Abstract
Aggregation functions work by taking as input one judgment set for each single individual. And it is up to the individual which judgment set to submit to the function. So the natural question arises: would it be possible for an individual to force the collective acceptance of a specific issue, by concealing her true judgment set and submitting an aptly modified one? This is, in a nutshell, the issue of the manipulability of judgment aggregation and it is the topic of the present chapter. We will study (non-)manipulability as a property of aggregation functions and explore the effects that such a property has on the process of aggregation.
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© 2014 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
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Grossi, D., Pigozzi, G. (2014). Manipulability. In: Judgment Aggregation: A Primer. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01568-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01568-7_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-00440-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-01568-7
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