Cooperation Between Russia and China in Multilateral Organizations: A Tactical or a Strategic Alliance?

Abstract

Both China and Russia are heavyweights in multilateral Geneva. While their priorities and strategies are not identical, their interests are often aligned in many forums. Thus, close cooperation can be observed in several Geneva-based organizations. In some, such as the UN Human Rights Council, China and Russia form the backbone of an increasingly assertive “autocratic alliance.” Particularly China has attempted to establish a counter-narrative on questions of democracy, human rights, and international law. This article outlines some factors that increased the effect of Chinese-Russian cooperation, but also depicts its limits. Cooperation between Russia and China is often defensive rather than proactive and not (yet) based on a joint long-term strategy. However, it is a tactical alliance that is, and will likely remain, a major challenge for the proponents of a rules- and values-based multilateralism even though Russia’s war in Ukraine will further shift the balance in this alliance towards China. This article argues in favor of stronger engagement in UN forums by the West and outlines possibilities for how the growing influence of this tandem can be countered.

1 Introduction

The question of a strategic alliance between Russia and China has been discussed by various authors for several years, some referring to this emerging cooperation as the “dragon bear” (Tchakarova, 2015). This alliance exists in various regional forums covering security, but also more and more economic cooperation. It can also increasingly be seen on a global level. One aspect that merits more attention is cooperation in multilateral forums and international organizations.

When the effects of Russia-China relations in multilateral organizations are discussed, the analyses often focus on their role in the UN Security Council. However, it is worth taking a closer look at other multilateral forums, particularly in Geneva, which allow one to observe the development of several interesting trends over the past years. This article will look at the cooperation between both countries, particularly in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Geneva-based Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Its analysis will neither trace the history of Russia and China’s cooperation throughout UN history, nor will it look at their voting behavior and positioning in the UN Security Council, which would likely merit an article on its own.¹ Instead, this analysis will examine current interests and influencing strategies of both actors in some of the main multilateral forums in Geneva, and highlight the commonalities and differences of both countries. Afterward, it will focus on some key areas of cooperation, addressing the question of the extent to which Russia-China cooperation in these forums is more tactical (defensive) cooperation, or whether and to what extent it is a strategic alliance to (re)define the norms of multilateral cooperation. Finally, this chapter will formulate suggestions for how the West can respond to the challenge.

2 Priorities, Commonalities and Differences

2.1 The Priorities of Russia and China in Geneva-Based Forums

Needless to say, Russia and China are heavyweights in the Geneva-based multilateral bodies merely by being permanent members of the UN Security Council. Moreover, multilateral organizations are considered as useful forums to increase one’s status on an international level. It is an equally important platform to receive (positive) “social markers” in order to increase domestic legitimacy or status (Johnston, 2007). The objective is thus to receive affirmation for one’s domestic practices and international policy actions and avoid criticism. Both Russia and China may use similar instruments in order to achieve this objective, but when focusing on Geneva-based forums, they have shown differences regarding their priorities.

For Russia, organizations with security policy relevance remain crucial forums. Also, the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) is considered important and prestigious: securing the post of director general of UNOG for a Russian national in 2019, Tatiana Valovaya, was considered important by Moscow. From a Russian perspective, Geneva is equally considered to be an important mediation hub where a number of background talks are held on conflict situations in which Russia is a major player: Russia’s engagement in the Syrian Constitutional Committee is one example even though the process has failed to deliver any results. This security lens also applies to other multilateral forums: Russia is an important player in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as it considers the topic of cyber security to be within the ITU mandate.

China’s priorities are strongly shaped by its geopolitical and economic interests, and can often be analyzed through the lens of the Belt and Road Initiative (Merkle, 2020): this explains the strong Chinese attention toward SDOs in Geneva, whether they include the ITU, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or other forums (Teleanu, 2021). Having a strong say in shaping technical and digital standards and norms is considered a crucial element for laying the groundwork for future global economic leadership. This is equally true for organizations responsible for infrastructure, and other economic forums such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

While both countries are latecomers to the WTO (China acceded in 2001, while Russia joined the WTO in 2012), their respective weight in the WTO differs. China is a key player in the organization (see also Mavroidis & Sapir, 2016). It has been a more active user of the WTO’s dispute settlement system² and has also joined (unlike Russia) the interim arbitration arrangement of 18 other WTO members (i.e. the EU, Australia and Brazil; see WTO, 2020). Unlike China, Russia is only present in two WTO negotiation groups. In contrast to Russia, China’s instruments of global influence are to a greater extent economic, which may explain its stronger engagement in multilateral economic forums. Neither country is a full market economy, but relies on a state-capitalist model that would make them natural allies whenever the calls for new and stricter rules on state subsidies arise. While many disagreements in the WTO are not linked to US-China antagonism, China has in many ways been perceived as an antipole to the US and to the West.³ The importance of the WTO for China is reflected in terms of personnel policy: maintaining the position of one of the deputy director generals is considered of key importance for China.⁴

Aside from its engagement in organizations relevant to economic development and trade, China has in past years increased its engagement in global health, particularly in the WHO, where China is considered a key player and where it has increased its influence substantially.⁵

An organization that is of key importance for both countries is without a doubt the UN Human Rights Council, where both attempt to dismiss criticism of their human rights records. An indication of the importance attributed to the UNHRC is the regularity of membership of both countries. In the 15 years since the creation of the HRC, China was one of the 47 members for 12 years, and Russia for 9 years (no more than two consecutive 3-year terms are permitted).

Across several organizations, China is attempting to consolidate the international isolation of Taiwan. While this is not possible in all Geneva-based bodies (Taiwan is a member of the WTO, where it is referred to as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu [Chinese Taipei]), it has over the past several years successfully blocked any attempt for Taiwan to join the World Health Assembly even as an observer.

Interestingly, migration and humanitarian questions receive comparatively less attention. For example, neither the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) nor the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) seem to be a priority for China or Russia, which is reflected in their very limited financial engagement in both organizations: UNHCR funding from the US was approximately 900 times higher than from China. Neither country was among the top ten donors for UNOCHA (2021).⁶ The same is true for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), where neither Russia nor China appear in the top 23 funders (for example ICRC, 2019).

While the differences in financial engagement are particularly strong when it comes to humanitarian or migration policy issues, in many other international organizations, neither Russia’s nor China’s financial input even comes close to the impact major Western countries, particularly the US, Germany, the UK or the EU as a whole, have on specific organizations. While China has substantially increased its contributions in past years to the UN as a whole,⁷ along with some other selected international organizations, in many UN agencies, it is still very far from the above-mentioned countries.

2.2 Challenging the Narrative

Both sides are keen to establish a counter-narrative on questions of democracy, human rights, and international law, as can be seen in the joint statement issued by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi (Ministry of External Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2021): the objective is to change the “hegemony” of the Western interpretation of human rights and democracy, as well as the role of international organizations. Both sides also state: “We noted the growing importance of the joint activities of Russia, China and a wide range of other countries to preserve the current system of international law in the context of the increasing Western attempts to promote its concept of a rules-based international order.”

Particularly China—emboldened by the departure of the US from some multilateral forums, i.e. the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)—has in past years strongly intensified its attempts to change the narrative in certain organizations, particularly in the UNHRC, that the notion of human rights should be less concentrated on individual but on collective rights. Another feature of this new discourse is an emphasis on a state-centric human rights dialogue and the respect of state sovereignty. Finally, the discourse emphasizes the right to development and the fight against poverty as key pillars of human rights. All three elements are considered attempts to weaken the traditional UN discourse on human rights. In order to achieve this objective, China has in past years regularly brought forward a resolution on “mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights” (see for example UN Human Rights Council, 2020). The seemingly harmless title of a resolution hides elements that would change the common understanding of human rights. While the resolution enjoyed broad support the first time it was introduced in 2018, views have become more polarized without hindering the adoption of the resolution. China thus has been much more proactive in shaping and promoting a different discourse in international organizations rather than merely attacking unwelcome procedures or norms.

Russian attempts to change the narrative and the normative discourse have been less visible compared to China, though its discourse in the ITU is attempting to receive global approval for highly controversial practices by “disguising” them with innocuous terms such as “information security.” Referring to the importance of rules “in the field of information security” is often interpreted as an attempt to target all measures that may have a destabilizing effect on states, including free speech.

2.3 Strategic Personnel Policy

Russia and China use personnel policy as a key instrument in their engagement in multilateral organizations. Overall personnel policy can be conducted at three levels: promoting the placement of junior staff in the UN organizations, securing crucial positions in the organizations, and finally, ensuring the rotation of diplomatic personnel between major UN locations. China has increasingly used the Junior Professional Office (JPO) program of the UN in these last several years to encourage young professionals to join UN organizations. Both countries have—as have other big players—demonstrated an eagerness to place their nationals in key UN positions: for Russia it was, i.e., the successful candidature of Tatiana Valovaya for the UNOG, but in 2021 Russia also put forward a candidate for the successor of the current secretary general of the ITU. China currently occupies four out of 15 secretary general or director general posts in specialized UN agencies,⁸ and has attempted to acquire the position of the director general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2020. Finally, particularly compared to other countries, China and Russia tend to employ staff for UN posts at their mission who specialize in UN affairs and who circulate exclusively between UN locations (and the relevant ministerial unit at home). The effect of this should not be underestimated: it takes time to adapt to the often highly technical debates in the UN and its relevant agencies. By the time the diplomatic staff not only gets a grasp of the discussions and is also able to provide strong input, half of the posting has already passed. Having experienced staff that are highly knowledgeable about procedural rules can be a very strong asset, not only in technical UN bodies, but also in the UN Human Rights Council.

Experts and first-hand observers of international Geneva regularly emphasize that China has substantially increased its influence within the UN. Some have even argued that with all their engagement in the past few decades, Russia has never enjoyed the same degree of political influence in Geneva that China does now. While Russia is considered by diplomats as having a relatively confrontational and at the same time relatively defensive approach in some of the UN forums, China has attempted to go further and tried more actively to change narratives in certain policy fields. Russia’s partial isolation in several forums (including its departure from the UN Human Rights Council in 2022) will further contribute to strengthen China’s leadership role in the autocratic alliance.

3 Cooperation of Russia and China in Geneva—A Tactical or a Strategic Alliance?

An extensive analysis of the cooperation of Russia and China in each of the Geneva-based UN agencies would go beyond the scope of this analysis. However, four dimensions can be identified: as mentioned earlier, both sides regularly cooperate when dismissing criticism of their policies in UN forums. China can mostly be identified as the driving force in attempts to shape a different narrative in UN organizations, while Russia is supportive of these proposals. Both sides jointly attempt to block the reform of international bodies. Last but not least, Russia and China have acted as authoritarian gravity centers in multilateral bodies, forming the core of countries that shield other authoritarian regimes from criticism and arguing in favor of a state-centric “dog does not eat dog” approach.

3.1 Dismiss Criticism of Domestic and Foreign Policies

Russia and China cooperate regularly in dismissing criticism toward their domestic and foreign policies. In Geneva, this can be seen most clearly in the UNHRC. Both Russia and China were elected to the Council for 2021 until 2023, and the first session of the Human Rights Council in 2021 already indicates close cooperation: out of 30 resolutions passed under the various items in the Human Rights Council session from February/March 2021, 15 were contentious votes and in all cases Russia and China voted in the same manner. Both countries successfully pushed for a resolution criticizing the effects of sanctions, which was adopted by a vote of 30 (including the support of all African countries) to 15 with two abstentions.⁹ In turn, China was also one of the very few countries that supported Russia’s motion to adjourn the Human Rights Council session following the failure of one special rapporteur to provide his report on time, see Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Voting behavior regarding the proposed suspension of the UNHRC by Russia, Venezuela and China during the 46th UNHRC session, February/March 2021

Both have also usually stood on the same sides during joint statement initiatives. For example, in July 2020 and in 2021, Russia supported joint statements launched by Belarus that strongly dismissed criticism toward China’s policies in Xinjiang. The overall support for the initiative can be seen in Fig. 2. When Russia was criticized due to its aggression against Ukraine, China’s stance alternated between support of Russia and abstention.

Fig. 2

Support within the UNHRC for Canadian and Belarussian joint statements exercising and dismissing criticism of Chinese human rights abuses, June/July 2021

3.2 Shaping a Different Narrative—Through Policies and Personnel

Cooperation does not apply merely as a defense mechanism to dismiss international criticism, but in some cases also results in the promotion of a joint agenda and narratives. In 2021 Russia supported the Chinese stance on “mutually beneficial cooperation” on the UN Human Rights Council, thus a resolution that promotes a different, more state-centric and collective interpretation of human rights (UN Human Rights Council, 2021) (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3

Voting behavior in the UNHRC on a Chinese resolution on the role of human rights in the UN system, February/March 2021

With the return of the US to the UN Human Rights Council, both have joined forces in attacking not only the US, but also other Western countries in general for undue interference in domestic affairs and of double-standards referring to alleged human rights deficits in Western countries (Wientzek et al., 2021). The most recent example was China launching a joint statement criticizing Canada for “serious human rights violations against the indigenous people in Canada”—right after Canada had initiated a joint statement criticizing China’s policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.¹⁰ Another instrument to blur the discourse on human rights utilized by both has been the promotion of government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) into forums reserved for NGOs. According to several observers in the Geneva ecosystem, this has contributed to diminishing the voices of truly independent human rights NGOs.

Both Russia and China also seem aligned when it comes to discussions about shaping standards for digital technologies. As a result, cooperation in international standardization organizations is increasingly emerging. This applies to highly sensitive issues such as the necessity to establish global standards for facial recognition. Supported by Russia, China is pushing for global standards in this area, something which—i.e. for ethical reasons—is strongly opposed by the EU and Western countries: global standards for facial recognition and surveillance technology—most recently in the ITU in 2020—in order to receive global approval for certain practices that are hardly compatible with the right to privacy, and that can contribute to discriminatory practices. On the other hand, Russia is pushing to discuss questions of cyber security within the ITU mandate that critics consider an instrument to limit freedom of speech in digital forums. In general, China is supportive of the Russian stances in the ITU, though it is hard to speak of a fully-fledged strategic alliance in this context. While Russian diplomats focus strongly on cybersecurity, Chinese experts in these forums prefer to focus on artificial intelligence and new intellectual property rights.

Russia and China cooperate when it comes to personnel policy. One example is the emerging discussion of the successor for the post of the director general in the ITU. Russian candidate Rashid Ismaylov succeeding Houlin Zhao (Chinese national) can presumably count on the support of China, even though the prospects of his election have deteriorated significantly since the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Observers consider the choice of the future candidate as crucial for the future orientation of the standard setting organization.

However, as a recent example has demonstrated, cooperation does not always succeed: in 2021, both opposed the nomination of the Ambassador of Fiji, Nazhat Shameem Khan, as the new chair for the UN Human Rights Council, given that she was known as having a strong and outspoken stance on human rights violations. Similarly, the fact that China lost the race for the post of director general of the WIPO against a candidate from Singapore with a relatively clear vote in the last round in 2020 shows the limits of the Chinese-Russian alliance on personnel policy. Open support by China or Russia may even be considered toxic in some cases, which may be one of the reasons China was very cautious not to reveal its preferences during the search for successors to the director general positions of the WTO and the ILO. While China’s support for WHO Director General Dr. Tedros was important for his election in 2017, this support has become a burden in the COVID crisis, as some countries have accused him of being too lenient with China following the COVID-19 outbreak. The limits of the cooperation became visible in spring 2022: Resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine were not only passed in the UNGA, but also in the UNHRC. Against Russia and China’s will, the UNGA voted to suspend Russia from the UNHRC. Equally, the ILO decided to reduce cooperation with Russia.

3.3 Defensive Stance on Reform—A State-Centric Vision of Multilateralism

Both countries defend similar positions regarding the reform of UN organizations, defending an approach that emphasizes state sovereignty and is wary of the introduction of monitoring, let alone sanctioning mechanisms. This can be observed in the ongoing discussions about the reform of the WHO: both countries have jointly resisted demands by other countries to increase the political independence of the WHO or reform the International Health Regulations (Fletcher, 2020), and neither is in favor of stronger external scrutiny in cases of outbreaks as suggested by some reform proposals, let alone of mandatory and immediate access for external observers or sanctioning mechanisms in case of non-compliance. Observers also fear that attempts to reform the UN Human Rights Council might lead to a coordinated attempt by Russia and China to weaken established standards in the process.

3.4 Russia and China as Beacons of the Autocratic Alliance in Multilateral Bodies

Russia and particularly China have also acted as authoritarian gravity centers¹¹ in multilateral bodies. Overall, China has been the primary gravity center and has been far more active in rallying supporters. This can be observed in various forums, be it in the Human Rights Council or in other forums such as WHO and Geneva-based SDOs. One of its key allies in several forums has been Pakistan—a country with which China has very deep economic (China-Pakistan economic corridor), political (joint containment of India) and military relations¹²: Islamabad’s support has been of key importance in avoiding resolutions critical of China’s policies in Xinjiang in the UNHRC.

Russia and China have equally served as staunch allies for autocracies such as Cuba and Venezuela, but also Eritrea, or other authoritarian states such as Egypt, Cameroon or Belarus. Several votes in the last session of the UN Human Rights Council show that China and Russia form the core group of the “autocratic alliance” in the UNHRC. Figure 4 shows which countries have demonstrated the strongest voting alignment with China in the UNHRC in 2019.

Fig. 4

Percentage of alignment with Chinese voting behavior in disputed resolutions in the UNHRC during 2019

A recent example of this mutual autocratic solidarity could be witnessed at an urgent debate on Belarus that featured a virtual intervention of opposition leader and presidential candidate Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya. The representatives from China and Russia tried to derail the debate with repetitive interventions.

China and Russia also defend the abysmal human rights records of authoritarian states, i.e. regularly dismissing criticism directed toward Syria, Saudi Arabia, Belarus. Similarly, during debates on resolutions on Belarus, Russia, but also China, regularly put forward numerous amendments in order to water down the language. Several examples have shown that shielding other autocratic or semi-democratic states from criticism leads to an “unvirtuous cycle,” i.e. stronger loyalty from the countries concerned toward Russia or particularly China. In return, the countries concerned initiate joint statements that dismiss criticism toward China. It is often Cuba, Venezuela, Belarus or Cameroon that table statements or resolutions on China’s behalf. Equally, China manages to leverage the support of countries with which it has close economic ties in order to influence voting behavior, thus sometimes even weakening the camp of—in principle—like-minded Western countries. The support, or lack thereof, in joint statements on the UN Human Rights Council paints a clear picture. Many Central and Eastern European countries that are included in the 17+1 initiative preferred not to join a critical joint statement—initiated by the UK—toward China’s policy in Xinjiang and Hong Kong in 2020.

Despite some noteworthy successes, the “autocratic alliance” on the UN Human Rights Council often finds itself on the losing side and cannot take support for its own initiatives for granted. In order to avoid its resolution being voted down at the last Human Rights Council session of 2020, China pulled back a resolution on the interpretation and definition of human rights when it could not be certain it had the necessary votes.

While China, supported by Russia, has attempted to re-shape narratives, particularly in the area of human rights, it is remarkable that both sides rarely come forward with concrete multilateral initiatives. It is thus striking that, for example, in the case of the COVID-19 crisis, both actors have strongly used vaccine diplomacy but are playing only a secondary (China) or no role (Russia) in the ACT Accelerator or the COVAX initiative, which are important examples of ad-hoc multilateral instruments. While particularly China has regularly highlighted the importance of multilateral solutions in speeches, both have demonstrated their preference for bilateral support, which allows them to target and reward “reliable allies.”

Cooperation between Russia and China is not a sufficient condition for either side to grant success in international forums, however. Overall, the results are mixed.

But a number of reasons favor the effect of the Chinese-Russian cooperation.

• 1. West fatigue: among many (particularly developing) countries, one can sometimes detect a certain “West fatigue” and the perception of a disproportionate role Western countries play in multilateral forums not only financially, but also in shaping narratives. China—with partial success, particularly in the WTO, but also in the WHO and in the UN Human Rights Council—has managed to portray itself as an advocate for developing countries and has at times successfully managed to rally the African group or the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to its side. This is facilitated somewhat by the membership of China in the G77. Russia seems to benefit from this effect to a lesser extent, although in some cases the G77 have supported Russian candidacies in multilateral forums.

• 2. A slow West: in several cases—be it on personnel questions or on substance—Western countries were either not united, managed to unite too late or did not manage to build alliances quickly enough beyond their own camp. The election of the director general to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), during which Western disunity resulted in the election of a candidate from China, is just one example. Similarly, complaints about the lengthy internal EU coordination process—which leaves little time to acquire further allies aside from the “usual suspects”—can be heard in Geneva.

• 3. A lack of willingness of many states to challenge China or Russia for fear of repercussions. The relatively timid (and regularly unsuccessful) support for Taiwan’s participation at the World Health Assembly seems to simply be a recognition of the fact that crossing blades with China in multilateral forums is simply not worth the fight. Even EU countries prefer not to position themselves too clearly on the side of Taiwan. Usually only the US, sometimes Canada and Australia as well as a dozen countries that recognize Taiwan, argue decisively for the inclusion of Taiwan in the WHA.

The influence of Russia’s and China’s cooperation has, however, also shown its limits for several reasons:

• 1. Good knowledge of procedures and instruments, the ability to build alliances and leveraging economic and political influence are important, but the (still) relatively small financial footprint in multilateral arenas in Geneva somewhat limits the impact and—this should not be underestimated—the credibility of the commitment of Moscow and Beijing to multilateral organizations. There continues to be a stark discrepancy between strongly-worded commitments to multilateral solutions and the absence of financial support for truly global initiatives.

• 2. In most cases, the cooperation had a primarily defensive character: dismissing criticism, and avoiding reform of multilateral organizations. However, only in a few cases did China and/or Russia manage to bring forward constructive proposals or initiatives to address global challenges. For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, most of the initiatives to combat the pandemic on a multilateral level were initiated by Western or Latin American countries—and not by China or Russia. The joint attempts to redefine narratives, particularly on human rights, are notable and should not be underestimated, but are not part of a strategy that covers all organizations.

• 3. While a sizable number of countries may sympathize with Russia or China, both countries fail to gather majorities for their positions among the countries that may not belong to the Western camp but are not autocracies either.

• 4. Disillusionment: Among at least some states, there is a certain disillusionment as to China’s intentions. The pressure China exerted on Ukraine following its support for a critical joint statement on China’s policy in Xinjiang and Hong Kong during the UN Human Rights Council in June 2021¹³ served as another eye-opener that help from China does not usually come without a price tag. This was also mirrored by the weakening support for China’s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁴ This is even more true for Russia since February 2022: Several states from Africa, Asia or Latin America that usually tend to abstain on country resolutions or controversial issues, strongly condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Overall, the cooperation between Russia and China does not yet seem to be a fully-fledged, coordinated strategic alliance with a consolidated vision applied across multilateral bodies, but rather functions as an (increasingly regular) tactical alliance.

4 Options for the West

Chinese-Russian cooperation in UN forums is a challenge for the West. While both countries are needed as important partners to address global challenges such as climate change or disarmament, they share a very different approach to multilateralism, which is in clear opposition to a Western understanding. This does not only concern the UN Human Rights Council, but also the role multilateral organizations are supposed to play. By breaking the normative hegemony of the West on the values and rules of multilateralism, China and Russia are attempting to reduce Western influence in general and in countries they consider as zones of influence in particular.

This should be a key concern for the West: if China and Russia determine values and standards, this will affect the political and economic influence of the West. Two examples: if IT standards are shaped not by the West but by China, this will have a detrimental effect for businesses, as rules will be adopted that are closer to the needs of Chinese businesses and not a non-market economy model. Also, being able to refer to an “ITU standard” is already an important ticket for market entry in third countries. If the global interpretation of human rights shifts to an understanding shaped by China and Russia, this might in the long term also lead to the questioning of certain values at home. Liberal democracies however do have options to counter this:

4.1 Stronger Engagement in Multilateral Forums

Due to the frustration with their seeming inability to reform and to address the challenges of a changed global environment, there are increasingly discussions in the US and some Western think tanks about alternative forums to the UN Human Rights Council, or to the WHO or the WTO (Reinsch & Caporal, 2021). These considerations are somewhat understandable in the current situation but they still do not seem realistic. Even the departure by the US from the Human Rights Council in 2018 did not delegitimize the organization for a vast majority of states—in particular, it merely led to a bolder stance from China. Thus, in order to limit the influence of China and Russia, Germany, European countries and Western countries in general need to engage more strongly in these organizations despite all their flaws and biases.

Stronger engagement should also be understood in financial terms. China and Russia may not be adequate contributors to some of the Geneva-based organizations, but especially China’s contributions have been increasing. If, on the other hand, Western countries decide to decrease their contributions, it will not only further damage the ability of these organizations to fulfill their mandate, but also make them more vulnerable to authoritarian influence. The EU’s and particularly Germany’s increasing financial engagement and push for an increase in assessed contributions (thus increasing the organizations political independence), as set out in the Franco-German WHO reform paper in August 2020, are a step in the right direction. The recent reductions in the UK’s contributions is a more worrying sign, as the UK is one of the pillar countries in various policy fields of the UN.

Increased financial engagement does not mean turning a blind eye to flaws inside these organizations. What would be needed instead is a “tough love” approach, assuring political and financial engagement but coupled with a stronger push for reform. In this context it will be important to agree on common proposals: there are numerous initiatives to reform the WHO, for example, but the push for reform will have a better chance of success if like-minded countries achieve a consensus on a common proposal.

Initiatives such as the “Alliance for Multilateralism” (initiated by France and Germany) or a future “Alliance of Democracies” (as suggested by US president Joe Biden) can help in this endeavor if they succeed at rallying like-minded countries and complement these forums, or are drivers of reform in these UN organizations. In order to fulfill higher ambitions (joint general statements), these initiatives would need to have a clear set of criteria as to who can be a member (and who cannot) and develop a common vision on rules and values of multilateral cooperation in the future.

Viable multilateral bodies and initiatives that are capable of delivering may also help to counterbalance attempts by Russia’s and China’s preference for bilateral support, which creates not only economic but also political dependencies.

4.2 A More Strategic Personnel Policy

As some painful examples of the past several years have demonstrated, Europe and the West as a whole will need to act more quickly, be more strategic and coordinate better when it comes to personnel policies. There should be a clearer joint strategy, not only among the EU countries, but also with key like-minded allies such as the UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Ukraine, New Zealand and the US on which positions are considered of key importance. More importantly, alliance building with other groups (such as the African Group, countries from Latin America and Southeast Asia) is crucial in order to avoid key positions in which norms are shaped to be held by representatives of states, such as Russia or China, that aim to redefine policy and discourse the way they do. The successful rallying of like-minded allies (including but not limited to Western countries) in the campaign in the context of the WIPO Secretary General election in 2020 should serve as a positive example. The next challenge will be the elections at the ITU in which a candidate from the US has entered the race against a candidate from Russia. Aside from the top positions, it will be important to facilitate and encourage one’s own diplomatic staff to acquire positions in international organizations. It might also be important to consider a change in deployment policy for the permanent missions, favoring staff who have already acquired relevant previous experience in multilateral or regional forums.

4.3 Building Alliances

Given that most organizations are based on “one country—one vote” logic, it is crucial to forge alliances even beyond one’s own comfort zone or like-minded group. Neither the authoritarian alliance nor like-minded Western countries have—on their own—a majority in multilateral organizations. This is particularly true of the African Group, which on many questions is remarkably well-coordinated, is often pivotal in order to create majorities or at least increase pressure on blocking countries. Intensifying outreach toward the African Group, or other relatively like-minded countries from Asia or Latin America, can play a crucial role in containing the influence of authoritarian actors. This will, however, also mean compromising on some long-held positions. These compromises will at times be hurtful, but winning the “neutral middle” will be crucial in order to not push them into the arms of Russia and China. Even thorny issues such as discussions on agriculture or controversial global health questions should not be taboo in this context, as that would prevent China or Russia from styling themselves as the defender of the developing countries. While a sizable number of African countries supported the suspension of Russia from the UNHRC, one should not take this support for granted. The reproach by some African diplomats that Western countries are applying double standards should not be taken lightly.

4.4 Leading by Example

Personnel policies and building alliances are important pillars, but the most important issue will be to not only talk the talk, but also walk the walk in the respective institutions. Supporting initiatives to address the global public good, such as the COVAX initiative, humanitarian initiatives, but also practical steps to increase the ability of developing countries to participate in global trade, will be important to (re-)gain credibility and in many cases support. Russia and China—as could be seen in the framework of the last UN Human Rights Council—like to cite the West’s own shortcomings and limited solidarity, whether that means referring to racist incidents in the United States or alleged serious human rights violations against the indigenous people in Canada¹⁵: While many if not most of these accusations can and should be seen as (sometimes rather vulgar) attempts of “whataboutism,” this does not mean that the West should not try to abide by the highest standards and cooperate with the various representatives and instruments of the UN Human Rights Council as closely as possible.

If the West is not united and misses the opportunity to strategically construct alliances beyond the “usual allies,” the effects of Chinese-Russian cooperation in multilateral forums will increase and may over the long-term change the paradigms of multilateralism. Aside from this normative shift, this would seriously affect the core interests of Germany, the EU and the West as a whole.