Abstract
In this essay I attempt to delineate the communicative framework upon which Aristotle constructed JSVMR 1–6, which sets out to establish and promote his cardiocentric theory. In particular, I seek to identify and decode the authorial techniques and strategies that Aristotle skillfully deploys to reinforce his argument that the soul is located within the body and resides in the heart, and to guide his audience to adopt it. Among others, I consider Aristotle’s use of the first person plural, cross references, implicit instructions for his readers, and the use of examples, and I analyse the characteristic features of his style of writing. The overall impression one gets from JSVMR 1–6 is that of a well-structured natural-philosophical discourse that reflects much greater care on the author’s part than is usually attributed to Aristotle’s treatises.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Verdenius (1985) p. 18: “[Aristotle] envisaged readers as the ultimate addressees of his works, but was unable to fix his thoughts at once in the rigid form of books. He therefore first expressed them more loosely and tentatively in his lecture-notes, but always having in view the ideal of a finished version”. Since Aristotle kept revising his “lecture-notes”, I concur with Netz (2001) p. 228 that much of the extant corpus should be conceived of as a kind of “Aristotle’s seminar reading, read, re-read and expanded by his students”. I believe that the JSVMR fits this description, presenting a text near to completion.
- 2.
Cf. Asper (2019) p. 10: “Aristotle wishes to construct a consensus as starting-point for further discussion and even research in each of the fields treated and beyond”. On the question of ‘audience-orientedness’ in scientific writings, see van der Eijk (1997) pp. 86–89; cf. ibid. p. 92 for the corpus Aristotelicum.
- 3.
The dual audience perspective has been already proposed by Tessitore (1996) with regard to the text of the EN. This perspective is not endorsed here with the aim of resolving any inconsistencies within the JSVMR but as a view allowing for the possibility that this work can be accessible and appealing to a mixed audience, i.e. an audience with a variety of background knowledge. Although in this essay I do not examine JSVMR 7–27, I believe that the dual audience perspective applies to this part of the text as well. In this case, however, much of the information provided by Aristotle appears as new knowledge to nearly all his students, since both the digression on respiration and the rest of the chapters dealing mainly with the role of nutrition and the environment (see in detail Essay 2) differ in nature from JSVMR 1–6 (proposed in Essay 1 to be a summary of ideas discussed elsewhere), breaking as they do for the most part new ground for natural-philosophical inquiry.
- 4.
The view concerning audience differentiation with respect to background knowledge seems to be in line with Asper’s (2007) remarks on the forms of communication developed in the philosophical ‘schools’ of Athens which were regularly “ohne explizite Adressatenbegrenzung” (p. 315).
- 5.
Cf. Tindale (2015) pp. 50–51: “In the first book of the Topics, Aristotle judges those opinions to be reputable “which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise – i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable or reputable of them” (i.1). This is because opinions don’t “show their character entirely on the surface” (Ibid.) and so may not be as reputable as they appear. Even people who have little power of comprehension, however, may recognize such deceptions. Thus, Aristotle extends the arguments of the Topics to the widest of audiences, requiring only the minimum of cognitive abilities to discern those opinions that are reputable. It perhaps should go without saying, but it is worth noting that any attempt to persuade assumes that an audience can be persuaded. That they are equipped with reason sufficient to review a case and recognize the power of a good argument, perhaps even setting aside personal bias to embrace that argument. Such an assumption underlies the project of the Rhetoric and arises from the capacity to be rhetorical that was discussed earlier”.
- 6.
This is clear not only from the content of JSVMR 1–6, which presupposes such background knowledge, but also from direct internal references to the PA, de An. and the Pr. included in the text.
- 7.
Cf. Natali (2013) p. 82: “But these were principally, as far as we can tell, students who were already advanced on the path of the bios theōretikos and had decided to pursue the life of a philosopher … Even if there were any such young men in his school, Aristotle does not mention in his works any young men who came there primarily to receive a bit of “higher education””. And p. 117: “The use of all these visual aids (lists of noteworthy opinions, tables, diagrams, maps, wind roses, and anatomical illustrations) clearly indicates a teaching activity that was fairly institutionalized”. Similarly, Asper (2019) p. 11.
- 8.
Asper (2019) p. 13.
- 9.
A number of features indicative of a desire for systematicity (similar to that occurring in technical texts, on which, see Asper (2016)) can be identified in the JSVMR: organisation of the material, attempts to prove a thesis on the basis of a specific method, clearly marked-off steps of research, definite structure with its own beginning, middle and end, use of terminology, associations of contents of everyday speech with the author’s terminological notions. Asper (2016) concludes by pointing out the link to rhetoric: “Systematicity, then, is partially a product of rhetorical strategies consciously chosen by an author” (p. 120). Tessitore (1996) p. 13 emphasises that “an adequate interpretation requires attentiveness to both the rhetorical and pedagogical dimensions of the Ethics, a concern that presupposes careful consideration of Aristotle’s intended audience”.
- 10.
- 11.
Cf. von Staden (1994) p. 105.
- 12.
Cf. Totelin (2012) p. 307.
- 13.
Cf. Asper (2013) p. 4.
- 14.
On whether arousal of emotion is a part of rhetoric (as we see in Rh. I 2.1356a14–20) or merely accessory (as it seems from Rh. I 1.1354a11–18), see Dow (2015) Chapter 7, with discussion of previous scholarship.
- 15.
- 16.
To draw a complete picture of the content and context of the passages analysed below, the reader may consult the relevant comments in the commentary section of this book.
- 17.
The verb διορίζω (467b13) is generally used to denote definitions, yet it should not escape our attention that at 1.467b13 the preposition διά- (“through”) seems to indicate that the formulation of a definition of the soul is preceded by an elaborate and painstaking research process (i.e. gathering, processing, and interpreting data, and thereby drawing clear-cut conclusions). Cf. de An. I 1.402a10–22, where Aristotle admits the difficulty of the subject under investigation.
- 18.
Hypothetically speaking, based on the text as we have it. The question of whether the Aristotelian text we read today corresponds to the text Aristotle had in front of him is beyond the scope of this essay. See also n. 19 below.
- 19.
By using the phrase “already written”, I do not mean to contribute to the continuing debate about the chronological order and the completeness of Aristotle’s works. Rather, I simply take the phrase εἴρηται πρότερον to refer to an – at least – unfinished draft already in circulation which served as a useful reading for Aristotle and his students (see n. 1 above). Based on the rationale developed by Verdenius (1985), another explanation for the phrase “already written” could be that Aristotle’s statement in 3.468b31-469a2 reflects what he intends to write in the PA: it is telling, in other words, of how he envisages the PA as a finished work. While this conjecture cannot be ruled out, at the end of the day, “[in] a certain sense, each of Aristotle’s unpublished works, once written, becomes contemporaneous with every other, including those not yet written” (Burnyeat (2001) p. 113). The reason for thinking that Verdenius’ idea is hardly applicable in the current context is that the PA view invoked here reflects a central Aristotelian doctrine on which much of the investigation in the PA is dependent; so the discussion of this view must have been a substantial part of the original first PA-draft. Moreover, I am inclined to believe that Aristotle here refers to an already written section, partly because at this point he presents us with the results of the investigation carried out there, and partly because he presupposes that his audience is familiar with this extensive discussion in order to move forward to the main argument of Chapter 3. I am aware that these two arguments are not undebatable; yet this does not affect the validity of the views put forth below.
- 20.
III 4.665b15–16 and III 5.668a9–11.
- 21.
In the same way we should interpret the imperative ἀφείσθω at 1.467b18.
- 22.
Cf. Rh. I 2.1357a3–23.
- 23.
In this section, I discuss only first-person plural verbs. In Chapter 1, we find three more indicators of the author’s persona: λέγω (467b19), ἡμῖν (467b31), βλέποντες (468a2–3). Special attention should probably also be given to words and expressions whose grammatical person, though not indicated, can be easily inferred from the context, e.g. λεκτέον ἐπιστήσασι τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον (6.470b4–5).
- 24.
Van der Eijk (1997) pp. 116–117.
- 25.
Cf. Asper (2019) p. 13: “In Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ case, writing for agreement even acquires certain conventions of style, for example, the notable reluctance to employ a personal authorial stance. All Aristotle ever says is ‘we’; … Individuality and names are thus reserved for the doxographical targets of disagreement. Aristotle prefers a rhetoric of objectivity. The agreement presented has thus an aura of being independent of time or place and is therefore always close to the recipient”.
- 26.
Similarly Lehoux (2017) p. 246.
- 27.
Cf. the antithesis between καλοῦμεν and συμβαίνει in 5.469b22–24: καλοῦμεν δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ μάρανσιν, τὴν δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων σβέσιν, [τὴν μὲν γήρᾳ, τὴν δὲ βίαιον,] συμβαίνει δ’ ἀμφοτέρας διὰ ταὐτὸ γίνεσθαι τὰς φθοράς. (“And we call the type of destruction caused by itself ‘exhaustion’, and the type caused by opposites ‘extinction’ (the former through old age, the latter violent), but it turns out that both types of destruction occur for the same reason.”)
- 28.
Lennox (2001) p. 215. Cf. also Essay 1, p. 138, and Essay 2, pp. 153–154, n. 3 and p. 166.
- 29.
A similar view is found in 3.469a18–20: ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον, ταύτῃ καὶ ζῆν φαμεν, ᾗ δ’ αἰσθητικόν, ταύτῃ τὸ σῶμα ζῷον εἶναι λέγομεν. (“for in so far as a body is an animal, in that respect we also say that it is alive, while in so far as it is perceptive, in that respect we say that it is an animal.”)
- 30.
3.468b29–30 is one of the few instances which Lehoux (2017) takes to “tell us explicitly that [Aristotle] has personally made a particular observation” (p. 243). In this passage, a claim to autopsy is “conjoined with a frank admission that in some, or even many, cases there are difficulties of observation that may make certainty elusive” (p. 244).
- 31.
See pp. 199–202.
- 32.
See also n. 17 above.
- 33.
For further details, see commentary at 3.468b29–30.
- 34.
Cf. the terms ἐπισκοποῦσι (468b17–18), ἀφαιροῦσιν (468b25–26) and ἐμβάλλουσιν (468b26) in Chapter 3. On passages reporting testimony given to Aristotle by others, see Lehoux (2017).
- 35.
See Essay 4, Case 2.
- 36.
For a more comprehensive picture of the first chapter’s thematic agenda and role in the treatise as a whole, cf. comments on 467b10–11 and 467b11–12.
- 37.
Cf. ἴσως at 467b11 and p. 180, n. 75.
- 38.
Cf. comment on 1.467b16–18.
- 39.
Falcon (2005) p. 6, while examining GA I 23.731a30–35 and 731b4–5, observes: “Aristotle is clearly reacting to a certain tendency to connect the name zōion with the verb for living and being alive, zēn”.
- 40.
For which see van der Eijk (1997) p. 117.
- 41.
There seems to be a substantial gap both between the premises assumed here and between the premises and the conclusion. This gap may be explained either by the spoken (or less-polished) character of this part of the treatise or, more simply and more plausibly, by the fact that lingering on matters that have already been discussed in detail in the de An. would be practically unnecessary for the immediate purposes of the present discussion.
- 42.
Cf. the discussion below (Essay 4, p. 218) concerning the thematic relationship between the rest of JSVMR 1 and De Nat. Pueri 23.
- 43.
Cf. pp. 146–147 and 151–158.
- 44.
Top. I 1.100b21–24. Cf. p. 130, n. 5 above.
- 45.
By ‘popular belief’, I mean a belief that is not scientifically based and that is usually connected with magical and/or religious traditions and folk practices. Though they are normally distinct, it is a given that such beliefs and newfangled scientific thinking in the fourth century BCE are sometimes so closely related that it is often difficult to identify the boundaries between them (Lloyd (1983)). The cases of σφακελίζειν and ἀστρόβλητα are further analysed in Essay 4, Case 5.
- 46.
Cf. Ph. II 8.198b36–199a3: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ’ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα⋅ οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ’ ἂν χειμῶνος. (“We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in summer but only if we have it in winter.”) Particularly noteworthy in this passage is the phrase ὑπὸ κύνα, literally meaning “in the time of the constellation of the Dog”, which is used metonymically to refer to the hottest days of the year as if such a convention were familiar to everyone; cf. comment on 6.470a31–32.
- 47.
Rh. II 20.1393a23–25.
- 48.
Rh. I 2.1357b26–30, APr. II 24.69a13–19; see Allen (2001) pp. 38–40 and Karbowski (2015) p. 208. Arguments by example can be very effective in enabling the audience to grasp a general principle or to draw a true conclusion (Allen (2001) p. 39). “[T]hey are intended to be familiar items that constitute evidence for certain generalizations by being obvious or uncontroversial instances of them” (Karbowski (2015) p. 209). Cf. comment on 5.470a7–8.
- 49.
See Essay 1, pp. 127–134.
- 50.
Cf. EE I 6.1216b26–28: “About all these matters we must try to get conviction by arguments, using the phenomena as evidence (μαρτυρίοις) and illustration (παραδείγμασι)”.
- 51.
Nevertheless, elsewhere and also at the very end of Chapter 2, he includes tortoises (which are not insects but animals) among those animals that live for some time after division of their body.
- 52.
παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου λαβεῖν ἔστι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν καταπνιγομένων ἀνθράκων, 5.470a7–8. (“And as an example of this one can take what happens in the case of choked up coals.”)
- 53.
Rh. II 20.1393a28–30; cf. Lloyd (1966) p. 406.
- 54.
See comment on 4.469b1–2.
- 55.
See comment on 3.468b16–18.
- 56.
Cf. comments on 1.467b10–11 and 467b11–12, and Essay 1, pp. 127–137.
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
These are well-summarised by Bremmer (2010) p. 16, who draws examples from Sappho, Hipponax and Pherecydes of Syros.
- 60.
Bremmer (2010).
- 61.
Pythagoras seems to have been the first to introduce reincarnation into Greece (14A8a DK).
- 62.
Cf. the Orphic view of the body as the prison of the soul, a view adopted by Plato (Cra. 400c, Grg. 492a–493a, Phd. 80e–81e, Phdr. 248c–d). In the Pythagorean Philolaus (44B14 DK), we find the idea of the body as a tomb of the soul; cf. Bremmer (2010) pp. 17–18.
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Korobili, G. (2022). Essay 3: Reconstructing Aristotle’s Authorial Strategies in De Juventute et Senectute, de Vita et Morte, de Respiratione 1–6. In: Aristotle. On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration 1-6. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99966-7_11
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