds, networks and entanglements between Germany and Sweden.⁸

By comparison, US propaganda in Sweden has received little attention. During the summer of 2021, the US Embassy in Sweden organized an exhibition on the Office of War Information’s Stockholm outpost.⁹ Yet, in terms of previous research, only a few academic studies exist on the topic. One example is Ann-Kristin Wallengren’s recent study on the OWI-sponsored documentary Swedes in America (Irving Lerner, 1943), starring Ingrid Bergman, which provides insights about the US film propaganda in Sweden.¹⁰ Moreover, historian Harald Runblom has traced the development of the OWI branch in Stockholm, focusing particularly on mapping the Nordic countries’ place in the overarching US propaganda strategy. Drawing on source material from OWI headquarters in Washington D.C., Runblom provides an overview of the expansive growth of the outpost, the American view on Sweden’s neutrality and the aims expressed in the US propaganda directives. While Runblom places the American propaganda in a broader historical and political context, and thus provides a foundation for further studies on OWI Stockholm, this chapter includes few empirical examples of what the US propaganda looked like, how it was disseminated and at whom it was aimed. Notably, at the time of writing this chapter, Runblom did not have access to the archival material collected by the Civilian Security Service’s counter-espionage due to a 70-year confidentiality clause on intelligence material, which was still in place until the mid-2000s when they were declassified.¹¹ As intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell argues, intelligence archives pose particular challenges for researchers, and the files accessible today tend to be fragments of a more complete archive. For example, with regard to the Civilian Security Service’s archive, there was a systematic culling of the holdings in 1945–1946 after the organization was dismantled.¹² This chapter will not provide a comprehensive account of all aspects of OWI Stockholm’s propaganda between 1942 and 1945. Rather, drawing on preserved primary sources such as transcribed phone conversations, supervised letter and telegram correspondence, invoices for propaganda items and newspaper clippings, the aim is to provide insight into the everyday work on American propaganda and to foster a more nuanced understanding of OWI’s media production in Sweden.

In his studies on World War I propaganda, Harold Lasswell argued that propaganda had powerful effects on audiences.¹³ Drawing on Freudian psychology, Lasswell underlined the importance of shared symbols that evoke associations and trigger emotional reactions, symbols which in turn can be manipulated by those who take effort to change collective attitudes.¹⁴ In doing so, Lasswell contended that propaganda did not have to strive for immediate effect, but rather its influence was contingent on long-term conditioning and repetition. The US propaganda in Sweden operated along these lines, focusing not solely on the ongoing war but also putting much effort into media promoting American culture, democracy and general way of life. This chapter concentrates on three types of American propaganda in Sweden (and the Nordics) hitherto under-researched: the support and dissemination of American news stories and lifestyle publications such as Reader’s Digest, the private screenings of controversial US films such as The Great Dictator (Charlie Chaplin, 1940) and The Moon Is Down (Irving Pichel, 1943), and the major architecture exhibition America Builds. As Marie Cronqvist and Cristoph Hilgert argue, media history is permeated by cross-border and cross-media entanglements,¹⁵ something which is not least evident in propaganda history. Drawing on the concept of entangled media histories, Stockholm can be described as a propaganda hub where competing interests were brought to the fore. This theoretical perspective will thus inform my analysis of the material conditions of US propaganda.

News from America

While the American Legation was smaller than its German counterpart, which at its peak employed 218 people,¹⁶ it grew significantly throughout the war. OWI Stockholm was established in Sweden during the summer of 1942 under the auspices of Karl Jensen, who arrived in Sweden in March the same year.¹⁷ During the war, the American Legation grew considerably, as one member of the legation noted in a phone conversation: “The Legation has expanded enormously since we got into the war, there now being a staff of 29 officers and over 130 employees”.¹⁸ The OWI outpost, which was dedicated to the large-scale American propaganda and information campaign, reached a peak in 1944 when the payroll included 50 people, of which most were American and Swedish nationals.¹⁹

During World War II, the Swedish press was an important part of the propaganda battle for Swedish public opinion. Nazi Germany, for example, exercised great pressure on the Swedish press throughout the war. As Åke Thulstrup writes: “The publication of news reports or of comments unfavourable to Nazi Germany, if only in the form of a strongly expressed adherence to democratic ideals as opposed to the aims of National Socialism, was looked upon as a kind of sabotage against Sweden’s gradual adaptation to Nazi-dominated Europe”.²⁰ The German Legation in Stockholm demonstrated “remarkable activity” in its attempts to influence the Swedish press, supplying newspapers with news stories as well as photographs about their achievements on the battlefields.²¹ Moreover, an explicit aim in transferring the Nazi German diplomat Hans Thomsen from the German Legation in Washington to Stockholm in 1943 was his knowledge about “the American press and propaganda” and his ability to counter it effectively in Sweden.²² Similarly, OWI Stockholm paid close attention to the German propaganda that circulated in Sweden: “The outpost uses Stockholm as a window to Europe. It collects information that comes from the belligerent parts of the continent … The material poured in by the Germans to swing the Swedes is useful for us”.²³ Moreover, a key aim of American propaganda in Sweden was, as Runblom observes, to “counterbalance the German presentation of the United States”.²⁴ In doing so, OWI Stockholm paid great attention to the press landscape. In contrast to Nazi German propaganda, which was often aggressive,²⁵ the American propaganda was consciously toned down, taking heed of the notion that Swedes do not “appreciate guidance from the outside” and that they have a “dislike for sensationalism”.²⁶

Much of the OWI’s media production is centred on print material. Most of this work was done in-house, in the basement of Villa Åkerlund in Östermalm, which was purchased by the American Legation in 1942. As noted in a hearing before the House of Representatives in 1944, Jensen “manages what amounts to a publishing house with a large photo service, mimeograph machines and offset presses. The presses are in the basement where the swimming pool once was”.²⁷ A particularly central propaganda task for the OWI was therefore to support the circulation of American news stories. This was primarily done in three ways.

Firstly, through the publication of magazines produced by the American Legation in Stockholm. The journal Comments from the American Press was published from 1942–1944, appearing twice weekly, featuring primarily news from the war front. Together with the British Legation’s Swedish-language Nyheter från Storbritannien, which was in circulation long before the OWI outpost in Stockholm was established, these newspapers were considered important tools for influencing public opinion.²⁸ Moreover, the American Legation published a pamphlet called News from the U.S.A. from 1942–1943.²⁹ In 1944, Comments from the American Press was replaced with a less regular edition of the journal Press Comments from USA, with Jensen referencing the fact that “a great deal of material about America is now available to our readers through the regular news channels”, making the currently high publication frequency unnecessary.³⁰

Secondly, in particular during the first years of operation in 1942–1943, OWI placed much emphasis on the translation and editing of American news stories, which were often offered to the Swedish press free of charge. The press relations were handled by the American Press Bureau, which operated out of the American Legation. In a letter back home, one translator noted how incredibly varied her assignments were:

I get all sorts of papers from the legation to translate and I read Life, Time, Fortune, Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s, The New World, Reader’s Digest etc. pretty regularly. I translate things about Robert Sherwood, the Mississippi-river, the Solomon Islands, General Eisenhower, Admiral Land, the new films, the new books, Hitler’s oil-strategy, “Hitler—the phony lover”, Mrs. Roosevelt: If you ask me, The art of Walt Disney, Mada Chiang Kai-shek and so on.³¹

While some of these topics are obviously political, such as the items about Eisenhower or Hitler’s strategies, others concern popular culture or an American way of life in general. In the intelligence archive, there are many traces of news items being offered to Swedish magazines and newspapers throughout the war, including recipients such as the popular magazines Veckojournalen, Husmodern and Allers, the daily newspaper Sydsvenska Dagbladet, and the niche publication Svensk flygtidning, a magazine about aviation.³² Besides this, the OWI also provided Swedish newspapers with photographs from the war front sent using the radiophoto system.³³

A third press strategy was to support the publication of commercial American titles. For example, the OWI assisted the publication of a Swedish-language edition of the American lifestyle magazine Reader’s Digest. In January 1942, Adèle Heilborn, the head of the Sweden-America Foundation (Sverige-Amerika Stiftelsen) from 1938 to 1966, wrote to an American colleague about the Swedish appetite for American culture:

Sweden is the kind of a propaganda tired country that would listen to cultural propaganda rather than war propaganda. Give us less pictures of the millionth cannon made by this and that factory, and more about science, culture etc … The editors and journalists all over Sweden are longing for American magazines.³⁴

The publication of Reader’s Digest under the Swedish name Det Bästa [The Best] in March 1943 was an instant success. This was highlighted during the OWI’s yearly hearing before the House of Representatives, noting that “Reader’s Digest, against the advice of its Swedish agent, printed 70,000 copies of its first issue. Those 70,000 were sold out in the first 4 days”.³⁵ According to OWI Stockholm’s representative, the second issue had a print run of 140,000 copies and sold out just as fast. The same source concluded proudly: “with the aid and help of the Office of War Information, Reader’s Digest is now the magazine with the largest circulation in Sweden”.³⁶ The support for Reader’s Digest exemplifies what propaganda theorist Jacques Ellul describes as “integration propaganda”, a complex and subtle form of long-term persuasion primarily striving to influence cultural norms, rather than to agitate.³⁷

OWI Stockholm also produced print propaganda for a Danish audience. As Harald Runblom notes, the Danish-language publication Nyt Over Atlanten (News Across the Atlantic) was launched in 1943, with 10,000 copies printed for circulation in Denmark. Few traces remain of this activity, but one document shows that Karl Jensen, who was born in Denmark and became a naturalized American citizen, received feedback on a pilot publication from a Danish contact: “I have read the samples you gave me … the size and printing of the magazine is good, and well used this propaganda can be of great value”.³⁸ While lamenting the “many examples of rather bad Danish”, the contact found Nyt Over Atlanten promising, adding that the Americans needed to keep the particularities and principles of propaganda in Denmark in mind. Seven central points of advice were outlined, such as “emphasize the romantic side of war, e.g. the actions of the saboteurs”, “let the Dane feel, that he too plays a part in the world” and “highlight the unreliability of the domestic newspapers”.³⁹ For Norway, the pamphlet Amerika-Nytt was printed in smaller numbers, around 3000 copies. As noted, much of the OWI’s printing was done in-house, but records gathered by the Civilian Security Service show that both Nyt Over Atlanten and Amerika-Nytt were printed regularly by Tryckeriaktiebolaget Federativ, a printing press operated by syndicalist trade union, the Central Organization of the Workers of Sweden (SAC). The production of propaganda for occupied Norway and Denmark was a sensitive issue, and the personal file on Karl Jensen notes that “the American Legation is highly anxious that word will get out that illegal propaganda aimed at Norway is being printed by the American Legation”.⁴⁰

Radio was another key medium for the dissemination of US news stories and war propaganda. During the war, there were various American radio broadcasts in Swedish (Fig. 1). However, much to the dismay of OWI Stockholm, correspondence suggested that most Swedes were not aware of the existence of such broadcasts despite the fact that these were advertised in major Swedish newspapers.⁴¹ Judging from the preserved intelligence records, much emphasis at the Stockholm outpost was placed on radio propaganda. For example, records show that weekly measurement reports on the reception quality of American and British radio broadcasts were drafted in Sundsvall in the north of Sweden.⁴² Among the stations monitored were General Electric’s shortwave broadcast to Europe WGEO, the OWI-founded American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE) and the British BBC.⁴³ ABSIE was created in April 1944 with the ambition to support the Allied invasion of Europe, transmitting in several European languages until July 1945.⁴⁴ On the ground in Sundsvall, Swedish telegraphic operators reported on the reception, made technical suggestions on how to adjust and move the frequencies to avoid interference, and commented on the content of the programmes.⁴⁵ Some monitoring reports paid particular attention to the reception of radio broadcasts in Norwegian, Danish and Finnish, something which might imply that the signal strength in Sundsvall was seen as an indication of the reception quality also in other Nordic locations beyond American reach.⁴⁶ Similarly, another important task for the Swedish outpost was to monitor Nazi German transmissions, and an OWI representative aptly described Sweden as “an ideal place to listen”.⁴⁷

Fig. 1

Advertisement for American Swedish-language radio broadcasts in Dagens Nyheter, 18 September 1943

The Circulation of Forbidden Films

During World War II, all major combatants devoted significant funds towards the production and dissemination of film propaganda.⁴⁸ Famously, Hollywood filmmakers such as John Ford, John Huston and Frank Capra filmed on the frontlines of the war.⁴⁹ Similarly, OWI mobilized film propaganda, perhaps most notably through the influential propaganda series Projections of America, 26 short documentaries which centred on the American way of life.⁵⁰ The first completed film in the series was indeed the previously mentioned film Swedes in America on the contributions of Swedish immigrants in the US,⁵¹ which was screened in Sweden during the autumn of 1943 as a pre-film to Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 1942).⁵²

During World War II, neutral Sweden has been described as a propaganda battleground.⁵³ Among other things, this was reflected in the pressure exerted towards the National Board of Film Censors (Statens biografbyrå) in questions surrounding film censorship. As Arne Svensson notes, there was close cooperation between the National Board of Film Censors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet) and the Government Board of Information (Statens informationsstyrelse) during the war.⁵⁴ Drawing on Swedish foreign policy, the film censors’ task was to assess whether imported films could harm Sweden’s relations with other nations, in which case the films should be banned or partially censored. As a consequence, the Film Censors paid attention to the propaganda content in foreign films. For example, the National Board of Film Censors received many complaints from both American, British and Nazi German representatives about feature films with propagandistic tendencies, repeatedly urging the Swedish censors to stop the distribution of the adversaries’ films.⁵⁵

The film screenings that took place in Sweden beyond the control of the National Board of Film Censors, however, have received little attention in previous scholarship. While all films that were distributed in Swedish cinemas passed the censorship bureau, private film screenings for members’ clubs, film societies and other associations did not require such approval. Private screenings were commonplace throughout the war. For example, as I have discussed elsewhere, the German Legation and pro-Nazi associations such as Samfundet Manhem arranged private screenings of films that were never submitted to the film censors, such as the notoriously anti-semitic propaganda film Der ewige Jude (Fritz Hippler, 1940).⁵⁶ Similarly, the American Legation and the Office of War Information supported the circulation of forbidden American and British films.

The most famous “forbidden” film is probably Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator from 1940. Even before the war broke out, the German Film Chamber approached the Swedish Film Chamber, which was headed by Svensk Filmindustri’s Olof Andersson, and made clear its view on Chaplin’s film, labelling it a tendentious film.⁵⁷ Previous research shows that Andersson, who also served in the Nazi-controlled International Film Chamber, answered subserviently to the German diplomats, assuring them that Svensk Filmindustri would not distribute the film, adding that the strict film censorship laws would likely lead to a ban of the film.⁵⁸ Technically speaking, however, The Great Dictator was never forbidden in Sweden, as it was not submitted to the Censorship Board until September 1945 when it was subsequently approved.⁵⁹ Most likely, the film producer United Artists deemed it improbable that the film would pass the Swedish censorship bureau, and refrained from submission in an act of self-censorship. Yet, this did not prevent the film from gaining significant circulation in Sweden during the war.

Surveillance records show that the American Legation supported the circulation of The Great Dictator and that the film was high in demand. Inquiries came from both individuals and larger organizations—ranging from a professor in Uppsala wanting to arrange a screening for 20 of his closest colleagues to branches of large unions such as the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, the Railwaymen’s Federation or Bofors Civil Servant Association asking to show the film to larger crowds of 1000 to 1200 people.⁶⁰ During the first years of the war, surveillance material suggests that commercial cinemas were commonly rented for private screenings, primarily during off-peak hours. However, in January 1943, the Swedish Association of Cinema Owners (Sveriges Biografägarförbund) decided that private screenings would no longer take place in their member cinemas.⁶¹ Larger screenings would often take place in auditoriums, such as the main lecture hall at the YMCA (KFUM) in Stockholm or cultural centres such as Folkets Hus, particularly after the cinema owners’ decision (Fig. 2).⁶² During the autumn of 1943, two copies of The Great Dictator were in circulation: one in Stockholm and another distributed around the rest of the country.⁶³ In Stockholm, Allied and German officials monitored one another,⁶⁴ something which also holds true for the private film screenings. For example, the editor of the Swedish film journal Filmbilden wrote to the American Legation and reported that the German film company UFA’s press division was in attendance during the American Legation’s most recent screening of The Great Dictator.⁶⁵

Fig. 2

Traces of the underground distribution of Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator (1940), F8EB:3, Allmänna säkerhetstjänstens arkiv, Swedish National Archives, Stockholm

Private film screenings occurred all the more frequently in 1943–1944. OWI supported the circulation of numerous other films besides The Great Dictator. One example is the John Steinbeck adaptation The Moon Is Down (Irving Pichel, 1943), which focuses on the occupation of a small town in Northern Europe. The Board of Film Censors banned the film in July 1943 with the justification that the similarities to the occupation of Norway are all too obvious.⁶⁶ Among other places, The Moon Is Down was screened at Moriska Paviljongen in Malmö for members of the Trade Union, much to the annoyance of three members of the National Socialist Workers’ Party (Svensk Socialistisk Samling), who were recorded talking about the unfairness that their request to arrange a private screening had recently been denied by the local police office.⁶⁷ Other examples of banned films that OWI circulated include the British anti-Nazi thriller Pimpernel Smith (Leslie Howard, 1941) and the Nazi resistance drama Underground (Vincent Sherman, 1941).⁶⁸ Famously, one of the people who attended a private screening of Pimpernel Smith was the humanitarian Raoul Wallenberg.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, OWI Stockholm’s film activities were not limited to popular Hollywood productions. A transcript of a wiretapped conversation between the representatives of the American Legation and the British Legation indicates that the Allies coordinated their film propaganda efforts in Sweden. The discussion focused on the dissemination of educational films for distribution in Swedish schools. James Knapp-Fisher, the Film Officer at the British Legation,⁷⁰ noted that he had provided a Swedish contact with seven short films from the British Ministry of Information and that the films would be screened in smaller villages, adding “this is precisely the type of propaganda that is so useful, but it cannot be too obvious”.⁷¹ The member of the American Legation responded that he would provide the same Swedish contact with a film about life at American colleges. They also discussed the potential of distributing films on advances in medicine among Swedish doctors in order to showcase their countries’ creativity and advancement in scientific matters. While the feature films distributed with the aid of the OWI Stockholm all belong to the anti-Nazi film genre and perpetuate strong political messages, the envisioned utility of educational films, promotional films about American colleges and science films was rather to provide a positive portrayal of America and Great Britain as civilized nations.

In the Civilian Security Service’s archive, there are no traces of attempted film distribution from Stockholm to the neighbouring Nordic countries. However, a long article on the Stockholm outpost suggests that such activities took place, and that the OWI distributed prints of their United Newsreel into Denmark.⁷² Moreover, records show that the American Legation approved the lending of films for a screening in Stockholm arranged by the husband of the famous Danish actress Marguerite Viby. The small audience of 16 people comprised Danish refugees as well as the Lord Mayor of Copenhagen.⁷³ Other examples of film screenings that the American Legation arranged for non-Swedish audiences include the sharing of five films in the US Department of War’s documentary film series Why We Fight (Frank Capra & Anatole Litvak, 1942–1945) with the Legation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Stockholm.⁷⁴ The connections between Allied representatives in the matter of film propaganda underline Stockholm’s status as a propaganda and intelligence hub (for more on Stockholm and its role in the triangular stream of information between London and Copenhagen, see Emil Eiby Seidenfaden’s chapter in this volume).

America Builds

The Office of War Information in Stockholm did not just focus on mass media. Another important tool for propaganda was the major architecture exhibition America Builds (Amerika Bygger), which opened at Nationalmuseum, the national gallery of Sweden, in June 1944. Within the diverse field of media archaeology and cultural-historical media research, scholars have foregrounded an expanded media concept, where museums, statues and exhibitions can be considered as media forms.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, mediation is a key function of museums, and curated exhibitions infer objects with meaning. Likewise, the exhibition America Builds built on and presented a range of media artefacts and served a distinct communicative purpose.

The Head of OWI Stockholm, Karl Jensen, started his career as a student of the architect Frank Lloyd Wright.⁷⁶ Jensen was a key figurehead in the organization of the exhibition. However, besides OWI, several organizations were involved in the planning and execution of the project: the Sweden-American Foundation (which was celebrating its 25th anniversary), the American-Scandinavian Foundation, the National Association of Swedish Architects (Sveriges Arkitekters Riksförbund) and the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA). Henry Goddard Leach, head of the American-Scandinavian Foundation, involved MoMA in the project, and they took the lead in assembling the material that was shown during the exhibition.⁷⁷ An article in the American architecture magazine Pencil Points, which labelled the exhibition a “unique contribution to psychological warfare”, outlined the four main sections: pioneers of modern architecture (such as Frank Lloyd Wright); outstanding buildings of the past ten years, U.S. housing in war and peace; and planning for the healthy growth of a large city.⁷⁸ The exhibit showcased a great amount of media—some 500 photographs, 100 photostats, pieces of fabric and material used during construction, posters and art work, architectural magazines, colour slides of American art, as well as documentary films for periodical screening at the Museum.⁷⁹ Some of the material had been utilized previously in domestic exhibitions, such as MoMA’s Art in Progress: Built in the USA exhibition from June 1944.⁸⁰ In connection with the exhibition, several lectures were offered. Jensen presented on the topic of Frank Lloyd Wright and organic architecture, the Finnish modernist architect Alvar Aalto talked about city-planning and his impressions of contemporary American building, and the American author and poet Frederic Prokosch, who worked as a staff member at OWI Stockholm, presented new directions in American painting.⁸¹ By focusing on distinctly “modern” aspects of America, the exhibition presented an idealized version of society, a narrative and image that was further perpetuated in the Swedish media (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3

A description of the America Builds exhibition as a contribution to psychological warfare in the architectural journal Pencil Points, vol. 25, no. 2 (1944)

The exhibition can be described as a typical mid-twentieth century media event, drawing on Espen Ytreberg’s historical understanding of Dayan and Katz’s concept.⁸² The opening ceremony was attended by Crown Prince Gustaf Adolf and Prince Eugen, brother of the Swedish King Gustaf V, lending credibility to the event. At the opening, the Head of Nationalmuseum Erik Wettergren underlined Swedish sentiment towards America: “America, a country closer to our hearts than many other countries at a closer distance, we welcome as a relative and a friend”.⁸³ America Builds gained attention in multiple media. In the press, author and art critic Gotthard Johansson, who introduced functionalism to a broader Swedish public, praised the exhibition: “the best architectural exhibition I have seen so far: lucid, fresh, captivating and varied”.⁸⁴ Moreover, the daily current affairs radio programme Dagens Eko (The Daily Echo) devoted time to America Builds.⁸⁵ Later, the exhibit moved to Gothenburg, where it was on display throughout September 1944 at Röhsska, the Museum of Design and Craft. After the war, America Builds became a travelling exhibition, appearing at the Finnish National Gallery Ateneum in Helsinki in 1945 and at Kunstindustrimuseet in Oslo in 1946. In the latter case, the opening ceremony, with Crown Prince Olav and Crown Princess Märtha in attendance, became a notable media event that was also captured in the newsreel Filmavisen.⁸⁶

Conclusions

Notably, the Office of War Information started operating in Sweden around the same time as Nazi Germany was beginning to experience a shift of initiative on the battlefield. As Klas Åmark notes, following 1942, Swedish public opinion grew more distanced and critical towards Nazi Germany.⁸⁷ In order for propaganda to be effective, Jacques Ellul observes, the audience needs to be receptive to it.⁸⁸ As the war turned against Germany, the Allies that were circulating propaganda in Sweden were thus speaking to an audience with a more favourable attitude than before.

This chapter examines the material conditions of US propaganda in Sweden and Stockholm’s function as a gateway for propaganda aimed at the other Nordic countries. The study shows that the US press strategy in Sweden differed from that of Nazi Germany, which Thulstrup has shown centred on threats and intimidation. With regard to the publication of newspapers, illustrated magazines and brochures, the American Legation was clearly identified as the commissioner of the material, offering a distinctly American view on the ongoing war effort. By contrast, the support of Reader’s Digest and the planting of US-friendly news stories in Swedish newspapers were inconspicuous, a typical example of what theorists have labelled grey propaganda. Although Sweden was not central to the US radio broadcasting efforts, OWI’s Stockholm outpost monitored the reception quality of US-sponsored Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Finnish-language broadcasts in the north of Sweden, as well as Nazi German broadcasts. Another important media strategy, which Swedish officials paid close attention to, was the circulation of forbidden films. For example, even though Chaplin’s The Great Dictator never passed the National Board of Film Censors, the film reached a considerable Swedish audience, something to which the amount of supervised correspondence about the film attests. Lastly, the exhibition America Builds in 1944 was a massive effort, and much work went into the difficult import of American photographs, books and films to Sweden. The fact is that the exhibition opened at the national gallery of Sweden had a symbolic bearing, and as a media event America Builds had a considerable impact in the public sphere.

Although previous research on World War II propaganda is exhaustive, surprisingly few studies focus on Allied media production and circulation in Sweden. A potential avenue for further research would be to approach Stockholm as a transnational, entangled propaganda hub. This chapter concentrates on US propaganda for a Swedish and a Nordic audience, but there are many questions remaining about the connections between the Allies on the ground in Stockholm when it comes to the making of propaganda, not only for the Nordics but also beyond. Furthermore, the topic of US propaganda in Sweden and the Nordics is of particular importance given the country’s rapidly increasing influence in the Cold War era. For example, as Mikael Nilsson observes, the purposeful acts of persuasion aimed at Sweden continued and accelerated in the Cold War era under the auspices of United States Information Service, targeting among other things Swedish newspapers, labour unions and universities.⁸⁹ This raises questions about continuities and shifts between the wartime propaganda and the Cold War era public diplomacy.