Abstract
In this chapter, we discuss the coalition formation activities undertaken when agents in a multiagent system come together to form teams. We refer to these activities as coalition structure formation, and divide them broadly into two classes: coalition structure generation activities, undertaken when agents are not selfish but willingly agree to implement the agenda of a single system designer; and coalition formation activities by selfish rational agents, where agents choose to participate in coalitions in order to maximize their own utility. We will now discuss both of these models, starting with the former.
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© 2012 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
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Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., Wooldridge, M. (2012). Coalition Structure Formation. In: Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-00430-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-01558-8
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