Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the existing evidence on the relationships between the migration of Venezuelans into Trinidad and Tobago, violent extremism and gang violence. It provides a brief overview of definitions and data, emphasizing the need for analytical clarity, pointing to a shortage of reliable data, and highlighting the challenge of distinguishing causation from correlation. A simple typology of the intersections between migration, gang violence, and violent extremism is developed, following the logic of migration of criminals (gang members), the need to link with local gangs, and the view that certain elements within the T&T society have become radicalized to the point where violent extremism is being displayed in different ways. It highlights implications for further policy debate including the need for closer dialogue between policymakers responsible for migration and those charged with preventing gang violence and violent extremism.
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Notes
- 1.
In August 2020, U.N. agencies estimated that 5.2 million Venezuelans had left their country.
- 2.
Senior immigration officer, in discussion with the author, January 9, 2020.
- 3.
This study focused on the island of Trinidad as opposed to both Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago is a twin island republic in the Eastern Caribbean.
- 4.
Senior immigration officer, in discussion with the author, January 9, 2020.
- 5.
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing power, and a collapse of social services created a humanitarian crisis. According to a 2019–2020 household survey, the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty increased to 96% in 2019 (80% in extreme poverty).
- 6.
Immigration Official, in discussion with the author, June 20, 2020.
- 7.
The Evander gang, or the Deltano Liberation Front, hails from the state of Delta Amacuro, where it controls a portion of the criminal markets at one of Venezuela’s main ports for both illegal and legal goods. The gang’s activities caught the attention of Venezuelan authorities. In March 2019, the group’s leader, Evander Barrada, was killed by the armed forces and members of the criminal investigation unit (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas – CICPC) of Venezuela’s national police. However, this did not stop the Evander gang from continuing to operate and spread.
- 8.
The Evander gang began its criminal history at La Pica prison in northern Monagas state near Venezuela’s Caribbean coast. The gang still has influence in that area and may be linked to pranes, or prison crime bosses, operating there, according to local sources. From Monagas, the gang expanded into the nearby state of Delta Amacuro, where it took control of the canals that connect it to the Caribbean Sea, from which boats can cross into Trinidad and Tobago. The group, formerly led by Barrada, extorts boats that carry desperate Venezuelan migrants to the neighbouring island and is involved in ferrying drugs and arms as well. The group also rustles cattle in Delta Amacuro.
- 9.
IOM and UNHCR reduced their estimate from 40,000 to 21,000 Venezuelans living in Trinidad and Tobago following the census, as the government put out its first estimate of Venezuelans in the country, but other reliable sources confidentially suggested to the authors that there might be as many as 60,000 or 80,000 Venezuelans in the country. The lack of accurate information makes it impossible to even hazard an educated guess on the real number.
- 10.
Immigration officer, in discussion with the author, September 5, 2020.
- 11.
Immigration officer, in discussion with the author, September 5, 2020.
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Mahabir, R. (2022). Migration, Violent Extremism, and Gang Violence: A Case Study of Trinidad and Tobago. In: Chami, G., Teelucksingh, J., Anatol, M. (eds) Managing New Security Threats in the Caribbean. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98733-6_4
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