Abstract
In this work, I offer an interpretation of the principle of individuation and the ontological status of individual bodies in the work of Margaret Cavendish. By proposing an alternative to the mechanical model of natural philosophy, Cavendish must approach the metaphysics of matter from a different angle. Such a perspective can offer fruitful elements to understand the complex and diverse landscape of natural philosophy in Early Modern Philosophy. I contextualize Cavendish’s natural philosophy and its relation to the developments of other early modern approaches. Section 1 is dedicated to an overview of Cavendish’s natural philosophy. In Sect. 2, I present the difficulty concerning the individuation of bodies in modern philosophy in order to reveal the background in which Cavendish develops her position. Before turning to the analysis of the central passages in which Cavendish explores the problem of individuation, in Sect. 4, I introduce the basic tenets of her metaphysics in Sect. 3. Finally, in Sect. 5, I turn to motion and its causes, given its fundamental role in individuation.
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Notes
- 1.
In many works Cavendish express the intention in the development of a system of nature. This is clear from Philosophical Letters (Cavendish, 1664, pp. 436–9); Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy (Cavendish 2001, p. 8; pp. 126–7); and Grounds of Natural Philosophy (Cavendish 1668, pp. 1–5). Cf. Deborah Boyle, The Well-Ordered Universe; Eileen O’Neill, Introduction. pp. XXI–XXXV to the complete and modern edition to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy; Karen Detlefsen ‘Cavendish and Conway on Individual Human Mind’; David Cunning, Cavendish, pp. 26–32; Sarah Hutton ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish’s Natural Philosophy’; Susan James ‘The Philosophical Innovations of Margaret Cavendish’; Eugene Marshall ‘Margaret Cavendish’ at Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sect. 2. http://www.iep.utm.edu/; and his introduction to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy; Susan James ‘The Philosophical Innovations of Margaret Cavendish’.
- 2.
Cavendish states: “Having viewed four of the most eminent of the ancient philosophers, I.
will proceed now to Aristotle; who may justly be called the ‘‘Idol of the Schools’’; for his doctrine is generally embraced with such reverence, as if truth itself had declared it. But I find he is no less exempt from errors, than all the rest, though more happy in fame.”(Cavendish 2001, p. 267).
- 3.
- 4.
This introductory presentation of Cavendish’s metaphysics employs for the most part the expositions made by Karen Detlefsen in her papers ‘Atomism, Monism and Causation in the Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish’ and ‘Cavendish and Conway on Individual Human Mind’.
- 5.
This phrase was coined by Eileen O’Neill in her introduction to the Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. Cf. O’Neill 2001, pp. XXIII–XXIV.
- 6.
Although Detlefsen and Shaheen have diferent approaches on the relation of matter and motion in Cavendish, both assert that motion have a fundamental role in the individuation of parts of nature.
- 7.
Jonathan Shaheen’s paper ‘Part of Nature and Division in Margaret Cavendish’s Materialism’ presents a careful and insightful interpretation of the principles of division and on the nature of the parts.
- 8.
Jonathan Shaheen defends the same view. Cf. Shaheen 2019, pp. 3560–3562.
- 9.
Eileen O’neill and Karen Detlefsen offer a detailed account of causation in Cavendish and its origins in the critical examination of transference of motion in a mechanistic context.
- 10.
In her recent paper about Cavendish’s and Conway’s conception of human mind, Detlefsen brings forward the importance of self-awareness and psychological representations to the individuation of minds. Here, this idea is generalized to every part of matter. Cf. ‘Cavendish and Conway on Individual Human Mind’, pp. 134–7.
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I would like especially to thank José Eduardo Porcher and Katarina Peixoto for the revision and comments on this work.
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Pricladnitzky, P. (2022). Cavendish and the Ontological Status of Individual Bodies. In: Lopes, C., Ribeiro Peixoto, K., Pricladnitzky, P. (eds) Latin American Perspectives on Women Philosophers in Modern History. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-00288-5_6
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