Keywords

2.1 The Period of Wakening to Planetary Boundaries

Humans have a tendency to see the times they are living in as periods of exceptional change, something that is historically very different from the past. Globalisation and the spread of the Internet at the turn of the century, and the financial crises of 2008–2010 are two such recent examples. In hindsight, these events changed many things significantly, and indeed could perhaps be seen as creating exceptional times. Currently, we seem to be facing yet another major periodic structural change, one that seems to be even more significant than the two we have already experienced in this century. Here, we identify this as the ‘period of wakening to planetary boundaries’. This period has its roots in scientists’ warnings, and is manifesting itself in increasing societal awareness of environmental concerns, and new international and national policy agendas directed at these. Time will tell how significant this period turns out to be, but currently the expectation is that it will lead to systemic changes in society, rather than only some fine-tuning. Here, we explain in more detail what we mean by this, and how it relates to the theme of this book.

‘Planetary boundaries’ is a concept that has been introduced by Earth system scientists (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015; Otto et al. 2020). It refers to anthropogenic pressures on the Earth system that have reached a scale where abrupt global environmental change can no longer be excluded (Rockström et al. 2009). Accordingly, Rockström et al. (2009) proposed a new approach to global sustainability that defines planetary boundaries within which humanity can expect to operate safely. They identified nine planetary boundaries, including climate change and biodiversity, and argue that transgressing one or more planetary boundaries may be even catastrophic due to the risk of crossing thresholds that will trigger non-linear, abrupt environmental change within continental- to planetary-scale systems (Rockström et al. 2009). Moreover, according to Otto et al. (2020), technological progress and policy implementations are required to deliver emissions reductions at rates sufficiently fast to avoid crossing dangerous tipping points in the Earth’s climate. Scientists and experts are also making suggestions for policy actions to avoid the tipping points. Palahí et al. (2020b) developed a 10-point action plan on how to respond to these challenges. The forest-based sector is understood to have an important role in helping to contribute to the solutions (Hetemäki et al. 2017; Palahí et al. 2020a, b).

This type of rhetoric concerning tipping-points and warnings is reminiscent of the ‘limits-to-growth’ debate of the 1970s. However, the limits-to-growth discussion emphasised the quantity of growth and the limits to the quantity of natural resources, whereas the planetary-boundaries discussion places emphasis on the quality of growth and the environmentally sustainable use of natural resources, as well as the need for circular economies and the mitigation of climate change, which were not major issues in the 1970s.

Nevertheless, it is evident that, globally, there has been a new type of awakening to environmental sustainability. People have reacted with heightened readiness, voiced their worries and taken action on climate change and biodiversity issues. In particular, the younger generations have become very active on these issues, and have managed to capture media attention and spread greater societal awareness, including to, it seems, politicians. This is evidenced by, for example, Greta Thunberg’s school strike for climate action movement and the attention it created globally. The ‘biodiversity crisis’ that has loomed for a long time in the shadows of climate change discussions has recently been brought to a new level of societal awareness with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Scientists have pointed out how these types of zoonotic diseases are linked to biodiversity, and why biodiversity loss is likely to make zoonotic diseases more frequent (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 2020).

Politicians are being awakened to a new degree of seriousness and urgency on climate and biodiversity issues. Of course, these are not new to the political agenda; for example, the Kyoto Protocol international climate treaty was adopted over two decades ago, in 1997, and similarly, the Rio Conference in 1992 established the Convention on Biological Diversity. However, the last 30 years have witnessed insufficient, or even no, action to seriously change economic and societal structures to be in line with the goals of previous agreements. This has itself worsened sustainability development and made the rationale for the agreements even more urgent and important than three decades ago. Also, the scientific evidence pointing to the serious risks of transgressing the planetary boundaries has become stronger and broader. The bulk of the voting population, at least in the EU, is also starting to be increasingly concerned about the negative impacts of climate change in their everyday lives and to worry about the future. These changes have finally led also politicians to understand the importance of the issue and having a sense of urgency to act. Moreover, the majority of politicians are no longer talking about the need to fine-tune our economies and societies gradually to tackle these issues, but are increasingly calling for systemic and urgent changes (e.g. the European Green Deal [EGD]).

The ‘period of wakening to planetary boundaries’ can be seen in the Paris Climate Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals, which the world’s states agreed to in 2018. Since then, these agreements have been beacons for national and regional strategies and policies, more or less everywhere around the globe. However, as one would expect, there has been variation in how strongly these agreements have been realised in new policy measures. For example, the USA pulled out of the Paris Agreement during ex-President Trump’s period in office (although the USA rejoined at the start of President Biden’s term), whereas the EU aims to implement the main goals via its EGD programme, launched in December 2019. In general, the trend of viewing the environment as a major priority in political agendas appears to be becoming stronger in an increasing number of world regions, and day-by-day. One of the latest examples is President Xi Jinping’s announcement at the UN General Assembly in 2020 that China’s emissions will peak before 2030 and they will strive to reach carbon neutrality before 2060. Whether these goals will be achieved is still to be seen, but nevertheless, the political goal is set.

2.2 Climate Change as the Deciding Phenomenon

In the planetary-boundaries discussion, climate change plays a central role due to its overarching impacts on all the other (eight) planetary boundaries. For example, climate change critically impacts biodiversity and land-use changes. Due to the drastic consequences of climate change, there is no question that it will be the deciding phenomenon of our times. It is shaping policies, strategies and actions at the global, continental, national, regional and individual levels.

Moreover, the science fundamentals clearly indicate that greenhouse gases (GHGs) caused by humans have been the dominant influence on the climate system at least since the twentieth century. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2018) concluded that human-induced warming has exceeded 1 °C above pre-industrial levels, and is continuing to increase at a rate of 0.2 °C per decade. Human-induced warming will exceed 1.5 °C around 2040, if this rate of increase continues. To avoid this development, 190 countries signed the Paris Agreement (United Nations [UN] 2020). This sets out a global framework to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 °C. Although nearly all the countries have ratified the Paris Agreement, the curtailing of global greenhouse emissions has not proceeded so far according to pathways that align with the Paris goal (International Energy Agency 2020a, b).

Despite scientific consensus about the role of anthropogenic GHG emissions on climate change, there is uncertainty in the climate response to emissions of GHGs. It is only possible to provide probabilities of the impacts of different emissions pathways on climate warming up to a certain point (e.g. below 2 °C). In emissions pathway scenarios, the reduction of long-lived CO2 emissions is the priority because cumulative CO2 emissions are the main determinant of future warming. Nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases are also long-lived GHG emissions, but their absolute global warming impacts are much lower compared to CO2 due to their emissions being magnitudes smaller. Short-lived GHGs, such as methane, affect the climate in different ways compared to long-lived GHG emissions. The constant rates of their emissions do not lead to increasing warming, whereas CO2 emissions do. Despite their differences, the various GHG emissions are typically aggregated as ‘carbon dioxide equivalence’, describing their 100-year time-horizon warming impact relative to CO2.

Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.1 °C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, and the six warmest years on record have taken place since 2014 (NASA 2020). The ocean has absorbed much of the increased heat, with the top 100 m warming by more than 0.33 °C since 1969 (von Schuckmann et al. 2020). Warmer waters, and melting water from ice-sheet mass loss in Greenland and Antarctica, have increased ocean sea levels (Velicogna et al. 2020). The global sea level rose about 20 cm in the last century. However, the rate in the last two decades is nearly double that of the last century, and is accelerating slightly every year (Nerem et al. 2018). It is estimated that the sea level will rise by 30–240 cm by 2100, depending on developments in lowering global GHG emissions in the future (IPCC 2019). Global climate change has already had many observable effects on the environment: glaciers have shrunk, the ice cover over the Arctic Ocean has decreased, the frost-free season (and growing season) in the north has lengthened, changes in precipitation patterns, and more extreme meteorological events, such as hurricanes, storms, droughts, floods and heat waves, have been detected in different parts of the world (NASA 2020).

According to the IPCC (2018), the extent of the effects of climate change on individual regions will vary over time and according the ability of different societal and environmental systems to mitigate or adapt to the change. Almost all coastal cities of any size, and all small, developing island states, are becoming increasingly vulnerable to rising sea levels (UN 2019). In particular, developing countries will suffer from more frequent and extreme weather events caused by climate change, and they will have more problems with food security and water scarcity in the future. In addition to the harmful effects on human systems, including human health, climate change will cause negative impacts on natural systems––air, biological diversity, freshwater, oceans and land––which will alter the complex interactions between the human and natural systems (UN 2019). For this reason, the key message of the IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming by 1.5 °C was that the harmful effects of climate change will increase so rapidly between the targets of 1.5 and 2.5 °C that it is imperative to limit global warming to 1.5 °C.

In order to stop global temperatures increasing, global emissions of CO2 gases must be cut to near net-zero by around the middle of this century in most 1.5 °C scenarios, and around 2075 for ‘well below’ 2 °C scenarios. In addition, net-zero GHG emissions in these scenarios must be typically reached around 15 years later than reaching net-zero CO2 emissions. Both net-zero situations would require the large-scale net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere because all anthropogenic CO2 emissions, and especially non-CO2 emissions, may not be stopped in the future. The removal of CO2 can be implemented, for example, with the help of afforestation and carbon- removal technologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage.

Chapter 3 contains a more-detailed discussion of the recent IPCC projections for global climate change. There is also an analysis on what this could mean, especially to boreal forests. However, next we turn to examining how the EU policy framework––the EGD––addresses the forest-based sector in climate mitigation.

2.3 The European Green Deal and the Forest-Based Sector

The EU aims to implement the main goals of the Paris Agreement via the EGD: “…a new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. It also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the EU’s natural capital, and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts (European Commission [EC] 2019)”. In essence, climate change mitigation and biodiversity will be at the centre of EU policies in the years to come.

The EGD policy document is, in many ways, a landmark, representing a new way of thinking in the EC. It is aimed at being a cross-sectoral policy outline that will have an effect on all legislative processes of the EC in 2020–2024. The political importance of the EGD is also evident in the requirement that “All EU actions and policies will have to contribute to the European Green Deal objectives” (EC 2019, p. 3). This includes many EU forest-sector-related areas, such as climate policy, biodiversity policy, energy policy, forest strategy, industrial policy, etc. The implementation of the strategies and polices proposed in the EGD will have significant implications for the EU forest sector in the coming decade. The EGD introduces a new political narrative and direction by setting a clear focus on climate, sustainability and biodiversity conservation across all policy areas. The EGD acknowledges the need for a systemic transformation, not only piecemeal policy changes, to achieve the goals set by the Paris Climate Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals and Convention on Biological Diversity.

The main goal of the EGD is for the EU to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent. To reach this goal, European GHG emissions and sinks should be equal in 2050. In addition to the fossil- and process-based GHG emissions included in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the EU’s Effort Sharing Decision (non-ETS), land-based emissions and sinks that occur in the land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector are being considered as new elements for EU climate policy. The so-called ‘no-debit rule’––a principle applied in EU law for the first time for 2021–2030––requires that GHG emissions from the LULUCF sector are compensated for by an equivalent absorption of CO2 made possible by additional action in this sector (EU 2018). The absorption can be effected through carbon sinks in agricultural soils and, especially, forest-related sinks. Thus, the actions of forest owners and farmers to secure carbon stored in forests and soils will contribute to achieving the EU’s climate-neutral target by 2050.

The EGD clearly acknowledges many of the potential problems relating to forests. Most of its statements regarding forests express problems such deforestation and threats to forests and biodiversity, and argue for forest and biodiversity restoration and protection. With respect to climate action, forests are mainly viewed as carbon sinks. There are hardly any statements on the multiple benefits forests provide to society, or the benefits that forest-based bioindustry could contribute to a more sustainable and climate-neutral society and to the Sustainable Development Goals. Indeed, Palahí et al. (2020a, b) argued that the bioeconomy is the missing link in the EGD, stating that “The bioeconomy, a circular economy based on renewable biological resources and sustainable biobased solutions, could certainly contribute to the Green Deal delivery and would deserve more attention. The bioeconomy can be a catalyst for systemic change to tackle holistically the social, economic and environmental aspects currently not yet enough coherently addressed”. A sustainably managed forest bioeconomy–– sustainability not just assumed, but imposed and monitored––could deliver the following EGD objectives.

First, moving towards a carbon-neutral EU requires not only moving towards fossil-free energy, but also to fossil-free materials. This means replacing carbon-intense products, such as plastics, concrete, steel and synthetic textiles. This is not only for climate change mitigation, but also because of other positive environmental impacts. The transformation called for in the EGD is simply not possible without using a new range of renewable biobased materials that can replace and environmentally outperform carbon-intense materials. This shift also provides an opportunity for modernisation and making industries more circular. Forest resources, if managed sustainably, are circular by nature and often easy to remanufacture. The EGD identifies several sectors, such as chemicals, textiles, plastics and construction, which will need new conceptual business models and innovations to become circular and low-carbon industries. The emerging bioeconomy could be a catalyst for this. Wood––the most versatile biological material on Earth––can be transformed into nanocellulose, which is five times stronger and lighter than steel. The first car made of nanocellulose was unveiled in 2019 in Japan. A new generation of sustainable and circular wood-based textiles, with much lower carbon footprints than fossil fibres like polyester, is now possible too (Hurmekoski et al. 2018). Engineered-wood products, such as cross-laminated timber elements and modules, are the most effective way to reduce the carbon footprint in cities and the construction sector, both of which are currently dominated by carbon- and resource-intense materials––concrete and steel.

Second, the bioeconomy offers an opportunity to address the past failure of the economy to value nature and biodiversity. This is because a sustainable bioeconomy needs to place nature and life at the centre of the economy. Biological diversity determines the capacity of biological resources to adapt and evolve in a changing environment. Biodiversity is therefore a prerequisite for a long-term, sustainable and resilient bioeconomy. On the other hand, a sustainable bioeconomy is necessary in the long term to protect biodiversity, as new biobased solutions to replace fossil products are crucial in mitigating climate change, biodiversity’s main threat. Moreover, forest management, such as promoting more resilient mixed forests or addressing natural disturbances, can simultaneously benefit biodiversity and the bioeconomy (Biber et al. 2020; Díaz-Yáñez et al. 2020; Krumm et al. 2020). Third, it is important to acknowledge that it is unlikely that actions to protect or enhance biodiversity can be funded by public money only. Forest owners and forest industries, generating enough income from a profitable bioeconomy, would be in a better position to reinvest in biodiversity and natural capital, in line with the aims of the EGD of preserving and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity.

Finally, the bioeconomy offers unique opportunities for inclusive prosperity and fair social transition. This is paradoxically related to one of the potential disadvantages of the bioeconomy compared to the fossil-based economy––a more complex ownership, mobilisation and processing of biological resources. Biological resources like forest resources are usually owned by many more people and entities, they are located in diverse rural areas, their costs are often higher, and transporting and processing biomass tends to be more costly and complex compared to fossil resources, such as coal and oil. However, these limitations are, at the same time, a great advantage, as they offer the possibility of a more-inclusive distribution of income, jobs, infrastructure and prosperity in many regions of the EU, especially in rural areas, in line with the EGD’s inclusive growth ambitions. For instance, forests cover more than 40% of the EU land surface, and the forest-based sector provides 3.5 million jobs. This is more than the three top energy-intensive industries (steel, chemicals and cement), which the EGD called “indispensable to Europe’s economy”, while forgetting to even mention the forest industry. In addition, the EU forest-based sector also includes 400,000 small- and medium-scale enterprises and 16 million forest owners. Thus, the forest-based sector offers an extensive and unique socioecological ‘fabric’ in which to progress the EGD ambitions.

In summary, the bioeconomy, when managed in a sustainable way, has major potential for helping to deliver the ambition set by the EGD. Palahí et al. (2020a, b) also stated that “it is still an important missing part of the complicated puzzle to overcome the past dichotomy between economy and ecology that very much defined the twentieth century. The bioeconomy provides us with the opportunity to build a new and synergistic relationship between technology and nature, between ecology and economy that can define the twenty-first century: the century where we would finally start respecting the laws of physics and integrate biology”.

2.4 Diverse Role of Forests and Forest-Based Products

As indicated above, the EDG views EU forests as mainly contributing to climate mitigation via forest sinks. Accordingly, the policy suggestions of the EDG emphasise reforestation, the restoration of degraded forests and forest conservation. The role of the forest bioeconomy in this effort is missing from the document. As argued above, this is a clear shortcoming, and hopefully it will be addressed later, in the design and implementation phase of the policies.

It is fitting to reflect on the importance of the global and EU forest-based sectors in climate mitigation based on some key statistics. Forests and wood are not equally distributed across world regions, and forests are also managed and used in different ways. These differences partly explain why forests have played diverse roles for nations, and also why cultural meaning and citizen perceptions of forests may differ across countries.

More than half (54%) of the world’s forests are located in only five countries––the Russian Federation, Brazil, Canada, the USA and China (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 2020). The forest area in the EU is relatively small in global terms, but its role as a forest bioeconomy products producer is a major one (Fig. 2.1). The EU forest area (ha) in 2020 accounted for only 3.9% of the world total, but its export value for forest products was 41% of the world total, amounting to USD95 billion (FAOSTAT). Although most of this export value figure is related to the EU’s internal trade, the exports to regions outside the EU are also major. In 2017, the EU27 forest products export value to regions outside the EU27 was USD36.5 billion, or 37% of the total EU27 forest products export value. This was more than the combined forest products export value of Brazil, China and the Russian Federation (USD35.3 billion), whose share of the world forests is 38% (i.e. 10 times more than the EU27).

Fig. 2.1
Two pie charts with values in percentage. 1. For forest area in 2020. R U S, 20. B R Z, 12.2. E U, 3.9. Others, 63.9. 2. For forest products export value. R U S, 4.6. B R Z, 4.9. E U, 41.1. Others, 49.4.

Shares of forest area and forest-product export values of the global total in 2020. (Data: FAOSTAT)

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Figure 2.1 indicates that the potential impact of the EU’s forest sink at the global level is low, and will be so in the future due to its small proportion of forest area. However, it is evident that the EU has to do its share in contributing to climate mitigation by enhancing forest sinks, and also providing an example of how this can be done via forest management. Its recent record on this has been quite good. According to the FAO, the forest area in Europe (excluding Russia) has increased by 17 million ha (9%) over the last three decades––an amount equal to the entire forest area of France. The volume of wood stock has increased even more, by 46%. Moreover, the carbon stock of forests in Europe (excluding Russia) has also been growing steadily over the last three decades––in 2020 it was 24% higher than in 1990 (FAO 2020).

On the other hand, the highly significant position the EU has in global forest-products exports indicates that it can play a major role in helping to advance the replacement of fossil-based energy, raw materials and products, and generally enhance sustainable production and consumption. To strengthen this role, EU27 forest bioeconomy product innovations, and increasing resource efficiency and circularity, will be key priorities. In doing this, the EU27 can also have a significant global impact in the movement to more sustainable production.

Interestingly, the increasing forest area and carbon sink in Europe has evolved simultaneously with a significant increase in wood production. Europe’s (excluding Russia) timber production added up to 13.5 billion m3 between 1992 and 2019, increasing by 67% during this period. Consequently, Europe has concurrently increased wood production, forest area, the volume of wood stock and the extent of the carbon sink. Unfortunately, this trend has not been seen globally, with deforestation taking place over the last few decades, especially in Africa and South America.

According to the FAO, the area of protected forests in Europe has also more than doubled during the last three decades. However, they cover less than 8% of the area used for wood production. Clearly, as also suggested by the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy from 2020, there is a need to further increase forest biodiversity. One important implication of the above data is, however, that it has been possible to enhance many of the forest ecosystem services at the same time. The EU should build on the lessons learnt from this history to implement its EGD.

But will there be enough wood for bioeconomy development in the EU27? Figure 2.2 shows the EU27 roundwood production and forest growing stock for the last two decades.Footnote 1

Fig. 2.2
A bar graph illustrates the roundwood production and growing stock in E U 27 from 2000 to 2019. While growing stock has an increasing trend, roundwood production rises and falls in between till 2011 and then rises steadily. The growing stock bar is absent for years from 2001 to 2004, 2006 to 2009, and 2011 to 2014.

EU27 roundwood production and forest growing stock, 2000–2019. (Data sources: FAOSTAT, FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment (2020) and Forest Europe (2020))

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In the EU27, roundwood production increased by 21% and the growing stock by 25% from 2000 to 2019. The ‘outliers’ in the roundwood production in 2005 and 2007 are due to large windstorm impacts, whereas the 2009 slump is the result of the global financial crisis. In 2018 and 2019, salvage logging in the EU27 appears to have been higher than the long-term average. Despite the increase in roundwood production, the EU27 produces slightly less wood today than it did two decades ago, in terms of the volume of trees in the forests. In 2019, 1.8% of the total volume of wood in the forests was used for roundwood production. Also, EU27 roundwood imports are today at the same level as they were at the beginning of this century. Thus, so far, wood resources have not impeded bioeconomic development in the EU27.

The future wood potential from EU27 forests, and the demand for it, are uncertain. The future wood supply potential will depend on factors such as the age structure of the forests, forest management measures, climate change impacts (positive and negative), afforestation and deforestation, the scale of conservation, etc. On the other hand, the demand for roundwood in the future will depend, for example, on the emergence of new bioproducts, the competitiveness of EU27 forest industries, better wood resource efficiency (e.g. using forest residues and production side streams), the declining demand for some traditional forest products (e.g. paper), and the level of roundwood imports and exports. What is worrying is that there is a lack of systematic global and European outlook studies that have comprehensively analysed the wood supply and demand in a way that the ongoing structural changes are taken into account (Hetemäki and Hurmekoski 2016; Jonsson et al. 2017; Hurmekoski et al. 2018; Hetemäki et al. 2020). Clearly, this is a serious shortcoming for the future planning and implementation of the EGD as well.

To conclude, motivated by the above facts, this book’s focus is on the whole forest-based sector––not just forest sinks––when discussing the role of forests in climate change mitigation.