Abstract
While the Baltic states are not strangers to disinformation and information warfare threats from Russia, it is only recently that the NATO Alliance has elected to focus on the very real risks that information warfare poses to the Baltic states and the Alliance in general. Russian-originating disinformation in the Baltic information sphere began over 70 years ago and continued throughout the Soviet period to today. Many narratives promulgated during this time have been rebranded and reused, though today they spread much faster with the help of social media and ever-evolving technology. Since joining NATO in 2004, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have routinely been listed as one of the top five threats to the Russian Federation (Levada, Allies and enemies among countries: Poll. Levada Center, 2019a; Levada, Who are our friends and who are our enemies? Poll. Levada Center, 2019b). This is, in part, due to rampant local disinformation campaigns targeting Russians in Russia and audiences abroad, disseminating the narrative that the Baltic states, as part of NATO, constitute a grave threat. This chapter outlines the history, mission, and purpose of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence as NATO’s response to information warfare threats in the Baltic states. The work of the Centre will also be examined and Latvia will be highlighted as a case study for effective mitigation of information threats and hybrid warfare.
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Hanley, M. (2022). NATO’s Response to Information Warfare Threats. In: Chakars, J., Ekmanis, I. (eds) Information Wars in the Baltic States. The Palgrave Macmillan Series in International Political Communication. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99987-2_11
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