Keywords

Introduction

Fuel poverty, as a distinctive policy problem, is a relatively recent phenomenon tied to a particular set of social and political projects, as well as specific metrics and social groups that were initially the focus in bringing it onto the public agenda. Many countries around the world still do not recognise fuel or the broader category of energy poverty as a specific issue (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015). Correspondingly, it does not form a focus for analysis, funding, or associated policy initiatives. The UK was one of the first nations to recognise fuel poverty as a distinctive policy problem and dedicate resources and policy attention to addressing the associated challenges (Bouzarovski, 2018). This has meant it has been particularly influential in the development of fuel poverty policy around the world (Mattioli et al., 2017), making a focus on the UK interesting beyond the specific country context (Bouzarovski, 2018). Though the focus within this book and chapter is on fuel poverty policy, it is necessary to contextualise this area in relation to wider energy demand strategy since the two are intimately interlinked.

Over the past several years, there have been some important developments in energy policy agendas related to energy demand. The UK’s Climate Change Act (2008), which enshrined in law a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050, has been amended to implement a new ‘net zero’ target (Parliament UK, 2019). At the same time, the current UK Government has been criticised for ‘dismantling’ much of the policy intended to ensure delivery of such targets (Parliament UK, 2019). Indeed, the Climate Change Committee (2019, p. 11) has stated that ‘current policy is insufficient for even the existing targets’. Crucially, these targets are asserted to require a far greater focus on energy demand if they are to be met (Eyre & Killip, 2019).

Since 2010, however, shifting political agendas have seen fuel poverty policy being prioritised over energy demand reduction, with alterations made to the primary energy demand policy—the Energy Company Obligation scheme (ECO). This scheme is characterised by a market-led approach that focuses primarily on improving housing efficiency and, while originally it was aimed at all housing, it has increasingly shifted to be focused on the worst housing and those on low incomes. The nature of UK fuel poverty policy is thus directly tied to a strategy initially designed to address energy efficiency across all forms of housing.

With the UK’s climate leadership role as hosts of the Conference of Parties (COP) 2021 a newly renewed focus on climate policy had begun to emerge, but there have also been further moves towards fuel poverty being the principle focus for energy demand policy with the publication of the Sustainable Warmth strategy (BEIS, 2021). Though the shift to focus policy on fuel poverty is important and necessary, little has arisen to address energy demand reduction issues more broadly. These shifts are important to highlight to provide context for the nature of fuel poverty policy in the UK. The chapter first offers an examination of these moves toward an increasing emphasis on fuel poverty within energy demand policy.

The shifting landscape of energy demand policy also gives insight into definitions and understandings of fuel poverty, with a relatively narrow focus on housing efficiency and heat evident in official narratives. In UK policy, this is reflected in changes in the specific approach to defining fuel poverty and the targeting of measures to enhance efficiency (BEIS, 2021; Hills, 2012). In this chapter, I discuss the dominant policy definitions and highlight how such approaches are in distinct contrast with the wider framings of energy poverty delineated in the academic literature and discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015; Day et al., 2016; Middlemiss & Gillard, 2015).

The chapter finally moves to address welfare policy as the area of ‘invisible energy policy’ (i.e. non-energy policy areas that have implications for energy demand issues) that forms the focus of the research. I examine existing links, connections, and boundaries with fuel poverty policies, and set out the policies, framings, and politics that dominate in this area. The chapter highlights how there are interconnections across to welfare policy but these are narrowly conceived and offer relatively little scope for more reflective thinking across different areas. While the invisible energy policy literature (e.g. Butler et al., 2018; Cox et al., 2019; Greene & Fahy, 2020; Royston et al., 2018) directs analysis towards links and interconnections, there are clear limitations on the extent to which these are (or even can be) currently considered within existing policy landscapes.

From Energy Demand Reduction to Fuel Poverty Policy

Energy demand reduction has been highlighted as central to delivering the net zero carbon emissions target and for meeting sustainability goals more widely. In a report on UK energy demand policy, Eyre and Killip (2019) assert that ‘Energy demand reduction, flexibility and decarbonisation will need to play a critical role [in sustainable transitions] and this should be recognised in energy innovation policy’ (2019, p. 7). At the same time, they point to inconsistency in policy development and implementation, with many successful policies having been reduced in scale or abandoned in recent years (Eyre & Killip, 2019). These include the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), the Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP), the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), and the proposed Zero Carbon Homes (ZCH) standard. These latter two policies were aimed at large organisations and new build housing, while the former two were targeted at the domestic sector. While the CRC and ZCH policies were ended with the election of a new conservative/liberal coalition government in 2010, the CERT and CESP policies were replaced with a similar but distinct mechanism, namely the Energy Company Obligation (ECO).

CERT required larger gas and electricity suppliers to achieve targets for reducing carbon emissions from domestic premises. The policy, which was enshrined in the Electricity and Gas (Carbon Emissions Reductions) Order (2008) and subsequent amendments, specified both the level of savings required and the ways that these were to be achieved—in particular, and increasingly as the scheme went on, the focus was on insulating homes. The target was set at 293 million lifetime tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions by December 2012. Suppliers delivered savings of 296.9 Mt CO2 by the end of the scheme, fulfilling the policy aims and causing it to be recognised as a success.

CERT also gave focus to a ‘priority group’ and required that at least 40% of the target had to be achieved through uptake by people and households within this group. There were further additional requirements to target a ‘super priority group’, which was defined as including people that qualified for welfare benefits, such as child tax credits, and below an income threshold. These requirements embedded an aim to align carbon reduction measures with addressing energy vulnerability and fuel poverty, though some argue it did not go far enough with the majority of measures still being deliverable to households outside of the priority groups (CSE, 2014).

CESP was also an obligation on suppliers to deliver energy saving measures but targeted specifically at low-income areas. This scheme was designed to promote a ‘whole house’ approach and to treat as many properties as possible within geographically defined areas selected using measures of multiple deprivation. Under this scheme, energy companies achieved over 85% of the target savings. Despite having been regarded as successes, in 2012 CERT and CESP were replaced by the most recent policy addressing energy demand—the Energy Company Obligation.

This policy continued in a similar vein to CERT and CESP by placing obligations on energy suppliers to deliver carbon emissions reductions or energy savings but with some marked differences. For example, under ECO, greater emphasis is placed on the fuel poor and ‘hard to reach’ properties, and companies have a larger degree of freedom in how they deliver on their obligations (i.e. which measures they implement). The components of ECO at its inception were as follows: the carbon emissions obligation is a requirement for energy companies to promote free instalment of energy saving measures (this includes loft and cavity wall insulation but there is no requirement as under CERT to prioritise this measure). The carbon saving community obligation targets low-income areas and promotes insulation more directly along with other measures such as connections to district heating systems. Finally, the home heating cost reduction obligation is an initiative targeted at improving the ability of low-income and vulnerable households to effectively heat homes. This typically includes measures such as boiler replacement.

ECO has since been amended through three further phases ECO2 (April 2015–March 2017) and an extension ECO2t (April 2017–September 2018), ECO3 (October 2018–March 2022) and ECO4 (April 2022–March 2026). Over this time, the changes to ECO have seen a move toward focusing on fuel poor households, with ECO3 being dedicated in its entirety to support for low income, vulnerable and fuel poor households and effectively ending the carbon emissions obligation component. This move has been regarded as progressive by many of those working in fuel poverty. However, it does leave a gap in terms of energy demand reduction policy for those outside of low-income groups. This, of course, does not require redirection of funding from ECO away from fuel poverty, but rather distinct and new policy initiatives that are able to address the major challenges facing the UK in reducing energy demand.

ECO was introduced initially in conjunction with the Green Deal—a financing mechanism designed to deliver energy efficiency retrofit to housing. Households could apply for loans toward the cost of home energy-efficiency measures, which would be repaid through the savings made on energy bills owing to the improvements. The policy was deemed unsuccessful due to low take-up and concerns about the quality of installations and was abandoned in 2015. With nothing to replace the Green Deal, and with the end to wider policies such as Zero Carbon Homes, this has left a lacuna in energy demand reduction policy.

Several other policy proposals and initiatives have failed to get off the ground or have been very short lived. One of the most prominent being the Green Homes Grant scheme that saw grants of between £5000 and £10,000 offered to fund up to two-thirds of the cost of energy efficiency and sustainability improvements (e.g. insulation, double glazing, heat pumps and biomass boilers) but was abolished after only 6 months amid major problems with the administrative complexity of the scheme for householders and contractors alike. The only lasting policy in this area since 2010 is the minimum energy efficiency standard for the Private Rented Sector (BEIS, 2019, 2021). This sets a minimum energy efficiency standard for landlords wherein all privately rented properties must receive an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) of band E or above. The aim is to tackle the least energy-efficient (bands F or G) private rental properties in England and Wales. These minimum standards have also become an increasing focus within fuel poverty policy amid recognition that ‘33.6% of fuel poor households in England are living in private rented accommodation’ (BEIS, 2021, p. 22), discussed in more detail below.

The final policy approach worth highlighting though not an energy demand policy per se is the implementation of smart meters. For the UK, this constitutes a key area of policy targeted at the domestic sector and includes claims and ambitions relating to energy demand reduction and fuel poverty. The Smart Metering Implementation Programme (SMIP) lays the legal foundation for energy companies to place a smart meter in every home and business by 2020. This flagship energy policy includes provision of smart meters with In-Home-Displays (IHDs) by energy companies to consenting householders (or business owners). It is intended to facilitate multiple other changes to the energy system (such as demand side management) but of interest for present purposes are the claims relating to domestic energy demand issues.

In this respect, it has been cast as a behavioural change programme that will deliver between 5 and 15% reductions in household energy consumption (Sovacool et al., 2017) and an opportunity to address issues of energy deprivation through easier switching, accurate billing, and more information to enable efficient usage, reducing bills and preventing debt accumulation (Gov.UK, 2018; Sovacool et al., 2017). The SMIP process and the claims about what it will deliver in terms of energy demand issues have, however, been subject to a series of controversies and problems in the process of roll-out. These have included socio-technical issues, such as installation failures, problems with the functioning of meters, and relatively low reported usage (60%) of the IHDs, which are central to claims regarding energy demand reduction and greater control for consumers (Sovacool et al., 2017).

Finally, I include within consideration of ‘energy demand’ policy, relevant UK transport policies. Though travel (or mobilities) is recognised within research as an equally important part of energy demand and an area of energy poverty, it is addressed almost entirely separately in UK policy through the Department for Transport (DfT). Arguably transport is an area of energy demand most in need of policy attention as there has been no net reduction in overall carbon emissions in this sector between 1990 and 2017 (Anable & Goodwin, 2019). Here, the current policy landscape focuses primarily on shifts to ultra-low and zero emission vehicles (e.g. electric cars) and efficiency gains as a way of reducing the carbon intensity of private vehicles, air travel, and haulage. There is very little in terms of policy that seeks to address current patterns in travel demand toward increasing growth, such as promoting alternative lower carbon modalities or more fundamentally seeking to alter the imperatives leading to increasing travel demands.

Anable and Goodwin (2019) mount a detailed critique of the assumptions underpinning current policy approaches to demand within the transport sector. They point to recent trends in car travel that have seen reductions in demand amongst age groups up to 59 and only a small increase in trips in the over 60s group. Using this evidence, they argue that the Department for Transport’s current policy approach focusing on electrification should be replaced by policies that seek to lock-in, enhance, and further support these existing trends toward reduced car travel. They note that these trends have been shaped by policy in other areas aimed at reducing air pollution or enhancing health and quality of life, but that other policies can equally contribute to increasing demand (such as planning and development or centralisation of core services). They conclude with several recommendations for future policy, many of which include reference to the need to appraise the impact of non-transport policies on travel.

Overall, the changes in government policy since 2010 have seen policies aimed at energy demand reduction either cut or shifted in focus toward addressing fuel poverty. The emphasis continues to be on building efficiency as the primary issue of concern, with little space for more expansive understandings focused on questions about the creation of energy demand. At the same time, transport policy has failed to move beyond strategies that promote replacement of personal vehicles with low and ultra-low emission vehicles. Again, there has been little emphasis on reducing demand for car travel despite existing trends toward fewer trips (Anable & Goodwin, 2019).

This raises questions about the place for energy demand policy in the moves toward a net zero carbon target, which as noted above is an important, if not essential, area of policy for reaching those targets (Eyre & Killip, 2019). Such insights indicate a significant gap between the policy response and the findings currently dominating academic research, which suggest a need for an urgent and wide-ranging strategy for reducing energy demand across different areas and sectors. Though, within this, fuel poverty is being afforded more much needed policy attention, the strategies to address it are arguably constrained by narrow problem framings and understandings. The next section moves to consider wider fuel poverty policy and brings focus on the shifting definition of fuel poverty in the UK that underpins ECO. The following discussion thus brings to light questions about the framing of fuel poverty and the relevance of definitional struggles within this policy area.

Energy Poverty Policy in Focus

The shifts in energy demand policy that have seen the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) effectively become a fuel poverty scheme have been accompanied by ongoing debates about how to define, measure, and therefore identify the subjects to which the policy should be targeted. These definitional debates are important not least because they shape framings and understandings of the problem and consequently the nature of policy designed to address it. This section thus turns to address the way fuel poverty has come to be defined within policy highlighting academic critiques and exploring the importance of these debates to current strategies.

In the UK, fuel poverty came to be positioned as an urgent political problem owing, in part, to key statistical data through which the idea of ‘excess winter deaths’ was brought into being (Sovacool, 2015). The excess winter deaths figure denotes the number of additional deaths that occur during periods of cold weather and, in the UK, was pivotal in bringing fuel poverty to the attention of governing bodies. This brought with it a focus on older people and heat as defining features of both the problem and attempts to address it. Though fuel poverty had been defined and secured a place on the policy agenda from the 1980s onwards, it was Brenda Boardman’s (1991) book that set out a specific definition, which has been utilised across the UK until recently.

Boardman (1991) defined fuel poverty as households whose fuel expenditure on all energy services exceeded 10% of their income. This was selected as a threshold because it represented twice the median expenditure on fuel and was the amount the poorest 30% of households were spending at that time (Moore, 2012). In terms of policy specifics, the expenditure threshold was modelled based on ‘needed’ energy consumption, rather than actual energy use. This was to avoid problems associated with genuinely fuel poor being missed due to underuse and wealthy but high energy users being included (Hills, 2012). ‘Required’ fuel costs were defined in terms of the fuel costs needed by a household to achieve a level of thermal comfort, adequate lighting, cooking, and typical appliance use to safeguard health (Moore, 2012). Under this definition, a core policy aim was established to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016.

The 10% definition was utilised to shape energy efficiency policies across the UK until England (though not the other UK nations1) adopted a new definition following a review (Hills, 2012). The new measure has been termed Low Income High Cost (LIHC) and defines fuel poverty as households that have a lower-than-average income and higher-than-average fuel costs. The calculation of higher-than-average fuel costs is based on modelled estimates of required (rather than actual) spending on domestic energy. The LIHC combines this estimate of fuel costs with income data that are used to identify households below a critical threshold income (i.e. less than 60% of the median income after housing and fuel costs). Any households that are below this level with higher-than-average fuel costs are defined as being in fuel poverty. The new measure brings an additional further emphasis on the depth of fuel poverty by reporting on the gap between the modelled required expenditure on fuel costs and actual expenditure—the so-called fuel poverty gap. This approach to measuring fuel poverty informs the delivery and assessment of policies like ECO and embeds particular ways of understanding the problem and its solutions.

The change in the definition has been critiqued with analysts such as Middlemiss (2016) highlighting some of its problematic effects. The first being that it further entrenches a distinction between fuel poverty and wider poverty and obfuscates links to wider structural causes, placing emphasis instead on energy efficiency as the primary policy response. The second problem, she argues, is that it concentrates attention on those who are deemed as being in greatest need, inferring a ‘tacit acceptance’ that some fuel poor households will be left outside of the remit. Finally, she points out that it decreases any recognition of the effects of changing prices in producing fuel poverty, further entrenching the idea that energy market reform is not one of the policy options relevant to energy poverty. This last point is perhaps particularly salient given high prices rises in recent years related, in part, to problems with the ways the energy market operates.

This change in definition has seen a shift in the policy problematisation of fuel poverty away ‘from a condition that should and can be eradicated (as in the previous fuel poverty target), to a condition that can at best be alleviated’ (Middlemiss, 2016, p. 2). The change in definition has had implications, then, for the high-level policy targets that have been set. Within the 2015 fuel poverty strategy (DECC/BEIS, 2015), the core target, underpinned by the LIHC measure, was to ensure that ‘as many fuel poor homes as is reasonably practicable achieve a minimum energy efficiency rating of band C, by 2030 (DECC/BEIS, 2015, p. 20). This is a notably more tightly specified target than that of eradication and it has focused attention on a narrower set of issues related to the best way to achieve efficiency improvements.

For example, there are interim targets that include reaching a minimum rating of band E by 2020 and band D by 2025. This approach of setting interim targets has been critiqued as being unlikely to support meeting the 2030 target. Mainly because, in practice, this is likely to mean multiple stages of intervention and building work on homes to bring them up to the band C requirement over the period up to 2030, where a one-off whole home approach to energy efficiency is likely to be more effective in the long-term. This is an important point of critique, but it sits within a very narrow frame of what addressing fuel poverty means by focusing on the specifics of achieving energy efficiency, rather than giving room to the multiple ways in which energy vulnerabilities and precarity are constituted and capabilities undermined (see Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015; Day et al., 2016; Middlemiss et al., 2019; Petrova, 2018).

Following consultation in 2019, BEIS published a new strategy for Sustainable Warmth addressing some of the critiques of the LIHC definition and associated approaches (BEIS, 2019, 2021). This new strategy includes an increased focus on a ‘straight to C’ approach where multiple measures for improving energy efficiency would be delivered to homes at one time, indicating a shift back to a whole house approach (BIES, 2021). It also includes changes to the measure of fuel poverty. This remains rooted in the principles of the LIHC measure but introduces a new absolute (as opposed to relative) high-cost threshold based on the energy efficiency rating of properties. Effectively anyone living in a home with an energy efficiency rating of D, E, F, or G would meet the high-cost criteria. The income threshold remains unchanged—any household with a residual income (after housing costs and energy needs) that would be below the poverty line are classed as meeting the income threshold. And a further significant change is that benefits targeted specifically at disability (Disability Living Allowance, Personal Independence Payment, and Attendance Allowance) are no longer counted as part of ‘residual’ or disposable income (BEIS, 2021, p. 11).

The new measure is called the Low-Income Low Energy Efficiency (LILEE) measure. As such, it is clear that the focus remains very much on housing efficiency. This is further emphasised in the ways that the fuel poverty gap will be assessed; i.e. by simulating the effect energy improvements would have on fuel costs and calculating the difference between a household’s current costs and the simulated costs (BEIS, 2019). This is hoped to ensure stronger connection between the measurement of fuel poverty and its drivers, i.e. energy efficiency, fuel costs, and incomes. It is expected to account for; (1) improvements to energy efficiency taking people out of fuel poverty; (2) increases in fuel costs pushing people into fuel poverty; and (3) income inequality increasing the number of people in fuel poverty. Additionally, the changes to the measure are expected to make it less susceptible to ‘churn’—i.e. people moving in and out of fuel poverty owing to the measure methodology, rather than any real change in their circumstance.

Beyond this, there are moves to bring greater emphasis on people deemed particularly vulnerable to cold (e.g. those with long-term severe physical and mental health problems or disabilities, very young children, and older people) signalling a continuing focus on energy for heating and particular groups that have historically been the target of interventions. In this, vulnerability is very much defined in terms of health and wellbeing, rather than wider issues of social participation, which are in themselves increasingly linked to health problems (e.g. Courtin & Knapp, 2017 on loneliness and health). The changes aim to ensure consideration of the impact of policies on the health and wellbeing of people on very low incomes even when they fall outside of the proposed fuel poverty metric (BEIS, 2019, 2021). This includes continuing possibilities for local government and other agencies to access policy measures and identify vulnerable households, without needing to adhere to the national measure.

All this gives an indication of the nature of the debate about fuel poverty in the UK policy context and the kinds of issues that are seen as within the scope of this policy area. Crucially, a focus on heat and energy efficiency remain central and shape a lot of the thinking and policy effort. However, even amidst this there is recognition of the limits of the measure and the need for local government and other agencies to be able to address fuel poverty in other forms, not only those defined nationally. Local and regional government bodies, charitable bodies, and non-governmental organisations both locally and nationally support people experiencing fuel poverty in a range of ways. These form part of the governance arrangements for energy poverty, while sitting outside of formal government.

Such activities include: (1) frontline referrals to the support and services available through national policy and wider central governance (such as ECO—meaning that it is not only the centralised application of the fuel poverty measure that is utilised to identify fuel poor); (2) use of local councils’ crisis funds to support people experiencing issues related to fuel poverty; (3) local direct delivery of support for energy efficiency measures; (4) housing association support for home heating; (5) help with managing budgets and energy-related debt; and (6) legal advice (e.g. in the event of disconnection). It is at this scale that the lived experience of fuel poverty is best understood and where there is arguably most scope for application of wider understandings of fuel poverty as a multi-faceted issue that intersects with other policy areas.

Such possibilities for a wider understanding of the issues relevant to fuel poverty are also set in train by the introduction of a new sustainability principle within the Sustainable Warmth strategy (BEIS, 2021). This represents one of the more significant changes to the existing principles as it embeds an aim to take-into-account other government priorities in the delivery of policy to address fuel poverty. Though this is primarily focused on environmental policy goals, such as clean air and low carbon transitions, it does denote the likelihood of an end to existing fuel poverty policies that further entrench high carbon dependencies, such as extension of the gas grid. This signals a potentially important shift in the interconnections between fuel poverty policy and other energy demand policies. It also includes ambitions for connection to policy areas outside of energy, with specific focus on health policy—though this perhaps offers further openings for consideration of other policy areas too.

Despite these higher-level shifts in definitions, strategy, and the associated targets, the policies themselves have seen relatively little change in terms of focus and approach over several years. The energy efficiency policies, such as ECO (discussed above), have changed in their detail but have also remained consistent in terms of addressing the thermal and wider energy efficiency of homes with varying degrees of focus on low-income households and deprived areas (see Sovacool, 2015 for discussion of older policies not discussed here).

Beyond energy efficiency, there are a set of wider core fuel poverty policies in the UK, and these too have remained fairly constant over time. Among these are two key policies delivered as part of welfare benefits and funded through general taxation. These are the Winter Fuel Payments—a universal payment of £100–300 made to all households with a member over the age of 65—and the Cold Weather Payments—a payment of £25 per week made to households in receipt of some state benefits when the temperature drops below 0 degrees Celsius for more than seven consecutive days. A further notable policy is funded through the energy market by additions to energy bills. The Warm Home Discount Scheme—which is a discount for those on low incomes of £140 off household energy bills (given directly through the supplier) between September and March.

The introduction of minimum efficiency standards for the private rented sector also discussed above has been given greater prominence within fuel poverty policy with recognition of the high percentage (33.6%) of fuel poor households in the sector. While at present the requirement is only for landlords to bring houses up to an EPC (Energy Performance Certificate) rating of band E, ongoing consultation processes look set to strengthen these regulations, as well as improve practices for enforcement (BEIS, 2021). For example, renewed attention is being given to the Housing Health and Safety Rating System for its potential role in addressing fuel poverty. This mechanism is currently used by local councils to ensure that homes within the private rented sector are not hazardous (BEIS, 2021).

There have also been some wider policies that target pricing that although not always aimed directly at the fuel poor are in some way part of efforts to address energy poverty. Most recently, price caps have been introduced for people on default tariffs and those with prepayment meters to protect customers who tend not to (or cannot) switch suppliers (Ofgem, 2019). This approach has incurred criticism, however, amid wholesale gas price rises (see Bradshaw, 2021 for discussion) that have seen several smaller energy companies collapse, which they argue is partly because they lack capacity to pass rising costs on to consumers. The high gas prices in the UK have contributed to decisions to raise the energy price cap, with detrimental consequences for consumers. Previous policies in this vein tended to be more targeted and tackled pricing through mechanisms such as social tariffs, which offered discounted price plans for vulnerable customers and fuel poor households.

Smaller scale and trial policies have also been developed but ultimately not rolled out at scale. These include things like health services making referrals for energy efficiency measures and fuel poverty support, such as the ‘Boilers on Prescription’ project, which was trialed in Sunderland in the early 2010s. These schemes were evaluated and generally regarded as successful from their trials but not taken up as central government policy. There are, however, some ongoing attempts by wider agencies such as Citizens Advice (a charitable body that assists people with money, legal, consumer and wider problems) to support this kind of work, for example through the development of tool kits (e.g. see Citizens Advice, 2018).

The energy companies also have social responsibilities, in part, connected to the regulatory system, which to varying extents can be utilised to help fuel poor households and limit exposure to severe energy poverty for vulnerable groups. For example, energy companies cannot disconnect pensioners living alone or people living with children under 5 years of age between October and March (i.e. the winter months) regardless of payment arrears. The six largest suppliers (known in the UK as ‘the big six’) have also signed up to an agreement not to disconnect people at any time of year if they have a disability, long-term health problems, severe financial problems, or young children living at home. There is a further requirement on energy suppliers to offer debt payment plans for those in arrears. And voluntary social or corporate responsibility schemes sometimes offer financial support for customers, with such funds often being channelled into debt relief. Though this, in effect, amounts to energy companies using their social responsibility funds to pay themselves money owed.

Overall, the existing policy portfolio on fuel poverty has been critiqued for a continuing emphasis on older people, heat, and efficiency, with these concerns continuing to dominate policy mechanisms and older people receiving the majority of funding and protections (primarily owing to the Winter Fuel Payment) (e.g. Middlemiss, 2016; Petrova, 2018; Simcock et al., 2016). Several studies have highlighted the energy precarity and vulnerabilities of other groups, such as young people, and the importance of a wider range of energy uses (beyond heat) to such groups (e.g. use of digital technology amongst young people) (see Middlemiss & Gillard, 2015; Petrova, 2018; Simcock et al., 2016). Analyses such as these and others (e.g. Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015; Day et al., 2016; Middlemiss et al., 2019) seek to open-up narrow definitions and understandings of fuel poverty, bringing attention to a need for more multi-faceted innovative approaches that are grounded in lived experiences of fuel poverty and addressed at supporting the capabilities that energy services afford people.

Such analyses have potential to take thinking about energy poverty beyond domestic contexts and draw mobilities into the frame (see Chapter 2 for discussion). This brings the relevance of transport poverty policies into focus. Mattioli et al. (2017) identify a handful of policies that have implications for transport poverty even if not explicitly cast in these terms. Policies include: (1) the English National Concessionary Bus Travel Scheme—which offers free off-peak bus travel for English pensioners (i.e. the over 65s) regardless of income; (2) transport vouchers and other forms of financial support provided through the welfare state (often delivered at local levels, rather than national scale policy); and (3) housing densification policies that reduce car dependence and the need to travel long distances (even if this is not their aim). Despite this small range of policies, there is no explicit policy remit relating to transport poverty in the same way as that which exists for domestic fuel poverty. But this is an important area of critique given the clear role of access to transport in ensuring capabilities relevant to wellbeing and social participation, and the interconnections between fuel and transport poverty within lived experience. Though this is generally recognised within the energy poverty literature, little research has explored these linkages in depth.

The policy context for fuel poverty, then, remains one dominated by a focus on domestic heat and provision of efficiency measures with mobilities sitting outside of existing remits. Though domestic efficiency programmes undoubtedly have a role to play in addressing fuel poverty, research and theory are indicative of a far wider ranging set of concerns that shape energy vulnerabilities and precarity, including the move to encompass mobilities (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015; Day et al., 2016; Mattioli et al., 2017; Middlemiss & Gillard, 2015; Middlemiss et al., 2019; Petrova, 2018; Robinson & Mattioli, 2020; Simcock et al., 2016). This literature highlights the importance of turning attention to the capabilities that energy services support and bringing into view the multiple policies, processes, and issues that shape experiences of energy poverty (Day et al., 2016; Middlemiss et al., 2019; Petrova, 2018). Such an approach to energy poverty that builds from lived experiences brings multiple different policy approaches (and areas) into view and provides footing for a wider dialogue about the issue and its solutions.

The linkages to areas outside of energy policy for understanding energy poverty challenges and issues have begun to be addressed in the academic literature with analysts such as Middlemiss (2016) and Snell et al. (2015) looking at welfare policy in particular. With the focus of the research in this book on welfare policy as an area of so-called invisible energy policy (i.e. non-energy policies that have effects for energy issues), it is to this area of policy that I now turn. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on introducing the policy area of welfare and the remit and reforms that characterise the landscape in the contemporary UK context, before moving to discuss some existing intersections across welfare and energy policy.

Introducing Welfare as Invisible Energy Policy

Welfare and employment policy has a long history as a core part of governance arrangements in the UK. With its roots in the post-war reform periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Fraser, 1984), it is a policy area that has been important to the configuration of contemporary life. It is also a politically contentious policy area that has seen significant and often controversial changes to its remit and policies. In the UK, since 2010 there have been major reforms applied to the welfare system. These reforms have been enacted under the auspices of austerity (Pemberton et al., 2015) and entail both cuts to provision and changes that affect or restrict eligibility to receive benefits. This makes contemporary welfare policy a fast changing and politically contentious area of policy that provides scope for examining the impacts of policy change as they unfold and raises important questions about how such reforms may intersect with energy poverty.

In the UK, welfare and employment policy is delivered through the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The central thematic policy areas of this department are related to pensions and ageing, poverty and social justice, employment, and welfare policy and reform. Since the 2010 general election (which saw a Conservative led government take power from a previous Labour government), DWP has implemented rapid and controversial reforms principally focused on delivering cuts and changes to welfare provision for all working-age people in receipt of welfare assistance. The reforms have built on the existing approach to welfare implemented by the previous Labour government in focusing on ‘getting people back into work’ but have extended conditionality to all but the most severely disabled and have been far more punitive with the introduction of harsh sanctions (Wright, 2016).

These reforms encompass: the imposition of work coaches to advise working-age welfare recipients how to address perceived individual deficits (in, for example, their skills or work experience); new sanctions for those who fail to meet the requirements of their Claimant Commitment (e.g. missing an appointment with your work coach), including the partial and total withholding of their entitlements; new ‘fit for work’ assessments (Work Capability Assessments) for those in receipt of disability benefits (including those with physical disabilities, mental health and wellbeing problems, and those with chronic conditions); changes to disability benefits (e.g. changes incorporated in a shift from Disability Living Allowance—DLA—to Personal Independence Payments—PIP) that have effectively entailed cuts as well as redefinitions of eligibility; and changes to housing benefits including the under-occupancy charge (known as the ‘bedroom tax’ or ‘spare room subsidy’), whereby if a home is considered too large for the occupant(s) then their social housing entitlement is reduced (Gov.UK, 2021; Roulstone, 2015).

All these changes have been applied in concert with a fundamental reform to the delivery of benefits—the shift to Universal Credit. Under the auspices of simplification, Universal credit involves the streamlining of multiple benefits into one single payment, encompassing and amalgamating Employment Support Allowance [ESA] for people with disabilities and ill health; Job Seekers Allowance [JSA]; income support; working tax credit; and housing benefit, amongst others. There have also been changes in the way the payment is received. Centrally, housing benefits now go directly to the claimant instead of being paid to the landlord, and payments are made monthly, as opposed to weekly or fortnightly.

These changes are meant to encourage better financial management and familiarity with payment patterns similar to many forms of employment. However, they have been applied in conjunction with a series of cuts to the amounts people receive placing increasing strain on people’s ability to manage financially. The change in the regularity of payments has also had implications for people’s ability to cope with very low incomes. Where a weekly payment might mean a person has limited funds (or none-at-all) for a few days, monthly payments can see people without money for a week or more. Moves to pay housing benefits directly to recipients, instead of landlords, at the same time as cuts have been applied has also seen some fall into arrears with rent, as they use the money to top up the deficits in new lower payments. The cost-cutting agenda has been further implemented through reductions in physical infrastructure, including closures of multiple job centres and shifts to move the benefits system online (Butler et al., 2018). It is important to note that through all these reforms older people aged over 65 have been protected from cuts, in terms of both state pensions and other benefits.

The wider political climate through this period has been a volatile one with multiple other political agendas intersecting with these changes. Not least severe and ongoing cuts to local government budgets and wider social care and health care services, such as the National Health Service (Duffy, 2013). There have also been changes in employment regulations that have seen increases in so-called zero hours contracts and other forms of insecure employment. This means that those no longer able to benefit from welfare systems can often move into poorly paid, insecure work. Though these policies are not the core focus for this book they remain relevant as wider context for the governance processes I address.

Contemporary welfare reform has been the focus of critique both within and beyond academia. One key area of critique has focused on the ways that such reforms ‘have increasingly sought to reduce entitlements and intensify conditionality by individualising responsibility and mandating behaviour change’ (Wright, 2016, p. 235). Wright (2016) highlights how these approaches are premised on ‘a dominant model’ of the welfare recipient as a ‘unitary rational individual’ that is personally responsible for their adverse circumstances and for taking action to resolve them (ibid.). Such models have been widely critiqued for failing to resonate with the lived experience of welfare recipients and removing policy focus from the wider structural issues that are constitutive of unemployment and poverty (e.g. Pemberton et al., 2015; Wiggan, 2012; Wright, 2016).

Other areas of critique relate to the treatment of particular groups under welfare reform, such as young people (under 25) and disabled people. For example, Roulstone (2015) points to a discursive shift in the construction of sick and disabled people toward dependency narratives and a corresponding retraction in related welfare spend. Austerity driven politics have seen the emergence of a discourse of ‘focusing support on those with the greatest needs’ (McVey, 2012—Parliamentary Under-Secretary for DWP 2012–2013—cited in Roulstone, 2015, p. 681). This has meant a significant reduction in welfare entitlements, with a 20% decrease in the number of recipients of Disability Living Allowance (now PIP) (Snell et al., 2015; see also Duffy, 2013).

In 2017, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities published a report on the impact of UK Government policies on the rights of disabled people since 2010, finding that reforms had led to ‘grave and systematic’ violations of the rights of disabled people (Parliament UK, 2018). These findings have been the subject of vociferous dispute, with the UK government strongly disagreeing with the conclusions reached by others on the consequences of reform. Nevertheless, the reforms have been highly controversial and the subject of significant and sustained critical review.

These reforms to welfare occur within a context of wider ongoing programmes that extend across government but which also form a major part of changes to the ways that welfare systems operate. Not least of these are the moves to digitalisation that are being actively enacted and promoted by government through multiple policy departments. DWP Digital is an arm of the Department for Work and Pensions that operates to move the benefits system online embedding requirements for digital access within the welfare system (Butler et al., 2018). Though not a policy per se, this wider set of changes has major implications for accessing the benefits system, receiving payments, and meeting the new requirements for recipients (such as claimant commitments).

Beyond the specifics of welfare reform, welfare and employment policy has roles in other important areas, including, for example, housing policy. Welfare policy has had an important historic and ongoing role in the shifting nature of housing development. While there was a long-established tradition of government owned and rented housing, motivated in large part by concerns about population welfare, from the 1980s onwards these trends were dramatically changed to see levels of social and council housing reduce and private ownership sharply increase (see Butler et al., 2018). This was in no small part heralded by a welfare policy called ‘The Right-to-Buy’ wherein people were supported and encouraged to purchase their government-owned homes.

This policy continues today and is combined with other policies related to housing, such as housing benefit, which has been affected by both cuts, more stringent requirements (e.g. relating to the under-occupancy charge), and changes in the delivery of payments so that they no longer go directly to landlords. Added to this are online systems through which housing can be secured that rely on the individual to negotiate access themselves. Such changes combine to create a situation where welfare recipients are more likely to live in private rented accommodation in areas away from major service centres where cheaper housing is available. Housing policy changes, both historical and contemporary, have thus had major implications for the living situations of those in receipt of benefits.

The invisible energy policy literature has brought focus on how areas of policy, such as welfare, that seemingly have little connection to energy issues and no explicit remit in terms of energy can nonetheless have implications for energy demand concerns. Typically research in this space has focused on how non-energy policy areas affect sustainability issues related to energy demand (Gormally et al., 2019; Royston et al., 2018), but as I’ve asserted earlier in this book there is scope to direct analysis toward energy poverty and examine the ways that this issue is shaped by wider policy areas too (Cox et al., 2019). While no studies explicitly focusing on invisible energy policy have looked at energy poverty, there are a small number of articles that have focused on the intersections between welfare policy and fuel poverty. The discussion now turns to these studies along with an exploration of the ways that policies across welfare and fuel poverty currently intersect.

Interactions Across Energy and Welfare Policy

Clearly welfare policy has an important role in shaping experiences of poverty and consequently fuel poverty. In this respect, there are obvious connections across the two areas. This, however, is not reflected in how the different government departments or areas work together. Though there are some existing connections these are primarily related to technical aspects of policy delivery.

The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) delivers the winter fuel and cold weather payments but within DWP they are viewed less as fuel poverty policy and more as welfare benefits. In addition to this, there is a connection in terms of data sharing and matching. For example, DWP provides income data that is used within the Low Income High Cost and Low Income Low Energy Efficiency measures of fuel poverty. This data sharing role is, however, one that DWP undertakes for multiple government departments, as it holds the biggest repository of government social data. The connections, then, are limited and do not, at present, amount to collaboration on issues at the intersection of poverty and fuel poverty.

The limited nature of the connections is also reflected in the most recent strategy on fuel poverty policy in the UK (BEIS, 2019, 2021), wherein a new principle of ensuring compatibility between different policy aims considers low carbon policy and health but makes no mention of welfare policy. Partly, such lack of interconnection is undoubtedly related to the different cultures that shape the different departments. One—energy—is largely technical and dominated by market-based policies delivered through the energy companies and supported by levies on consumer bills. The other—welfare—is far more political and oversees policies that are funded through general taxation. Another related factor in this, though, is the long-standing battle to have fuel poverty recognised as something distinctive from wider poverty. And there are good reasons for wanting there to be a distinction.

In a key paper that looks across welfare and fuel poverty policy areas, Middlemiss (2016) has highlighted how the different political contexts within which these areas of policy are addressed often sees those in poverty demonised or positioned as undeserving of support, while those in fuel poverty do not face the same kind of vitriolic public discourse. For many, distinguishing fuel poverty as a separate issue has been achieved through a long-fought battle and the benefits of it being treated as separate far outweigh the problems. Some, however, have pointed to issues with this distinction arguing that it obscures structural causes of fuel poverty and entrenches a focus on energy efficiency over and above measures that address income inequality, energy market reform, or the cost of living and energy prices (Middlemiss, 2016; Petrova, 2018).

Middlemiss (2016) argues that the focus on energy efficiency obscures the lived experience of energy poverty and the complex interrelated ‘assemblages’ shaping such experiences, including poor health, major life events such as bereavement, employment, housing situation, and so on (also see Harrison & Popke, 2011; Middlemiss & Gillard, 2015). She highlights how channelling policy attention in this way means that those on low incomes but living in energy-efficient homes are overlooked even if they still cannot afford sufficient energy services necessary to support health, wellbeing, and social participation. She links this to differences in the characterisation of the subjects of these different areas of policy, noted above, and argues that a considerable distance has been constructed between the two policy areas despite addressing a very similar population. Where in the case of fuel poverty the focus is on technical solutions and infrastructural efficiencies, in welfare the emphasis is placed on individual behavioural problems and deficits e.g. in skills and/or motivation (Wright, 2016).

These differences in political positioning of the subjects of welfare and energy poverty policy make it more difficult to imagine collaboration between the different departments. The possibilities for collaboration and forms of cross departmental governance in this case, thus, appear constrained. But there are good reasons for thinking about the different policy areas in combination and understanding the implications of welfare policy for energy poverty. For example, in another notable paper on this topic, Snell et al. (2015) show how disabled people have simultaneously been affected by reduced incomes owing to welfare reform, and changes in their eligibility for fuel poverty support (i.e. under the LIHC/LILEE measures), despite evidence showing the increased vulnerability of disabled people to fuel poverty.

In sum, there are clear connections between the issues of fuel poverty and wider poverty but there are also stark divisions in how these issues are understood and addressed through policy. There are also other welfare and employment policies and processes that can be thought about in terms of their implications for energy poverty. These include housing policies and benefits, for example, that have seen changes affecting the nature of property ownership, the dynamics of where people live, and the types of housing in which they are likely to live. Or the moves to digitalisation of the benefits system, which further intertwines with other cuts and changes to have implications for issues of energy poverty. While welfare reforms have been given some attention in terms of energy poverty within the notable contributions discussed here, the wider policy area of welfare taking in multiple reforms and policy shifts along with their interconnections represents an important area for further analysis.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the contemporary UK policy context for energy poverty and introduced the ‘invisible-energy policy’ case on which the empirical analysis within the remaining chapters is focused—namely welfare policy. I highlight how the policy understanding of fuel poverty is still very much (and increasingly) focused on heat and building efficiency, but I argue that there are some policies and approaches that create room for more complex understandings of energy poverty. These include recognition of the important role of local governing bodies and non-governmental organisations in identifying and supporting those experiencing energy poverty. Such modes of delivery for support can operate outside of the narrower framings embedded in the national fuel poverty measures and are therefore less restricted in both who they support and the approaches they adopt. This is a space in which more complex understandings of the dynamics constituting energy poverty are likely to have greater purchase.

The possibilities for and limits to synergies across policy areas have also been discussed. In this respect, I suggest that although there are severe constraints on policy remits and cultures, there are also some openings for connections to be made. The introduction of a sustainability principle to fuel poverty policy in the UK is interesting in this respect (BEIS, 2021). This has brought focus on connections across policy issues, such as air pollution and carbon emissions, but has also opened-up to other areas like health signalling further possibilities. The inclusion of a different approach to income in the new measures of fuel poverty (Low Income High Cost/Low Income Low Energy Efficiency) has also seen connections being forged between the departments responsible for welfare policy and energy poverty. Though, as noted, these connections are quite limited, they could offer avenues for new forms of dialogue to emerge.

Ultimately, I argue that looking outside of energy policy and exploring intersections across policy areas and issues makes possible a fuller engagement with alternative ways of conceptualising energy poverty. In this book, I work to develop the capabilities-based energy poverty frameworks (discussed in Chapter 2) in combination with ideas and insights founded in practice-based energy research (see Chapter 3) to build distinctive insights relevant to understanding the dynamics of energy poverty. The remaining chapters present an analysis of interviews undertaken with those implicated in welfare policy (see the introductory chapter for description of the methods and wider project). These chapters build insights relevant both to a deeper understanding of energy poverty and to the value of bringing these different conceptual traditions together. This entails advancing the flexibility inherent in capabilities and energy services-based perspectives by incorporating discussion of multiple energy services, across electrical technologies and heat, and through to mobilities.

While as discussed here there have been some analyses of the implications of welfare policy for energy poverty (e.g. Middlemiss, 2016; Snell et al., 2015), there are no studies that address the idea of invisible energy policy explicitly within this space. Nor are there analyses that draw together the wider conceptual insights developed by practice theory-inspired energy scholars with concepts for thinking about energy poverty. The chapters that follow offer a bounded analysis of data from a wider project focused on welfare policy as an area of invisible energy policy. The emphasis is on developing and opening-up analytic lines that work across the intersections of practice theory-based research (including invisible energy policy) and energy poverty concepts or insights (such as those relating to capabilities and precarity).

First, Chapter 5 is directed at examining the ways that invisible energy policy arising from welfare shapes the emergence of energy poverty with deep implications for capabilities. In this, the chapter explores the value of the invisible energy policy agenda for better understanding the emergence and experience of energy poverty. I argue that it can be utilised to extend analysis of policy areas and the wider discourses and narratives that define them (cf. Middlemiss, 2016), as well as facilitating an openness that can allow insights relevant to developing capabilities-based understandings of energy poverty. This chapter thus draws together ideas from across the practice theory-inspired invisible energy policy agenda (Cox et al., 2019; Royston et al., 2018), with those from energy poverty research including work on political problematisations (Middlemiss, 2016), precarity (Petrova, 2018), and energy capabilities (Day et al., 2016; Middlemiss et al., 2019). It sheds light both on the dynamics of energy poverty and on the ways that the invisible energy policy agenda can have value for examining issues of energy deprivation.

Following this, Chapter 6 gives attention to how ideas concerning the constitution of need from practice-based energy research (e.g. Shove et al., 2012) can be important for understanding energy poverty. Again, drawing on a capabilities-based understanding of energy poverty, this chapter develops insights into the ways that non-energy policy affects not only people’s abilities to meet energy service needs, but their possibilities for shaping and resisting those needs too. This takes a cue from Walker’s (2013) analysis where concepts of recruitment and defection as processes that shape the emergence and decline of different practices are explored for their relevance in thinking about inequality. But the analysis goes further by drawing in the invisible energy policy agenda to explore the ways that different areas of governance exert power. I argue that marginalisation, evident for those subject to some forms of welfare policy, constrains possibilities to resist or defect from practices, and that processes of constitution can be far more oppressive that is suggested by existing work exploring these ideas. This brings focus to how understandings of power and inequality can be brought more firmly into practice theory-based analysis and research on energy.

Note

  1. 1.

    The empirical research was undertaken in England. As such, I do not discuss the other nations within the UK where there are some marked differences in approach including retention of the 10% fuel poverty definition and eradication targets.