Introduction

Abstract

The use of sanctions in international political economy has increased dramatically in recent years. Sanctions are now arguably the most important instruments of US foreign policy towards ‘contender’ states, like Russia and Iran. Indeed, more sanctions were enacted during the first three years of the Trump administration than under all previous ones. The Biden administration does not seem to be willing to reverse this course of action any time soon. Tightening, not easing, of sanctions policies is a more likely scenario. This book draws on a comparative analysis of Russia and Iran under sanctions to back up a famous argument that the very emergence and existence of contender states has been a result of counter-hegemonic struggles, which have prompted the adoption of ‘Hobbesian’ regimes. This research addresses a crucial puzzle: why, even as sanctions have taken their toll on targeted states and induced economic problems and trade disruptions, have they been largely ineffective in terms of their stated objectives, such as political deterrence, foreign policy or a regime change. Despite initial economic grievances in the short run, in the longer run, the effects of sanctions have been paradoxical: the target states have managed to adjust to external pressures and to develop internal self-protection mechanisms.