Introduction

Many African economies recorded consistent economic growth over the second decade of the twenty-first century (UNECA 2017a, b; Awortwi and Remi Aiyede 2017). Indeed, six out of the ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2014 were in Africa (AfDB 2015) and this had encouraged the provision of social assistance and other pro-poor policies and programmes in the continent. The World Bank’s State of Social Safety Net report for 2015 indicated that the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implementing cash assistance programmes to deserving citizens had increased from 20 to 40 within the period of 2012 to 2014. Garcia and Charity (2012) indicated similar growing trend for the number of countries in Africa implementing social assistance programmes. According to them, more than 120 social cash transfer programmes were being implemented in Africa between 2000 and 2009. However, economic growth in Africa have not translated into social development everywhere since poverty, exclusion and unemployment remain major issues in the continent (Awortwi and Remi Aiyede 2017). The 2017 Africa Sustainable Development Report (UNECA 2017a) underscored the continent’s slow progress in reducing poverty, notwithstanding the economic growth recorded. It noted the lack of inclusiveness and the disproportionate prevalence of poverty among women and the youth (p. ix). There are doubts things may improve anytime soon. UNECA (2017b) Economic Report on Africa (ERA) also indicated a falling growth in the continent’s economy by more than half (i.e., from 3.7% in 2015 to 1.7% in 2016). Though the fall is attributable to several factors, including weak global economic conditions, low oil and commodity prices as well as adverse weather conditions (UNECA 2017b), it also points to the weak economic conditions and policies of Africa’s largest economies. For instance, Nigeria’s economic growth contracted by 1.6% while South Africa grew by 0.6%, Angola by 0.8%, Algeria by 2.9%, Egypt by 3.4% and Morocco by 1.7% in 2016 (UNECA 2017b: 3). This slow growth by countries perceived to be the continent’s economic giants has been insignificant to be able to push the continent out of poverty.

In addition to severe infrastructural deficits and data limitations that restrict Africa’s industrial development relative to other regions in Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, this chapter argues that governance and leadership are also crucial to the continent’s development. Countries in Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean face similar developmental challenges as Africa including global economic competitions, the often-low oil and commodity prices and severe adverse weather conditions. They also face challenges of limited data, infrastructural deficits and land reforms. However, they have been able to record sustainable economic growth with very limited natural resources. The difference in how these regions manage their developmental challenges relative to Africa is leadership, and this has been aptly captured in the 1989 World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR).

Leadership has a direct link to good governance and economic development as it provides the guide to achieving both (Chazan et al. 1992). Great leadership skills, intertwined with remarkable understanding of the policy making process, could produce outcomes that are germane. Therefore, leadership and policy implementation competencies have direct implications on policy direction and are very critical to ensuring that policies yield positive impact on the lives of majority of people in society.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section “Leadership in Africa” examines the concept of leadership broadly and leadership in Africa specifically, after the introductory section in one above. It focuses on traditional and modern leadership features and roles in Africa. Section “Governance in Africa” discusses the evolution of governance in Africa since 1900 to 2016 using five indicators (Accountability, Participation, Deliberation, Division of Power and Freedom of Expression) drawn from the Varieties of Democracy data version 7. Section “Governance, Leadership and Public Policy Interface in Africa” looks at the interface between leadership, governance and public policy making in Africa and the likely challenges, while Section “Conclusion” provides the conclusion.

Leadership in Africa

Leadership is an influential process towards achieving a set goal (Northouse 2004). It is both a process and an outcome. The process involves the skill of persuading people to obey or accept the vision and thinking of the person leading. This skill either is acquired through learning experience as in process leadership or could be innate as in trait leadership (Jago 1982). In either case, the outcome focuses on meeting a specific objective, target, vision or goal. Ayee (2013: 182) identifies three major features of leadership; its ability to mobilize and inspire people, its ability to promote unity and encourage group behaviour, and its ability to strengthen institutions by roles and hierarchy of responsibilities. It can therefore be argued that leadership is about the exercise of influence by one person over another or group of persons using the best traits as well as required skills and knowledge to achieve desired goals (Lawal 1993; Sikula 1996; Akpala 1982).

The literature on leadership in Africa developed slowly, yet examined many themes after independence (Fourie et al. 2017), including political leadership, leadership and management; leadership styles; leadership and gender; leadership development; leadership and development; leadership and African values; traditional leadership; individual leadership; leadership and ideology; leadership and religion; local leadership; leadership succession and leadership in education in that order (Fourie et al. 2017: 3).

The 1970s witnessed an expansion of the leadership literature in Africa in three main fronts (Fourie et al. 2017: 3): the decoupling of traditional leadership that existed before independence and which was widely utilized during colonial rule from political leadership. In Ghana and Uganda, traditional leadership came under a barrage of criticisms and alienation. The second front was the emergence of constructive criticisms on the dominant focus of the leadership on literature on only political leadership to the neglect of other forms of leadership in the continent. Hotchkiss (1979), in this regard, wrote about the role of union leaders in Sierra Leone and how they fought for the interests of their members. Also, the role of traditional and unionize leadership (including the Aborigines Rights Protection Society and the Fante Confederacy) to the colonial struggle in Ghana became prominent. This type of leadership was also felt in Mali when the Cocoa Farmers’ Movement mobilized local people to attain heroic results and influence policy (Bingen 1996). Other themes and conceptualization of leadership were discussed continuously, notably among them were charismaticFootnote 1 and instrumentalFootnote 2 leadership. Kofele-Kale (1978) defines instrumental leadership in Africa as amounting to “societal leadership” where power and influence are primarily exercised by family members and close associates of the leader to achieve private ends. He concludes that instrumental leadership in Africa advances the interest of the self rather than the collective or group.

Africa’s historical experiences interrupted the natural development of the discourse on leadership. Colonialism created a bifurcated leadership in Africa: traditional and modern.Footnote 3 Ekeh (1975) explains the role of colonialism in creating “two publics” in Africa: the “primordial” and the “civic” publics. Even though both “publics” are underpinned by morality, the primordial public is more private and personal and more akin to traditional leadership compared to the civic public which is more civil and relies on transparent institutions to function. Traditional leadership in Africa is more of a personal rule associated with the office holder, underpinned by history, tradition and customs (Ayee 2001). Traditional leaders are acceptable within specific ethnic communities and closely linked to the hereditary systems of power and privileges (Ayee 2013). They have monopoly of power and often govern with arbitrariness. On the other hand, contemporary leadership comes with some of the features of the civic public. It is characterized by norms of impersonality and the absence of arbitrariness (Ayee 2001). Legitimacy is drawn from the people and documented legislations. Leaders are accepted by everyone regardless of their ethnicity and there is the rule of law and equality before same (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 Traditional and modern leadership compared

These leadership features influence the kind of role they play in society. The traditional leader in Africa had all powers of the kingdom vested in him. Mamdani (1996) argues that the multiple roles of the traditional leader in Africa are commensurate with the “sum and substance of his authority” (p. 23). The traditional African leader played the following functions: governance function, where s/he serves as the head of the traditional governance council; military function, where s/he serves as the commander-in-chief of his people and personally leads the army into battles in defence of her/his kingdom or for expansion; religious function, where s/he serves as the spiritual head of the community and performs sacrifices on behalf of the kingdom; administrative function, where s/he serves as both the custodian of the land and superintend over the day-to-day administration of his kingdom. Traditional leaders also embodied deep cultural values of the people and represent the identity of the community. They provide symbolic leadership and serve as custodians of development and the dynasty, mediate in disputes and serve as symbols of reconciliation.

Modern leadership is engulfed in a myriad of functions, some of them not quite different from traditional leadership roles. Leaders often represent political parties and contest elections to win power. They organize government upon winning political power and formulate policies as well as supervise their implementation. Modern leaders provide direction, coherence and meaning for development; they work to create jobs, improve people’s living standard and alleviate poverty. They govern to fight crime and protect their citizens. They embody the values of their society and represent the state at international forums (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2 Functions of traditional and modern leadership

The difference between traditional and modern leadership can be narrowed down to three crucial issues: mode of selection, attributes and performance evaluation (Ayee 2013). According to Ayee (2013: 188) “traditional leadership is regarded as a closed system, characterised by stratification, hereditary succession, legitimacy and personalism. These features are untenable in modern leadership characterised by openness, legal rationality, universalism, equality and change.”

The way traditional and modern leaders are selected constitutes one of the major differences between them. The acceptance of electoral democracy in Africa has led to majority of modern political leaders being elected by their people in a relatively competitive manner. Traditional leaders, on the other hand, are born into nobility and inherit power. The mode of selection invariably has an impact on the performance evaluation of both traditional and modern leaderships. While modern leaders are evaluated by citizens and the international community based on their performance, traditional leaders are not evaluated in the same manner. Attributes differ among individual leaders and not by the generic titles of traditional or modern leadership and may be very difficult to discuss without reference to specific individuals.

Leadership, whether traditional or modern, has been identified as the bane of Africa’s development due to the myriad of challenges that it confronts as an institution. The first leadership challenge, vis-a-vis, development is the tension that sometimes exists between modern and traditional leadership in Africa. Countries in Western Europe have maintained the same leadership form overtime, refining and reforming it in response to challenges and circumstances in the quest for development. This is not the same in Africa because of colonialism. Colonialism has led to a situation where traditional leadership and the leadership in the modern sector are separated. They exist side by side and are often not synergetic. The role of traditional leadership in modern policy making process varies considerably across countries on the continent. In some African countries (including Burundi, Rwanda, Tunisia and Tanzania) traditional leaders play very minimal role in the policy making process. In others like Ghana and Nigeria, they play very significant roles and are quite influential in affecting policy outcomes. In the latter case, there are often tensions between these two leadership categories. For example, in Ghana the Constitution recognizes the role of traditional leadership institutions and has created the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs. Chiefs are also appointed into the Council of State which has the role of advising the President on national policy issues. At the same time Clause 1 of Article 276 bars Chiefs from engaging in active partisan politics. Traditional leaders that often attempt to openly influence the policy making process are often misconstrued to be actively partisan. Indeed, some traditional leaders have openly violated this provision. However, there is a third case where traditional and modern leadership work closely together to foster unity and bring about development in Africa, especially in countries like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Modernity and Western liberal democracy have withered the powers of traditional leadership in majority of African countries; the remaining traditional rights and privileges that they use to exercise are constantly being taken away from them. Traditional leaders are required by Western liberal democracy to reform and change cultural practices that form the source of their authority. Secondly, globalization and urbanization have both globalized local challenges beyond the reach of just a single leader. The shared challenge of ending poverty, stemming the spread of HIV/AIDS, checking human rights abuses, fighting corruption and bad governance are localized issues but global in response. Globalized problems require international solutions. International solutions need international cooperation, and a country’s ability to benefit from a global solutions and interdependency requires a certain amount of political, economic and security powers that are way beyond the reach of the traditional leader.

The increasing monetization of leadership selection procedures, both traditional and modern, has negatively affected the quality of leadership in terms of impartial and selfless rule. Monetization of traditional leadership has led to the selection of people outside of the royal family that have money and these practices have raised legitimacy concerns. Increasingly, it becomes difficult for traditional leaders to exercise authority when they have questionable legitimacy. In modern leadership, elections are conducted with money and often won with money. This creates a situation where elites that sponsor electoral campaigns capture governments. Developments of this nature breed political exclusion, urban bias, weak political will and centralization of political power. These few leadership challenges, from the many lot that face Africa, continue to impact on the governance process of the continent. The next section examines their implications for governance in the continent.

Governance in Africa

Broadly defined, governance refers to the various means through which social life is coordinated (Heywood 2007: 6). The World Development Report (WDR) defines governance as “the process through which states and non-state actors interact to design and implement policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power” (WDR 2017: 41). Governance has to do with the changes in “responsibilities of public authorities and institutions and the several ways in which order, and stability are generated in modern society” (Ayee 2016: 3). A best fit summary from these definitions will assume governance to be a kind of interactive process (Edwards and Romero 2015), societal regulatory rules (Koiman 2003; Hyden and Court 2002) and power dynamics (WDR 2017; Ayee 2016). Governance occurs at different levels (i.e., from the international to community levels) creating a complex and an overlapping network of actors with different power dynamics. There are several ways of acquiring political power. Yet, this section will examine three critical modes: first, through inheritance or hereditary transfer; second, through the gun or military coup d’état; and finally, through elections or democracy. Power that is acquired hereditarily is less likely to be openly contested, participatory and inclusive. The level of Accountability may also be limited since power holders will be more inclined to account to the source of their power rather than to those that are being governed with the power. Similarly, power acquired through military coup d’état is more likely to follow in the same fashion as hereditary power; being dependent on the gun and the few elements that helped made the coup a success. Power acquired through elections is more likely to be transparent, accountable and participatory. This assumption is reinforced by the way power is acquired in a democracy—basically, through popular ballot. Elections and perhaps the existence of both horizontal and vertical institutions of Accountability have made transparency, Accountability and Participation more likely in a democracy than in the other modes of acquiring power.

Which of these modes of acquiring power is most developmental? Democracy is assumed to be the most developmental since decisions are made in a more inclusive and participatory manner. Democracy is therefore deemed befitting for the African continent to address the conflicts, poverty and poor governance that challenge its progress. For example, the 2003 Human Development Report noted that the 1990s was a “decade of despair” in which many countries, majority of them from Africa, experienced reverse development because of war. Williams (2011) also notes the sheer volume of armed conflicts that are fought in the continent and the propensity of these conflicts to retard development. The democratic peace theory suggests that democracies have in-built conflict resolution mechanisms that prevent the escalation of ordinary disputes into full-blown conflicts. Democratic institutions could reverse the developmental deficits necessitated by conflicts. Despite these virtues of democracy, there has been a democratic recession globally (Diamond 2011, 2015; Gyimah-Boadi 2015; Kurlantzick 2011; Levitsky and Way 2015). Democratic norms and practice are in retreat globally. The increasing deficits in the provisions of services and the satisfaction of the basic needs of citizens in a democracy, the unflinching equation of democracy to elections and the tendency of states to have illegitimate governments that rose to power through electoral fraud and monetized elections, and the adequate influence of the electorate in decision making after elections account for erosion of confidence in democracy.

Conclusively, how power is acquired is as important as the manner it is used. Most countries have been able to successfully develop under conditions described as less democratic. Wade (2003) describes the developmental strategies employed by the Asian Tigers in their infant stages of development as purely illiberal. Therefore, when the Asian financial crisis occurred in 1996, one of the neo-liberal explanations was what they termed “crony capitalism”—a term that symbolizes the practice, as well as the implementation of economic principles that are contrary to the established practices under a capitalist economy (O’Brien and Williams 2004). Indeed, capitalism is the economic manifestation of political liberalism and the two are expected to complement each other. The relative economic successes of Rwanda and Ethiopia as well as similar feats achieved under military regimes in Africa (also under the Acheampong’s regime in Ghana in the 1970s) collectively reinforce the now popular theory of “developmental autocracies.” Developmental autocracy refers to a situation where an economy superintended by a supposedly non-democratic government can grow and develop. It is important, however, to note that developmental autocracies are often fragile and exposes countries to severe developmental crisis. Developments are better managed by strong and efficient institutions rather than strong men. The economic challenges post-Meles Zenawi Ethiopia is going through is evident of the fragility of this development model. In this section I present the evolution of governance in Africa since 1900 to 2016 using the five indicators: Accountability, Participation, Deliberation, Division of Power and Freedom of Expression drawn from the Varieties of Democracy data.

In the 1900s in West Africa, Division of Power was the least deep in terms of the five democratic indicators selected for analysis with a value of 0.12 and the Accountability indicator was deepest than all the other indicators with a value of 1.51. The values for the other indicators are Freedom of Expression (1.21), Deliberation (0.73) and Participation (0.63). As the West African sub-region progresses in democratic governance, most of these indicators appreciated remarkably: Accountability by 69%, Participation by 203%, Deliberation by 297%, Division of Power by 1392% and Freedom of Expression by 150%, all in 2016. Figure 9.1 indicates this growth for West Africa. The figures for Southern Africa are not quite different from West Africa in terms of the deepening of the principles of good governance. In the 1900s in Southern Africa, Division of Power was the least deep in terms of the five democratic indicators selected for analysis with a value of 0.44 and the Accountability indicator was deepest than all the other indicators with a value of 1.52. The other indicators had these values: Freedom of Expression (0.88), Deliberation (0.58) and Participation (0.47). As democracy deepens in Southern Africa, most of these indicators leapfrogged as well: Accountability by 53%, Participation by 296%, Deliberation by 310%, Division of Power by 361% and Freedom of Expression by 177%, all in 2016. Figure 9.2 indicate the growth for Southern Africa.

Fig. 9.1
A spider graph with 5 vertices labeled as accountability, deliberative component, freedom of expression, division of power, and participatory component. The values are plotted for the years 1900 and 2016.

Development of good governance in West Africa (1900–2016). Source: Analysed from V-Dem online data version 7 (2018)

Fig. 9.2
A spider graph of Southern Africa with 5 vertices labeled accountability, deliberative component, freedom of expression, division of power, and participatory component. The values are plotted for the years 1900 and 2016.

Development of good governance in Southern Africa (1900–2016). Source: Analysed from V-Dem online data version 7 (2018)

Fig. 9.3
A spider graph of East Africa with 5 vertices plotted for 1900 and 2016. The vertices are labeled accountability, deliberative component, freedom of expression, division of power, and participatory component.

Development of good governance in East Africa (1900–2016). Source: Analysed from V-Dem online data version 7 (2018)

The development of good governance at East Africa followed the same pattern of growth as in West and Southern Africa from 1900 to 2016. In the 1900s in East Africa, Division of Power was the least deep with a value of 0.33 and the Accountability indicator was the deepest with a value of 1.43; Deliberation tied with Participation at 0.47 and Division of Power came last (0.33). The figures witnessed tremendous growth over the years with Accountability recording 46%, Participation 232%, Deliberation 319%, Division of Power 303% and Freedom of Expression by 62%, all in 2016.

The development of good governance at Central Africa also followed the same pattern of growth as in the previous three regions: West, South and East Africa from 1900 to 2016. In the 1900s in Central Africa, Division of Power was the least deep in terms of the five democratic indicators selected for analysis with a value of 0.12 and the Accountability indicator was deepest than all the other indicators with a value of 1.25. In the 1900s, therefore, Accountability was deepest (1.25), followed by Freedom of Expression (0.62), Deliberation (0.5), Participation (0.45) and Division of Power came last (0.12). The figures witnessed tremendous growth over the years with Accountability recording by 67% in 2016, Participation by 231%, Deliberation by 338%, Division of Power by 1058% and Freedom of Expression by 266%, all in 2016. This is shown in Fig. 9.4.

Fig. 9.4
A spider graph of Central Africa with 5 vertices plotted for 1900 and 2016. The vertices are labeled accountability, deliberative component, freedom of expression, division of power, and participatory component.

Development of good governance in East Africa (1900–2016). Source: Analysed from V-Dem online data version 7 (2018)

Even though different reasons could explain the relative improvement in some of these indicators of good governance in all the four sub-regional blocs (i.e., the fact that these regions were centralized or acephalous around the 1900s could explain why the indicator on Division of Power or Deliberation or even Participation may be weak or deep; military regimes and one party states after independence could also explain why these indicators could be high or low; another reason could be efficient local government system, federal or unitary governmental system as opposed to any other reasons), there is the clear message that between the years of 1900 and 2016, these indicators have witnessed tremendous advancement in all these four regions, except in Northern Africa where no data exist. Table 9.3 presents the values shown in the radar graphs above, while Table 9.4 presents, in comparative terms, the percentage of improvement that these indicators have gone through.

Table 9.3 Average measures of good governance in African regions (1900–2016)
Table 9.4 Changes in measures of good governance in African regions in percentages (1900–2016)

There are two cautions that need to be exercised here in looking at these figures. First, the figures in Table 9.4 do not indicate, for example, that the West African sub-region is the best in terms of Accountability compared to the rest of the regions. The figure there suggests that the West African sub-region appreciated more in the Accountability index than all the other regions on the same variable. Second, the increasing pattern of development for all the indicators of good governance does not suggest that there are entrenched good governance practices. Several challenges remain regarding the practice of good governance, notwithstanding its increasing development. For example, the increase in acceptability of good governance and its broader indicators may be since it is now the global dominant paradigm and has become conditional in Africa’s dealings with the rest of the world, including the International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as in bilateral and multilateral engagements. These could condition acceptability but not quality in practice. Good governance in Africa is affected by elite capture, patrimonial tendencies, urban bias, corruption and a plain confusion of the theoretical understanding of these concepts and how they should be practised. These challenges vary from one sub-region to another and from one country to another, yet they should not be discounted since they have broader implication on policy making in the continent.

Governance, Leadership and Public Policy Interface in Africa

Public policy issues relate to basic ethical issues facing society (Stewart et al. 2008). Public policy can therefore be seen as a “set of ideas and practical search for institutional arrangements for the realization of the goals of society” (Anderson 1975: 5). Policy constitutes collective thoughts about how societal challenges are addressed in a more equitable and ethical manner. It also requires institutional arrangements for service delivery, including legislations and regulatory bodies. Public policy also involves processes, activities and actions (Nielson 2001), and not merely a single event. The nature of public policy suggests that it requires adequate planning, introspection and the capacity to execute it meaningfully and successfully. Public policies are implemented with purpose. Hence Anderson (1975) perceives public policy as a “purposive course of action” (p.2). Public policy as decisions, (in) actions or activities pursued by an actor or set of actors are to achieve often specified goals in the public interest.

Governance has intrinsic values. These values include creating opportunities for people to live peacefully without fear, setting the environment for people to live and interact according to the laws of the land, creating opportunities for sustained economic growth and expanding the freedoms that people enjoy (WDR 2017). Leadership and policy making are therefore crucial to achieving the intrinsic values of governance. Leadership (as in an individual King or Government as a collective entity) is necessary in the provision of security that will enable citizens live in a peaceful manner. Leaders need policy to guide action to achieve the goals of security, economic growth, expansion of freedom and to guarantee the rule of law and the general well-being of citizens. The kind of leadership exercised in a state or society will influence the calibre of policies formulated and implemented and that will invariably impact on governance.

There is relative stability of tenure in a traditional leadership than in a modern leadership. While traditional leaders could be removed from office for committing selected offences considered as taboos, leaders mostly stay in power through their life course if they avoid these misconducts. Modern leaders could also be impeached (in a typical Presidential system) or lose power in a vote of no confidence situation (in a typical Parliamentary system). Whereas the Presidential system is relatively stable than the Parliamentary system, leaders in both systems face constitutional term limits which make a person unable to lead for a life course. Stability of tenure could have implications for public policy making.

Leadership stability provides opportunity for the formulation and implementation of long-term policies that do not only deal with proximate developmental challenges but deeper structural ones as well. Stability in tenure also makes room for continuity in policy making rather than truncation. It prevents abandonment when a new political party with different ideological orientation succeeds a rival party. In some countries in Africa, constitutional provisions reinforce policy continuity in the event of a change of government, yet new governments often abandon capital-intensive investments. For example, Chap. 6 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana (i.e., the Directive Principle of State Policy) calls for, among other things, the continuation of government policies regardless of the party in power, but this call is often not heeded once there is a change of government.

Also, there is mostly fusion of powers in traditional leadership (i.e., where the King exercises Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers at the same time) compared to the relative separation of powers in modern governance systems. Fusion of powers is more manifest in a Parliamentary system of government than in a Presidential system. However, the collaboration/conflict relationship is felt more between the Legislative and Executive branches of government than in the relationship between these and the Judicial branch. The Judiciary is relatively independent and often exercises independent judgement and oversight over the other two branches. Further, per the design of modern governance institutions, the three branches of government are mostly presided over by different individuals or actors (i.e., the Chief Justice for the Judiciary, the Speaker of Parliament for the legislature and the President or the Prime Minister for the Executive; in a typical Anglo-Saxon fashion) unlike in the traditional system where one person (normally the King or Queen) carry out the three main functions of government.

This separation or fusion of the branches of government have implications for policy making. Speed in policy making may characterize the traditional leadership relative to the modern context (especially in situations where there exists a bicameral legislature) in which the first and second houses of the legislature will have to pass a bill before it goes to the Executive branch for assent. On the flip side, there is relatively less scrutiny and the exercise of oversight in public policy making where one person superintends the entire processes through its different stages of maturity. This explanation could be theoretical more than practical especially in some African countries where majority of the membership of the legislature come from the party that controls the Executive branch. In situations like this, the work of the Legislative branch (including public policy making) is influenced more by partisan politics than the common good.

Further, the policy making environment in modern governance system is influenced by a wide range of complex and networked actors than in the traditional context. States, under modern governance system, enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states but are also members of international institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organizations, among others. These arrangements have wider implication for public policy making in a modern leadership compared to the context of traditional leadership. For example, bilateral or multilateral agreements as well as policy conditionalities from international organizations could affect domestic policy making process in a positive or negative manner. Besides these international policy actors, local policy actors including civil society, unions, pressure and interest groups could bring their influences to bear on the policy making process of modern system. A policy making context of this kind will require relative commitment, coordination and cooperation to be successful. According to the WDR (2017) commitment in this sense is about duty bearers making the right policy decisions and public service providers thinking in the interest of the larger population and not only their personal interest. Coordination requires competitive investment environment that guarantees financial stability through the pursuit of credible policies, and clearly defined and enforced laws. Cooperation guarantees against opportunistic behaviour and allow for equity and inclusion. There is always a challenge to align global and continental developmental goals with that of national development priorities. African countries are members of many sub-regional, regional and global institutions—that is economic, political, security, etc.—yet in the pursuit of programmes of actions agreed upon from these bodies, they lose sight of their national developmental priorities. This therefore calls for a better coordination and harmonization to reap the benefits of the many confusing development agenda out there.

However, serious challenges remain in this interactive process. Prominent of these challenges is the poor development of scientific and technological knowledge via research. Research is fundamental to development (Chang 2005; Wade 2003) and according to the Economic Commission for Africa (2017a: 8), Africa spends less than 0.5% of its GDP on research and development compared to the more than 1% spent in most developing regions as a whole and the 2% in developed regions. The realization of Africa Union’s Agenda 2063 as well as the Sustainable Development Goals, the Commission noted, is hampered by inadequate scientific data. Indeed, research and development expenditure as a share of GDP stagnated at 0.4% during the period 2000–2013 in Africa (excluding the North).

There is also a challenge of investment in key sectors such as agriculture that employs majority of the African labour force. About 355 million people in Africa face food insecurity (UNECA 2017a); yet, agricultural productivity has been low with little deliberate attempt to improve that sector. Fiscal allocations to that sector in most African countries are below 10% of budgetary resources commitment made under the Maputo Protocol. Africa has vast land but only 5% of agricultural land in the continent is irrigated compared to 41% in Asia and 21% globally (UNECA 2017a). At the country-specific levels, not enough is being done to improve the levels of citizens’ well-being. The New Patriotic Party government under Nana Addo Danquah Akufo-Addo launched what it dubbed “Planting for Food and Jobs” programme as a way of increasing agricultural production to reduce food insecurity and to rebrand agriculture to make it attractive to much of the youth who are unemployed but seek white-collar jobs.

Conclusion

This chapter sets out to examine the role and interaction of leadership, governance and public policy in Africa and its implication for development. It shows that leadership attributes are generic and may qualify a person to lead. However, the ability of leaders to translate public confidence reposed in them through either royalty or popular vote into actionable developmental policy is cumbersome and context-specific. While in developed democracies, there is basically one major culture and tradition that evolved and has been refined by situations and circumstances, in Africa colonialism has created a bifurcated public sphere of leadership, thereby generating tensions rather than integrated co-existence in governance. The limited penetration of Western liberal democracy further alienates the contribution of traditional leadership to national development. This should be addressed as matter of policy to achieve synergy and the benefits of both institutions.

Segregated and often conflictual leadership systems in Africa have implication for governance. Policy making in Africa is limited by both bifurcated leadership and bad governance. In addition, limited data, poor capacity (both institutional and human) as well as bureaucracy and politicization are rampant in the African policy making environment. These together militate against the genuine quest and the countless efforts of the continent to either grow on its own or catch up with the now industrialized countries.

Moving forward, Africa needs to strengthen its leadership capacity by building cohesion between traditional and modern leadership. This is possible by reforming traditional leadership institutions and de-monetizing modern electoral processes. This reform could reduce apathy, exclusion and foster collaboration between these two institutions. Also, good governance can gain traction when practical steps are taken to address patrimonialism and corruption in the modern sectors. These will enable leadership and governance to address the concerns of citizens, promote the interest of the people and bridge the gap between the continent and other developed economies.