Epilogue

Abstract

This final chapter discusses the different strategies adopted by Mughals, English and Jesuits. It highlights that, although from different starting points, all three passed through similar learning processes which sought to identify shared interests or manipulate their political culture. It also argues that the problems between Mughals and firangis were not the result of a clash between dissimilar cultural worlds, but from the frustrated expectations caused by the negotiation processes.

Writing some good two centuries after the events between 1580 and 1615, Nawab Muhabbat Khan, the author of the Akhbar-i Muhabbat, described relations between Mughals and firangis as extremely troubled. During the Akbari reign, the enforcement of the Portuguese cartaz system encouraged the perception that it was ‘beneath the royal dignity to enter into treaties with the Firingis’.¹ There were, however, some Mughal luminaries such as Abdur Rahim Khan‑I Khanan who dealt with the Estado da Índia to safeguard their shipping and commercial ventures.² The arrival of the EIC and other Europeans added a new, troubling element. Alluding to the events of 1612–1615, Nawab Muhabbat Khan described the conflict between the Portuguese and the English as one episode within a series of disturbing events among the firangis that required the mediation of the Mughal emperor:

When the Emperor Nuru-d din Muhammad Jahangir ascended the throne of Delhi, there existed great discord and animosity between the Christians of Portugal, France, etc. Thirsting after the blood of each other, they read together the same evil book of hatred and malice. Contrary to the manner in which they had been treated, the Emperor granted the English a spot in Surat for the erection of a factory. This was the first settlement which the English made on the coasts of India. Before this, they also occasionally brought their cargoes to the ports of Hindustan, and having sold them there, returned to their native country. Afterwards, they also began to establish their factories at different places in the Dakhin and Bengal.³

While noting that the events of 1612–1615 were a crucial moment for the English presence, the rhetoric of the Akhbar-i Muhabbat follows the model of other Mughal works that exalted the imperial authority and universal rule of the padshah. Indeed, Jahangir’s intervention in the conflicts between the troublesome firangis could be read as an illuminating example of successful efforts in sociopolitical stability and economic prosperity achieved by the Mughal polity across its different territories. Nawab Muhabbat Khan’s overview of the dealings between Mughals and firangis also reveals a process of learning about how to deal with the European powers, from an apparent posture of hostility and distrust towards the Estado da Índia to the receptiveness to stimulate the presence of European traders. There was, indeed, a difference from the ostensibly hostile stances of men at such as Qulij Khan or Qutb al-Din Muhammad Khan towards the Estado da Índia, and the readiness to forge partnerships with the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch demonstrated by Muqarrab Khan and Asaf Khan. These different approaches also reflect a generational change triggered by a combination of factors such as the religious policies of Akbar, the transformations in the composition of the Mughal elites and the increasing interest of the imperial family and other luminaries in overseas trade. The case of Muqarrab Khan’s metamorphosis into Dom João de Távora is, perhaps, revealing of the ways in which after almost three decades of Luso-Mughal exchanges, a high-ranking member of the Mughal imperial apparatus was able to identify the symbiosis between Catholicism and the Iberian Crowns and manipulate it to enhance his personal agenda.

English and Jesuits also passed through a similar learning process, although from different starting points. The Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean began in 1498. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Estado da Índia not only became a part of the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean, but was continuously exposed to the Indo-Persian political culture and familiarised with the functioning of South Asian trade.⁴ The EIC, however, was a newcomer. The lack of detailed knowledge in England about the commercial and political realities of the subcontinent meant that the EIC dealings with the Great Mughal required not only learning about his empire, but also the wider geopolitical reality in which the company would operate. The zeal and curiosity with which William Finch, William Hawkins and Thomas Kerridge annotated their journals regarding the troubled relations between Jahangir and the Deccani sultanates is an illuminating example of the efforts made by the EIC employees to understand the geopolitical realities of South Asia.

Both Jesuits and English scrutinised the functioning of the Mughal court and its political culture, identifying a common denominator between the firangi and the Mughal polities. Like their Iberian and English counterparts, the Mughals were a dynastical polity organised along similar lines to the European monarchies, with a courtly apparatus and a complex administrative machinery. Indeed, as the accounts written by Montserrat, Xavier and Hawkins suggest, the problems between Mughals and firangis did not derive from a clash between dissimilar or incompatible political cultures, but from the frustrated expectations caused by the negotiation process. The Portuguese and English not only sought to impose their own terms in the negotiations with a far superior power, but also expected to obtain immediate and definitive agreements. However, as Jos Gommans noted in his studies on Mughal wafare, the ‘Mughal policy was usually aimed not at destroying but at incorporating the enemy, preferably by means of endless rounds of negotiations’.⁵ This strategic principle was also present in the Mughal diplomatic approach. Akbar and Jahangir preferred to maintain permanent negotiations with the Estado da Índia and the EIC, rather than establishing conclusive agreements regarding the Portuguese cartaz system or the concession of trading privileges to English merchants. This strategy allowed a considerable degree of flexibility, which made it possible for the Mughal authorities to adjust to changing geopolitical circumstances. There was also an intention to prolong the presence of foreign diplomats both as a demonstration of Mughal universal rule, insinuating the subordination of foreign polities,⁶ as well as an intention to convert the delegates of foreign rulers into representatives of Mughal interests, acting as de facto double agents.⁷ This intention is patent Jahangir’s decision to grant a mansabdar to William Hawkins, transforming the EIC emissary into a member of the Mughal nobility.

The Jesuits, who were also integrated into the Mughal courtly apparatus as clergymen and scholars, besides their role as informal diplomatic agents of the Estado da Índia, developed their own strategies of ‘Mughalisation’ to secure their place in the Mughal social and political structures. This entailed constant negotiation with local agents, which involved the performance of different functions that suited the interests of myriad actors, who had capacity to enhance the status and agency of the missionaries. In these negotiations, the Jesuits were inevitably in a position of inferiority as supplicants who asked for protection and patronage. While this strategy, as the cases of Manuel Pinheiro and Jerónimo de Azevedo reveal, facilitated the role of the padres as privileged mediators between the Estado and the Great Mughal, it also raised some doubts about the ability of the missionaries to objectively analyse Mughal démarches. Viceroys such as Francisco da Gama and Jerónimo de Azevedo often demonstrated their scepticism regarding the Jesuit views on the Mogor, believing that the missionaries’ usual positive perception of Mughal attitudes towards the Estado was heavily influenced by their personal ties and dependence on the emperor and other relevant figures of the Mughal imperial apparatus.

This proximity was also noted by the EIC men. The alarming reports of William Hawkins or Thomas Kerridge on the gestures of Mughal generosity towards the missionaries contributed to a perception of an extraordinary Jesuit ability to influence the Mughal emperor and other senior figures. Although missionaries such as Jerónimo Xavier and Manuel Pinheiro knew how to navigate the intricate inner world of Mughal politics, the Jesuits perceived their position as one of immense fragility and dependence, not only on the emperor’s goodwill, but on the vacillations of Luso-Mughal exchanges, as the events of 1613–1615 revealed.

‘Mughalisation’ also raised some suspicions among the EIC men. The transformation of William Hawkins into an English Chan and his gradual adoption of an Indo-Persian habitus raised questions concerning his allegiances and identity as an Englishman. Hawkins’ failed exploits, and the subsequent debacles of the embassies headed by Paul Canning and William Edwards, seemed also to have generated a perception of the alleged unsuitability of ‘mechannick fellowes’ to perform diplomatic tasks and ensure an adequate representation of the English polity and project political authority. This debate echoed the theoretical and juridical discussions surrounding the office of the ambassador as a representation of sovereignty, ideally performed by virtuous individuals whose physical traits, intellect, aristocratic background and moral integrity reflected and enhanced the reputation of a prince.⁸ However, as the cases of Hawkins and Edwards reveal, the debate was also stimulated by the growing fear of the risk of allowing merchants to use diplomacy as an instrument of social mobility by exploring the opportunities offered by the Mughal court to obtain financial and symbolic rewards.⁹ In other words, the EIC feared that its merchant envoys would superimpose their personal interests over the company’s goals. The decision to send a royal embassy headed by a member of the Jacobean court such as Thomas Roe sought thus to ensure a diplomatic representation performed by someone committed to English foreign and commercial policies. After Roe’s embassy, the EIC preferred to use local and provincial mechanisms of lobbying and political petition used by Mughal subjects, acting often as an interest group fully integrated into the Mughal imperial system.¹⁰