Abstract
This chapter examines social media data and reporting from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia through the quarterly historical research compiled by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence from 2017 to 2022. It explores messaging and narratives in Russian and English, and monitors online manipulation of information. The research collects data from VKontakte and Twitter, and examines current and historical trends to assess patterns, changing manipulation and automation tactics, and strategies employed by overseers of automated accounts disseminating inauthentic and automated messages. The research primarily focuses on anti-NATO and anti-Baltic sentiment, exploring patterns, responses, and coordinated disinformation campaigns on social media.
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Notes
- 1.
In the third report of 2020, the algorithm was revised and run again on the data from 2017. The results were amended to 56% of posts were automated in Russian. Only 30% of the accounts have been deleted, while most of the rest remain unused.
- 2.
An in-depth look may be seen at: https://stratcomcoe.org/news/bots-talk/44
- 3.
On November 25, 2018, a Russian Coast Guard vessel, operated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), fired on three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to transit the strait. Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia recognizes the strait as Russian waters, while Ukraine does not. Russia blamed Ukraine for the incident.
- 4.
Sputnik, a Russian state-owned online news website, was founded by Rossiya Segodnya in 2014. The website is published in 31 languages and is known for spreading disinformation as well as factual news (Watanabe, 2018).
- 5.
The Latvian SS Volunteer Legion was formed in 1943 after Nazi defeats on the Eastern front and a push to form military units among occupied populations. However, recruitment was primarily through conscription and the unit “neither was voluntary nor an ordinary part of the German SS.” The Legion remains the subject of political and narrative debate (see Bøtcher, 2000).
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Hanley, M., Huhtinen, AM., Sartonen, M. (2022). Robotrolling in the Baltic States. In: Chakars, J., Ekmanis, I. (eds) Information Wars in the Baltic States. The Palgrave Macmillan Series in International Political Communication. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99987-2_8
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