Abstract
This chapter presents a review of Asia’s economic significance as well as an account of what appears to be South Africa’s China-centric foreign and trade policies. It provides a succinct overview of the problems and prospects which define the Indo-Pacific, as well as the rationale for studying the region’s importance for distal countries, South Africa included.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
News24. 2001 (11 December). ‘China a Key Partner: Mbeki,’ News24 Archive. Available at: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/China-a-key-partner-Mbeki-20011211 (Last accessed: 18 November 2019).
- 2.
AFP. 2014 (4 December). ‘Zuma: China Can Free Africa from “colonial shackles”,’ Mail and Guardian. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2014-12-05-zuma-china-will-free-africa-from-colonial-shackles (Last accessed: 14 December 2018).
- 3.
Kohli, Harinder S., Ashok Sharma and Anil Sood (Eds.). 2011. Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century (New Delhi: Sage).
- 4.
Romei, Valentina and John Reed. 2019 (March 26). ‘The Asian Century Is Set to Begin,’ Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/520cb6f6-2958-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7 (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
- 5.
See Moreno, Ramon. 1998 (August 7). ‘What Caused East Asia’s Financial Crisis?,’ Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter. Available at: https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/1998/august/what-caused-east-asia-financial-crisis/ (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
- 6.
The main source of anxiety at the root of the “taper tantrum” were fears of a market meltdown due to the end of quantitative easing which had been the main strategy for US economic recovery following the Great Recession. But this proved not to be the case; thus the effects were short-lived in the US. See Neely, Christopher J. 2014 (January 28). ‘Lessons from the Taper Tantrum,’ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- 7.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 2015. Asia–Pacific Trade And Investment Report 2015. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Available at: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Asia-Pacific%20Trade%20Brief.pdf (Last accessed: 3 November 2019). China, which has been a major player as the assembly and export center for global supply chains, has been flagging a change to this status quo. As a consequence, “the growth in exports to China from other Asian economies has been depressed as China, by increasingly using domestically produced parts, has become less dependent on imports” (Nakaso 2015: 5).
- 8.
UNCTAD. 2021. ‘Investment Flows to Developing Asia Defy COVID-19, Grow by 4%,’ UNCTAD. URL: https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-developing-asia-defy-covid-19-grow-4.
- 9.
Hatton, Celia. 2015 (December 21). ‘Who Will Take Care of China’s Elderly People?,’ BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35155548 (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
- 10.
Under MIC 2025, 9 sectors have been pegged as “priority areas” (PRC Government, 2015; May 19). These are “improving manufacturing innovation, integrating technology and industry, strengthening the industrial base, fostering Chinese brands, enforcing green manufacturing, promoting breakthroughs in ten key sectors, advancing restructuring of the manufacturing sector, promoting service-oriented manufacturing and manufacturing-related service industries, and internationalizing manufacturing” (PRC Government, 2015; May 19). See: PRC Government. 2015 (May 19). ‘‘‘Made in China 2025” Plan Issued,’ Available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
- 11.
“The plan has become a political flashpoint in the Trump administration’s trade war with China…Vice President Mike Pence invoked the country’s ire when he lambasted Made in China 2025 — its sweeping industrial planning strategy—as a directive to obtain American intellectual property” (Crawford 2019; May 7). See Crawford, Emily. 2019 (May 7). ‘Made in China 2025: The Industrial Plan that China Doesn’t Want Anyone Talking About,’ PBS. Available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/made-in-china-2025-the-industrial-plan-that-china-doesnt-want-anyone-talking-about/ (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
- 12.
“Within weeks of Trump’s first tariff announcement in June 2018, the Chinese government started to downplay MIC 2025 and has avoided mentioning the plan since (which Trump held up as evidence that, thanks to him, China had abandoned the plan). Chinese media has been barred from reporting on it. And in March of this year [2019], [Prime Minister] Keqiang did not mention MIC 2025 in his annual government work report for the first time since its announcement” (Crawford, 2019; May 7). Nevertheless, “spoken or otherwise, there seems to be consensus that the principles behind MIC 2025 are alive and well — China just isn’t using that name anymore” (Crawford 2019; May 7).
- 13.
Jakhar, Pratik. 2019 (September 7). ‘Confucius Institutes: The Growth of China’s Controversial Cultural Branch,’ BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49511231 (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
- 14.
“As of the end of 2018, there were 215,000 foreigners living in the city with work visas, with about 18,000 of them considered to be high-level talents, the most across the country” (Xing, 2019; January 16). See: Yi, Xing. 2019 (January 16). ‘Shanghai Home to Largest Foreign Worker Population in China,’ China Daily. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/16/WS5c3ed0a9a3106c65c34e4d2a.html (Last accessed: 4 November 2019). See also: International Labour Organization. 2017. Attracting Skilled International Migrants to China: A Review and Comparison of Policies and Practices (Geneva: Centre for China and Globalization). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-beijing/documents/publication/wcms_565474.pdf (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
- 15.
MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity. 2019. ‘Where Does South Africa Import From? (1998),’ MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity. Available at: https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/import/zaf/show/all/1998/ (Last accessed: 7 November 2019).
- 16.
There are two types of tariffs: specific (fixed for all products in a similar class) and ad valorem (based on the value of the goods being imported).
- 17.
In 2019, South Africa’s rate is around 4.32%, having consistently come down since 1993, when it was around 13.4%.
- 18.
According to its website, the WTO is “the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.” URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr_e.htm#:~:text=In%20brief%2C%20the%20World%20Trade,predictably%20and%20freely%20as%20possible (Accessed: 11 January 2021).
- 19.
The 1947-signed General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had been the main framework but not a standing body. After the creation of the WTO, GATT was incorporated into it and remains the basic standard for WTO members and countries that wish to gain entry into it.
- 20.
See the study here: Dean, Mark and Sebastia-Barriel, Maria. 2004. “Why Has World Trade Grown Faster Than World Output?,” URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~md3405/Other_Paper_1.pdf (Accessed: 11 January 2021).
- 21.
A.P. Thirlwall, ‘Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,’ African Development Bank, p. 5.
- 22.
Office of the United Nations Secretary-General. 2018 (17 August). ‘International Trade and Development,’ United Nations.
- 23.
While world output (or GDP) has expanded fivefold, the volume of world trade has grown 16 times at an average compound rate of just over 7 percent per annum. See A.P. Thirlwall, ‘Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,’ African Development Bank, p. 5.
- 24.
Office of the United Nations Secretary-General. 2018 (17 August). ‘International Trade and Development,’ United Nations, p. 3.
- 25.
A.P. Thirlwall, ‘Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,’ African Development Bank, p. 7.
- 26.
A.P. Thirlwall, ‘Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,’ African Development Bank, p. 7.
- 27.
They offer the following example: “the Department of Trade and Industry does not have fully fledged units that are sufficiently staffed to pursue commercial diplomacy in these new priority economies, that is, Brazil, Russia, India, and China and a host of other emerging economies. It also lacks a dedicated research capacity to inform South Africa’s strategies on engaging with the new economic players” (Qobo and Dube 2015: 151).
- 28.
It is a commonly held historiography that “In the period beginning around 2002, especially midway through President Thabo Mbeki’s first term of office, South Africa placed a strong emphasis on Africa’s renewal or renaissance,” whereas under Mandela there was a “moralising discourse on human rights that was characteristic of President Nelson Mandela’s era (1994–1999)” (Qobo and Dube 2015: 151), whereas the Zuma presidency in turn was characterized by the tilt toward the East. Nonetheless, as the remainder of the section develops and as the remainder of the chapters in this book show, this neat compartmentalization is not without its flaws. Indeed, the eastward tilt had already begun in the 1990s. See Van der Westhuizen and Smith (2015: 344).
- 29.
“News of SA's nuclear deal with Russia has raised the spectre of another arms deal in the making, with concerns over the tender process and funding for the multibillion-dollar project.” See Legal Brief. 2018 (November). ‘Concerns over SA's nuclear road ahead,’ Legal Brief. Available at: https://legalbrief.co.za/diary/legalbrief-forensic/story/concerns-over-sas-nuclear-road-ahead/pdf/ (Last accessed: 3 November 2019). Writes another national publication, paraphrasing the former president’s remarks in an interview one year after stepping down: “He has claimed that the agreement – despite its monstrous cost – would have helped prevent the mass schedules of load shedding we have seen in the last week” (Head 2019; March 22). See Head, Tom. 2019 (March 22). ‘“I’m not corrupt: it’s just propaganda” – Jacob Zuma goes nuclear on his critics,’ The South African. Available at: https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/jacob-zuma-news-nuclear-deal-russia-corrupt/ (Last accessed: 3 November 2019).
- 30.
This took place on the first of January in 1998.
- 31.
It should be noted, however, that Van Westhuizen and Smith’s survey did not directly ask its respondents about their feelings toward China. In a August 2017 published survey by Pew, it was indicated that “only 45 percent of South Africans had a favorable opinion of China’s role in the world. This level of support for Chinese foreign policy lagged behind all other African countries represented in the survey, and was lower than the 53 percent of South Africans who viewed the United States as a constructive force in international affairs” (Ramani, 2018; August 31). See Ramani, Samuel. 2018 (August 31). ‘Can China Burnish Its Image in South Africa?,’ The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/can-china-burnish-its-image-in-south-africa/ (Last accessed: 2 November 2019).
- 32.
SARB. 2019 (June). Quarterly Bulletin (No. 292). Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/9328/01Full%20Quarterly%20Bulletin%20%E2%80%93%20June%202019.pdf (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
- 33.
JSE. 2014 (November 28), ‘Oakbay Resources and Energy lists on the JSE’, JSE. Available at: https://www.jse.co.za/articles/oakbay-resources-and-energy-lists-on-the-jse (Last accessed: 29 July 2019).
- 34.
Fin24. 2017 (June 23). ‘JSE Suspends Listing of Oakbay Resources,’ Fin24. Available at: https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/jse-suspends-listing-of-oakbay-resources-20170623 (Last accessed: 29 July 2019).
- 35.
Gwala, Sandile. 2016. ‘Rand Depreciation,’ Deloitte. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/process-and-operations/za_Rand_Depreciation_brochure_BPS.pdf (Last accessed: 17 November 2019). Gwala notes that “The Rand is one of the currencies most exposed to China, hence any adjustments to Chinese foreign policy has a direct impact on the Rand. After People's Bank of China devaluated the Yuan by 2% in mid-2015, the Rand lost close to 26% of its value during the next six months.”
References
Alexandroff, Alan S. 2015. South Africa in a Complex Global Order: How and Where to Fit In? South African Journal of International Affairs 22 (2): 249–268.
Bheemaiah, Kariappa, Mark Esporito, and Terence Tse. 2020. Are We Experiencing a K Shaped Recovery from COVID-19? World Economic Forum, December 22. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/12/k-shaped-covid19-coronavirus-recovery/ (Last accessed: 23 January 2022).
Crawford, Emily. 2019. Made in China 2025: The Industrial Plan that China Doesn’t Want Anyone Talking About. PBS, May 7. Available at: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/made-in-china-2025-the-industrial-plan-that-china-doesnt-want-anyone-talking-about/ (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
Europa. 2021. Global Gateway: Up to €300 Billion for the European Union’s Strategy to Boost Sustainable Links Around the World. European Union, December 1. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
Greenhalgh, Susan. 2005. Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China’s One-Child Policy. The China Quarterly 182: 253–276. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192474.
Gwala, Sandile. 2016. Rand Depreciation. Deloitte. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/process-and-operations/za_Rand_Depreciation_brochure_BPS.pdf (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
Holden, Merle G., and Alan G. Isemonger. 1999. A Review of Trade Trends: South Africa and the Indian Ocean Rim. Development Southern Africa 16 (1): 89–105.
Jacques, Martin. 2009. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Penguin.
Kohli, Harinder S., Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood, eds. 2011. Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century. New Delhi: Sage.
Mutambara, Tsitsi Effie. 2017. How Has Trade Between South Africa and China Evolved Over the Past Decade? Transnational Corporations Review 9 (2): 97–111.
Mzungulu, Anelisa and Bhaso Ndzendze. 2021. Alleviating Unemployment in South Africa: Harnessing Comparative Advantage in the Services Sector. The Thinker 88 (3): 18–29.
Nakaso, Hiroshi. 2015. Asian Economy: Past, Present, and Future. Bank of Japan. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2015/ko150424a.htm/.
Ndzendze, Bhaso. 2018a. Implications of the US-Led War on Terror for Africa-China Relations. UJCI Africa-China Occasional Paper No. 4.
Ndzendze, Bhaso. 2018b. BRICS Members’ Low Investment in JSE Points to Limited Economic Ties. Business Day, July. Retrieved February 22, 2019 from https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018b-07-24-brics-members-low-investment-in-jse-points-to-limited-economic-ties/ (Last accessed: 5 March 2019).
Ndzendze, Bhaso. 2019. Is There a Reverse Correlation in Growth of Japanese and Chinese Exports to Africa? Evidence from South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, 2007–2017. Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 23 (2): 39–80.
Ndzendze, Bhaso. 2022, Forthcoming. World Bank ‘Doing Business’ Index Scores and FDI Influx: Findings from Four African Countries, 2009–2017. Berlin: APRI.
Qobo, Mzukisi, and Memory Dube. 2015. South Africa’s Foreign Economic Strategies in a Changing Global System. South African Journal of International Affairs 22 (2): 145–164.
PRC Government. 2015. ‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued, May 19. Available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm (Last accessed: 4 November 2019).
Romei, Valentina, and John Reed. 2019. The Asian Century Is Set to Begin. Financial Times, March 26. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/520cb6f6-2958-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7 (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
SARB. 2019. Quarterly Bulletin (No. 292), June. Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/9328/01Full%20Quarterly%20Bulletin%20%E2%80%93%20June%202019.pdf (Last accessed: 17 November 2019).
Toyana, Mfuneko. 2021. Foreign Investment into South Africa Tanked in 2020 After Ramaphosa’s New Deal Falters. Daily Maverick, August 2. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-02-foregin-investment-into-south-africa-tanked-in-2020-after-ramaphosas-new-deal-falters/ (Last accessed: 23 January 2022).
UNCTAD. 2021. Investment Flows to Developing Asia Defy COVID-19, Grow by 4%. UNCTAD. https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-developing-asia-defy-covid-19-grow-4.
United Nations. 2015. Asia-Pacific Trade And Investment Report 2015. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Available at: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Asia-Pacific%20Trade%20Brief.pdf (Last accessed: 3 November 2019).
der Westhuizen, Van, and Janis and Smith, Karen. 2015. Pragmatic Internationalism: Public Opinion on South Africa’s Role in the World. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 33 (3): 318–347.
Yan, Sophia. 2017. Made in China’ Isn’t so Cheap Anymore, and That Could Spell Headache for Beijing. CNBC, February 27. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html (Last accessed: 18 December 2021).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ndzendze, B. (2022). Introduction: Differentiated Engagement. In: The Political Economy of Sino–South African Trade and Regional Competition. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98076-4_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98076-4_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-98075-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-98076-4
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)