Abstract
Acquisition processes are considered to be the acquisition of a company or a significant share in the equity of other companies, regardless of whether this was achieved by purchasing the property or ownership share of the acquired company or by pooling ownership interests. A takeover is considered hostile if management officially rejects the takeover bid. In countries whose capital markets are dominated by banks, including Croatia, companies are significantly more protected from hostile takeovers compared to economies with developed financial markets. The authors explore the features of integration processes, with special emphasis on hostile takeovers in the context of the development of the Croatian capital market. The results of primary research indicate its relative underdevelopment, which can be related to the achieved degree of institutional stability as one of the preconditions for its development.
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Acknowledgement
This work was funded within the project line ZIP UNIRI of the University of Rijeka for the project ZIP-UNlRl-130-5-20.
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Appendix: Business Merger and Acquisition Survey
Appendix: Business Merger and Acquisition Survey
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1.
Your position in the company is:
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(a)
Managerial
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(b)
Non-managerial
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(a)
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2.
The company operates:
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(a)
Less than 5 years
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(b)
6–10 years
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(c)
11–15 years
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(d)
More than 15 years
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(a)
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3.
In what sector does your company operate? __________________
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4.
Has your company applied a strategy to integrate business with another company so far?
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(a)
Yes, successfully
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(b)
Yes, unsuccessfully
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(c)
Not
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(a)
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5.
If the answer to the previous question is YES, what kind of integration it was:
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(a)
Merge
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(b)
Friendly re-ional
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(c)
Hostile takeover
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(a)
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6.
How likely is it that your company will initiate some of the following forms of business integration in the future (5 years old)?
Forms of integration | 1 (less than 50% Probability) | 2 (50% probability) | 3 (more than 50% probability) |
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Merge | |||
Friendly takeover | |||
Hostile takeover |
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7.
How likely is it that your company will receive an offer in the future (5 years) or be the subject of some of the following forms of business integration?
Forms of integration | 1 (less than 50% probability) | 2 (50% probability) | 3 (more than 50% probability) |
---|---|---|---|
Merge | |||
Friendly takeover | |||
Hostile takeover |
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8.
If there is a likelihood that your company would be subject to a hostile takeover, what strategy would you use to prevent such a takeover?
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(a)
Poison pill
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(b)
Crown jewels
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(c)
White Knight
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(d)
“Pacman” defense
IN MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A HOSTILE TAKEOVER:
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(a)
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9.
How do you assess the probability of a hostile takeover with regard to the development of capital markets in the Republic of Croatia?
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(a)
Low (1)
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(b)
medium-term (2)
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(c)
high-level (3)
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(a)
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10.
How do you assess the likelihood of a hostile takeover given the dependence of external financing of your company through capital markets in the Republic of Croatia?
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(a)
Low (1)
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(b)
medium-term (2)
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(c)
high-level (3)
-
(a)
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Ramić, S.H., Silić, D., Buterin, D. (2022). Integration as an Indicator of (under) Development of the Croatian Capital Market. In: Olgić Draženović, B., Buterin, V., Suljić Nikolaj, S. (eds) Real and Financial Sectors in Post-Pandemic Central and Eastern Europe. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99850-9_8
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