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Cancel Culture and Digital Nationalism in Mainland China

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Abstract

This chapter examines recent cases of individuals, brands, and media texts being cancelled in the People’s Republic of China after being deemed to denigrate the Chinese people or the authority of the PRC government. These events are situated against a longer history of nationalism shaped by China’s “Century of Humiliation” and the government’s propagation of nationalist education after the 1989 student-led protests. Major cancel events may involve not just grassroots mobilizations, but also state commentary, some in support of cancel actions and other instances seeking to tamp down nationalist outrage. In the case of the Italian company Dolce & Gabbana after it posted racially offensive content, PRC authorities initially supported social media backlash, and then sought to downplay the incident. In 2021, multiple Western apparel brands were cancelled for statements against forced labor in the production of Xinjiang cotton, provoking nationalistic social media and PRC government responses. Controversies over the status of Hong Kong and Taiwan have also led to cancellations. One recent case involving the Thai television series 2gether illustrated the phenomenon of “fandom nationalism,” which the government has praised on various occasions when it aligns with official positions, such as the “One China Principle.”

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sandvoss (2019), 125.

  2. 2.

    Wang (2006).

  3. 3.

    Liu (2019).

  4. 4.

    e.g. see Yang (2009), (2015).

  5. 5.

    Li (2019), 16. See also Wang (2012).

  6. 6.

    Callahan (2010), 15.

  7. 7.

    Wright (2018), [160].

  8. 8.

    Weiss (2014), 9.

  9. 9.

    e.g. Hobsbawm (1992, 2nd ed.).

  10. 10.

    Wright (2018), [167].

  11. 11.

    The National Radio and Television Administration is the main national government agency that oversees media content. In terms of regulating online media, the agency’s broad mandate includes “reviewing the content and quality of radio, television, and online programs”; see Explanation of the State Council’s Institutional Reform Program [关于国务院机构改革方案的说明]. Gov.cn, March 14, 2018. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/14/content_5273856.htm, para. 36.

  12. 12.

    Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Preserving Computer Network Security. Gov.cn, December 28, 2000. http://english1.english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/22/content_68771.htm

  13. 13.

    See King, Pan, and Roberts (2017).

  14. 14.

    Schneider (2018), 183.

  15. 15.

    Hong Kong was one of the territories that imperial China had been forced to cede to Britain after it was defeated in the First Opium War, and although the UK government formally transferred sovereignty back to the PRC in 1997, Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC has allowed it to maintain a separate government. However, the PRC government has been working to increase its political influence. Taiwan, an island east of mainland China, has functioned as its own nation-state since the Kuomintang Party retreated there in 1949 when it was clear that the CCP would assume control over the mainland. A faultline in Taiwan politics lies between pro-independence and pro-unification positions.

  16. 16.

    Liu (2004).

  17. 17.

    SCMP Reporter (2001).

  18. 18.

    Rosen (2003).

  19. 19.

    The mainland Chinese government began actions against idol fandoms and celebrity culture in mid-2021, and has since banned this kind of fan practice on the grounds that it is part of “unhealthy” culture; see Bai (2021), Koetse (2021).

  20. 20.

    See Little Chrysanthemum Gosling Garden (2016).

  21. 21.

    e.g. see Yang (2019) for an overview.

  22. 22.

    ‘ba’ (吧 bā) refers to one of the subforums of the Baidu forums, while ‘Di’ (帝 dì) “emperor” originated as a nickname given to a Chinese soccer player. The Diba forum was thus originally focused on sports, but developed into “China’s biggest online club (27 m+ users and 960 m+ posts) with a unique, satirical subculture” (Liu 2019, 125).

  23. 23.

    See sunnyy. “Copy of 쯔위 사과 설명 (영어) TWICE Tzuyu apology explained (ENG).” YouTube, July 7, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqsJ2Xrv-IQ

  24. 24.

    See Li (2019), 14.

  25. 25.

    For example, see Wu, Li, and Wang (2019).

  26. 26.

    “China” in Mandarin, 中國 Zhōngguó, is literally “Zhong-nation”; zhōng also means ‘center; middle.’ The ‘A’ portion of ‘A-Zhong’ is commonly added before someone’s name to create an affectionate form of address.

  27. 27.

    Du (2021), 4.

  28. 28.

    China Youth League (@共青团中央). “Diba and the fangirls go on expedition again! Those trying to ruin Hong Kong, sorry, you’ll be disappointed [帝吧、饭圈女孩再出征 ! 妄图毁掉香港的人, 对不起, 让你们失望了].” Weibo, September 1, 2019. https://card.weibo.com/article/m/show/id/2309404411734793257132?_wb_client_=1

  29. 29.

    See Du (2021), 11.

  30. 30.

    Liu (2018).

  31. 31.

    See Li, Rhea. English translation to Dolce&Gabbana all 3 DELETED controversial ads for The Great Show. YouTube, November 22, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzoxIb2Fa74

  32. 32.

    For timeline of major events, see Huang and Janssens (2019), 130.

  33. 33.

    Using 辱华 rǔhuá “insulting China/the Chinese,” which has been a hot-button term in other cases, or 歧视中国人 qíshì Zhōngguó rén “discriminating against Chinese people”‘; for example, see Huang and Janssens (2019), 131.

  34. 34.

    diet_prada. “#DGlovesChina? More like #DGdesperateforthatChineseRMB lol. In a bid to further appeal to luxury’s covetable Chinese consumers, @dolcegabbana released some hella offensive ‘instructional’ videos on the usage of chopsticks.” Instagram, November 19, 2018. https://www.instagram.com/p/BqXYtsZl6D5

  35. 35.

    See Wang (2020), 247.

  36. 36.

    See Liao (2018).

  37. 37.

    See Idiens (2018).

  38. 38.

    See Linder (2018).

  39. 39.

    Zhang Ziyi (). “D&G has brought humiliation on itself [].” Weibo, November 21, 2018. https://weibo.com/1914100420/H3Gt2lqRP

  40. 40.

    Chen, Estelle (chen_estelle). “Glad to see that most of the talents who were supposed to walk your show in Shanghai stood up for their country and said no to your stupid shit.” Instagram, November 21, 2018. https://www.instagram.com/p/Bqb3o1iH1fc

  41. 41.

    Lucky Blue Smith (luckybsmith). “After what has gone down today and until I have more clarity of the events—I have decided not to participate in the show this evening.” Instagram, November 21, 2018. https://www.instagram.com/p/Bqb-zlRH7Ei

  42. 42.

    Communist Youth League (@共青团中央). “We welcome foreign companies coming to invest and start businesses in China; at the same time, foreign companies operating in China should respect China and the Chinese people [我们欢迎外国企业来华投资兴业, 同时在华经营的外国企业也应当尊重中国, 尊重中国人民].” Weibo, November 21, 2018. https://weibo.com/3937348351/H3GQixVWe

  43. 43.

    Global Times [环球网] (@globaltimes). “‘D&G makes another statement: only mentions that it was ‘unfortunate’, no apology.’ [【D&G又发声: 只提’不幸’, 未见歉意】.” Weibo, November 21, 2018. https://weibo.com/1686546714/H3Kpe9gqA

  44. 44.

    Huang and Janssens (2019), 124.

  45. 45.

    See Hall and Suen (2018); Koetse (2018).

  46. 46.

    Koetse (2018).

  47. 47.

    Friedman and Wee (2018).

  48. 48.

    For full English translation, see China Daily (2018).

  49. 49.

    Sina Finance(@新浪财经). “Dolce & Gabbana apologized in Chinese and English on Twitter, Youtube, Instagram and Facebook [杜嘉班纳在推特、Youtube、Ins和脸书上用中英文致歉].” Weibo, November 23, 2018. https://weibo.com/1638782947/H41mM1NqJ

  50. 50.

    Zhang (2018).

  51. 51.

    Xie (2018), para. 26.

  52. 52.

    Friedman and Wee (2018), para. 20.

  53. 53.

    Nanda and O’Connor (2020).

  54. 54.

    Mok, Karen (@karen莫文蔚). “Sincerely offering everyone this album ‘The Voyage’ [gift emoji], the adventure is more meaningful because of you [heart emoji] [衷心送给大家这张‘The Voyage’专辑[禮物], 旅程因为你们而更加圆满圆满❤].” Weibo, June 11, 2021. https://weibo.com/1722656062/KjGBkCPKn

  55. 55.

    Koh (2021).

  56. 56.

    For UN statements, see “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism …” REFERENCE: OL CHN 18/2019. UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, November 1, 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/SR/OL_CHN_18_2019.pdf; UN joint statement on Uighurs in Xinjiang. Human Rights Watch, July 10, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf. For early news reports, see Doman et al. (2018).

  57. 57.

    Dou and Deng (2019).

  58. 58.

    da Costa (2019); Sudworth (2020); BBC News. “New evidence of Uighur forced labour in China’s cotton industry—BBC News.” YouTube, December 14, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t28nnviKar4

  59. 59.

    Xinhua (2021), paras. 15, 34.

  60. 60.

    Adidas. 2021. Modern Slavery Act Transparency Statement. October 2019. https://www.adidas-group.com/media/filer_public/02/e5/02e51e8a-220e-4dbb-9291-bdc33921f4cd/modern_slavery_act_transparency_statement_2018.pdf, para. 9.

  61. 61.

    Nike statement on Xinjiang. https://purpose.nike.com/statement-on-xinjiang. Undated, but Kashgary and Lipes (2020) mention it.

  62. 62.

    Paton and Ramzy (2020).

  63. 63.

    H&M Group statement on due diligence. n.d. (but press reports note that it was posted September 15, 2020; e.g. see https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/h-m-cuts-ties-with-chinese-supplier-over-accusations-of-forced-13115222). H&M Group. https://hmgroup.com/sustainability/fair-and-equal/human-rights/h-m-group-statement-on-due-diligence/

  64. 64.

    Department of Homeland Security (2020).

  65. 65.

    Al Jazeera (2021).

  66. 66.

    e.g. Datt (2021). For an analysis of Twitter and YouTube posts advancing a CCP narrative about Xinjiang, see Kao et al. (2021).

  67. 67.

    China Youth League (@共青团中央). “Spreading rumors and boycotting Xinjiang cotton, while still wanting to make money in China? Delusional! [一边造谣抵制新疆棉花, 一边又想在中国赚钱 ? 痴心妄想 !].” Weibo, March 23, 2021. https://weibo.com/3937348351/K7E7iAC8x?type=comment#_rnd1627043744082

  68. 68.

    People’s Daily (@人民日报). “#IsupportXinjiangcotton [#我支持新疆棉花#].” Weibo, March 24, 2021. https://weibo.com/2803301701/K7IpgaGqx

  69. 69.

    See Datt (2021); #IsupportXinjiangcotton [#我支持新疆棉花#] hashtag. https://s.weibo.com/weibo?q=%23%E6%88%91%E6%94%AF%E6%8C%81%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86%E6%A3%89%E8%8A%B1%23&Refer=top. Read 8.1 billion times; discussed 43.003 million times (as of 2021-07-21).

  70. 70.

    Global Times (2021); Song, Victoria (@宋茜). “Victoria Song’s solemn declaration [宋茜 严正声明] [statement graphic attached].” Weibo, March 24. https://m.weibo.cn/status/4618325151713956?

  71. 71.

    Grundy (2021), para. 2.

  72. 72.

    e.g. see Yan (2021); Global Times (2021).

  73. 73.

    See Teh (2021).

  74. 74.

    See Seabrook-Suckling (2021).

  75. 75.

    Paton (2021).

  76. 76.

    See Ma and Han (2021).

  77. 77.

    Kao et al. (2021).

  78. 78.

    See Feng (2020).

  79. 79.

    ซานยามะ ||| zanyama (@zanyama_). “Thanks for all the engagement! I do apologize for my lack of caution talking about HK. To be honest, the caption wasn’t meant to imply any political stance in this conflict. I’m an outsider with no knowledge in this matter, and I only know HK as a beautiful place to be. (1).” Twitter, Apr 9, 2020. https://twitter.com/zanyama_/status/1248315806393323521

  80. 80.

    See Everington (2020); Xin (2020).

  81. 81.

    e.g. see Tanakasempipat and Potkin (2020), para. 12.

  82. 82.

    Global Times (2020).

  83. 83.

    For example, in response to posts disparaging Thailand as being “backwards” and “poor,” one reply was “Our country is poor, but your country is pooh!,” referencing the children’s character Winnie the Pooh, who is banned in the PRC due to memes that liken President Xi Jinping to Pooh. Chinese criticisms about Thailand’s government, king, or overall future intended to be insulting were instead met with agreement by Thai posters. One reply to the Chinese insult “NMSL” (short for nǐ mā sǐle ‘your mother is dead’) was a humorous “Which one?,” which alluded to rumors that the Thai king had been sequestering himself with a harem of women during the Covid-19 crisis. See Everington (2020); Feng (2020).

  84. 84.

    See Global Times (2020).

  85. 85.

    This was the first comment by the National Tourism Administration of Thailand (Chinese: 个别艺人言论不能代表国家立场, 请网友们保持理智。) under their Weibo post: National Tourism Administration of Thailand (@泰国国家旅游局). “[# Magical Thailand# 8 K blockbuster] The epidemic situation in China is getting brighter and brighter. We also feel that everyone misses Thailand more and more, and released this video especially to help you alleviate your greed [【#神奇泰国#8K大片】中国疫情日趋光明, 咱也感受到了大家对泰国的想念与日俱增, 特把这个视频翻出来先给大家解解馋].” Weibo, April 12, 2020. https://weibo.com/5297476385/ICW3FoJqL

  86. 86.

    Chinese Embassy in Thailand. Statement by the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Thailand concerning recent online statements related to China. Facebook, April 14, 2020. https://www.facebook.com/ChineseEmbassyinBangkok/posts/2942654555781330

  87. 87.

    Schaffar and Wongratanawin (2021), 7. Also, for accounts of transnational boys love fandom, see Lavin, Yang, and Zhao (2017).

  88. 88.

    Schaffar and Wongratanawin (2021) identify a Hong Kong Twitter user, ShawTim, as being the first to use the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag to refer to Thailand, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

  89. 89.

    Castronuovo (2021).

  90. 90.

    The Chinese version of the hashtag, 奶茶聯盟, seems to be censored on Weibo, and does not show up in searches of either the China Daily or People’s Daily websites, but the English-language Global Times has published several articles criticizing the alliance, accusing “separatist authority” agents in Hong Kong and Taiwan for fomenting “anti-mainland” sentiment; e.g. see Guan, Zhang, and Bai (2021).

  91. 91.

    More specifically, the reference was to “fangirls,” and there has been discussion about the gendered dimensions of the phenomenon, including around the moniker of “Little Pink” (小粉红 xiǎo fěnhóng) given to nationalist fangirls; see Fang and Repnikova (2017).

  92. 92.

    Hinck (2012).

  93. 93.

    e.g. Guan, Zhang, and Bai (2021).

  94. 94.

    See Feng (2021).

  95. 95.

    See Feng (2021).

  96. 96.

    See Davis (2021).

  97. 97.

    e.g. see Wang (2021).

  98. 98.

    Hu, Xijin (@胡锡进). “Zhao Ting and her film ‘Nomadland’ have been controversial over the past few days [赵婷和她执导的电影《无依之地》连日来受到争议].” Weibo, March 8, 2021. https://weibo.com/1989660417/K5d17aYoA

  99. 99.

    e.g. see Huang and Xie (2021).

  100. 100.

    Lu (2021a, b).

  101. 101.

    In Chinese, 爱国营销号 àiguó yíngxiāo hào, literally ‘patriotism promotion account’.

  102. 102.

    e.g. see Cassell (2021).

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Ng, E. (2022). Cancel Culture and Digital Nationalism in Mainland China. In: Cancel Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97374-2_5

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