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“A Most Spectacular Example of Cross-Border Collaboration”: Albertville and Barcelona

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International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics ((PASSP))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the two Olympic Games that occurred immediately following the end of the Cold War. This context is considered amid domestic terror threats to both editions of the Olympics. In Albertville, the location of a nuclear reactor sparked calls to change the location of the Olympics to make sure the Games remained safe. For Barcelona, issues for security planners included geography and domestic politics as a Basque separatist movement threatened to attack the Games.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While it does not consider the Olympics or sport, Thomas Risse-Kappen’s “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 185‒214 provides a thought provoking analysis on the impact of transnational relations on the end of the Cold War. He provides a focus on security and transnational relations from 195‒204. See also, John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 5‒58; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

  2. 2.

    Perhaps the biggest question in this regard was Yugoslavia. The United Nation Security Council sanctioned the nation due to its role in the Balkan War, thus preventing the nation from sending teams to international competition. With the aid of the IOC, individual athletes from Yugoslavia competed at the Games. For a more detailed account, see Guttmann, The Olympics, 185 and Larry Maloney, “Barcelona 1992,” in Historical Dictionary of the Modern Olympic Movement, ed. John E. Findling and Kimberley D. Pelle (Westport, TC: Greenwood Press, 1996), 179.

  3. 3.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990.

  4. 4.

    Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona,” New York Times, July 11, 1992.

  5. 5.

    Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12‒17, 1986, Lausanne, 133, IOCL. A contract was signed by both hosts prior to the 1988 Olympics but security was not included.

  6. 6.

    Minutes of the 91st IOC Session, October 12‒17, 1986.

  7. 7.

    Marlise Simons, “France’s Site for the Olympics,” New York Times, September 29, 1991.

  8. 8.

    Rone Tempest, “Preparations Have Not Been All Fun and Games for France,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1992; Alan Riding, “Albertville Concentrates on Big Picture,” New York Times, February 2, 1992.

  9. 9.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991, Folder: Securite aux Jeux Olympiques d’hiver d’Albertville 1992 correspondance, rapports et dossiers d’info 1989‒1992, File: correspondance et rapports de M. Ashwini déléguer CIO pour la sécurité 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  10. 10.

    When Albertville initially made their bid, Jacques Barnier told the IOC that there would only be one Olympic Village at Brides-les-Baines. At a June 1991 meeting of the IOC, Barnier responded to a question about athlete accommodation, “the downhill skiers would stay in Val d’Isère; the freestyle skiers would be in Tignes; the bob and luge competitors in La Plagne; the biathletes and cross country skiers in Les Saisies; the ice hockey players in La Tarda. All skaters and ski jumpers would stay at the main Olympic village in Brides-les-Bains.” Quote found in Minutes of the 97th Session of the International Olympic Committee, June 13‒16, 1991, Birmingham, 29, IOCL. It is not clear when or how the AOOC decided on this policy.

  11. 11.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  12. 12.

    Michael Janofsky, “Come to the Winter Games and See France. A Lot of It.,” New York Times, April 28, 1991.

  13. 13.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  14. 14.

    Minutes of the 93rd IOC Session, February 9-11, 1988, Calgary, 27, IOCL.

  15. 15.

    Albertville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 236.

  16. 16.

    . According to the AOOC, Prouteau served as the “Commanding General of the defence zone.” Quote found in Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 238.

  17. 17.

    For a detailed history of the work of the GIGN see, Roland Môntins, 40 ans d’actions extraordinaires (London: Pygmalion, 2013).

  18. 18.

    This is detailed in several sources. See, John Hoberman, “Toward A Theory of Olympic Internationalism,” Journal of Sport History 22, no. 1 (1995): 1‒31; Roger Cohen, “Reporter Asserts Elysee Palace Tapped His Phone,” New York Times, March 5, 1993.

  19. 19.

    “Olympic staff advised to be kind to terrorists,” Daily Herald, February 2, 1992.

  20. 20.

    Examples are found in “La sécurité des prochains Jeux d’hiver Huit mille policiers, gendarmes et militaires surveilleront l’espace olympique d’Albertville,” Le Monde April 25, 1991 and “Les Jeux Olympiques d’Albertville: Plus de neuf mille hommes assurent la sécurité des sites,” Le Monde, February 8, 1992.

  21. 21.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  22. 22.

    Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the Olympiad Albertville 1992, part 2, 238. A further 2,800 Gendarmes worked to protect the public and help traffic flow.

  23. 23.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  24. 24.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  25. 25.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  26. 26.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, July 16, 1991.

  27. 27.

    Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 59.

  28. 28.

    Eunika Mercier-Laurent, Mieczyslaw Lech Owoc, and Danielle Boulanger, eds., Artificial Intelligence for Knowledge Management: Second IFIP WG 12.6 International Workshop, AI4KM 2014, Warsaw, Poland, September 7‒10, 2014, Revised Selected Papers (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 171‒173. A “sub-prefect” controlled the zones while the “Central Command Post” made decisions in case “local resources” could not handle the problems.

  29. 29.

    This argument is most cogently made in Jean-Loup Chappelet, “Olympic Environmental Concerns as a Legacy of the Winter Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (2008): 1884–1902. Chappelet contends the Albertville Games forced the IOC to consider environmental impacts as the IOC “could not afford a repeat of Albertville environmental criticism in subsequent games,” 1892. See also, Vincent May, “Environmental Implications of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games,” Tourism Management 16, no. 4 (1995): 269–275.

  30. 30.

    John May, “World-Class Destruction,” New York Times, February 17, 1992.

  31. 31.

    Rone Tempest, “Going for the Gold: Games Will Either Be the Salvation of Struggling Savoy or the Last Push Down Ski Slope Toward Economic Ruin,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1992.

  32. 32.

    Mycle Schneider, “Fast Breeder Reactors in France,” Science and Global Security 17 (2009): 43.

  33. 33.

    Mycle Schneider, “Fast Breeder Reactors in France.”

  34. 34.

    Nissim only claimed responsibility for the attack in 2003 in an interview with the Swiss newspaper Le Temps. Sylvain Besson, “Après vingt ans de silence, un ex-déupté avoue l”attaque à la roquette contre Creys-Malville,” letemps.ch. May 8, 2003. Accessed January 26, 2018. www.letemps.ch/suisse/2003/05/08/apres-vingt-ans-silence-un-ex-depute-avoue-attaque-roquette-contre-creys-malville.

  35. 35.

    Besson, “Après vingt ans de silence.” Initial theories blamed terrorist Carlos the Jackal for the attack but Nissim claimed responsibility in 2003. See, Gar Smith, Nuclear Roulette: The Truth about the Most Dangerous Energy Source on Earth (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2012), 114; Four years later, the RAF and the CCC merged with an aim of creating “a band of communist guerrillas in western Europe.” Quote found in Giuseppe Amadei, “Parliamentary Assembly Report on the European Response to International Terrorism,” in International Terrorism: Political and Legal Documents, ed. Yonah Alexander (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 417.

  36. 36.

    “Some thoughts on the Security arrangements at the Olympic Games,” Folder: Securité aux JO: rapports et correspondance, 1981‒1985, File- Rapport sur le risqué terrorist 1984, IOCL.

  37. 37.

    Guttmann writes of Berlioux’s demise, “it had been clear for several years that Berlioux was too strong willed a person to work easily with [Samaranch],” The Olympics, 166.

  38. 38.

    According to the GTD, from the end of the Seoul Olympics to the Opening Ceremonies in Albertville, France faced over two hundred acts of terrorism. January of 1991, almost precisely a year before the Games, was the worst month with over fifty attacks. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data File]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. As Ramón Spaaij notes, there are limitations to the GTD, including “the GTD does not include information on state terrorism.” Quote found in Spaaij, “Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas,” 465.

  39. 39.

    Letter from John Brotchie to Françoise Zweifel, July 23, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL.

  40. 40.

    Letter from Linda P. Martineau to Françoise Zweifel, May 30, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL.

  41. 41.

    Letter from M.B. Davis to Françoise Zweifel, April 26, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléair de Creys-Malville, File: Lettres des protestation contre la proximité d’Albertville à la centrale nucléaire de Creys-Malville, 1987, IOCL.

  42. 42.

    Letter from Gilles Tremey to Françoise Zweifel, August 7, 1987, Folder: Securité aux JO d’hiver d’Albertville central nucléaire de Creys-Malville, File: Lettre de Gilles Tremey (COJO) à Françoise Zweifel (CIO), IOCL. (Author’s translation).

  43. 43.

    Letter from Gilles Tremey to Françoise Zweifel, August 7, 1987.

  44. 44.

    Alberville Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 239. Scholars later uncovered a rarely discussed plot where a group destroyed the fiber-optic cables to the television feed during the Opening Ceremonies. See Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City, 48. The authors claim a group called “Coordination, Offensive, Use, Interruptions, and Cut” perpetrated the attack.

  45. 45.

    Minutes of the 99th IOC Session, July 21‒23, 1992, Barcelona, 108, IOCL.

  46. 46.

    Mike Rowbottom, “Barcelona 1992: Security threat played down.” Independent.co.uk. July 24, 1992. Accessed January 31, 2018. http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics-barcelona-1992-security-threat-played-down-1535486.html.

  47. 47.

    “Interior atribuye a los GRAPO el atentado contra un gasoducto en Vilafranca en vísperas de los JJ OO.” Elpais.com. July 25, 1992. Accessed February 1, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/1992/07/25/espana/712015216_850215.html.

  48. 48.

    The best analysis of the relationship between Barcelona and the Spanish State is John Hargreaves, Freedom for Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Samaranch’s legacy has been difficult for historians to grapple with. The most stringent criticism of him relates to his role with the Franco government. The harshest critique is found in Andrew Jennings and Vyv Simson, The Lords of the Rings: Power, Money and Drugs in the Modern Olympics (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992). There have also been attempts to scale back some of the criticism. While not quite a defense of Samaranch, Hill writes in Olympic Politics that Jennings and Simson “quote hardly any sources, and do not really put Samaranch into the context of Spanish politics at the time, so that it is difficult to evaluate what they say,” 74. See also Guttmann, The Olympics, 171‒172.

  49. 49.

    The details of this system are found in Barcelona Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXV Olympiad Barcelona 1992, volume 3, part 3, 306‒307.

  50. 50.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990, Folder: Ceremonies d’ouverture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989‒1992, IOCL. He told Abad this system would “accelerate the rate of progress since simultaneously various committees [would] be attending to their respective jobs.”

    He also commented that the system would require the subcommittees to effectively coordinate with one another.

  51. 51.

    “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992,” March 14, 1988, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1988, IOCL.

  52. 52.

    “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992.”

  53. 53.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990, Folder: Ceremonies d’ouverture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  54. 54.

    This number is found in Stephen Essex, “Platform for Local Political Expression and Resolution (Barcelona 1992),” in Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond, ed. Vida Bajc, 228.

  55. 55.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, November 30, 1989, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  56. 56.

    “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  57. 57.

    “Brief Report on Security on Summer Games 1992,” undated, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  58. 58.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990.

  59. 59.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990.

  60. 60.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990.

  61. 61.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990.

  62. 62.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 20, 1990.

  63. 63.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Josep Abad, April 20, 1990.

  64. 64.

    “A Review of Security at Barcelona Olympics,” undated, Folder: Ceremonies d’ouverture et du cloture du Jeux Olympiques d’ete de Barcelona 1992: projects, scenarios et tests de securité, File: project concomant les ceremonies, 1989‒1992, IOCL. The system established in Pusan employed concentric rings along with submarines.

  65. 65.

    “Brief Report on Security on Summer Games 1992.”

  66. 66.

    Juan José Echevarria, “El Gobierno creará una Comisión de Segurdiad para los Juegos Olímpicos, la Expo y Madrid Cultural,” elpais.com. October 28, 1988. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/28/espana/593996401_850215.html.

  67. 67.

    Barcelona Olympics Organizing Committee, The Official Report of the Organizing Committee, 305.

  68. 68.

    Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13‒16, 1991, Birmingham, 31, IOCL.

  69. 69.

    “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989. Kumar also noted the massive difficulty in clearing the mountain of potential threats.

  70. 70.

    “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report.”

  71. 71.

    Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1989‒1992, IOCL.

  72. 72.

    At a basic level Kumar listed, “perimeter of the harbour, mooring areas, access control of persons and merchandise, subaquatic checking of the ships ‘hulls, sea surveillance of the surrounding areas by spead [sic] boats, direct surveillance of spots which could be considered vulnerable.’” Quote found in “A Review of Security at Barcelona Olympics,” undated.

  73. 73.

    “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report,” November 30, 1989.

  74. 74.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 13, 1988, Folder: Security at the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona: reports, File: Reports, 1988, IOCL.

  75. 75.

    Letter from Ashwini Kumar to Juan Antonio Samaranch, April 13, 1988, It is unclear what this weaponry was as Kumar described it as “appropriate equipment.”

  76. 76.

    “Bombing Kills 8 in Barcelona; Basque Separatists Blamed,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1991.

  77. 77.

    A detailed history of the development of Basque nationalism can be found in Cameron Watson, Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present (Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, 2003), 170‒188.

  78. 78.

    A far more detailed history of the ETA is found in Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro, eds., ETA's Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). Following the death of Franco, the ETA’s military arm split into two factions with differing ideas on how to achieve their goals. ETA military, ETA(m), believed in continuing the military struggle while ETA politico-military, ETA(pm), changed in the years following Franco’s death and argued that their aims could be achieved without resorting solely to violence. The vast majority of attacks carried out in the early 1990’s were the responsibility of ETA(m). For a more nuanced history of this group’s development see, John L. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency): The Fight for Euskadi 1890‒1986 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 149‒185. On the dissolution of ETA see, “El Desarme Definitivo de ETA,” May 3, 2018. Accessed June 10, 2018. https://elpais.com/especiales/2017/desarme-definitivo-de-eta/.

  79. 79.

    Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13‒16, 1991, 32.

  80. 80.

    Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13‒16, 1991, 32.

  81. 81.

    Minutes of the 97th IOC Session, June 13‒16, 1991, 32.

  82. 82.

    “Planning the Barcelona Olympic Games 1992,” March 14, 1988. His claim that terrorist Iturbe Abosolo headed a France-based ETA “Executive Committee” in March of 1988 brings part of his analysis into question. Alonso died in a car crash in Algeria in March 1987, nearly a full year prior to Kumar filing his report. Abosolo’s obituary is found in, Edward Schumacher, “Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, Exiled Basque Terrorist,” March 3, 1987.

  83. 83.

    Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond, 48. The Summer Olympics was not the only major international target for terrorists in Spain in 1992. The Universal Exposition was set to begin in April in Seville, the capital of Spain’s Andalusian region. Spanish police arrested one ETA member preparing an attack in Seville with a “350-kg truck bomb loaded with shrapnel.” Quote found in Beth Finkelstein and Noel Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain,” The Washington Post, August 11, 1991.

  84. 84.

    United States. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary [Peru: Increasing Terrorist Activity in Lima; Heavily Excised],” 1988, 6.

  85. 85.

    Terra Iliure committed 53 attacks between the announcement of Barcelona as host and the Opening Ceremonies. See, Pete Fussey et al., Securing and Sustaining the Olympic City: Reconfiguring London for 2012 and Beyond, 49.

  86. 86.

    Finkelstein and Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.” In Freedom for Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games, Hargreaves notes the Guardia Civil led a “sweep” in an attempt to round up members of Terra Lliure. While most of those detained were later released, these arrests led to “suspicion among nationalists that the central state apparatus was up to its old tricks, and intended to intimidate them into desisting from campaigning around the Olympics,” 84.

  87. 87.

    Finkelstein and Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.”

  88. 88.

    “A Critique of Project Follow-Up Report.”

  89. 89.

    TREVI was formed following the Munich Olympics in 1975 as a counter-terrorism coordination committee. See, Fernando Jiménez, “Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response,” in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993), 121.

  90. 90.

    Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona.” The article did not specify which countries.

  91. 91.

    This attack received no media attention outside of a single article, Beth Finkelstein and Noel Koch, “The Threat to the Games in Spain.” Finkelstein and Koch mention the attack in passing and do not provide further details. There is no mention of the bomb in the BOOC records, Kumar’s files, Samaranch’s files, or the Global Terrorism Database.

  92. 92.

    Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992. Action Directe was a French terrorist group that operated from 1979‒1987 and, according to one scholar, “collapsed after a mass arrest.” Quote found in Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?,” The Journal of International Policy Solutions 9 (2008): 43.

  93. 93.

    Untitled Security Report from Ashwini Kumar, January 1992.

  94. 94.

    Teresa Whitfield, Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Whitfield calls the operation a “spectacular success” and that the “shock to ETA... was immediate, and real,” 74. The three men arrested were Jose Luis Alvarez, the ETA’s “ideologue,” Joseba Arregui Errostarbe, “the dean of ETA bombers,” and Francisco Mugica Garmendia, “Spain’s Public Enemy No. 1.” Quotes found in William D. Montalbano, “Basque Terror Dealt Crippling Blow by Arrests,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1992.

  95. 95.

    William D. Montalbano, “Address Book Leads to Basque Terror Leaders,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1992. The car bomb was one of the ETA’s trademarks and Spanish police said “it [was] impossible to protect against a car bomb.”

  96. 96.

    Ibid Part of the raid that captured the ETA leadership uncovered details on how the ETA’s structure operated. One official described the organization as “hydra-headed.” Quote found in William Drozdiak, “Avowed “Decapitation” of Basque Group in Doubt as Olympics Near,” The Washington Post, May 4, 1992.

  97. 97.

    Alan Riding, “OLYMPICS; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona.”

  98. 98.

    One CIA analysis in 1984 noted that the increased autonomy under Felipé Gonzalez’s regime had limited sentiment toward the ETA. One section notes, “ETA’s raison d’etre of perceived centralized oppression emanating from Madrid [had] lost credibility.” Quote found in “Spain: Basque Terrorism and Government Response,” November 1984, CIA FOIA ERR, Document No: CIA-RDP85S00316R000300110004-3. Guillermo Arbeloa, an ETA member, described “an evident loss of popular support” following the car bombings. Quote found in Rogelio Alonso, “Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011): 704.

  99. 99.

    John Hooper, “ETA Offers to Lift Olympics Terror Threat,” The Guardian (London), July 11, 1992. However, two car bombs set off within days of the start of the Tour must have slightly diminished that belief. Elliott Almond, “Tour de France: Indurain Gets Off to Good Start,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1992.

  100. 100.

    John Hooper, “ETA Offers to Lift Olympics Terror Threat.”

  101. 101.

    Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Basques in Spain, 2004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38dec.html [accessed 12 February 2018]. According to this document, the Spanish government held firm “to its policy of demanding the unconditional cessation of hostilities as a prerequisite for talks.” A separate news article also noted that the raid uncovered documents that ETA believed that attacking the Olympics would not serve the organization’s purposes. See, “SPAIN: Basques Waver on Attacking Olympic Games,” The Ottawa Citizen, July 17, 1992.

  102. 102.

    This incident occurred on the same day Johnson was scheduled to leave the Village. Christine Brennan, “An Olympic Celebration To the Finish,” The Washington Post, August 10, 1992.

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Duckworth, A. (2022). “A Most Spectacular Example of Cross-Border Collaboration”: Albertville and Barcelona. In: International Security and the Olympic Games, 1972–2020. Palgrave Studies in Sport and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05133-3_6

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