Infrastructure development is a critical driver of any economy. In a developing country such as Nigeria, it is central to the improvement of national development, especially roads and bridges that expand networks, reduce transportation bottlenecks, enable investment opportunities and connect (ethnic) communities. This chapter presents two major bridge projects. The first is the Second Niger Bridge, started under President Jonathan in 2013 and with a completion date of 2017, which, at the time of writing (2021), is still only 17% complete, with more than a billion dollars having been spent on it. The second is the Third Mainland Bridge, started in 1977 under the civilian Shagari government and sitting as fragments after he was ousted in 1983, which was finally completed under President Babangida (the last military president) in 1990, at a cost of $1.1B, and is currently a major traffic artery carrying a million vehicles per day.

7.1 The Second Niger Bridge: A Stalled Project

7.1.1 Project Initiation

The Second Niger Bridge was conceived to widen traffic capacity in addition to the old First Niger Bridge at Onitsha (which had been built in 1965 and caused structural stability concerns because of excessive loads). The Second Niger Bridge was first proposed by the Shagari government at the end of the 1970s as a critical link to the communities in the South-East and South-South of Nigeria. But the project was never materially pursued until, before his election, President Goodluck Jonathan announced (to general applause) his intention to finally build the bridge; indeed, he promised at an Onitsha town hall meeting on 30 August 2012 that “he would go into exile if he did not deliver on the project by 2015” (Wikipedia, 2020).

The Jonathan Administration committed $850K to the planning and design of the bridge, but it took until 2015 for work on the project to begin. The project was announced as a public–private partnership (PPP) involving a consortium between Julius Berger and the motorways investment company of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA), based on a design, finance, build, operate and transfer (DFBOT) model that would cost US$653M, with the federal government contributing US$150M, while the consortium would raise the rest of the funds. The government established a “Presidential Infrastructure Development Fund (PIDF)”, from which it would finance the project (Olisah , 2020).

President Jonathan explained this as follows. “We designed a funding model bringing in the private sector, arranging with Julius Berger. And we set up a sovereign wealth fund. With the sovereign wealth fund, we could fund projects with government budgeting and in collaboration with Julius Berger. It was a tripartite arrangement, so the funding was through the public–private partnership (PPP), with seed loans from the sovereign wealth fund. The first money that we used was from the sovereign national wealth fund for that project.”

However, the language that was used publicly about the PPP was slightly misleading. What President Jonathan meant by a “PPP model” was a tripartite arrangement of collaboration between the government, the private sector and the contractor (on the financial model) to deliver the project. It was not the case that the contractor would ever fund the project or run it upon completion. There was no financial plan in place beyond an intention that the private sector would bring in the funds, and the contractor was meant to work with this assumption and start the project. In the meantime, the government went to the sovereign wealth fund and pulled out $150M (and more later). The hope was that this would inspire the private sector to invest and the contractor to bring equipment to the project site and commence work. President Jonathan’s words were, “We designed a funding model bringing in the private sector, arranging with Julius Berger …,” but this meant getting the contractor started using the money from the sovereign wealth fund. Indeed, it was not that the government had the funds to complete the project, but rather that the private sector would soon come to fund the project.

President Jonathan stood for re-election in 2015 but was unsuccessful, being beaten by President Muhammadu Buhari (who had been a military government president in the 1980s). The Buhari Administration cancelled the contract in August 2015 (Jide, 2015). This was when the real trouble started. Again, President Jonathan commented: “Unfortunately, I laid the foundation stone very close to the election period. People were complaining, but we did not care. (…) The financial model for the Second Niger Bridge was very good, but political reasons got in the way. We play politics with everything in Africa. I am saying this to impress it upon you. In this country, we face a severe issue of successive government continuity with good projects.”

The project was expected to be completed in 2017. The bridge construction work stopped for 31 months, and the project has not moved beyond 17% of construction (although the completion status is a matter of opinion, as we will see below, see Fig. 7.1). It has already cost the Nigerian government more than a billion dollars.

Fig. 7.1
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The Second Niger Bridge at 17% completion in 2021

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7.1.2 Contract Disputes and Recontracting

There was some public discussion about who the bridge would benefit most among the three regions the bridge would connect. Public commentary stressed, “The Second Niger Bridge is not an Igbo Bridge. The South-East cannot claim ownership of the bridge more than Delta and Edo States.” However, this somewhat tense public discussion did not result in a loss of public support for the project; on the contrary, as the project stalled, representatives from all three regions called for its continuation.

The Buhari Administration (at least publicly) supported the project, prompting comments in the press: “But interestingly, this vision has been sustained by the Buhari government” (Business Day , 2020). However, the public terminology of a PPP consortium was stopped. Indeed, the PPP structure was accused of “failing to perform” (Vanguard , 2020), and the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) expressed concerns about the cost of the project, the toll fees to be charged under the public–private partnership (PPP) and the design, build, finance, operate and transfer (DBFOT) model. Moreover, it cited issues relating to the compensation to be paid to the host communities located along the proposed bridge.

The government redefined the project as government-owned and funded. Its spokespersons commented: “The government is now funding the project. The PPP model wasn’t working, and that was why construction work on the project stalled for a while. So, in order to make progress, the government decided to take it up, as well as [to] make budgetary provision for it (…). The era of PPP is over and it is fully funded by the government this time.” In answer to the question about whether the government had the funds to continue with the project, the controller said, “Of course, the government has the funds. Why are you afraid about whether government has the funds or not? The federal government has decided to fund the bridge and we are happy to see that” (Okechukwu , 2018).

Interestingly (and supporting our interpretation that it was not the contractor who failed to deliver), the project was awarded to the same contractor, namely Julius Berger Nigeria, which had also (successfully) built the Third Mainland Bridge. The difference was that a local contractor was added to the main contractor, Reynolds Construction Company (RCC; the contractor who had won the contract for the abandoned library project), replacing NSIA, which had been part of the original consortium. The contract sum was $541M (N206B) (NAN, 2020a).

7.1.3 Continued Stalling

Even after being rewarded the contract, Julius Berger left the site because of a lack of funding from the federal government. The press commented: “A cross-section of citizens has cautioned that the appropriate thing should be done by expeditiously releasing funds and not starving the project of funds to make it a reality” (Amaize et al., 2018). A parliamentary committee expressed concerns about the “slow pace of work, [and that] there is no way that President Buhari will commission the Second Niger Bridge during his tenure”. However, the committee blamed the contractor for “showing its unfit and unprofessional behavior in the way it has handled these projects”; it also accused Julius Berger of irregularities in securing the contract—that there was no due procurement process (NAN 18 July 2020a).

The Buhari Administration continued to pay lip service to the project, and the president visited the site multiple times. After talk of the work being 33% complete, in October 2020 President Buhari said that “the Second Niger Bridge has attained a 46% completion status” (NAN 8 October 2020b); in addition, Mr Fashola, the Minister of Works and Housing, said on television that the government had committed to completing the bridge by the first quarter of 2022.

However, the authors observe that little progress has been made at the time of writing (early 2021; see Fig. 7.2); indeed, concern is being publicly expressed that the bridge will not be completed even after Buhari’s second term (Vanguard , 2020). Moreover, the government budget simply has no room for the large mobilization of funds that would be necessary to go from a 46% completion status to full completion: the Nigerian government’s total capital project budget for 2021 is insufficient to complete the project by 2022. Nigeria’s application for funding of other projects, such as the Electricity Transmission Network and Infrastructure, at $486M, is still pending at the World Bank . Another application to the World Bank by the Buhari Administration in the amount of $1.5B, to finance recurrent expenditure for the 2020 budget, is being given slow consideration but is subject to reform by the Nigerian government. Thus, it is not clear where the financing for the bridge will come from, and we must therefore conclude that the aforementioned hopeful announcements represent political statements rather than being based in truth.

Fig. 7.2
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Second Niger Bridge work in process in 2021

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7.1.4 Diagnosis of the Reasons for Failure, in the Words of (Former) President Jonathan

President Jonathan was accused of not being serious in his intentions: “In 2015, Jonathan used the project as a campaign tool, assuring Nigerians that while the old Azikiwe (Nnamdi) built the First Niger Bridge, the young Azikiwe (himself) would build the second. Unfortunately, Jonathan did not win the election for his second term” (Business Day , 2020).

The authors had the opportunity to interview President Jonathan and asked why the bridge project had not been completed on schedule and why the 31-month delay had not been prevented? At first, President Jonathan said that even though Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Coordinating Minister of the Economy and Minister of Finance, came from Anambra State (one of the states that the bridge would connect), this showcasing of the importance of the bridge to her and the people of Anambra State was not enough to get the project done. (The implication was that somehow this might have been her fault.) We probed further and uncovered the real issues, according to the president.

In his words, “I am telling you from the state level to the federal level there are people who initiate programmes and projects without funding. You want to gain some political points by telling people, ‘We are doing this for you. Mr President, Mr Governor, we are doing this for you.’ But if you go to the minister in charge of works or finance and say, please, how do you intend to fund this project, they will begin to tell you how Mr President thinks we should do the project and they have no choice. Nobody will show you the project’s financial plan, and these are significant reasons why major projects failed in this country” (Jimoh, 2021: 110).

Thus, the project again illustrates (as with the National Library in Abuja) the lack of financial plans for large government projects in Nigeria. The Second Niger Bridge lacked financial planning; it was merely initiated, in President Jonathan’s words, “You just want to gain some political points by telling people we are doing this for you.” Thus, from the outset, scheduled completion was not a priority. President Jonathan suggests that for project success in Nigeria, “You must have a financial model for payment, and if you want to borrow, you must have a repayment plan. When you don’t design a payment model, you may not execute that project. A president can wake up in the morning and award one project of, say, N3B [$8M]. Yet, once the president moves up to N35B [$90M] and above, this is where the financial model must come in or the project will fail” (Jimoh, 2021: 110).

7.1.5 Conclusion

This project had been long in the making and offered large benefits to the Nigerian nation, given the number of states that the bridge would connect. President Jonathan had a strong rationale for starting the project. However, the project became a political pawn: first, as an election play for him (used at the “last minute”) and then in the refusal by the Buhari Administration to continue the project (perhaps understandable in light of the missing financing, but in contrast to their lip service). The lack of continuity is already emerging as a continuous theme.

The second continuous theme is the lack of stable funding (which is also visible in the library projects). President Jonathan announced the set-up of a PPP consortium based on a sovereign wealth fund, which did not quite describe the financing situation or put in place a solid financing model that would enable the project to be completed. This construction was then dismantled by the Buhari Administration, and a lack of funding stability again caused work to stop.

Finally, when the project is fought over and undermined by its owners (the various government branches), first, the contractor is put in a difficult situation, being denied the stability of engagement that is necessary to make investments and to dedicate resources, and second, the contractor then faces hard-to-resist temptations to game the project, hide budgets and obtain profits by any means (which we again saw in the library projects, on the positive and negative sides).

The Buhari Administration says it is not interested in the PPP funding models used by some other countries. Could there be another political game going on with the bridge? Nonetheless, the contractor is not visibly moving the project forwards, and different parties claim different completion levels (as mentioned earlier). President Jonathan regretted the ongoing political game with the Second Niger Bridge, but it was a game of his own making.

7.2 The Third Mainland Bridge: A Completed Project

7.2.1 Introduction

Three main bridges connect the mainland to the island in Lagos State in Nigeria. They are the Eko, Carter and Mainland bridges. Of the three, the Third Mainland Bridge has the longest span, at 11.8 km (Fig. 7.3). The bridge connects both the Oworonshoki and Apapa-Oshodi Express Ways while running through to the Ibadan Express Road from Lagos. President Ibrahim Babangida’s Administration completed the construction of the bridge in 1990. For a long time, it was the longest bridge in Africa, carrying over a million vehicles per day.

Fig. 7.3
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The 11.8 km Third Mainland Bridge at Adekunle Junction

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7.2.2 Starting and Stalling

The project was commenced in 1977, under the military government of President Obasanjo, with a goal of completion in 1980. Obasanjo resigned in 1979 and handed power over (for the first time in Nigeria’s short history) to a civilian administration under Shehu Shagari. The project continued, and its first phase (5 km, ending at an exit at Ebute-Metta) was completed in 1980, but at this point the project stopped progressing.

The Shagari government was ousted by a coup in 1983, which led to another military government under General Buhari. The project stopped under the new administration. Widespread dissatisfaction with Buhari’s restrictive governance led to another coup, after which General Ibrahim Babangida (who had also played an active role in the coup of 1983) became the new president in 1985 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020). In 1986 President Babangida announced that he would return power to a civilian government in 1990, a transition that finally took place in 1993 after some complications (such as an attempted coup by a Muslim Major from the North in 1990 and the relocation of the country’s capital from Lagos to Abuja, in the centre of the country in 1991). The handover of power was complicated, as Babangida annulled the elections; finally, under pressure, he handed power over to a civilian interim government under the businessman Ernest Shonekan. In the midst of these tumultuous events, President Babangida picked up the Third Mainland Bridge project again and led it to completion by 1990.

7.2.3 Restarting the Project Under President Babangida

The authors had the chance to interview (former) President Babangida in early 2020, who explained the reason behind his decision to finish the bridge and what influenced him. We cross-checked this for accuracy with some of the senior government officials (the project owner) and the contractor involved in the project (Jimoh, 2021: 112):

I will tell you a story. In 1982–1983 I was watching the show 48 Hours on American television. They said in the programme that Nigeria was a country of riches, and I watched that programme to the end. I think Okonjo Iweala, or someone, talked about projects in Africa and Nigeria called “White Elephant Projects”. So, they went on the bridge and said this is one of the classic examples of building fantasy projects and showed the bridge that ended in the middle of the water. That stayed with me, even when I came into office, and I always had it on my mind.

Then, in 1983, the Shagari government was toppled, and unfortunately he did not have enough time, so he could not have done anything about the bridge at that time. So, when we came in, it came back to me that there was a challenge that I had no option other than to face. We had to do something about it to prove the cynics wrong, a challenge that we must tackle with determination to prove to some people that Nigeria could solve problems.

Now, I had a very talented young man who was the military governor of Lagos. I also had a lot of talented engineers. So, I told the governor, we need to talk about the bridge, and I asked, is it doable? Can we do it now? He said, yes, we can do it. So, I told him you should get the people who have worked on such projects before, such as Julius Berger Company or Melafi Mark Anthony Construction Company. He went out to mobilize the contractors. The contractor worked out the job with its engineers, and they found out that the job could be executed.

I called the contractors and told them: “Look, I want this bridge to become a reality.” I told them, “I am not interested in the technical details, because I am not a technical man, but get me this bridge, and I assure you, we will be able to pay the money.” I also got them to make a promise: “I will come back here on my birthday, promise me, give me this as my birthday present.” And the contractors promised me they would provide me with the project. And that went well.

Thus, this project had an owner who knew what he wanted, and a professional contractor handled the bridge. However, other principles of megaproject management were not followed—there was no contract bid for a mega project of this nature, as is normally the case, no stakeholder engagement and no proper government monitoring department. President Ibrahim Babangida was not interested in detail—the contract was awarded for $1B (finally running to £1.1B), and we do not know how the computation was done. The contract sum was higher than what many people considered appropriate for the remaining work, and some stakeholders made a case of alleged corruption. We asked President Babangida whether corruption was an element in the project (as some had claimed). He confirmed, “Yes. People could think that since the amount involved is enormous at one billion dollars.”

The design was what the contractor deemed suitable for the bridge. And, as “God will have it”, the project was completed on time; at least, as the president said, “Give me this as my birthday present.” The project emerged from the president’s desk. There was no approval process beyond President Babangida.

7.2.4 Project Execution and Outcome

Some stakeholders argued that President Babangida knew what he wanted from the bridge even before he became president. He did not hide his intention to complete a bridge; it was not a “White Elephant Project” that ended in the middle of the water.

The project file confirms the involvement of the Federal Ministry of Works, and some of the ministry officials participated in the survey that was conducted. Still, the ministry could do little to influence the contractor’s interest because of the fear of the military government. For instance, nothing could be done in terms of contract negotiation. The project owner’s quality of representation was not particularly strong in the field, beyond the military president’s office, and the president confirmed that he had “a lot of talented engineers”. Ministry officials beyond the president’s office played a very weak oversight role. The contractor was having a field day in every respect (on due process in contractor selection, see Von Branconi and Loch, 2004; Olatunji, 2008).

During the contract execution stage, the subcontractor arrangement (by the main contractor) seemed effective, as was the management of the supply chain, and there was clarity of problem-escalation procedures. One example of this occurred when the bridge was to be extended to Yaba/Oyingo and the contractor felt this was not part of the project. The supervising ministry staff and the minister of works brought this to the president’s attention, and the section was ultimately included. The Army also protected the military government on a daily basis. All other stakeholders were powerless and could not mount any reasonable engagement in the project’s life cycle for fear of the military.

In the end, there is clear evidence that a quality global standard project was delivered on schedule and with little cost overrun. The bridge is an economic success. There is, however, criticism—some stakeholders cite Lagos State’s masterplan, which renders the nation-building role of the Third Mainland Bridge dependent on the completion of the Fourth Mainland Bridge, which it was promised would be built by President Babangida but which was not tackled during the eight years he was in office.

7.2.5 Conclusion

This case is representative of the approach of “heroic leadership” of powerful decision-makers (in many cases, the presidents themselves) who tried to accomplish significant improvements for their country (which, in this case, worked) but neglected their own limitations (in knowledge and decision-making) and the impacts of their “lonely” (personal with little consultation) decisions on continuity.

The “rescue” of the Third Mainland Bridge is one case of a dominant leader getting his way, cajoling the project contractor to deliver project management with effective collaboration—with a generous price and the application of power later on to deliver. It is not that there is weak leadership of mega projects in Nigeria; on the contrary, there are “Über-Leaders”, who fill an institutional vacuum with “lonely” (and sometimes wise but sometimes ill-informed) decisions.

The anecdote of President Babangida and the Third Mainland Bridge shows both the strengths and weaknesses of a project management system with weak institutions—powerful leaders (who often had good intentions!) could move mountains and accomplish things. The lack of continuity meant that the project was initially in a bad state, but Babangida was able to overcome this discontinuity and finish the project within his term.

On the other hand, leaders do not always get it right and they make mistakes. Babangida picked up on the Third Mainland Bridge by accident, quite “randomly”. What if he had not watched the critical television show? Would the project have continued to languish? Or, might he have discovered a different languishing project that was even more important than the Third Mainland Bridge? As successful as this project rescue was, was it the right project to choose? The complexity of the economic benefits of multiple large government projects is too great for leaders acting on a whim to choose the right priorities, regardless of how powerful they are. Even if they are able to push their choices through, this does not mean they are the best choices for the nation that they are trying to build.